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		<title>What I Learned About Investing from Darwin</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/05/31/what-i-learned-about-investing-from-darwin/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=what-i-learned-about-investing-from-darwin</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 May 2023 10:17:54 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>by Pulak Prasad, 2023 (330 p.) This was a fantastic book and the reviews on Amazon (of which there are already 78 after about one week since publication) are almost all extremely...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/05/31/what-i-learned-about-investing-from-darwin/">What I Learned About Investing from Darwin</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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									<p><u>by Pulak Prasad, 2023 (330 p.)</u></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">This was a fantastic book and the reviews on Amazon (of which there are already 78 after about one week since publication) are almost all extremely positive, with 90% giving the book a 5-star rating.  One reviewer writes: “When an investor delivers a return of 20%+pa (after fees) over 15 years, outperforming his index by 11%, you better listen.”  Another writes only that “it’s amazing, just buy it and study with pencil.” Yet another writes that Prasad’s book is an “exceptional work that seamlessly merges the realms of biology and finance.”  I second all these assessments and rate this book a must read not only for investors, but also evolutionary biology enthusiasts, philosophers, politicians, military strategists, and regulators.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Prasad is candid and comes across as humble and transparent, yet brilliant and deeply knowledgeable on investing and biology. As he claims in the beginning of the book: “I will not begrudge you for questioning my authority to speak on matters of evolution when I do not have a degree in evolutionary theory. My defense is the same as the one given by Mary Jane West-Eberhard in her stunningly original book <em>Development Plasticity and Evolution</em>: I can read.”  Indeed Prasad cites many notable scientists, books, and research papers. He also displays an impressive ability to explain complex theories while drawing precious parallels to the art of investing. Being a fan and devout believer in his approach, <u>this book ranks among the best I have ever read.</u></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">On <a href="https://www.pulakprasad.com/author-bio/">his website</a>, Prasad establishes his credibility as a brilliant investor and shows that his simple approach has worked for decades. He grew up in India and went to seven different schools in his first twelve years of study, as his father was in the armed forces and was transferred to new locations every couple of years. He is gifted with a sense for numbers and thought he could be an engineer. Like Google’s Sundar Pichai, he earned an engineering degree from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), which is one of the world’s most prestigious technical universities. He got his first job in Unilever India, where he did not enjoy the work, so he left to pursue an MBA at the Indian Institute of Management.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">At 54, Pulak Prasad is four years older than Sundar Pichai, but he landed a job at McKinsey &amp; Company in 1992, which was 10 years before Pichai, and at the age of just 23. But while Pichai came to the U.S. to earn a Masters degree from Stanford and an MBA from Wharton before joining McKinsey, Prasad remained in India. Like several notable investors before him, Prasad left McKinsey to become an investor. He spent eight years at Warburg Pincus, four of which were as the co-head of India. He then left Warburg in 2007 to start Nalanda Capital, which focuses exclusively on listed Indian securities. Despite a rough start where he drew down over 50% of his investor’s capital during the bear market of 2008, Nalanda today manages about $5 billion, primarily for US and European institutions.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Apart from investing, and common to other great investors, Prasad has a passion for reading. For reasons not clear even to him, he became interested in Darwinian theory of evolution about a decade ago, when he started devouring books on the topic. Encouraged by readers of his investor quarterly letters, he decided to write this book on the parallels between evolutionary theory and investing. I had never heard of Prasad before, but after reading this book I became a big fan!</p><p style="text-align: center;"><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-8533 size-full" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/image001.jpg" alt="" width="215" height="191" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/image001.jpg 215w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/image001-150x133.jpg 150w" sizes="(max-width: 215px) 100vw, 215px" />Pulak Prasad (54)</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">While I thoroughly enjoyed Prasad’s book and am in awe with his knowledge and writing skills, I took issue with one key contradiction in his philosophy: the insistence on low P/E ratios in order to buy an outstanding company, even though his objective is to hold them over the very long term. I passionately agree with most of what Prasad espouses, which I share in my extensive highlights and notes below, but it would be disingenuous of me to let this key disagreement go unmentioned. Prasad is well aware and transparent about the contradiction in wanting to own outstanding businesses “forever,” while only buying them when they are cheap. He does not proclaim that this is the only, nor necessarily the best way to do it, but that it is his way and he plans to stick with it. In the concluding chapter he writes: “We have a straightforward rule that is also easy to implement: Buy when the price is right.” But then he admits that “We have no way of figuring out the right price. Maybe some folks do. Good for them.”</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Towards the end of the book Prasad gives an example of what he means by <em>right price</em>. “Let’s say we have valued a business at $100 per share. If the stock falls to $100 and our business assessment remains unchanged, we buy as much of the business as we can at or below $100.” My question is this: If he is so focused on owning outstanding companies forever, then why is some arbitrary near-term entry price so important? And why isn’t he a seller when the valuation is high? He summarizes his pushback against these common questions with two statements and one question: <em>A great business usually surprises to the upside</em>; <em>valuation multiples generally don’t stay benign for great businesses</em>; and <em>why should valuation be limited to only the next five or ten years</em>?</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Prasad is willing to hold onto businesses when they are trading at what others might consider egregious multiples, and he gives the example of holding onto stocks with trailing P/E multiples of 60x. But on the way in, he insists on buying his “forever” holdings at mid-teens trailing P/E multiples, that were, on average, at a discount to the Indian market valuations. How does he do this? He claims that he is willing to wait for the right time, which is basically when markets are crashing or when his “forever” companies are having serious short term problems, and that he is willing to wait for decades if that is what it takes.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">I have several issues with his buy discipline, even though I respect it and admit that it has worked for him. The first is with the contention of holding “forever,” since even the most outstanding companies do not remain outstanding forever, just like trees don’t grow to the sky. I get it, and agree, that a small group of elite companies tend to distance themselves from the rest due to advantages that persist over the long term. <em>Peter Thiel</em> calls it <em>exponential dominance</em> in his book <em>Zero to One</em> (2014). This is a key thesis behind our investment approach at <em>Victori Capital</em>, and it was elegantly proposed by <em>Vilfredo Pareto</em> in the late 1800s. It applies not only to species and companies, but also to countries, pea-pods, and wealth accumulation generally. Pareto was not the first to observe this phenomenon. The Bible has a famous quote in <em>The Gospel</em> of <em>Matthew </em>(25:29): “For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath.” In other words, the richer tend to get richer, and the poor tend to stay poor.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Matthew’s principle is why it makes sense, as an investor, to own for the long term, not only the best businesses, but the ones that have remained formidable for a long time and stand a good chance of getting even more formidable into the distant future. As I mentioned, Prasad does not disagree with this, but by demanding a low trailing P/E on the way in, he shuts the door on owning most of the very best businesses. And by not letting the very best businesses enter and remain in his portfolio, he incurs a huge opportunity cost that works against his ability to compound value with lower risk, which is his stated objective. What if that stock he thinks is worth $100 never gets even near $100, but instead compounds at 20% for 20 years, thereby going up 32-fold? With his inflexible and dogmatic P/E-based buying rule, he will most certainly miss these stocks, and as he admits, there are not a lot of them out there to be caught.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">But it doesn’t stop there. What if the market does crash, as it has over the centuries and most certainly will again at some point in the future, thereby giving Prasad the opportunity to load up on these “forever” companies he has been waiting years to buy below the arbitrary P/E multiple he requires? How can he back up the truck on these stocks if he is fully invested in a portfolio filled with high P/E stocks that have been appreciating for many years? He could of course deploy leverage, but debt is something he claims to avoid like the plague. He can also sell the expensive stocks to buy the cheap ones, but he refuses to do that, and doing it could impose a high capital gain tax liability on investors that are not tax-free institutions.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">These are conundrums that most fund managers face, and I felt like Prasad failed to properly address them – or at least he did not address them as well as Thomas Phelps did in <em>100 to 1 in the Stock Market</em> (1972), or Phil Fisher did in <em>Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits</em> (1958). These two incredible investors both espoused focusing on long-term returns from outstanding companies, while eschewing near-term valuation filters such as trailing P/E ratios. Prasad mentions Phil Fisher’s “scuttlebutt” approach to discerning strong signals from weak ones, but perhaps he should have also mentioned what Phil Fisher said about getting caught up on near term valuation measures. Charlie Munger, Chuck Akre, and Terry Smith (to name a few amazing investors) have argued the same thing, which is that over the long term, the trailing P/E multiple at which and outstanding company trades is almost always irrelevant to what one receives in value. As usual, perhaps it was Warren Buffett who said it best: “Price is what you pay, value is what you get.”</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Of course I am not suggesting I believe in paying any price for a good story. I never have in my 25 year career paid egregious multiples for a theme stock, even though I have witnessed people do it successfully all around me. As has been confirmed empirically by evolutionary scientists over the ages, outstanding companies, like long-lived species,have common traits that converge over long stretches of time. Like Prasad, we look for these traits by studying the long histories of our candidates and their industries. But unlike Prasad, when we find them we buy them with the intention of holding them for as long as they remain outstanding, by our definition.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Prasad espouses laziness in investing, but investing does not reward the lazy. It takes a lot of work to find the most outstanding companies, but it takes even more work to ensure that they remain outstanding. Just saying we never sell seems simple and, indeed, somewhat lazy, and I certainly do not subscribe to it. To paraphrase Phelps, serious investing is not something you can do well in your spare time, especially not after dinner.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Above I wrote that I take issue with the word <em>forever</em>, because nothing lasts forever. What the Brazilian songwriter Vinicius de Moraes wrote about <em>love</em> also applies to stocks: “What I can say about love is that it is not immortal, but more like a flame that burns infinitely while it lasts.” My version of this concept has been written on our whiteboard since we started Victori in 2014: <em>Never fall in love with a stock, it will break your heart every time</em>. This simple rule also applies to markets, fund managers, and countries.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">For someone who invests exclusively in an emerging market and believes that investing mirrors evolution (which plays out over the very long term), Prasad should pay heed to what <em>Todd Petzel</em> points out in Chapter 2 of his excellent book, <em>Modern Portfolio Management</em> (2021): “The fact that the United States has managed to have a continuously trading stock market all during a period of relatively free capitalism and growing GDP does not guarantee that the next 200 years will be as kind. This is a common error in the study of financial markets. If the data shows that an event has not happened, it is too frequently inferred that it cannot happen. … Wars, revolutions, and hyperinflations have each destroyed entire asset markets. The investor that says, ‘Such things can&#8217;t happen to me,’ should instead say, ‘I suspect a complete wipeout is a small-probability event, but if it happens, how will I cope?’” The insurance company Mass Mutual captured it well in their famous tagline: <em>You can’t predict. You can prepare.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Nassim Taleb</em> argues a similar point in the prologue of <em>The Black Swan</em> (2007): “The sighting of the first black swan might have been an interesting surprise for a few ornithologists, but that is not where the significance of the story lies. It illustrates the severe limitation of our learning from observations or experience and the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a general statement derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans.” This is why using terms like <em>never selling</em> or <em>holding forever</em>, is so dangerous.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">In closing, Prasad has produced a masterpiece investment book that I would strongly recommend to anyone interested in investing and/or evolutionary biology. Regardless of your own view on when to buy or how to invest generally, there are many precious insights in this book that apply not only to investing but life in general. I feel indebted to Prasad for sharing all the knowledge he packed into this wonderful book, which I intend to read again and again as I evolve as a student of markets and practicing investor.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong> </strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS [My notes are bolded]</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If you explore the “evolution” section of any scientific journal (for example, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, available at </em><a href="http://www.pnas.org/"><em>www.pnas.org</em></a><em>), you will be dazzled by the range of research topics and the stunning advances being made by scientists. But the investment community? It doesn’t matter how you look at it—the data are ugly. Really ugly. And <u>it shows that we, the fund managers, are idiots</u>. According to a 2021 S&amp;P report on the U.S. equity market (called the SPIVA U.S. Scorecard), <u>across periods of five, ten, and twenty years, 75 to 90 percent of U.S. domestic funds underperformed the market</u>. Let that fact sink in before you read any further. About 75 to 90 percent of fund managers, most of whom have graduate degrees, including MBAs, from elite schools and manage trillions of dollars, fail to beat the market. If you are part of the financial services community, you may believe that it is easier to outperform the small-cap market benchmarks. Not true. The market outperformed about 93 percent of small-cap funds during the ten-year period from 2011 to 2021. That is bad enough, but the dismal news does not end there. <u>Not only are most U.S. funds underperforming, but they have also gotten worse over time. According to the same S&amp;P report, in 2009, over three-and five-year periods (ten- and twenty-year periods were not reported), “only” 55 to 60 percent of U.S. domestic funds had underperformed the market</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Who Am I? I am an equity fund manager. In 2007, I founded an investment firm called Nalanda Capital, which currently manages a little more than US $ 5 billion invested in listed Indian securities. <u>Nalanda’s investment philosophy can be summarized in ten words: We want to be permanent owners of high-quality businesses</u>. Let me repeat that: We want to be permanent owners. <u>We don’t invest unless we think we can own a business</u> <strong><u>forever</u></strong>. A bad business that is dirt cheap? Pass. A mediocre business at a low price? Thanks, but no thanks. <u>A high-quality business at a fair price? Give me more so I can</u> <strong><u>never</u> </strong><u>let go</u>. <u>We invest almost exclusively in businesses owned and run by entrepreneurs of which the entrepreneur is typically the largest shareholder, and we are usually the second largest</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Nalanda’s approach to investing comprises three straightforward, sequential steps: 1. Avoid big risks. 2. Buy high quality at a fair price. 3. Don’t be lazy—</u></em><em> <strong><u>be very lazy</u></strong>.</em><em> </em><em>This straightforward investment process has led to the following outcome. One rupee (INR 1) invested in Nalanda’s first fund at its inception in June 2007 would have been worth INR 13.8 in September 2022. The same amount invested in India’s Sensex (the country’s large- cap index) would have been worth INR 3.9, and if invested in the Midcap Index would have been worth only INR 4. <u>Over a little more than fifteen years, based on actual cash inflows and outflows, the annualized rupee return for this fund was 20.3 percent (after all our fees), and the fund beat both the Sensex and the Midcap Index by 10.9 percentage points. That is not a bad track record</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>This experience across industries, companies, and continents may qualify me to pontificate on the peculiarities of a pizza delivery business model</u></em><em>, but I will not begrudge you for questioning my authority to speak on matters of evolution when I do not have a degree in evolutionary theory. My defense is the same as the one given by Mary Jane West-Eberhard in her stunningly original book Development Plasticity and Evolution: I can read.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 2000, in response to a question about his favorite books, <u>Munger recommended The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins. I read the notes of this meeting in 2002 and decided to buy the book. My life hasn’t been the same since</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As mentioned, <u>most investors have a poor long- term track record. The implication of this is obvious: Most investment methods don’t work over the long run. Ours has. And so here I am, sharing my thoughts with you</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Just as scientists can’t agree on the definition of what constitutes a species or a gene, <u>investors have wildly different opinions on calculating something as simple as a business’s value</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I will argue that <u>learning the skill of not investing is harder and more important than learning how to invest</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Let me borrow from the field of statistics to describe them. The first kind— <u>dubbed a type I error</u></em><em> </em><em><u>1 by statisticians who can never be blamed for being creative— occurs when I make a bad investment because I erroneously think it is a good one<strong>. It is the error of committing self-harm</strong></u></em><em> <u>and is also called a false positive or error of commission</u>. <u>A type II error occurs when I reject a good investment because I erroneously think it is bad</u>. This is the error of rejecting a potential benefit and can be termed a false negative or <strong>error of omission</strong>. Every investor, including Warren Buffett, makes these two errors on a regular basis. They either harm themselves or walk away from a great opportunity. As any statistician will tell you, the risk of these two errors is inversely related.  <u>Minimizing the risk of a type I error typically increases the risk of a type II error, and minimizing the risk of a type II error increases the risk of a type I error</u>. Intuitively, this seems logical. Imagine an overly optimistic investor who sees an upside in almost every investment. This individual will make several type I errors by committing to bad investments but also will not miss out on the few good investments.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Back to Buffett’s two rules. Despite losing money occasionally, what is he asking us to do when he orders us not to lose any? Buffett has never explicitly explained this (at least I have never found an explanation), but this is what I think he means: Avoid big risks. <u>Don’t make type I errors. Don’t commit to an investment in which the probability of losing money is higher than the probability of making money</u>. <strong>Think about risk first, not return</strong>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We at Nalanda never bring stock price volatility into a risk discussion. <u>We define “risk” as the probability of capital loss</u>. The higher the probability of loss, the higher the risk. If my investment in Company A is likely to lose more money over my investment in Company B, I will deem Company A to be “riskier” than Company B irrespective of past or future volatility in their stock prices.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A Great Investor Is a Great Rejector</u></em><em>: </em><em>According to data from the World Bank, the United States had 4,400 listed companies in 2018. For simplicity, let’s assume a round 4,000. First, we need to decide how many of these are “good investments.” Let’s keep it simple and classify a “good investment” as one that will make us a decent return over the long run. It has a competent and honest management team, a modest growth rate, makes enough money, and has low leverage.</em><em> </em><em><u>Let’s assume that 25 percent of the listed universe comprises “good investments</u></em><em>.” If you talk to practitioners— that is, actual investors— you will not get a number too far from this percentage. In any event, the exact percentage is less significant, as we will see. Thus, we can say there are 1,000 good investments and 3,000 bad investments in the U.S. listed universe by this logic. Again, don’t get too pained about this strict dichotomy; it is serving a purpose that we will get to.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If he sees a good investment (i.e., one in which he will make money), he makes a favorable investment decision 80 percent of the time. Thus, his rates of type I and type II errors are both 20 percent. If this star investor makes an investment decision, what is the probability that it is a good investment? You’d say 80 percent, right? Wrong. The answer is 57 percent. But why? Isn’t he right 80 percent of the time? How can we go from 80 percent to 57 percent? Here is how. There are 1,000 good investments in the market, and since this investor makes a type II error 20 percent of the time (i.e., he mistakenly rejects 20 percent of these), he will select only 800 companies from his list. The market also has 3,000 bad investments, and since he makes type I errors 20 percent of the time (i.e., he mistakenly accepts 20 percent of these), he will mistakenly select 600 companies from this list, thinking that they are good investments. Thus, his universe of what he thinks are good investments will be 1,400 companies (800 + 600). Are you with me? Good. Now to the most interesting part. Of these 1,400 businesses that the investor thinks are good investments, how many do you think are good investments? Only 800. Hence, the probability of his making a good investment will be 800 ÷ 1,400 = 57 percent.</em><em>  </em><em><u>Let me repeat this statement, which is the bedrock of our philosophy and that of the rest of this book:</u></em><em> <strong><u>There are very few good investments in the market</u></strong>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Let’s say that our investor, <u>Investor A, decides to become better at rejecting bad investments and reduces his rate of type I errors from 20 percent to 10 percent</u>. Thus, from the 3,000 bad investments in the market, he will select only 300 businesses (10 percent × 3,000). As his type II error rate remains 20 percent, he will erroneously reject 200 of the 1,000 good investments, thereby selecting 800 investments. Thus, Investor A has selected 1,100 investments (300 + 800), but only 800 of these are good<u>. In this scenario, Investor A’s probability of selecting a good investment improves from 57 percent to 73 percent</u> (800 ÷ 1,100). I assume you will admit that this is quite a dramatic improvement in his success rate. Investor B, unlike Investor A, is more focused on not missing out on good opportunities. He chooses to reduce his rate of type II errors from 20 percent to 10 percent and keeps his rate of type I errors at 20 percent. Thus, of the 1,000 good investments, he will select 900 (90 percent × 1,000), and of the 3,000 bad investments, he will mistakenly assume that 600 are good (20 percent × 3,000). Thus, Investor B has selected 1,500 investments (600 + 900), but only 900 are good. Thus, Investor B’s probability of selecting a good business improves from 57 percent to 60 percent (900 ÷ 1,500). This is an improvement— but only by 3 percentage points. Good, but not great.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Guess what happens if another investor, Investor C, improves his rate of both type I and type II errors from 20 percent to 10 percent. I was flabbergasted when I first saw the answer: 75 percent. This is barely above the 73 percent achieved by Investor A, who was focused only on reducing type I errors. A dramatic improvement in performance comes only when the rate of type I errors— errors of making bad investments— is reduced. <u>Thus, whereas most investment books and college curricula focus on teaching how to make good investments, everyone would be better off by learning how not to make bad investments. An investment career is probably among the very few that rewards the skeptic more than the optimist. Buffett is the best investor in the world because he is the best rejector in the world</u>.</em><em> </em><strong>[AA Note:  While I understand that it is heresy to disagree with the statement that Buffett is the best investor in the world because he is the best rejector, I don’t agree.  He might be the best investor, but it is probably due to how cheap his cost of capital from insurance float is, how frequently it comes in, and permanent it is.  I also think that he benefits, more than most investors, from the Matthew Effect.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>There are myriad ways of learning life lessons— parents, siblings, one’s spouse, friends, books, movies, school, college, work, and leaders are a few sources that come to mind. I will never really know why I am what I am. But <u>I am reasonably confident of the identity of my primary teacher and guide in the area of investing— my own mistakes</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Most investors will keep making type I errors (making bad investments) throughout their careers. At least I have, and I will. It’s inevitable. <u>So when I say that we need to avoid type I errors, I am proposing that we try to avoid the avoidable type I error. By not taking on big risks. What is a big risk? It is not clear to me that a definition is possible or even desirable for a practitioner</u>. Instead of defining “big risk,” let me describe the kinds of situations we avoid at Nalanda.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Being Wary of Criminals, Crooks, and Cheats People don’t change</u></em><em>. Especially criminals, crooks, and cheats. As permanent owners, we at Nalanda have no interest in a business owned or run by someone who defrauds customers, suppliers, employees, or shareholders. When we come across such a person, we don’t ask if the business is cheap enough for the risk to be mitigated; we don’t ask if we could persuade this individual to change; we don’t ask if their crimes are trivial enough to ignore. We simply walk away.</em><em>  <u>W</u></em><em><u>e are highly vigilant and do not even start assessing the business fundamentals until we have convinced ourselves that the promoters have impeccable integrity</u></em><em>.</em><em> </em><em><u>We employ a two level process for this assessment</u></em><em>. <strong>We always hire a forensic diligence expert</strong> to assess if the owner or senior managers have a dubious past. During this period, <strong>we conduct our parallel diligence on the promoters and managers</strong> by scouring the media, studying past annual reports, listening to their conference call recordings, reading their interviews, and talking to people who have had personal and business dealings with them. In almost half the cases, we ask the external firm to further probe issues that have arisen during our diligence (for example, money leakage for large capex contracts or a cash payment to senior managers). This dual check provided by outsourcing and insourcing has prevented a lot of heartburn for us over the years. More importantly, it has saved a lot of money for our investors.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The fact remains that there are some well- known dodgy businesses in India whose stock prices have done reasonably well over the past few years. But we have never played this game and never will. Our philosophy of permanent ownership requires— demands— that we partner only with promoters of the highest integrity. And so that is what we do.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This is exactly what happens in the world of investing. Managements that have underperformed for long periods are able to convince investors to bet on their businesses with nothing but fancy promises and McKinsey reports. I blame neither managements nor McKinsey because optimism is not a crime. But I do get baffled at investors who, despite having access to data that amply demonstrate the incompetence of incumbent management, are willing to bet their clients’ money on the hope that this management will suddenly morph into an industry beater in the near future. <u>More often than not, the dream scenario hyped up by the management morphs into a nightmare</u>.</em> <strong>[AA Note: in other words, start with people and avoid bad track records.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>P&amp;L obsession is not limited to consultants. Read any analyst report or listen to conference call recordings that discuss quarterly results. You will be inundated with comments and questions on revenues, costs, and profit. After many years of investing<u>, I realized that I needed to focus as much, if not more, on the company’s balance sheet. Receivables, inventory, payables, fixed assets. And most important of all, debt</u>. Corporate finance theory has a thing for leverage.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As a long- term investor in a business, I don’t want the company ever to go bankrupt— whether the times are good or bad. I can live with a slightly lower return on equity and lower earnings-per-share (EPS) growth, but at least I will live. <u>Not having high leverage probably makes sense to everyone. But the following may not: I am an advocate of no leverage</u>. <u>More than 90 percent of our portfolio companies have— and have always had— excess cash</u>. Only three businesses out of about thirty in our portfolio have some debt. But even this debt is quite small— the maximum debt/ equity ratio among these three is 0.3.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Some of our portfolio companies do occasionally make acquisitions. Our counsel to them is to be deeply skeptical of the potential value creation in all cases. I will admit that the success rate of our advice has not been very high. Fortunately, <u>none of our companies is addicted to M&amp;A, and the ones that do make acquisitions have never bet the company</u>. I am convinced that the cost of distraction— even if it was a small one— has not been worth the effort. If any of them start becoming serial acquirers, we will promptly press the exit button.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Not Predicting Where the Puck Will Be</em><em>:</em><em> <u>What do mid- nineteenth-century railways and late twentieth-century dot-coms have in common</u>? Railways transformed the United Kingdom in the early nineteenth century. The first passenger railway between Liverpool and Manchester was authorized by Parliament in 1826 and opened in 1830. Railways allowed people to travel farther at a much lower cost and in less time than the alternatives. They also spurred the growth of cities by enabling cheaper and faster transport of people and building materials. Many entrepreneurs jumped into the fray and by 1844 had opened more than 2,200 miles of railroad line. The stock market loved these companies, which promised growth forever. Between 1843 and 1850, 442 railway companies made a public offering of shares. Between January 1, 1843, and August 9, 1845, the index of railway stock prices doubled. But the bubble burst, as they inevitably do. <u>The railway index fell over 67 percent from 1845 to 1850— many companies collapsed owing to incompetence, poor financial planning, or fraud</u>.</em><em> </em><em><u>The common thread that binds eighteenth-century railways and twentieth- century dot-coms is the potential for enormous value destruction wrought by a fast- changing industry.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Some companies in industries that change fast ultimately do end up creating a lot of value. But very few companies</u></em><em>. The only ones that have created truly significant value from the dot-com era are <u>Amazon and Google</u> (Facebook was founded in 2004). If you want to be charitable, you could add eBay and Priceline (now called Booking Holdings). But that’s it. Just step back and think about this for a moment. Only a handful of businesses from the 1995– 2000 bubble have prospered. To give you a sense of the scale of destruction, 546 IPOs successfully raised $ 69 billion in 1999 alone. What would have been the probability of finding the next winner? The path to creating wealth in rapidly evolving industries is treacherous, and we refuse to walk on it. Many investors are slaves to the famous quote of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky: “I skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been.” 27 I am not one of them. I am just not that smart. In fast- changing industries, I have no idea who will win, when, or how. And to draw the parallel with hockey, <u>since I don’t know where the puck is going to be, I refuse to play</u>. We at Nalanda love stable, predictable, boring industries. Give us electric fans over electric vehicles, boilers over biotech, sanitaryware over semiconductors, and enzymes over e- commerce. We like industries in which the winners and losers have been largely sorted out and the rules of the game are apparent to everyone. For everything else, thanks, but no thanks.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>There is a structural problem with an arrangement in which a parent also has a listed subsidiary</u></em><em>. We have better things to do than to participate in this inherent conflict.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But You Would Have Missed Tesla! <u>Yup. We would have</u>. We eschew a very long list of risks. This is the core element of our investment strategy. We don’t invest in businesses run by crooks, we detest turnarounds, we stay as far away from leverage as possible, we refuse to engage with M&amp; A addicts, we can’t figure out fast- changing industries, and we don’t align ourselves with unaligned owners. Are there any businesses left for us to invest in? In India, not many. At Nalanda, our shortlist comprises seventy- five to eighty companies out of a universe of about eight hundred with a market value of more than $ 100 million. Except for filial love, nothing in life comes free. Nalanda’s approach has a trade- off that many of you may find unacceptable. Imagine it’s late 2017, and you are impressed with all the media coverage of Tesla. The product seems like a winner based on its vast fan following. The CEO looks as impressive as the car he makes. But in 2017, Tesla had a net debt of about $ 7 billion and had suffered an operating loss of $ 1.6 billion. The company was also burning cash very fast— it had consumed $ 4.1 billion during the year. The traditional car businesses like BMW, Ford, GM, and Toyota had not yet entered the electric vehicle fray, but they had announced big plans. We abhor debt in general, but debt in a loss- making company with negative free cash flow in a fast- changing industry? <u>One can get fired at Nalanda for proposing an investment in a business like this</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Tesla and Eicher Motors are the kinds of type II error we will inevitably commit because we reject highly indebted businesses, rapidly evolving industry landscapes, and turnarounds</u></em><em>. But we will not change our approach. For every Tesla and Eicher, hundreds of unproven business models and turnaround stories are unceremoniously consigned to the dustbin of history. We believe our success is contingent upon our being comfortable with missing out on Teslas and Eichers because on average, avoiding type I errors works wonders over the long term. It has done so for us.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A bumblebee is a hairy insect that barely measures an inch in length.  The species— there are about three hundred of them— have been around for about thirty million years</u></em><em>. They are preyed upon by crab spiders and birds. Their survival strategy was beautifully demonstrated in an experiment conducted by Dr. Tom Ings and Professor Lars Chittka of Queen Mary University of London, whose work was published in Science Daily in 2008. The scientists created a garden of artificial flowers that also contained some robotic crab spiders. They hid some spiders and made others visible. Whenever a bumblebee landed on a flower with a crab spider, the spider “captured” the bumblebee between its foam pincers. Within a few seconds, the robotic spider released the bee. The team found that the bumblebees soon started committing more type II errors: they started avoiding flowers even where there were no spiders, thereby reducing their foraging efficiency. In the wild, this instinct to avoid danger at the cost of going hungry must have played a significant role in the tremendous success of the species over millions of years. <u>If the bumblebee can, why can’t we?</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Evolutionary theory has taught me that . . . . . . <u>the first and probably most important step in reimagining investing is to learn how not to invest</u>. 1. Living things prioritize survival over everything else. In the animal world, this applies to prey and predator. Plants give up on opportunities to grow by redirecting resources when survival is at stake. 2. Millions of years of evolution have programmed the organic world to minimize errors of commission in favor of errors of omission. 3. Buffett’s two rules of investing (never lose money, and don’t forget to never lose money) are essentially a diktat for eliminating significant risks. 4. At Nalanda, we want to be permanent owners of high- quality businesses. Hence, we want to minimize risk before maximizing returns. 5. Just like the living world, we forgo potentially juicy opportunities if the risk of losing our capital is high. 6. We do this by avoiding crooks, turnarounds, high debt, serial acquirers, fast- changing industries, and unaligned owners. I believe we can be better investors only if we are better “rejectors.” 7. One downside of this approach is that we occasionally walk away from a potentially attractive investment. We are willing to live with this downside.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>BUY HIGH QUALITY AT A FAIR PRICE</em><em>:</em><em> This section describes and, using evolutionary theory, justifies our buying philosophy at Nalanda. For many investors, identifying the right business to buy at the right time is almost all there is to investing. Switch on CNBC, open a financial newspaper, or read a blog, and you will witness a lot of time spent and ink spilled on companies to buy. This is unfortunate. <u>As we have already seen in section I, not buying is an equally—if not more—important skill</u>. There is also a profound conundrum about the buying strategy advocated by most fund managers. Everyone seems to spout the exact same philosophy as this section’s topic: Buy high quality at a fair price. I challenge you to find me a fund manager who professes to buy poor-quality businesses at high prices. Then why does the performance of professional investors vary so widely? One reason—not the only one, but a crucial one—is that our community has wildly different opinions on the meaning of “high,”“quality,” and “fair.” In this section, with many evolutionary theory elements as a backdrop, I will clarify the meaning of these words as they apply to Nalanda. I will discuss what we buy in chapters 2 to 4 and how we buy in chapters 5 to 7.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One alternative would be to use a <u>two-step process that we use at Nalanda</u>. <u>In the first step, we use one selection criterion that filters out low-quality or average- quality businesses and yields a preliminary list of high- quality companies</u>. In the second step, we do more work on this preliminary list to further whittle it down to a final list. Our investable universe is around 800 Indian businesses (with a market value of more than $ 150 million). Of these, we have rejected close to 350 companies to minimize the risks outlined in the previous chapter. About 450 businesses remain. We then apply a single filter to cut down this list to about 150 firms. <u>Let me call this single filter “F.” Remember that F simply gives us the preliminary list on which we need to work further to reject or choose businesses</u>. After doing this work, our final list has only about 75 to 80 businesses. F gave us an excellent head start. And it continues to do so because we don’t spend any time analyzing a business unless F has cleared it.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A first plausible assumption would be “a great management team.”</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I</u></em><em> </em><em><u>know that many professional investors will disagree with me. Many people in the fund management world pride themselves on their purported ability to separate the wheat from the chaff after a series of management meetings.</u></em><em> Some of them may have this rare skill, but most are either deluded or lying. And if there is someone out there who can assess a company’s quality by meeting management, we can applaud them from the sidelines without falling into the trap ourselves.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Okay, let’s recap. <u>We want to use a single filter, F, to select businesses for further analysis</u>. This should hopefully save us a lot of time and effort. We wondered if we could use “quality management teams” or “fast growth” as our starting point. We rejected both as good candidates for F because it is tough to assess the former, and the latter can end up causing heartburn.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Does a high gross margin tell us anything about the quality of the business? Not really</u></em><em>. Several internet businesses boasted a gross margin of more than 90 percent in the dot- com era, but almost all experienced huge losses because of their marketing spends.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Take this example of two real- world businesses: Business C has had an operating margin of about 3 percent over the past fifteen years. Business T has delivered an operating margin of 19 percent over the same period. Would you reject Business C and select Business T because T is “better” than C? If you did so, you would have spurned Costco, one of America’s best- run businesses. Business T is Tiffany &amp; Co., a reasonably well-run business but not as well run as Costco. <u>What makes Costco at a margin of 3 percent a better company than Tiffany at 19 percent?  I will get to that shortly</u>. Suffice it to say that using margins as a starting point to narrow our list of companies may lead us astray. It fails our second and third criteria (removing most, if not all, low- quality businesses and selecting high- quality businesses).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We haven’t yet considered macro factors for building the short list. But which single piece of macro data should we consider for short-listing individual businesses? For example, if “experts” believe that inflation will rise, should we short-list only consumer goods businesses able to pass on the increased cost to their customers? If we do so, should we then completely revise the list if the inflation expectations get reversed within six months? I don’t know how to account for macro factors for short- listing high- quality businesses. I am not suggesting that it is the wrong thing to do— just that I don’t know how it can be done. And so, <u>we avoid considering any macro factor as our preliminary filter F</u>. What about accounting for macro factors when making our final list? More on that later.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Darwin, with his acute powers of observation, knew this. His statement at the beginning of this chapter asserts that <u>hairless dogs have imperfect teeth and pigeons with feathered feet have skin between their outer toes. He predicted that if humans choose to select for one characteristic, they will surely also cause transformations in other characteristics owing to what he called the “mysterious laws of the correlation of growth.</u>”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>At Nalanda, here is what we begin with while short-listing businesses<strong>: historical return on capital employed (ROCE).</strong></u></em><em> The first word first. Historical. I devote an entire chapter to this important and oft- ignored word, but for now I wanted to clarify that the ROCE number is what a business has delivered in the past. We don’t listen to stories about how ROCE will improve in the future. We want to assess a company purely on its historically delivered ROCE. Now let’s look at some definitions. ROCE is simply the operating profit of the business as a percentage of total capital employed. As defined earlier, operating profit is earnings before interest and taxes, or EBIT. Why do we not use profit after tax (PAT) instead? Remember, we want to understand a business’s operating performance, and mixing it with financial measures like tax and interest will muddy the waters. We do not ignore tax or interest charges in our overall evaluation of the business, but for calculating ROCE, we limit ourselves to operating performance. What about total capital employed? This typically comprises two factors: net working capital and net fixed assets. In the net working capital number, we like to exclude excess cash (i.e., cash minus debt if cash happens to be much greater than debt) because extra cash is not an operating asset. Also, high- ROCE companies generate a lot of cash, and incorporating cash into the capital employed number will unnecessarily reduce ROCE. If you are uncomfortable with this, you can include a portion of cash in capital employed. For an acquisitive company, we also include the capital invested in acquiring businesses, but let’s keep things simple for the moment. Thus, ROCE for nonfinancial companies can be defined as follows: EBIT ÷ (net working capital + net fixed assets)</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I claimed that Costco at an operating margin of 3 percent is a better business than Tiffany at 19 percent.</u></em><em> If we limit our definition of “better” to the level of ROCE, then I was right. This is because Costco’s average ROCE from 2014 to 2019 (pre- pandemic) was 22 percent compared to Tiffany’s 16 percent. Costco is deploying its capital much more effectively than Tiffany, and this more than compensates for Costco’s low margin. Let’s take the example of just one important part of its capital employed: inventory. Costco keeps about 31 days of inventory in its warehouses and retail stores. Guess the same number for Tiffany. It is 521 days, or almost a year and half! Tiffany’s operating margin is impressive, but Costco’s dramatically better management of its inventory and other assets ensures it earns a higher ROCE than Tiffany.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Just because we can’t measure management quality through interviews and discussions does not mean quality management teams do not exist. Of course they do. What we need is not some airyfairy impression of an investor made over a coffee (or a Zoom call) but a quantitative measure. We don’t vote for the best cricket bowler, best running back, or best marathoner based on their interviews or their ability to articulate their excellence, so why should we do it for management teams? The best bowling statistics and the best finish times determine the best bowler and the best marathoner. Similarly, in my view, <u>an excellent— but not the only— indicator of the quality of the management team is their historical track record on the quantity of ROCE.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The median historical ROCE of our portfolio of thirty businesses— most of which are more than thirty- five to forty years old— is about 42 percent. I am obviously biased since I am an investor in these businesses, but I do think the management teams of these businesses are excellent. Are they exemplary, or am I just calling them first rate because they happen to have high ROCE? I don’t know. Does it matter? We should expect the following from a quality management team. <u>That they deliver products and services to their customers that are superior to those of their competitors, allocate capital prudently, attract and retain quality employees, manage their cost structure (which is commensurate with their size and revenue), maintain a quality balance sheet, and continuously innovate by taking calculated risks. All this should— and does— correlate with high ROCE.</u> A Consistently High- ROCE Business Is Likely to Have a Strong Competitive Advantage All long- term investors, mentored by more than five decades of Buffett’s letters and annual meetings, demand that companies have a “sustainable competitive advantage” (SCA). But how does one go about assessing whether a company has an SCA? If you peruse business and investment books, the sources of SCA turn out to be the usual suspects: brand, intellectual property, network effect, economies of scale, and low cost.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Once we have short-listed a company based on its sustained high ROCE, we start analyzing its competitive advantages.</u></em><em> After weeks or months of research, we may conclude that this high ROCE is unsustainable and that the company just got lucky historically. So be it. We then choose to stay away. But taking this route— of starting our assessment of competitive advantage only for high- ROCE companies— saves us a lot of time and effort.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A company delivering high ROCE with modest revenue growth will generate excess cash</u></em><em>. This is not an opinion— just a mathematical fact. For example, Company X growing its sales at 10 percent with ROCE of 25 percent can grow from zero cash to a cash balance of almost 18 percent of sales in five years (other assumptions: margin 15 percent, tax 30 percent). With an increasing cash cushion, X’s management team can choose to launch new products or target new geography. Even if the new business fails, X can recover given its ability to generate cash from its core business.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>After the companies have been through the risk filter, as I discussed in chapter 1, <u>we reject companies with long-term historical ROCE lower than 20 percent</u>. Our preliminary short list of about 150 companies consists only of those that have delivered ROCE of more than 20 percent over the past five to ten years or more.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>R</u></em><em><u>emember this chapter is about where you start looking for great businesses, not what guarantees great investment return (spoiler alert: nothing does).</u></em><em> The second problem with making a preliminary list of only high- ROCE businesses is that it rejects companies that may become hugely successful in the future. Take Netflix. If we had evaluated Netflix in early 2018, its median ROCE for the previous ten years (2008 to 2017) of 10 percent would have been too low for us to include it on our preliminary list. We would have missed out on a spectacular wealth- creation opportunity: Netflix’s stock price jumped 2.9 times from January 2018 to December 2021. But here is the thing. We would have looked at this lost opportunity and not regretted it one bit. I know we will lose Netflix- like businesses, and I am okay with it. Our strategy of selecting only high- ROCE companies for our initial list invariably excludes some potential winners, but it also excludes hundreds of low- quality businesses that we would never want to own. Thus, on average, I believe this approach works well for us. We will not change our approach just because others have made money with a strategy that we have chosen to avoid. C’est la vie.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Chapter Summary:  Evolutionary theory has taught me that . . . . . . <u>to avoid getting drowned by a deluge of data and information, we can reimagine investing by initially selecting a single business trait that brings with it many favorable business qualities</u>. 1. In nature, selection for just one trait can influence many other behavioral and physical qualities of an organism. 2. Dmitri Belyaev and Lyudmila Trut’s long-term experiment in Siberia has shown that selecting for tameness in wild silver foxes transforms them into a creature not unlike a pet dog over very few generations. The foxes become docile and crave human attention. They also develop floppy ears, a piebald coloration, and a shorter snout and can be reproductively active more than once a year. 3. Investors could benefit immensely by homing in on a business trait that, when selected, brings along many other favorable qualities with it. Some popular parameters like management quality, high growth, and high margins are inappropriate or inadequate. 4. The single business quality that correlates favorably with many other areas of business excellence is historical return on capital employed (ROCE). We start our analysis by selecting only those businesses that have historically delivered high ROCE. 5. High ROCE generally (but not necessarily) indicates that the management team is stellar, they allocate capital effectively, they have built a strong competitive advantage over their peers, and they have room to innovate and grow. 6. Selecting for ROCE is a good starting point of analysis. It helps us narrow down our choices. We do a lot more work to create a short list of attractive businesses after this initial filter. 7. However, not all businesses with high historical ROCE will necessarily continue to be considered good businesses. There are no guarantees in investing.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Living Organisms Are Highly Robust MBA degrees, management seminars, best-selling business books, and corporate titans all seem focused on ensuring that companies adapt to change and evolve into a better version of themselves. If one could bottle up corporate obsession, the label on this bottle would declare, <u>“How do we change faster, better, and easier?” I beg to differ</u>. The question that should be on the minds of business leaders and investors is almost the exact opposite: How do we change without changing?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Something similar has been happening at McKinsey over the past century. Today’s McKinsey bears no resemblance to Marvin Bower’s McKinsey in terms of geographical presence, organization processes, type of client work, and breadth of expertise. But at some fundamental level of culture, oneness, problem- solving, and working with CXOs, the firm has remained stubbornly Boweresque</u></em><em>. It has changed without changing. This is what we seek as owners in our businesses: the ability to keep evolving while staying robust.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Let’s recap our journey until now. <u>We have eliminated serious risks (chapter 1) and have shortlisted businesses based on ROCE (chapter 2). Now we need to select companies for their robustness.</u> Here are some learnings we have internalized at Nalanda.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>You will notice that, unlike in chapter 2, where we used the quantitative criterion of ROCE to select businesses, <u>many factors contributing to robustness are qualitative</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Different investors attribute different weights to the factors listed in table 3.1. For instance, <u>many investors do not consider customer concentration to be a problem for a business. We do.</u> We took advantage of these contrasting opinions a few months after the inception of Nalanda.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We Assess Evolvability Indirectly by Measuring Robustness Directl</u></em><em>.As permanent owners, we Nalanda folks are hungry for companies that can successfully implement neutral strategies to evolve and adapt to a changing environment. We want evolvability. Correction. We need evolvability. Having invested, we need the business to survive the onslaught of AI or other technologies, to upstage its increasing online and offline competition, to withstand multiple recessions, to conquer the adverse effects of climate change, to survive management turnover, and much more. We need it to be able to adapt.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Many investors contend that management interviews and discussions are an excellent way to assess the future adaptability of a business. Maybe. I consider such interviews a waste of time</u></em><em>— but more on that later (in chapter 7). But there is an indirect— and I would argue a reasonably reliable— path of satisfying my need. It is by measuring the robustness of an organization. Robustness lays the groundwork for evolution in living things. It does the same in businesses. Robustness is a necessary— though not sufficient— requirement for businesses to evolve successfully. In a robust business, just as in a living organism, evolvability comes free.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>What I have outlined is not a theoretical construct. We have seen this story play out in many of our businesses. When the pandemic began, the general opinion was that all Indian businesses would suffer. <u>Sharp stock market declines in March and April 2020 mirrored this opinion. However, as the months passed, the differences in the impact on the business of companies with differential degrees of robustness became quite stark</u>. During and after the COVID crisis, we have seen these divergent outcomes play out across many of our companies and industries, be it paint, innerwear, air conditioners, tires, pipes, or batteries.<br />There is an unbroken chain of life between us and our last universal common ancestor (scientists call it LUCA) 3.5 billion years ago. 12 Every part of this unbroken and evolving lineage has had robustness at multiple levels: genes, proteins, and body plan, to name just three. In a not dissimilar manner, I have discovered over more than two decades of investing that more levels of robustness lead to more evolvability.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We want our companies to tilt toward the left side of table 3.1 across all factors. Thus, <u>we want the business to be robust at the level of ROCE and concentration of customer base and degree of leverage and strength of competitive advantage, and so on</u>. Is this asking for a lot? You bet. We are permanent owners— the key word here being “permanent.” If a business can’t last permanently, we don’t want to own it. Without several levels of robustness, how will we be sure that the business will survive over the long term? I wish I could categorically answer the question, Is this a robust business? As a practicing investor, I know that assessing robustness is a matter of judgment and that there is no shortcut to this process. I have arrived at a certain heuristic after many years of investing. There clearly are black- and- white extremes to robustness (e.g., a business with just two customers) but in many, maybe even most, businesses, it is the gray zone that stares at us.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>For example, is a company with a debt/ equity ratio of 2.0 robust? Probably not</u></em><em>. What about a ratio of 0.2 or 0.5? Maybe. For me, the answer depends on the other factors of robustness. Almost all the companies in our portfolio are debt free. Still, in 2010 we invested in India’s leading plastic pipes business (used in homes and agriculture), Supreme Industries, whose debt/ EBITDA ratio was 0.6. Not high, but not zero either. Despite the company having debt— which was small to begin with— we concluded that the company was robust because it was the clear industry leader, had been gaining market share over its competitors, had a return on capital of more than 30 percent, had successfully designed and launched many products over the past decade, had thousands of distribution points across India, was able to negotiate the best terms with its suppliers, and had not wasted time and money on unnecessary acquisitions. It was not perfectly robust, but it was resilient enough. Today, the company is debt free and continues to be the industry leader by a wide margin. The more levels of robustness, the more we salivate.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>There are millions of small businesses across the world that are incredibly robust but will stay small</u></em><em>. And then there are businesses that test the limits of robustness and implode. The former risk nothing, and the latter risk everything. The Goldilocks zone between these two extremes is what I call “calculated risk.” It is the degree of risk that makes managers uncomfortable, but not too much; it compels the organization to innovate, but not too much; it forces the business to invest, but not too much; and it adds areas of potential growth, but not too many. To me, the company that best demonstrates calculated aggression and risk- taking is Walmart. Small digression. Let’s see if you know the answer to this question: What was Sam Walton’s age when he founded Walmart? If your answer begins with a one or a two, your answer was the same as mine. And like I was, you are wrong. Sam Walton was forty- four when he opened his first Wal- Mart store in 1962 in Rogers, Arkansas (Wal-Mart became Walmart in 2018).  Not all the great founders of the modern era are from Silicon Valley, not all of them were hard- charging teenagers, and not all of them wanted to “change the world.” After graduating from college, Walton started in sales at J. C. Penney in 1940, then enlisted for the war in 1942. In 1945, he started managing a franchise Ben Franklin store in Newport, Arkansas (where the population was then seven thousand). By 1950 he was running two stores in Newport and had achieved reasonable success by experimenting and innovating. One of his innovative ideas that had been a massive hit with his customers was an ice cream machine. As he writes in his autobiography, “Every crazy thing we tried hadn’t turned out as well as the ice cream machine, of course, but we hadn’t made any mistakes we couldn’t correct quickly, none so big that they threatened the business.” Could there be a better definition of calculated risk? After Walmart’s initial success in Rogers, Sam Walton opened more stores. 14 By 1967, he had opened twenty- four stores, which brought in sales of about $ 13 million. The company reached $ 1 billion in sales in 1980, by which time it had 276 stores and about 21,000 associates. Note that store openings and selling more products through the same stores propelled growth from 1967 to 1980. During these thirteen years, sales per store had increased about seven times. How had Walton done this? By continuously trying new things, expanding product offerings, and broadening the customer base.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The company did something similar—small, measured, and low risk—when it launched its web business. <u>In 2000, Walmart joined hands with a leading Silicon Valley investment firm, Accel Partners, to launch</u> <u><a href="http://walmart.com/">Walmart.com</a></u>. Accel, by the way, gained much fame (and a gargantuan fortune) as a result of its $12.7 million investment in an early-stage company called Facebook in 2005. In about eighteen months, in mid-2001, Walmart acquired the minority stake of Accel to own <a href="http://walmart.com/">Walmart.com</a> fully. By 2020, Walmart’s e-commerce sales had climbed to $24 billion and <a href="http://walmart.com/">Walmart.com</a> was approaching 10 percent of Walmart’s overall U.S. sales. What had started as a “neutral” strategy in 2000 is now fast becoming the centerpiece of Walmart’s approach to gaining market share. One of our largest investors is a well-known U.S. university endowment. They have been investing in funds globally for many decades. Their CFO visited our Singapore office in 2011. After he had finished grilling us on compliance and other related matters, I wanted to know if he could share any learnings with us. He said that the one industry in which their fund managers had consistently lost money across time and geographies was retailing. In this context, Walmart’s success is awe inspiring.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I don’t understand product marketing, but thankfully Page [an Indian company he owns] does.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Robustness Is a Proxy for Evolutionary and Business Success</u></em><em> <strong><u>but Doesn’t Guarantee It</u>: Dinosaurs</strong>, a diverse group of more than a thousand reptilian species, dominated our planet for 180 million years. 17 As a matter of comparison, we Homo sapiens have been around for less than 0.2 million years. Dinosaurs couldn’t have survived and thrived for so long unless they were highly robust and adaptable. Molecular evidence has shown that many modern mammalian orders— Carnivora, Primata, Proboscidea— coexisted with dinosaurs for at least 30 million years during the Cretaceous period (145 to 66 million years ago), and maybe even earlier. The mammals during the era of dinosaurs were small, squirrel sized, and probably insectivores. If aliens had landed on our planet 65 million years ago, they never could have predicted that a small offshoot of the insignificant mammalians would reign supreme one day. The cataclysmic aftermath of an asteroid strike in the Yucatan peninsula 65 million years ago wiped out the dinosaurs. But the mammals survived. No one is sure why. The extraordinary robustness of dinosaurs did not guarantee their evolvability. In general, the greater the robustness, the greater the evolvability. But sometimes, robustness ceases to help businesses adapt. We can see this in Gap’s failure to grow despite the company being very robust. Its revenue stayed flat at about $ 16 billion from 2005 to 2020, although it delivered ROCE of 20 percent or more for more than a decade and had no leverage. In general, multiple levels of robustness are better than a single level. But sometimes, even multiple levels of robustness can’t safeguard the future of a business, as has been the case for thousands of newspapers across the world. In general, highly robust businesses evolve by taking calculated risks. But sometimes, very rarely, businesses can succeed by taking huge risks, as shown by Netflix. We at Nalanda never bet against the odds. And so, despite some rare counterexamples, we have kept and will continue to keep robustness at the front and center of our investment approach. As permanent owners, we seek robustness in companies as the best available benchmark to assess if they are likely to adapt and survive over the long term. A better measure may exist, but I don’t know what it is. We invest only in highly robust companies. Many of them have stayed robust and have grown their sales and profits over decades. But our track record is not perfect. We have witnessed two key problems with this approach. First, a business can lose its robustness.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Being a permanent owner, we are tolerant of declining sales or margins or market share. But we will not risk survivability</u></em><em>. As the company’s robustness nose- dived, we exited the business at a loss.<br />The second problem is too much robustness.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We have made almost forty investments to date, and in all of them, robustness was a primary— but not the only— selection criterion.</u></em><em> We have worked on the assumption that robustness will lead to growth and evolution. This assumption has failed us on two occasions: one in which the company lost robustness and another in which the company’s excessive focus on robustness compromised growth. I am surprised at our strategy’s low failure rate. We have been quite lucky, and while robustness should continue to reward us across our portfolio, we will continue to encounter failures of the first or second kind over time.<br />“Confronted with a like challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY” (emphasis in the original text). This is the best advice for investors in the best chapter of the best investing book ever written: The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham, Buffett’s actual and spiritual mentor. The chapter is titled “ ‘Margin of Safety’ as the Central Concept of Investment.” Graham knew that the corporate world is highly uncertain and that the best protection offered to an investor is the price they pay for a business.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In this chapter, I have <u>used the word “robust” to extend the margin-of-safety concept</u> to many other facets of a company. We have sought a margin of safety on business quality by demanding high ROCE and a wide competitive moat, on the strength of the balance sheet by requiring it to be debt free, on the bargaining power of customers and suppliers by requiring them to be fragmented, and on the sustainability of economics by insisting that the industry be slow- changing.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted what had appeared to be highly robust hotel chains; Intel’s erstwhile dominance in semiconductor chips has been upset by the likes of AMD, Nvidia, and Samsung; Amazon has already destroyed many small and large retail businesses; <u>regulators in the United States and Europe appear to be threatening the very existence of Google and Facebook in their current form</u>. </em><strong>[AA Note: I disagree.  As the technology cold war heats up, Google becomes more important.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We know that given the nature of the businesses we are after— those with very low risk and exceptional business quality—</u></em><em> <strong><u>they will almost never be available cheap</u></strong>. The market is not an idiot; it is almost always efficient. Almost always. Not always. We wait for those few occasions to pay what we call a “fair” price. Not too low but not too high either. What is “fair”? Rather than describe it, let me state the actual number. The median trailing twelve- month (TTM) entry PE ratio for the Nalanda portfolio is 14.9. The median TTM PE for the period from 2005 to 2020 for India’s primary index, Sensex, is 19.7 and for the Midcap Index is 23.8. Thus, we are buying what we think are exceptional businesses at a 25 to 30 percent discount on the index. Over almost a quarter of a century of investing, I know I have been wrong on many occasions. The margin of safety of our entry price pays for my errors of judgment.<br />A Leader Is Made a Loser Lazarus of Bethany was miraculously brought back to life by Jesus in the New Testament. Charles Lazarus performed a modern capitalist miracle by making Toys “R” Us the largest and most well- respected toy business globally. Lazarus is also a beggar in a parable in the Gospel according to Luke, the third of the four Gospels of the New Testament. Once a miracle of Lazarus, Toys “R” Us suffered the same fate as Lazarus the beggar.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In 1988, the Wall Street Journal boldly predicted, “Toys ‘R’ Us, Big Kid on the Block, Won’t Stop Growing</u></em><em>.” As if on cue, the problems started. In 1988, Walmart’s market share at 17.4 percent came marginally ahead of that of Toys “R” Us at 16.8 percent. Toys “R” Us was in second place after being the leader for fifteen years. Toys “R” Us was being squeezed at both ends: by discount chains like Walmart, Target, and Costco, which competed on low prices, and by so- called edutainment companies like Zany Brainy, Noodle Kidoodle, and Imaginarium, which offered higher- priced specialized toys and better service.<br />Too often, a business in trouble tries to buy its way out. Toys “R” Us was no exception. It acquired Imaginarium Toy Centers in 1998. It also tried frequent management changes— the company had three CEOs from 1994 to 2000. But its downward slide continued with Amazon, too, muscling its way into the toy segment.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Toys “R” Us was spectacularly successful for about four decades, from the late 1950s to the late 1990s. By the mid-2000s, however, it wasn’t growing, its market share was declining</u></em><em>, and its profitability had taken a severe beating. Whatever the reasons for its trouble, there was no doubt that it was in trouble. The company’s robustness had suffered significantly. Maybe it was bad luck, maybe it was management missteps, or maybe it was a bit of both. One way to think about this situation is to picture an elite marathoner whose performance has dipped in recent months. They used to be a picture of health and vigor, but nowadays, they look exhausted and cannot run even ten kilometers at their earlier marathon pace. They are now at the starting line of the Boston Marathon. What would you expect their coach to do before the race starts? If I were the coach, I would advise them to withdraw from the race, rest and recover for a few months, and slowly build their mileage back up. Maybe your advice would be different—you might counsel them to take it easy and just finish the race without worrying about a podium finish to minimize damage to the body. I assume you would be shocked if I told you that the coach not only asked them to run at full speed but also loaded a ten-pound bag on their back!</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Remember that <u>the capitalist world is a Boston Marathon that never ends</u>— there is no respite at the end of a punishing two- hour race. The race goes on and on and on and on and on: 24 hours × 7 days a week × 365 days a year. It’s unending, unrelenting, unforgiving.<br />Dear Amazon, you have opened physical book shops in Manhattan. Time for toys?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Chapter Summary: Evolutionary theory has taught me that . . . . . . we can reimagine investing by owning only robust businesses that are resilient to internal and external shocks, while continuing to evolve and grow. 1. <u>There is a paradox in the living world: Organic life is highly complex but not fragile. Organisms have survived hundreds of millions of years despite living in constantly changing external environments and undergoing a barrage of internal mutations</u>. This is because they are robust at multiple levels. 2. Thus, an accidental change in DNA sequence does not affect which amino acids are made; a change in amino acids or their sequence does not impact the synthesis of proteins; and a change in proteins need not affect the body plan of an organism. 3. Neutral mutations permit new functions and adaptations to arise without disrupting current functioning. 4. We want our businesses to mimic the robustness of the living world: to survive and prosper in a dynamic external environment, withstand internal strategic and organizational upheavals, and evolve by taking calculated risks. 5. Hence, we choose to invest only in businesses that are robust at multiple levels. A robust business has high ROCE, minimal or zero debt, a strong competitive advantage, fragmented customer and supplier bases, a stable management team, and is in a slow-changing industry. 6. Just because a business is robust today does not mean it will continue to be so. Our only protection against the loss of robustness of a business is to be price sensitive. We do not invest unless the market offers us an attractive valuation, which happens rarely.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>You are going bald. Not because of age, but because you have been tearing your hair out. A few months ago, you committed to investing $100,000 with a money manager. This fund manager did not want to raise cash and said that he would call commitments if he saw attractive opportunities to invest in the market. He made a strong pitch with a snazzy PowerPoint presentation, and, like everyone in the industry, he promised to be long- term oriented. He also claimed that he does not like to lose money (as if everyone else does!) and that he carefully assesses the quality of businesses and buys when everyone else is selling. Very Buffettesque. Very old world. You have heard the same spiel from everyone, but he seems quite sincere. Or at least he put on a good act. A few quarters have passed, and he has called $ 40,000 from you. At the end of the quarter, the value of your $ 40,000 investment is $ 38,000. You know that the market has been a bit weak lately, so you ignore the minor loss. You are a patient sort and don’t fret over the value of your investments daily like many of your friends. But when you check your investments next quarter, you see that the value of your portfolio is now only $ 32,000. You have taken a hit of 15 percent in a single quarter. To rub salt into your wounds, the fund manager demands $ 15,000 more from you. He is entitled to; you have signed an agreement with him that commits you to keep investing until your $ 100,000 limit is reached. You invest the additional $ 15,000. One more quarter goes by, and you are aghast to discover that the value of your $ 55,000 is now only $ 39,000. You are down 30 percent within six months! The fund manager repeats the same mantra, “We are long term, patient, blah . . . blah . . . blah,” while asking for an additional $ 15,000! You talk to some of your friends who appear to be stock market experts. All of them advise you to stop investing more and to withdraw your remaining capital promptly. Unfortunately, your lawyer advises you that there is no way out. Not only can you not redeem your capital (because you have agreed to a lock- up for many years), but you must honor your commitment. With great reluctance, you invest an additional $ 15,000. Your total investment is now $70,000. You have read Buffett’s great annual letters and listened to his interviews on TV. You remember that he advises investors not to check their stock holdings obsessively. Hence, this time, you decide to wait six months before reviewing how your portfolio has performed. Kudos for your patience! The day finally arrives. You haven’t felt this nervous since the first time you used a fake ID to enter a bar. You open your account statement with increasing dread. Your worst fears are realized. Your $70,000 investment has now almost halved to $36,000. <u>Your portfolio has lost about 40 percent during the past six months. Oh, and your money manager is threatening to ask for more money</u>. Apart from continuing to tear at your remaining hair, what should you do? The horns of dung beetles. Maybe they have the answer.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We want the businesses we own to increase in value over the long run. <u>And the only way for this to happen is for the company to perform well over many years, preferably decades</u>. Investment success may not correlate with business success for a day trader or short- term investor. But for us, the ultimate success of an investment is almost entirely dependent on the ultimate success of the business. If you accept this premise, then as permanent owners, we should focus exclusively on the quality and performance of the business over the long run. And that is what we do. However, this is easier said than done. In today’s world of Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Twitter, WhatsApp, and other soul- destroying inventions, it is not easy to escape the din of proximate noise that can drown out the desire to seek sources of ultimate success. When there is a specter of a Greek default, an announcement of reduced jobs growth in the United States, OPEC negotiations break down, the Federal Reserve hints that the days of low interest rates are over, or company revenue falls, stocks can fall. Similarly, a bullish projection by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on world growth, the recapitalization of banks in China, the success of a new product launch, or the increased pace of vaccination for a global pandemic can lead to higher stock prices. All these are proximate causes of price movement. And all are divorced from what could ultimately lead to the business success or failure— and hence a higher or lower market value— of a company. The question we investors don’t ask often enough but should is relatively straightforward: Does this proximate cause have anything to do with the cause of ultimate business success? The interesting thing about proximate causes is that they are almost always evident in screaming newspaper headlines and hyperventilating news anchors. Ultimate causes, thankfully, are way too dull for media coverage. Why “thankfully”? I will get to it.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If you want to lash out at the fund management community for being impulsive and trigger-happy, go ahead. <u>But please don’t blame us for being inconsistent</u>. Whenever the markets get excited about a macroeconomic event, the fund managers behave predictably by riding the proximate bandwagon of stock prices. And then they repent at leisure. Fund managers have a Pavlovian reaction to macro or market data. Will interest rates be higher? Sell. Will inflation be lower? Buy. If the fiscal deficit shoots up? Sell. Or is it a buy? Most businesses should be (and are) relatively immune to short- term macro movements. As shown in table 4.1, their stock prices, for some inexplicable reasons, are not.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I am not cherry-picking here. Over the long run, well- run businesses create a lot of value irrespective of the macroeconomic environment. Do we seriously think Amazon, JPMorgan, Michelin, Nestlé, Siemens, Tesco, Walmart, Zara, and other excellent businesses are held hostage to inflation and fiscal deficit? If the business and stock price performance of exceptional companies is immune to macroeconomic perturbations, <u>aren’t we, as investors in those companies, better off ignoring the economy</u>?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The third problem with using economic data is the most obvious of all. No one knows anything</u></em><em>. Okay, that is exaggerating a bit. But only a bit. Since even expert economists are abysmal at forecasting the economy, why should we investors squander our time giving it any importance? I assume you will agree that an economist’s most important task is to forecast a recession. This would enable the government to take the necessary steps to prevent widespread pain and suffering. In March 2018, the IMF published a working paper titled “How Well Do Economists Forecast Recessions?” 9 The authors compared real GDP forecasts with actual growth data for sixty- three countries from 1992 to 2014. They showed that while GDP contracted by an average of 2.8 percentage points during recessions, the consensus forecast from the year before the recession was a growth of 3 percent! Worse, even during the year of the recession, the average forecast was a contraction of 0.8 percent when the real contraction turned out to be 2.8 percent. Prakash Loungani, one of the authors of this IMF paper, told The Guardian in an interview that according to his analysis, economists had failed to predict 148 of the last 150 recessions! “The record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished,” he said. One would have thought that with a greater volume of data, more computing power, and better algorithms, our ability to forecast would have improved over the years. Yeah, right. In the same Guardian article, Mark Pearson, the deputy director for employment, labour and social affairs at the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development in Paris, said, “We are getting worse at making forecasts because the world is getting more complicated.” Way to go, Mark. I know that many investors spend a lot of time poring over economic data. Maybe they have figured out a way to factor in exchange rate movement or the external debt levels of the country in their decision- making. I am unable to do so. I do not know how to translate any economic indicator into the prospects of a specific business. We ignore every piece of proximate macroeconomic information. We do not believe these data help us assess the ultimate success or failure of a business. We have no economic advisers, we do not talk to economists at banks or brokerage houses, and we do not discuss any economic indicators in our team meetings. Their weightage in our investment decision is a big zero.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I don’t fraternize with folks in the financial services industry to exchange ideas or information. However, when I started my investing career with Warburg Pincus in 1998, I spent a fair bit of time with fund managers and finance professionals connected with the Indian equity markets</u></em><em>. I had a consulting background and wanted to understand the workings of the capital market and its participants. I thought I had a lot to learn. I was right, just not in the way I had imagined. After just a couple months at Warburg, I could predict the exact words of a finance industry professional’s greeting. It wasn’t “How are you?” or “How’s it going?” or just “Hello.” It would almost always be “Kya lagta hai?” Translated from Hindi, in stock market parlance, this means “What do you think the market will do?” I remember being confused. Here I was, a novice trying to understand how the markets work, while this “expert” was seeking my opinion? Do they not know? It took me a while to conclude that they don’t. No one does.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But there are many other occasions when <u>the market moves because, well, it moves. Such is the nature of markets.</u> The proximate causes of market movements are unknown, and in my view, unknowable.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Why did fund managers in the United Kingdom start piling on to BP, Rolls- Royce, and Diageo on July 25 after a huge increase in the U.S. indices on July 24? The explanation that comes to mind was offered by the great John Maynard Keynes when he opined that the stock market players were playing a complex guessing game. 11 He asked us to imagine a game in which competitors pick the six prettiest faces from one hundred photographs. <u>The winner is not the one who picks the prettiest faces but whose choices match the average of all the competitors</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Keynes had learned from bitter experience that this market guessing game is a colossal waste of time</u></em><em>. In the 1920s, he used a detailed economic model to predict market levels and failed to see the Great Crash of 1929. He also underperformed the market during this period. He switched to picking stocks and, like Buffett, eschewed diversification. He declared, “<u>The right method of investment is to put fairly large sums of money into enterprises one thinks one knows something about</u>.” No wonder he turned out to be an excellent investor. Keynes managed the endowment of King’s College, Cambridge, from 1924 to 1946. During this twenty- two- year period, he compounded the college’s wealth by almost 14 percent a year. If someone had invested £ 100 with Keynes at the start of 1924, it would have been worth about £ 1,675 at the time of his death in 1946. The same money invested in the UK stock market index would have been worth only £ 424. Astonishingly, this period included the Great Crash of 1929, the Great Depression, and the Second World War.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I have not met a single finance professional who claims that markets can be predicted. So why do industry players spend so much time obsessing over future market levels?</u></em><em> Why do fund managers devote enormous time and effort obsessing over what other fund managers think and do? Flawed incentives, false comfort, one- upmanship, you name it. It doesn’t really matter. We ignore all market forecasts. Well, maybe not entirely. I do look at them on days when I want to have a good laugh. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Here is my question for you: <u>What do you think Nikola’s market value was at the end of December 2020</u>, three months after the Hindenburg exposé? Remember that the company had no battery or fuel cell technology, had no prototype, its founder had exited ignominiously, GM had terminated the partnership, and the government had begun investigating fraud. My answer would be close to zero. Nope. It was $ 6 billion! The Hindenburg report appeared to be fact based: They backed up almost all their assertions with documents, photographs, text messages, videos, and interviews. I am in no position to double- check their research. However, the facts that Milton resigned and GM terminated the partnership seem to indicate that a reasonable portion— if not all— of the report was credible. If so,<u>how does one explain a $ 6 billion valuation for a company like Nikola? That’s an unfair question because I doubt anyone fully understands how companies are valued. But in this case, I want to offer a two- word answer. Thematic investing</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A foolproof method of checking the interest level in a concept or theme is to analyze Google searches using Google Trends</u></em><em>. If you do so for the term “electric vehicles” between January 2014 and January 2019 in the United States, you will see a relatively flat trend. However, between January 2019 and February 2021, interest in electric vehicles quadrupled.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Like almost every proximate theme before and since, the <u>automotive tech theme</u> has three properties. <u>It hypes up total addressable market (TAM), is simple to understand, and is actionable</u>. First, TAM. Every theme I have encountered since the start of my investing career in 1998 plays on the enormous size of the addressable market. And the size is usually so large that it dwarfs the businesses currently operating in that industry or theme. No wonder it is usually the most salient proximate cause of a theme gone wild.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In my experience, <u>there is only one problem with chasing a proximate theme based on TAM. It’s useless</u>. It makes astrology- based forecasts look respectable. TAM is pointless because it does not tell us whether any profits will be made, and even if a business can be profitable, TAM is silent on who will make that moolah.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The second reason for the seductiveness of a proximate theme is its simplicity. <u>Even a casual reader of business news will be aware of themes like e-commerce, renewable energy, electric vehicles, fintech, food delivery, artificial intelligence, self- driving cars, infrastructure, and biotech</u>. Unlike economic forecasting, which is full of jargon like “GDP” and “monetary supply,” a layperson can relate to themes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>How should we separate the proximate causes from the ultimate ones when there is euphoria or bearishness in a theme? Unfortunately, I am not aware of a foolproof method for doing so. But here is what we do. We define our unit of analysis clearly as the company. Not the economy, not the market, not a theme. <u>We care about the fundamentals of the company— nothing else. We have never invested in a theme and never will</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As I have discussed in this chapter, <u>we ignore proximate problems related to the economy, the market, and even the industry</u>. But the dilemma is much trickier to address when the proximate cause of problems relates to the company itself. Suppose the sales growth and profitability of the company has declined in the past few quarters, whereas its main competitors showed no such struggle. How would you decide if the performance issues are related to proximate (and hence temporary) causes or ultimate (and hence more permanent) causes? In my experience, developing a method and an instinct to separate proximate and ultimate causes of failure or success when they relate to a company event is invaluable for a long- term investor. I have been an investor for more than two decades, and this is where I stumble most often. As usual, at the extremes, the decision is straightforward. If the share price declines owing to a downturn in one or two quarters, we ignore the decline, considering it a proximate event. But if the decline results from a loss of market share for three years in a row, we ask if there is something fundamentally wrong with the business. It is the gray area in between these extremes that creates the worst headaches for us. I do not know of any foolproof method of cracking the conundrum; the answer is almost always very company specific.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Pain and the Gain of <strong>Headline Harassment</strong>: Let’s go back to the question I raised at the beginning of the chapter. You have sunk  70,000 in a fund that is now worth $ 36,000. Everything the fund manager touches seems to be heading down. Apart from continuing to tear your hair out, what should you do? Nothing. At the end of the anecdote, the time was March 2009. If you had done nothing and continued to hold the fund, your $ 36,000 would be worth a little more than $770,000 at the end of September 2022. Which is a multiple of 21.4 times over 13.5 years. In comparison, the main stock index grew six-fold during these years.<u>As you may have guessed, this was not a hypothetical situation.</u> <strong><u>I have described what transpired at Nalanda</u></strong>. What you see in the numbers I’ve given is the result of our aggressive buying during the global financial crisis of 2008 and its dramatic longer- term impact on the fund’s performance. The only change you would need to make is to switch dollars to rupees. 17 Your patience would have paid. A lot. As the Indian market started falling from March 2008, we started buying high- quality businesses, and we did not stop until early 2009. The further the market fell, the greater our buying frenzy was. In December 2008, <u>the fund had delivered an annualized return (called the internal rate of return, or IRR, in investing parlance)</u> <strong><u>of negative 55 percent (!)</u></strong><u>,</u> and we continued to invest as much as we could. The fund’s annualized rupee return as of September 2022 was 20.3 percent (after payment of all fees and expenses). What allowed us to invest when the world seemed to be coming to an end? We ignored all proximate causes of stock price decline and focused exclusively on the ultimate sources of success of a business.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>It is common knowledge that lousy news attracts way more eyeballs than good news</u></em><em>. We may blame the media for this bias, but psychologists have shown that people prefer reading bad news and remember it better. The media simply exploit an existing prejudice. In an article titled “On Wildebeests and Humans: The Preferential Detection of Negative Stimuli” in the journal Psychological Science, researchers showed that subjects remembered negative words faster and more often than positive ones.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In sharp contrast, there was no celebration of business as usual at the high-quality companies that were becoming part</u></em><em> of our portfolio during this period. No headlines screamed, “WNS Processes Another Mortgage Application,”“Triveni’s Factory Manufactures Turbine Number 39 for the Year,”“Page Industries Adds Two More Retailers Today in the City of Aurangabad,” or “Carborundum Factory in Chennai Finishes Another Shift.” Earlier I wrote, “Ultimate causes, thankfully, are way too dull for media coverage.” Now you know why. There is one more important reason we could embrace a diametrically opposite attitude to that of many of our peers in 2008. We are fortunate to have long-term investors—primarily U.S. university endowments and U.S. and European family offices—who have supported our aggression when the world seemed to be coming to an end. Not even one investor defaulted on their commitment. No one (I hope) tore at their hair! I know that many private equity and hedge funds could not persuade their investors to commit more capital in 2008. We were very fortunate.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Chapter Summary Evolutionary theory has taught me that . . . . . . we can reimagine investing by ignoring proximate causes of stock price movements while focusing on ultimate explanations of business success. 1. Evolutionary biology explores natural phenomena by searching for proximate and ultimate causes. Proximate mechanisms explain immediate influences on a trait. The role played by natural selection explains the ultimate cause of an organism’s success or failure in an environment. 2. Thus, to understand the impressive size and variety of dung beetle horns, evolutionary biologists ask the proximate question (e.g., which network of genes was switched on?), as well as the ultimate question (e.g., what is the adaptive value of the horns?). Scientists understand that these are different types of questions with different types of answers and that both types must be asked. 3. The investing world, too, must differentiate between proximate and ultimate causes. <u>Proximate causes of share price changes can result from the macroeconomy, the markets, the industry, or the company itself. Since proximate causes are highly salient (e.g., the Fed announcing an interest rate cut or a company announcing a slowing of sales growth), investors may erroneously overweight them in their decision-making process</u>. 4. We ignore all proximate causes when analyzing businesses. We focus exclusively on the business fundamentals, or the ultimate causes of the success or failure of businesses. 5. We were aggressive investors during the financial crisis of 2008 and the early days of the COVID- 19 pandemic because proximate worries compelled the markets to overlook the ultimate causes of the success of many high- quality businesses.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>An Overlooked Reason for the Underperformance of Fund Managers: We encountered two harsh realities in the introduction to this book: About 90 percent of fund managers cannot beat the market, and their performance has worsened over time. Why do fund managers underperform? Talk to a dozen insiders, and you will get a dozen different reasons for this sorry state. <u>One oft-repeated complaint is the misalignment of incentives for the fund manager</u>. The fund management company gets paid based on the size of the fund, not on its performance. But over the long term, many researchers have found that an increase in fund size can lead to declining performance. For example, in a study published in 2009 in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, an analysis of actively managed funds in the United States from 1993 to 2002 demonstrated a “significant inverse relation between fund size and fund performance.”  Similarly, in a 1996 article in the journal Financial Services Review, the authors write, “<u>Once large, equity funds do not outperform their</u> peers.”  They go on to advise investors to invest in smaller funds.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>What you will not find in these articles is the crux of this chapter. I <u>believe a crucial reason for the continued underperformance of fund managers is their focus on future rewards while ignoring the treasures of the past.</u> We at Nalanda pursue the profession of investing the same way evolutionary biologists do: <strong>We interpret the present in the context of history</strong>. Evolutionary biology does not make predictions as physics and chemistry do. Nor do we. Instead, our investment approach attempts to explain the present by interpreting what occurred in the past. In an essay on the theory of evolution, the late Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould wrote, “The present becomes relevant, and the past, therefore, becomes scientific, only if we can sum the small effects of present processes to produce observed results.” 4 He could have been writing about the way we invest.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Darwin wrote more than twenty-five books, and hundreds more have been written about him and his oeuvre. We can’t cover even a fraction of his genius here</u></em><em>. In this chapter, I want to focus on only one aspect of his method, which is evident in his groundbreaking book On the Origin of Species: his focus on historical information to make deductions about ongoing evolutionary processes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In my layperson’s view, the reason Darwin’s crowning achievement— the theory of natural selection— was not discovered earlier and remained unaccepted by many stalwarts during and after his lifetime was that few <u>understood the powerful effect of small changes accumulated over very long periods of time</u>. But for those who understood the relevance of history, the theory was so powerful and straightforward that the famous biologist Thomas Huxley remarked, “How extremely stupid not to have thought of that.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Chapter 14 of Origin presents copious evidence to bolster his claim that most species have evolved from very few common ancestors. <u>He called this phenomenon “descent with modification</u>.” He starts by pointing out the obvious: Organic beings are nested within groups. 19 The hierarchy levels, in ascending order, are as follows: species, genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom. Thus, dogs are the species Canis familiaris and belong to the genus Canis. When grouped with wolves and jackals, they belong to the family Canidae. When Canidae is grouped with other families like Felidae (cats), Ursidae (bears), Mustelidae (weasels), and many others, we get to the order Carnivora. Carnivora brackets along Cetacea (whales and dolphins), Perissodactyla (horses, tapirs), Sirenia (dugongs), Lagomorpha (rabbits), and others to form the class Mammalia. Mammalia, Amphibia, and other classes merge to form the phylum Chordata. Chordates, mollusks, nematodes, and numerous other phyla cluster to create the kingdom Animalia. Carolus Linnaeus, the Swedish botanist, laid the groundwork for this classification system in 1735 in Systema Naturae (The System of Nature).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Darwin was right, of course. Scientists have concluded that <u>our last universal common ancestor (LUCA) arose somewhere between 3.5 and 4 billion years ago</u>. LUCA then gave rise to the six significant kingdoms of life: animals, plants, fungi, protists, eubacteria, and archaea. Although Darwin wasn’t aware of four of these six kingdoms, I find it staggering that he still arrived at the correct conclusion. What a genius.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We see the same set of historical facts as everyone else.</u></em><em> <strong><u>We have no interest in forecasting the future</u></strong>. We study the history of a business to understand its financials, assess its strategies, gauge its competitive position, and finally assign value to it. So let’s take them one by one.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>[I recall] one of our portfolio companies a few years ago. We met with the CEO and CFO for about an hour or so. As we were about to depart, the CFO received a call on his mobile phone, got visibly upset at the caller, and exclaimed, <u>“I can’t say anything; the results will be out after a few weeks.” It turns out that the caller was a well-known investor who was checking to see how the quarter was progressing on the revenue and profit front</u>. If investors hound the company management for following quarter results, wouldn’t they do the same with research analysts? So why should the analysts bother with longer- term history? Analysts produce forecasts because their clients demand they produce forecasts. I am sure many of them know it is a futile exercise. Here is why. Let’s say I need to project the following year’s financials. I will need to forecast at least ten (if not more) numbers ranging from units sold, price per unit, cost of goods sold, sales expenses, receivables, capital expenditure, and so on. Let’s assume that I am a great guesser and that I will correctly guess each of the ten numbers with a 90 percent probability. Hence, the chance of guessing all ten numbers correctly for next year would be only 35 percent (0.9010). One may quibble that not all ten are independent variables, so we should not multiply them. True, but the number of variables is much greater than ten, and they are all at least semi- independent. Whichever way you evaluate the probability of guessing the next year’s financials correctly, it is probably worse than guessing heads or tails after tossing a coin. But this was only for next year. I also need to project for the following year and the year after that. How accurate do you think my estimates will be? The only financials we prepare are for the past decade or more. <u>Our financial trackers have no projections. Instead, we use the same factual financial information to which everyone else has access. Not unlike Darwin</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>If we don’t forecast financials, what do we do with historical numbers? A lot</u></em><em>. As permanent owners, we are incredibly paranoid about the financial performance of our businesses. So here is the way we use historical financials to assess our portfolio companies.<br />Two things may be evident to you as you read these questions: They are about the company’s strategic steps in the past, and these are issues that even a first- year undergrad could raise. What’s so great about these questions? Nothing. We ask these questions not to evaluate the answers objectively but to subjectively assess if they fit our preexisting hypotheses of success or failure. Yes, we know the answer we want before we have asked the first question. If we have done a decent job over many years, it is not a result of asking these mundane questions but because our underlying bias demands the answers fit our template. We have our templates for success and failure, and we aim to assess if the company’s strategy fits a pattern. Very few do—</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We avoid the automotive component space because, in general, its clients, the automotive companies, do not allow them to make money</u></em><em>. In the United States, for example, the top five car companies controlled about two- thirds of the market in 2021.27 This concentration allows them to drive a tough bargain with their suppliers: the automotive component companies. Unsurprisingly, not many parts suppliers can consistently earn a decent profit. India is even more consolidated than the United States— the dominant car company, Maruti Suzuki, controls half the Indian market. The Indian motorcycle market is an oligopoly of just three companies. It is not unusual for a parts supplier to have a huge customer concentration— a top customer typically accounts for 30 to 50 percent of revenues. Hence, our bias is to reject almost every automotive component business. There can be an exception, though. But that exception must fit the following template. First, the parts supplier would need to manufacture a critical component requiring proprietary technology and have a low customer concentration over many years. It should have only one or two competitors, and the competitive dynamics in the industry should be stable over the long term. Finally, there should have been no new entrants to the industry for many years, and the company should have delivered good financials historically. Note that not a single criterion here is about the future.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Assessing the strategy of a business is useless unless we have a strategy to comprehend the strategy</u></em><em>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Darwin discovered that the success of a species is not dependent on its being the best but simply being better than the competition.</u></em><em> This joke will make it more straightforward. <strong><u>When two friends hiking in a forest spot a lion, one starts putting on his running shoes. His friend says, “What are you doing that for? You can’t possibly outrun a lion.” The man replies, “I know, but I need only to run faster than you, not the lion!”</u></strong></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Investors, analysts, and academics have beaten the term “sustainable competitive advantage” to death. Still, as in evolutionary theory, the real question is not just about sustainable competitive advantage but about being consistently better than the competition. <u>And what is the meaning of “better”? For us, it relates to measurable parameters like ROCE, market share, free cash flow, balance sheet strength, consistency of financials, and other such measures</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We want our businesses to gain market share over the long term</u></em><em>, recognizing full well that the trend line may occasionally reverse in the short term.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In our diligence process, we received a lot of qualitative information from the management, customers, and even competitors about how the company’s strategy and direction had started yielding fruit in recent years. <u>The company had been performing well recently, but, with a longer-term lens, I should have seen that the company was a chronic underperformer</u>. Moreover, the same team of founder- managers had been running the business since its inception. So how could the following five- year result be any different from the past twenty- five? I had made a big blunder. When it comes to gauging competitive position, barring some exceptions, there is almost nothing better than measuring market share of volume, revenue, and profit over a long period. We live and learn.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Which of these three—45, 32, or 25—is the correct PE? It depends on the investor</u></em><em>. For us, it is the backward-looking 45, and for my friend, it is the forward-looking 25. Most discussions of PE or other valuation ratios (like price/book or enterprise value/EBITDA) are forward-looking. The only PE ratio we discuss relates to the delivered earnings of the past. It may be the previous twelve months or the past three years, or, for some highly cyclical businesses, even the past ten-year average PE (i.e., current market value divided by the average earnings of the past ten years). We also use other valuation metrics, but all value the current business based on its past performance. I can understand if some investors project earnings over one or two years since that’s not too far in the future. It’s not ideal, but I get it. What I fail to fathom is why investors do something worse. Much worse. It’s called discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. This makes academic sense. It’s true mathematically. But as a practical way to invest, it borders on being nonsensical. Let’s understand why. There are two main requirements for building a DCF spreadsheet: the discount rate and the cash flow projection.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>again, isn’t the notion of measuring risk by using volatility as a proxy quite silly?</u> As I discussed in chapter 1, how does riskiness have anything to do with volatility? For an investor, the riskiness of a business is directly proportional to the probability of capital loss of investing in that business. The higher the potential loss, the higher the risk. I don’t care about β and never will. As you can see in the formula, we need a number for the expected market return.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>If investors can’t forecast cash flows even a few days or months in advance, how can they be expected to project cash flows years ahead? But this is what the DCF methodology demands.</u></em><em> <strong>[AA Note: True, but one can use DCF models to gage the impact of different long-term outcomes.]</strong></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Investors and analysts rarely fail to build massive, complicated financial models that assess dozens of factors to project cash flows over many years in the future. Hail Excel. It’s not that the builders of these Excel models— whether analysts, bankers, consultants, or investors— are unaware of the pitfalls. But for some reason, the deep desire to look far in the future to arrive at an exact number overwhelms the rational voice admonishing the person to stop pretending they are doing anything useful. One of the best ways for you to get a sense of this future obsession is to read the transcripts of a company’s quarterly results conference calls. Most companies post such transcripts in their websites’ “Investor Relations” section. <u>I analyzed three conference call transcripts— for Walmart (for Q2 2018), P&amp; G (for Q4 2017), and General Motors (for Q2 2017)— and the results are stark. For Walmart, analysts and investors focused twenty-eight out of forty- nine questions on the future (e.g., “implied EBIT margin direction within the guidance”). On the P&amp; G call, fourteen out of twenty questions asked the management to make some kind of prediction (e.g., “Do you have more initiatives hitting the market?”). At General Motors, a staggering twenty- seven out of thirty- three questions were forward- looking (e.g., “What should we think about the cadence of the expected savings from the restructuring actions?”).</u> The tug- of- war between the analyst and the management team is occasionally painful to witness: The former tries to pin down exact forecasts for revenues and margins (so that they can populate the DCF model). Knowing full well that the future is inherently unpredictable, the latter attempts to sidestep the question with some broad generic comments. For example, on the General Motors call for Q2 2017, an analyst wanted to know the revenue projection for OnStar, an advanced communication system installed in GM cars. The answer from the CFO was, “As we have talked about before, yes, OnStar is generating revenue. We don’t disclose it separately. It continues to grow.”My sympathies lie with company management; they know that they don’t know what the future will bring. But, on the other hand, most analysts and fund managers, having never worked in a company, think that it is the management’s job to know the future; how else how will they be able to populate their DCF models? <u>I have been on the boards of more than twenty-five companies, and over the years I have never seen a management team meet its budgets.</u> Some exceed their projections, and some undershoot. Occasionally, the over- or underperformance is by a wide margin. If the company management can’t forecast correctly, how can investors do so? They can’t. More importantly, they shouldn’t try. We have never done a DCF analysis and never will. However, I know many— if not most— investors and analysts do. Maybe they have figured out a method to look far into the future that eludes me. In any event, our approach is straightforward.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Oh, one last point on valuation. It is always the last thing we discuss. When evaluating a business, risk comes first, quality second, and valuation last</u></em><strong><em>. </em></strong><strong>[AA Comment:  Ok.  But you only buy when the valuation is below an arbitrary level, even though you are searching for the long term winners.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As long- term investors, we have dissociated ourselves from the “what will happen?” obsession and replaced it with “what has actually happened?” The former is a laundry list of conjectures and opinions, and the latter, to a large extent, consists of facts. Of course, facts in and of themselves are empty, and what matters is the opinions we build onto those facts, but at least they give us a foundation for a discussion. For example, if a company has had a historical ROCE over the past decade of 40 percent, two investors could have widely different opinions of this “fact.” One could assert that the company has a great future, and the other could argue that microeconomic theory demands that these returns will be competed away. Understanding that the company has had unusually high returns in the past focuses the investors’ attention on the sources of these returns and their sustainability. For example, did the company earn these returns because of regulatory protection from overseas competition, and, if so, are we comfortable backing a business that has not faced genuine competition? Or were these returns earned despite fierce competition? <u>What has the company done relative to the competition that has made it so unique</u>?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The once- famous company Nokia exemplifies the first category of issues. Nokia was a high- flying company in the late 1990s and dominated the mobile phone market in the same way that the iPhone does today.  Large emerging markets like China and India were severely underpenetrated in the mobile phone sector in the 1990s. Based on historical performance, it appeared that Nokia would conquer the world. Investors couldn’t buy enough Nokia stock, and, at its peak in the year 2000, Nokia’s market value was about $ 325 billion. Since then, it has lost more than 90 percent of its value. In the year 2000, all the historical signals from the company— its financial performance, competitive position, reputation, and dealer and customer feedback— would have screamed, “This is an amazing company.” But Nokia could not compete with Apple, Samsung, or tens of local Chinese and Indian competitors over the next decade, and the Nokia phone is now a museum relic. Anyone relying only on the history of Nokia would have suffered massive losses. Giving weight to a track record is a necessary condition for investment success, but it is in no way sufficient. <u>We find this to be especially true in fast-changing industries that may or may not be technology related. Thus, in the case of Nokia, while most historical signals would have led one to conclude that the company had been truly outstanding, the very nature of the technology industry, in which rapid change is the norm, should have made any investor pause</u>. We have avoided fast- changing industries like the plague, and many are not even in the technology space. Industries like retailing, microfinance, food delivery, and e- commerce are in the early stages of evolution in India.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I changed seven schools in twelve years because my father was in the armed forces, and they transferred him every two years. These were all government schools where the quality of teachers wasn’t usually the best, to put it mildly. However, I doubt even the best private schools had someone like the incredible Mr. Rathod. We had recently arrived in a small town called Jamnagar when I was in grade 7. I was miserable because I had to bid farewell to my friends in the previous town (called Dehu Road), and I found it hard to fit in socially at this new school. However, Mr. Rathod and his history class got me through that year. He refused to teach us history from the prescribed textbook. Instead, he ordered us to use the school library to read about ancient and modern Indian history from books and popular comics. And then he asked each student to pick a topic and educate the class on what they had learned. Of course, the rest of us were free to disagree with the presenter, and Mr. Rathod encouraged us to be methodical and logical in our arguments. I distinctly remember a group of twelve- year- olds almost coming to blows when debating the British influence on India. Before meeting Mr. Rathod, history for me was objective, undisputed, unchanging. <u>Before him, every history teacher had drilled into me that there was only one correct answer to any question. Mr. Rathod taught us that most answers to questions in a history test should begin with, “It depends.</u> Throughout grade 7, he showed us directly and indirectly that history can teach us less about who they were and much more about who we are. The notion that we can all be great investors just by gauging history is nonsense. It has been fundamental to our process, but it works for us because of who we are. So I bring my prejudices and biases to something as simple as a historical balance sheet. Occasionally, there are vehement disagreements on how to interpret the past. It occurs even within our small, well- knit team, which has worked together for many years. In the middle of these fiery debates, I often yearn for Mr. Rathod. Why couldn’t he be here to adjudicate this?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Evolutionary theory has taught me that . . . . . . we investors can reimagine investing by studying and understanding the history of a business and an industry instead of constantly obsessing over the future. 1. <u>Darwin, the founder of modern evolutionary theory, understood better than anyone before him that the present was the result of the cumulative effect of the past</u>. 2. He proposed his three groundbreaking theories— natural selection, sexual selection, and common descent— by construing history in a new light. 3. Unlike physics and chemistry, the science of evolutionary biology does not make predictions. Rather than answering the question, “What will happen to humans?” it ponders over the conundrum, “How did bipedal humans evolve from an ancestral quadruped ape?” 4. The investment world is obsessed with the future. Studying history has taken a backseat to making bold forecasts. 5. Taking a leaf out of evolutionary biology, we focus exclusively on widely and openly available historical information to analyze businesses. We spend no time building projections and forecasts. 6. We develop a point of view on company financials, strategy, competitive position, and valuation by analyzing what has already happened without bothering about what will happen. 7. However, <u>concentrating on the past does have two main downsides. We may wrongly assume that (1) a historically successful business will continue to be so, or (2) a failed or failing business will continue to be so</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Our investment strategy has an unusual feature. <u>We don’t invest in individual businesses. It may seem like we do, but we don’t</u>. What in the world do we invest in then? Let’s do an evolutionary thought experiment to answer the question. Imagine another Earth- like planet that is at a similar distance from its sun- like star. This is not entirely improbable since there are a billion trillion (1021) stars in the universe. Would this planet evolve the same life forms as those on Earth? How likely is it to have honeysuckles and hornbills? Philosophers may have pondered this question for millennia, but the first modern scientist to attempt an answer was the late Harvard paleontologist and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould. In his excellent book Wonderful Life, Gould took the position that evolution was unpredictable: “Replay the tape a million times . . . and I doubt that anything like Homo sapiens would ever evolve again.”<br />Dolphins are mammals just like us, and sharks are fish. But their fusiform body shapes are pretty similar, and, more interestingly, they have the same coloration. Both have a light underbelly and darker back, making them harder to spot from above and below. George McGhee, a paleontologist, claims that the reason sharks, dolphins, tuna, and the extinct ichthyosaur look alike is that there is only one way for a fast- swimming animal to evolve.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Let’s move on to plants. Most of us have had coffee, tea, and chocolate (derived from cacao). The Brazilians among us will be familiar with the drink Guaraná Antarctica, made from the guaraná plant in the Amazon rainforest. All four plants produce the same chemical desired by humans: a purine alkaloid called 1,3,7- trimethylpurine- 2,6- dione— in short, caffeine. 9 These four plants may seem to be closely related, but they aren’t. <u>The common ancestor of tea and coffee dates back a hundred million years. Cacao is more closely related to maple and eucalyptus trees than to tea and coffee. Bizarrely, the ancestor of coffee gave rise to potatoes and tomatoes but not tea! Plants have many defense mechanisms against predators, and it appears that some have converged toward the same solution: producing caffeine.</u></em> <strong>[AA Note:  The book Why We Sleep shows a picture of what caffeine does to a spider’s ability to build spider webs.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I could go on and on to fill this book with examples of convergent evolution in the natural world</u></em><em>. But scientists now agree that convergence is the rule, not an exception, in nature. This sentiment is best expressed by the most famous advocate of convergence, the Cambridge paleontologist Simon Conway Morris, who has written two books on the subject. He has explained convergence by saying, “Certainly it’s not the case that every Earth- like planet will have life let alone humanoids. But if you want a sophisticated plant, it will look awfully like a flower. If you want a fly, there are only a few ways you can do that. If you want to swim, like a shark, there are only a few ways you can do that. If you want to invent warm- bloodedness, like birds and mammals, there are only a few ways to do that.” Convergence in nature symbolizes a profound fact<strong>: There is a pattern to success and failure</strong>. What can the Caribbean anole, the crest- tailed marsupial mouse, and caffeine teach us about investing? Convergence in business symbolizes a profound fact: There is a pattern to success and failure.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We Don’t Invest in Individual Businesses Earlier in the chapter, I made the following assertion about our investment strategy: We don’t invest in individual businesses. It may seem like we do, but we don’t. So what in the world do we invest in then? <u>We invest in convergent patterns. We seek patterns that repeat. As we saw, “replaying the tape of life” often yields the same result</u>. We operate on the principle that the business world is no different. There is a big difference between asserting “I love this business” and “I love this business construct.” We are fans of the latter, not the former. We don’t care about a business; we are deeply attached to a business template. Not unlike the natural world, which converges toward a small subset of answers to the same questions, we have seen that companies around the globe behave in similar ways when facing a similar environment. Not always, but often enough. We have benefited enormously by asking this simple convergence question up front: “Have we seen this pattern elsewhere?”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We detest the phrases “This time, it’s different” and “My gut yells me this will work.”</u></em><em>  We need to see the evidence that our investment thesis has worked elsewhere. If it hasn’t, we are unlikely to touch it.  We are the antithesis of the venture capital community, which earnings its living by betting on untested and unproven businesses.  I am in awe of successful venture capital firms, but my admiration for them will never translate into a desire to emulate them.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Daniel Kahneman is one such individual.  <u>His masterpiece Thinking, Fast and Slow should be compulsory reading for all investing 101 classes</u>.  If you are already an investor, there is no more valuable chapter to read (and re-read_ than Chapter 23, “The Outside View.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As I was transitioning to consulting in my early investing days<u>, I was the biggest believer in the myth that more work produces better answers for investors.  It doesn’t.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The second benefit [of not investing in bad businesses] was the time , money, and effort saved</u></em><em>.  Instead of conducting lengthy and unproductive management meetings, schmoozing the investor relations person, paying fat fees to consultants, and spending weeks to construct multimegabyte Excel spreadsheets, we spend a few hours on the internet, download a few reports, and make our decision within a few minutes <u>with enough time to go home early to our families</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Buying into a business means also buying into the industry of that business</u></em><em>.  … But how could we be sure that it would continue to be successful?  By witnessing the convergent outcomes of other businesses within the industry, all of which had been able to scale their revenues over many decades without sacrificing profitability. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I highlight six types of businesses we avoid at all costs:  1. Those owned and run by crooks. 2. Turnaround situations. 3. Those with high levels of debt. 4. M&amp;A junkies. 5. Those in fast changing industries. 6. Those with unaligned owners.  … The common thread through all of these was the hunger for detection patterns and seeking a convergence of outcomes.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>We are price sensitive. <strong><u>The median trailing price/earnings ratio for our portfolio at the time of our investment is less than 15 when the Indian marlet has been about 19 to 20</u></strong>.  We have rarely ever paid 20 times trailing P/E. Most importantly, we have never said, “This is such a great business that even 30 P/E is justified.” … The markets are generally efficient – businesses like these are rarely6 available at a throwaway price. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I know I that I would have missed Amazon in the past, and will miss an Amazon-like business in the future.  So be it.  The only saving grace of this failure<u>? I doubt I will see another Bezos in my lifetime</u>.</em> <strong>[AA Note:  And he retired years ago.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Zahavi’s handicap principle contends that a signal that is costly to produce is honest and therefore can be relied upon by a receiver. Strong signals:  1. Females are more attracted to males with redder or brighter hues.  2. Males with redder coloration are fitter than paler males.  3. It is costly for healthy males to produce a deep read pigment. …</u></em><em> <strong><u>For a signal to strong, it must be costly</u></strong>.  An honest signal is not “our margins will be 15% next year” but “our average margin was 12% over the last ten years.” … A good reputation is a very costly signal – and hence an honest one.  [Cites Phil Fisher and the “scuttlebutt method” for ascertaining good reputations.]  [Doesn’t mention that a repeated willingness to go against the grain by investing in the long term when the market is myopically punishing such action, is perhaps one of the strongest and honest signals a company can send.]</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Kurten demonstrated mathematically and empirically that phenotypical change (i.e., changes in the bodily characteristics of a species) could be rapid from one generation to the next, but that in contrast, evolution can be slow on long time scales. … Contrary to expectations, the pace of genetic evolution is inversely correlated with the period of measurement.  In less than a decade, a finches’ beak size increases then decreases because of natural selection.  When observed over decades, beak size did not change that much.  It fluctuates due to extreme weather events. … This realization has helped me formulated an investing principle that I call the Grant-Kurten principle of investing.  It goes as follows: When we find high-quality businesses that do not fundamentally alter their character over the long term, we should exploit the inevitable short-term fluctuations in their businesses for buying and not selling. … Since [buying opportunities] arise infrequently, we rarely ever buy.  We are lazy.  After investing, we ignore the short term fluctuations because the fundamental characteristics of stellar businesses remain stable over the long term.  We have sold only when there had been an egregiously bad capital allocation or irreparable damage to the business.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The absence of evidence is evidence of absence.</u></em><strong> [AA Note:  Nassim Taleb disagrees.]</strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>There are a few large and successful firms in most industries.  The successful companies are becoming even more successful.  Weak companies are getting weaker.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We have a straightforward rule that is also easy to implement: Buy when the price is right.</u></em><em>  Unfortunately, not everyone follows this rule.  A widely practiced rule is buy when the time is right.  That is also a straightforward rule, but is it easy to implement?  We follow the former because we know the price we want to pay for the business we want to own.  It may or may not be the right price, but we know it for sure.  We have no way of figuring out the right price.  Maybe some folks do.  Good for them. … Lets say we have valued a business at $100 per share.  If the stock falls to $100 and out business assessment remains unchanged, we buy as much of the business as we can at or below $100.  [After making this statement he espouses the magic of compounding and how it made investors like Buffett and Davis fabulously rich over the very long term, as measured in decades.]  … Not selling makes us better buyers.  That seems like a weird assertion. … Over the years I have heard many objections from my fund manager friends and investors who have refused to give us money because they were uncomfortable with our permanent owner approach.  .. <strong><u>Why should I hold on to 60 P/E stock?</u></strong>  We are price sensitive; we do not invest if the valuation is high.  A logical question, then is, Why aren’t we seller when the valuation is high? … It’s a logical and fair question.  It is so logical and fair that most fund managers will sell and exit at this point.  We won’t.  The reasons are three-fold.  First we have found that great businesses usually surprise to the upside. Second, valuation multiples generally don’t stay benign for great businesses. Third, why should I limit my valuation to only the next five years? </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Objection 2:  My “incremental” return will be low from now on [i.e. after the multiple expands, while I own it well beyond the entry multiple that I demand].</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Objection 3: There is a better opportunity to deploy capital. <strong>… <u>We never engage in “sell-high-to-buy-low activity</u></strong>. &#8230; One justification for this hamster-on-a-wheel behavior is that it is prudent to sell a business with a 50 P/E to buy a business with a 15 P/E.  Not for us.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>We have been successful investors not because we are better at buying, but because we refuse to succumb to the temptation of selling</u></em><em>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The investment community ties itself up in knots over finding the “best” investments.  I have seen extraordinarily complex algorithms and multigigabyte spreadsheets to assess the value and quality of a business.  One the other hand, we are interested only in executing a sound investment process. … We invest only in exceptional businesses because most businesses fail, and we want to reduce uncertainty.  <strong><u>We buy only at attractive valuations because, while we don’t know what will go wrong, we assume that something will</u></strong>.  … Our algorithm … has only three steps:  1. Eliminate significant risks. 2. Invest only in stellar businesses at a fair price. 3. Own them forever.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"> </p>								</div>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/05/31/what-i-learned-about-investing-from-darwin/">What I Learned About Investing from Darwin</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Airlines of the Jet Age: A History</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/04/12/airlines-of-the-jet-age-a-history-2011/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=airlines-of-the-jet-age-a-history-2011</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2023 11:16:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History & Economics]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Reginald E. G. Davies, 2011 (461 p.) This is a comprehensive book that provides the history of the airline industry, from its beginnings early in the 20th Century through the...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/04/12/airlines-of-the-jet-age-a-history-2011/">Airlines of the Jet Age: A History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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									<p style="font-weight: 400;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">By Reginald E. G. Davies, 2011 (461 p.)</span></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">This is a comprehensive book that provides the history of the airline industry, from its beginnings early in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century through the modern era of transcontinental airliners and deregulation.  It provides detailed and thorough stories of hundreds of airlines around the globe, including their founders, geo-political contexts, business strategies, and the aircraft they flew.  Packed with pictures and maps, it also serves as a precious reference guide to an important industry that continues to make the world smaller.  At 461 pages, the hard copy sells on Amazon for $51.88, while the Kindle version goes for $39.99, but for anyone who enjoys reading about airlines and their airplanes, it is definitely worth the price.  In the spirit of full disclosure, my opinion may be biased, for I am an aerospace engineer by training, worked as an airline securities analyst for nearly a decade, and several of my close family members spent most of their adult life in the industry, including my father, two of my cousins, and my brother, who flies the 787 Dreamliner for American Airlines.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">The author, R.E.G Davies, was born in 1921 and died shortly after the publication of this seminal book, aged 90. He had a long career in the aircraft manufacturing business, where he worked for BEA, Bristol Aerospace, de Havilland, and Douglas Aircraft.  He published many other books on the industry during his long career, including illustrated issues on <em>Pan</em> <em>Am</em> (1987), <em>Delta </em>(1991), <em>TransBrasil</em> (1997), <em>Charles Lindbergh</em> (1997), and <em>Howard Hughes </em>(2006). This website (<a href="https://www.yesterdaysairlines.com/model-airport-blog/an-airline-its-aircraft-series-by-reg-davies">link</a>) profiles Davies and several of his other works. Needless to say, he is an authority on the subject.</p><p style="font-weight: 400; text-align: center;"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8502" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/image001.jpg" alt="" width="372" height="290" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/image001.jpg 372w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/image001-300x234.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/image001-150x117.jpg 150w" sizes="(max-width: 372px) 100vw, 372px" /><span style="text-align: center; letter-spacing: 0px;">Reginald Edward George Davies</span></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">What I liked most about the book was how it provides the context for one to draw critical inferences about how the industry developed and where it may be headed.  A major insight was that the deregulation that swept the globe in the late 1970s had the opposite impact of what was intended.  Instead of creating greater competition and lower fares, it led to many failures, massive consolidation, and, ultimately, higher fares.  While government backing and equipment selection were crucial determinants of survival pre-deregulation, it wasn’t until the mushrooming of the low-cost-carrier (LCC) model that companies like Southwest in the US, Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe, and Air Asia in the East transformed the industry by making air travel more accessible.  “For almost two decades,” Davies writes, “the annual increase in passenger-miles in the United States had averaged about 15%, which meant that the total volume doubled every five years. When the Jet Age began, the figure was 40 billion. In 1970 it was 170 billion. The numbers for the first-class market hardly changed, but for all other classes of travel, in sheer numbers alone, the airline industry had undergone a metamorphosis. <u>Air travel for the masses had arrived</u>.”  The success of the new model was a boon for the jetliner and engine manufacturers, most notably Boeing, Airbus, General Electric, Rolls Royce, and Pratt &amp; Whitney.  While thousands of Boeing’s 7-series and Airbus 3-series wide body jets were sold, the Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 narrow bodies sold in the tens of thousands, making them by far the most ubiquitous aircraft on the planet.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Another interesting insight is how many of the big airline collapses happened as a result of hubris and over-expansion. Even among the low cost carriers, demise was a result of loss of focus.  Conversely, the big success stories were led my managements who stuck to their knitting.  For example, both Southwest and Ryanair have focused on secondary airports and a fanatical devotion to keeping costs low, not only through frugality, but also simplicity. Sticking to strategies like one aircraft type, one class seating, no frills service, and point-to-point flying, was crucial to these airlines’ success and dominance over the decades.  When we were happy shareholders of Ryanair during my days at the Dreyfus Corporation, circa 2000, I was delighted to discover during a visit to their Dublin headquarter that CEO Michael O’Leary’s office had cement flooring.  Now that’s the kind of frugality one doesn’t see too often!</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">A final insight is that one of the biggest beneficiaries of the rapid growth in commercial aircraft deliveries that occurred post-deregulation is the aftermarket parts industry.  Heico Corp. (HEI), which is one of the <em>Outstanding Companies</em> in our portfolio, is a leader in this attractive end market. Heico makes FAA-approved generic aircraft parts and sells them to practically every airline in the world &#8211; over one thousand, carrying more than five billion passengers annually.  With Asia &#8211; and China in particular &#8211; still behind but growing rapidly, and with the average age of aircraft in service surpassing ten years, the need for aftermarket parts should continue to grow briskly for decades to come.  Heico is by far the largest non-OEM supplier, with over twenty thousand parts in its catalog, but they also provide distribution and niche repair services as well as specialty parts for the OEMs themselves.  The stock has been compounding in the 20’s for decades and we see little reason why this should change. Incidentally, on Wednesday, April 19, 2023, at 10:00 NY-time, we will be conducting a one-hour webinar on Heico, so if you have an interest in learning more about this amazing company and the industries they serve, here is the <a href="https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-ynyaVLVRWeQTcra9LmlCA">registration link</a>. An expiring link to the replay will be available to those who request, but I’ll stop here on this timely commercial.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">In closing, this was a worthwhile book that I would recommend to not only those who are fascinated by airlines and airplanes, but also world history and business strategy.  While the book was not necessarily easy to read, I feel smarter about the aerospace industry and the important role it plays in shaping world history.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Regards,</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Adriano</p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em><u>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</u></em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part One: Piston-Engine Prelude</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 1: Air Transport Infancy</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During the first few years after the epoch-making flight of the Wright brothers on 17 December 1903, little thought was given to the idea that heavier-than-air flying machines (airplanes, or aeroplanes) could earn an honest living by carrying people or goods, for peaceful purposes or for war, at any time during the then foreseeable future.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Starting with the LZ 10 Schwaben on 15 July 1911, four Zeppelin airships flew within Germany until the outbreak of the Great War of 1914–18. They carried 34,028 passengers (of whom 10,179 paid for the privilege) on 1,588 flights, either on local sight-seeing jaunts or sometimes between German cities.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The question of “which was the first airline?” has to be qualified by precise definitions. Omitting the qualification of a sustained operation, i.e., more than a few months’ service duration, pride of place must go to the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line, founded by Percy Fansler in St. Petersburg, Florida, toward the end of 1913.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In Russia, a far-sighted designer, Igor Sikorsky, with the cooperation of Mikhail Shidlovsky, chairman of the Russo-Baltic Wagon Company at St. Petersburg, built the world’s first four-engined aircraft.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Then, on 30 June 1914, with a crew of three, Igor flew from St. Petersburg to Kiev, a distance of 660 miles, with one stop, arriving in triumph in the afternoon of the next day.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A month after the flight to Kiev, the Great War broke out.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By a remarkable coincidence, the first cautious steps toward the foundation of a great new industry were made in two cities of the same name: the first regularly scheduled airline in St. Petersburg, Florida, and the first successful load-carrying airplane, as a transport vehicle, in St. Petersburg, Russia.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 2: Airline Adolescence</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By the mid-1920s, air transport in the United States was effectively non-existent, except for the Post Office air mail system, which did not carry people.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With the realization that air transport could lead to big business, after the Kelly Act and especially after the sudden enthusiasm for and promotion of aviation by Charles Lindbergh’s dramatic solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean in 1927, airlines converged into amalgamations and affiliations, and airline stocks sold at a premium. The resultant corporations survived the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and the largest ones became a trio of powerul transcontinental airline systems. Their financial backing and consequent stature was considerable, and their combined strength enabled the United States to overhaul other countries. By 1929, U.S. airline traffic went from strength to strength to dominate the world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The transcontinental trio that emerged from all the infighting consisted of: (1) United Air Lines, formed by the amalgamation of four of the contract mail carriers. Backed by the Boeing Company, its coast-to-coast route linked San Francisco directly with New York via Chicago and intermediate points, using, predictably, Boeing aircraft types. (2) American Airways, the merger, under the control of the Aviation Corporation of America (AVCO), of three airline groups, each of which had been formed by the merger of, or as subdivisions of, several smaller mail contract carriers. Aircraft used were of many different types, from many manufacturers. (3) Transcontinental and Western Air (T.W.A.) was the result of the merger of Western Air Express and Transcontinental Air Transport (T.A.T.) because Walter Brown, the Postmaster General, would not approve mail contracts to two airlines competing on the same route.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Boeing had produced what aviation historians agree was the first “modern” airliner. The Boeing 247 incorporated several refinements. It had only two engines, which, however, produced the same power as the Ford Tri-Motor’s three, and eliminated the excessive vibration and noise in the cabin caused by the engine in the nose of the fuselage. The engines were mounted into, rather than attached to the wing, and this feature alone added about 25 mph to the speed because the landing gear could be retracted, reducing the airflow drag.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>the Boeing 247 was about 60% faster than the Ford, which was quickly seen to be obsolescent.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The winner of this special competition was Douglas Aircraft Company, with its DC-1, a prototype that quickly went into production as the Douglas DC-2. It had 14 seats, compared to the 247’s 10, flew just as fast, and its cabin was far more comfortable, mainly because the wing spars did not go through it. If the 247 was the first modern transport airplane, the DC-2, with its comfortable cabin, was the first that could justify the use of the word airliner.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>While the European nations were linking their empires with their respective homelands, the United States had adopted—or had been cajoled into the acceptance of—a “chosen instrument” to develop an overseas network. The instrument was Pan American Airways, an airline that had been formed and expanded, with remarkable efficiency and élan, by Juan Trippe, entrepreneur extraordinary. It had been founded in 1927 and made its first scheduled mail flight from Key West, Florida, to Havana, a 90-mile hop, on 28 October 1928.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>For the west coast (Pacific) route, an agreement was made with the W.R. Grace shipping and trading company to form the Pan American-Grace Corporation (PANAGRA), and the line reached Buenos Aires, the Argentine capital then known as the “Paris of South America,” on 12 October 1929. Meanwhile, however, a rival enterprise, the New York, Rio and Buenos Aires Line (NYRBA) had pioneered the east coast (Atlantic) route, also to Buenos Aires, and with superior equipment.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In the late 1920s, Pan American Airways encircled the Carribbean Sea with flying boats, because landing strips in Central America and in the islands were inadequate. The initial aircraft were Sikorsky S-38s,</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With the Sikorsky S-42, Pan American Airways made the world’s first trans-ocean airline survey flight in 1935.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One of the most famous flights in air transport history: Pan American’s Martin 130 flying boat, the China Clipper, opened Trans-Pacific air mail service in 1935, and passenger service in 1936.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Germany had had to surrender all its colonies, and Deutsche Luft Hansa (D.L.H.) had been handicapped in its route development by the political and social effects of the aftermath of the First World War. Its technical prowess was unmatched.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One of the first countries in the world to establish scheduled air services was Australia. The reason for its success was simply a matter of geography. The vast emptiness of the “outback” precluded surface transport, which was near to being non-existent.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Surprisingly, the colonial nations did nothing to develop air transport in China, except, as early as 1920, two British companies made a few attempts, but were frustrated by the belligerent activities of the many local war-lords.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Frustrated by bureaucratic procrastination, Curtiss had had to set up China Airways Federal and started service on 21 October 1929 up the Yangste River as far as Hankow, but had to terminate this on 15 December. Finally, a compromise was devised to satisfy all parties. A new C.N.A.C. was incorporated on 8 July 1930 and it proceeded to develop air routes between the main cities of China.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The French lost the political game in Brazil, when the German Condor Syndikat started some experimental flights, called the Linha da Lagôa, on 3 February 1927, in the southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul, in which much of the population had German roots, and many were German-speaking. This line developed to become the Syndicato Condor, which began operations on 1 July 1927, and soon expanded northward. Additionally, German immigrant interests founded Viação Aérea Rio-Grandense (VARIG), which took over the Linha route and concentrated on local services within the southern State, starting on 22 June of the same year. These airlines used Junkers or Dornier equipment.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Promoted aggressively by Ralph O’Neill, and obliged to set up a Brazilian subsidiary, NYRBA got under way on 1 August 1929, with a shuttle service across the River Plate, and finally completed its route to Miami (not New York) on 25 February 1930. O’Neill introduced the fine Consolidated Commodore flying boats, but was outmanuevered by the wily Juan Trippe of Pan American Airways, which absorbed NYRBA on 15 September, and changed the name to Panair do Brasil on 21 November of the same year.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Within Brazil, the only other airline of consequence before the Second World War was Viaçâo Aérea São Paulo (VASP), founded by the City, the State, and the Bank of the rapidly growing metropolis of São Paulo. It too used German aircraft, introducing the ubiquitous Junkers-Ju 52/3m to Brazilian air travelers.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 3 Wartime Hiatus – And Opportunity</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 3 September 1939, when the world was poised to consolidate an inter-connecting airline system, the nations divided themselves into warring factions, extending far beyond the confines of Europe.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>When the Second World War broke out in Europe, Pan American had just begun scheduled services across the North Atlantic, and it continued to expand during the next two years.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A group of the largest U.S. airlines had sponsored the design of a large airliner as early as 1936. The result was the Douglas DC-4E, which United Air Lines put into experimental service, briefly, on 1 June 1939.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 10–11 July 1943, the Australian QANTAS Empire Airways inaugurated the world’s longest nonstop air route, one that would keep that record for many years.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>All routes beyond the Mediterranean and those to the west of the western frontier of Germany were immediately suspended in 1939.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During most of the Second World War, Deutsche Lufthansa could carry important passengers to northern Norway and to Portugal and the Mediterranean.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 4: Post-War Recovery</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In the first full post-war year, passenger traffic doubled, from six million boardings in 1945 to 12 million in 1946. The five leading trunk airlines were each boarding more than a million each every year. American Airlines, United Air Lines, and T.W.A. controlled the transcontinental skies; Eastern Air Lines dominated the area east of the Mississippi; and Capital Airlines, which emerged in the northeast, was a substantial competitor. Meanwhile, under Juan Trippe’s brillant leadership, Pan American Airways dominated intercontinental air routes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In Brazil, for example, most of the country, larger than the U.S. 48 States, with inadequate railroads, still awaited the benefits of air transport. To service the small communities throughout the land, where airfields were usually short dirt strips, the veteran DC- 3s were welcome. Many airlines were formed by inventive entrepreneurs to supplement the established VARIG, Cruzeiro do Sul, and VASP inter- city networks. Redes Estaduais Aéreas, Ltda. (REAL), in fact, vigorously promoted by Linneu Gomez, expanded everywhere until the construction of a connecting road, and before its demise and acquisition by VARIG, its number of boarding passengers, often to fly only a few miles, climbed to rank tenth in the world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 5: Worldwide Expansion</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The designs were as good as, if not better than, the Americans’ but the mass production capability was inadequate. Even worse were the shortcomings in product support.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Except for the Atlantic, many of the British routes in the post- war recovery period were still flown by flying boats.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Until the latter 1960s, almost the entire continent of Africa was under colonial rule. Only Liberia, which had been founded with the support and instigation of the United States (but was commercially dependent on it because of its rubber industry), and Ethiopia, which had suffered Italian colonial rule for a few pre- war years, had enjoyed political independence since the “Struggle for Africa” in the latter years of the 18th century.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With the exception of South Africa, a thriving British dominion, rich in minerals, including gold and diamonds, Africa had never had an indigenous airline. When the Second World War ended, the entire continent, except, as previously noted, Liberia and Ethiopia, was still under European colonial rule. In many ways, ranked among all the continents, Africa had been something of a poor relation, with the Europeans and their airlines interested only in serving their overseas administrations, businesses, affluent safari hunters, and armed forces. Except for Johannesburg, not a single city south of the Mediterranean hinterland could be regarded as a viable destination in its own right. But a new infrastructure had been established, partly because of wartime necessity. The tide of nationalism among the host of small embryo countries was to take a few years to grow in strength and momentum, but the need for efficient communications and travel for people, mail, and cargo was, during the 1950s, growing at an alarming rate. Railroad construction had lost its momentum. Promising lines drawn hopefully on the map remained broken. The ambitious Cape- to- Cairo railway was never completed. Road construction was sporadic and inadequate. The continent was thus poised for further airline development on a grand scale; and in May 1952, this is what happened, in a manner that was to be one of the most far- reaching single events in the history of air transport.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Two: The First Jet Age</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 6: The First Jets and Turboprops</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The jet engines did not use gasoline. Early experiments had quickly shown that this petroleum product, highly refined with high octane- ratings, had improved the performance of piston engines. But this was dangerous, even lethal, if used as the fuel for jet engines, which were subjected to strong compressed air pressure and ignition. The engines simply blew up. The solution was to use kerosene, a fuel that, though refined from crude oil, like gasoline, was less volatile, and more managable for the apparatus of jet engine design. Even so, the fuel consumption rates were high.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The all- important T.B.O. (Time Between Overhaul) was the criterion of technical excellence by which all engines were judged, as this was a major item of maintenance cost, one that brought the aircraft back into the hangars for days at a time, costing precious revenue.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One of the unseen yet revolutionary benefits the introduction of jet engine propulsion bestowed upon the commercial airline industry was service life that reached 12, 15, 20 years or more.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The supreme accolade came on 20 October 1952, when the great Pan American Airways, symbol of the United States’ technical supremacy across the world’s airways, placed an order for the Comet 3, a developed version of the Comet, able to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Tragedy was to come later; but for a few glorious months, de Havilland had the world at its feet.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A new phrase suddenly received much attention in the language of aeronautical terminology: metal fatigue. The phenomenon was already known, but it had hitherto never been a problem, as no case had ever been recorded of an airliner’s structure being affected by it. But the Comet was different.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 7: Turboprop Ascendancy</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>No doubt Canada’s commonwealth affiliation affected the decision in a small way, but the airplane sold itself, especially when it was able to comply with the strict regulations imposed on all airliners by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By mid- 1957, three- quarters of Capital’s seat- miles were flown by Viscounts, but Capital had over- reached itself. Perhaps it misjudged the traffic projections and underestimated the ability of its competitors to remain strong. More important, under the regulatory Civil Aeronautics Board authority, all new route extensions had to be argued at great length, with the incumbent airlines resisting all attempts by newcomers to penetrate their territories. Capital desperately needed longer routes. The lucrative markets to Florida were delayed until September 1958. Capital’s finances took a plunge. It could not make its progress payments to Vickers, which foreclosed on the debt. On 1 June 1961, the airline was purchased by United, which continued to fly the Viscounts for several years after the takeover.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>American Airlines, under the leadership of C.R. Smith, had recognized the threat from Capital Airlines’s Viscounts on many of its prestige routes, especially New York- Chicago. It outlined the specification for a four- engined type that would outclass the British turboprop. The request was met by Lockheed, famous for its Constellations, with the four- engined L- 188 Electra, which answered Smith’s requirements. It was twice as big as the Viscount, and its Allison 501 engines made it faster— 400 mph instead of 300 mph. It was more than adequate for all the main inter- city routes of the United States, except for the transcontinental nonstops, which were the province of the Douglas and Boeing jets.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 3 February 1959, an American Electra crashed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport, but this drew no special attention. There were soon two more crashes, by Braniff on 28 September and by Northwest on 17 March 1960. Both aircraft had broken up in flight, and the F.A.A. stepped in. There was much understandable pressure to ground the Electras, but F.A.A.’ s “Pete” Quesada surprisingly did not do so. Instead, with the problem revealed as a cyclic vibration caused by the long shaft between engine and propeller at the high speed cruise level, services were permitted to continue at a speed reduced from 400 to 316 then to 295 mph.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>the Electra sales were subsequently sluggish. The Australian QANTAS bought it for the Tasman Sea route to New Zealand, and the latter’s Tasman Empire Air Lines (TEAL) had to follow suit. In Europe, only the Dutch K.L.M. joined the customer list, and in Latin America, it found favor with only the Brazilian VARIG.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Only 33 Tupolev Tu- 114s were built, but it made its mark. It was larger than the contemporary jets, with a gross weight of 170 tons, compared to the Boeing 707- 300’ s 168 tons; and for more than a decade, until the advent of the Boeing 747, it was the largest airliner in the world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 8: The First Big Jets</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The first of the famous line, the Series 100, made its first flight on 15 July 1954— while the de Havilland team was working day and night to revive the now endangered Comet— and on 13 October 1955, Boeing made its breakthrough into the commercial airline market, hitherto dominated by Douglas, Lockheed, Convair, and Martin. Previously, for different reasons, it had failed. The 1933 Boeing 247, the 1939 Boeing 314 flying boat, the post- war Boeing 377 Stratocruiser were all good airplanes, but they never sold in substantial numbers. With the Boeing 707, this was to change dramatically and permanently.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Boeing 707- 100 made its first flight on 20 December 1957 and delivered the first one to Pan American on 15 August 1958. The airline had a dozen aircraft in service before the first Douglas DC- 8 was delivered, on 7 February 1961. By this time, Pan Am’s Boeing 707s had girdled the globe, and Trippe reduced the DC- 8 order to 19.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>the Jet Age began in earnest when Pan American’s 707 started to fly every day across the Atlantic in October 1958 and the whole world rushed to jump on to the Big Jet band wagon.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By the year 2000, U.S. domestic travel reached almost saturation levels; everyone traveled by air, with long- distance railroads only a memory.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By the end of the year, eight U.S. domestic airlines were operating jets. The fourth member of the Big Four, Eastern Air Lines, had delayed its jet order, uncertain as to the choice between jet and turboprop, but finally entered the field on 24 January 1960, at long last to be on a technical par with National on the key New York- Miami route.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Before the Comet 4 and Boeing 707s made their dramatic entry on the scene in October 1958, a trans- Atlantic air journey between New York and London, Paris, or Frankfurt, even nonstop in a Lockheed Super Constallation or DC- 7C, could take between 12 or 14 hours, depending on the winds, invariably westerlies.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The introduction of jet airliners revolutionized the entire basis of trans- Atlantic service. Average speeds in excess of 550 mph permitted an eastbound journey in a comfortable seven hours, and westbound in about eight— because of the prevailing winds.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Stimulated by the introduction of Economy Fares in April 1959, North Atlantic air traffic grew by leaps and bounds. During the five years following the introduction of the jets, passenger numbers doubled, and then quadrupled in a decade.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>All the airline countries of the world cheerfully laid down concrete to extend and to strengthen runways to accept the Boeing 707s and the DC- 8s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The proliferation of jet airline services throughout the world was phenomenal. Within two or three years of the historic trans- Atlantic inaugurations of October 1958, a dozen airlines were crossing Asia and a dozen to South Africa. Almost as many were crossing the South Atlantic, eight or nine across the Pacific, the Central Atlantic, and even the North Pole.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Boeing name became identified with the Jet Age, superseding Douglas, which ruled supreme since the DC- 2 of 1934. And apart from any technical considerations, such was its imprint on society as a whole that Boeing Boeing was a box- office success for theater- goers during the 1960s. The Seattle manufacturer became a household word, epitomizing the transport revolution that became known universally as “the Jet Age.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The ascendancy of the turboprop generation to front- line flagship status lasted for barely a decade. By the 1960s, any airliner that was propeller- driven was regarded as old fashioned.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 9: The Short-Haul Jets</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 12 December 1959 the Brazilian airline Viação Aérea Rio- Grandense (VARIG), only the third to open service with the short- haul jet, took a gamble while waiting for delivery of its Boeing 707s. It linked its home city, Porto Alegre, with New York, with stops at São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Port of Spain, and Nassau, and on 20 January 1960 it consolidated the service to include Brazil’s new capital, Brasilia.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Several other airlines had followed Capital to buy the new turboprop, but there was no rush to buy Caravelles. Trans World Airlines (T.W.A.) did order 20 Mark 10A versions on 7 September 1961, but the order was cancelled in May 1962. Pressure to buy American products was strong.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Germany’s reentry into the commercial airline field took a little longer. A whole decade went by while the scars of war and the bitterness of Europe simmered down toward the country that had bred Nazi- ism. Not until 1 April 1955 did the once- familiar flying crane insignia (oldest in the airline industry, dating back to 1919) reappear in European skies. Three years later, after Convairliners, the new Lufthansa introduced the Viscount (the larger V- 800 series); in 1960, after Constellations, it introduced its first long- range jet, the Rolls- Royce- engined Boeing 707- 430. Unlike Alitalia, it deferred interest in short- range jets until 12 April 1964, when the versatile Boeing 727 went into service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In spite of the devastating experience of the Comet 1 disasters, the lessons had been learned and the later Comet 4 Series performed creditably, in spite of being overwhelmed by the larger and more efficient Boeing 707s and Douglas DC- 8s. Rolls- Royce was still in the forefront of jet engine technology.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Eastern Air Lines put the first Boeing 727 into service on the Philadelphia- Washington- Miami service on 1 February 1964. This was followed five days later by United Air Lines, and by American Airlines on 12 April. This tri- jet was thus in service with the three largest airlines in the world even before the Trident opened service with British European Airways. Within a year, 727s were to be seen at every major airport in the United States, and the overseas sales quickly built up. Lufthansa, rapidly finding its feet again as it reestablished its preeminent European status, started 727 service on 12 April 1964.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The timing for Boeing could not have been better; during the 1960s, as Japan began to assert itself as a major industrial power, air traffic growth reached a phenomenal 20% annual growth level for several years, and often exceeded it.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During the 1960s and 1970s, the world’s average air traffic growth rate was sustained at 15%, only declining to lower levels in the 1980s. This meant a doubling of airline traffic every five years, and the world demand for new airliners was almost insatiable.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Boeing 727 was a superb airliner, versatile in range and able to turn in a profit for its operators even at comparatively short ranges, for example, on Eastern Air Lines’s Air- Shuttle in the dense Boston- New York- Washington air corridor. Ultimately, 1,932 aircraft were delivered, almost exactly twice as many as the previously creditable record set by the 707/ 720. The Seattle manufacturer was on the crest of a wave.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>De Havilland Trident sales were eclipsed by the Boeing 727, but it sold well in China, where trading with the United States was limited by the communist government. This one is at Nanning.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Although Soviet manufacturing and design technology was donated to the Chinese during the period of Sino- Soviet friendship, operational efficiency was not.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>After a flirtation with Sud Aviation, with the idea of building the Caravelle under license, Douglas revived an almost- discarded project and, in April 1963, announced a twin jet, with two Pratt &amp; Whitney JT8D engines.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In the case of the DC- 9, an additional factor was the emphasis on easy maintenance, with the ground engineer’s needs recognized to be as important as the pilot’s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 10: Proliferation</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1960, 13 of the top 25 airlines of the world were in North America, and these included the leading five giants: the so- called Big Four U.S. domestic companies (United, American, T.W.A., and Eastern) and Pan American, which still dominated the world’s intercontinental air routes. Nine airlines were in Europe, led by Air France, Britain’s B.O.A.C. and the Dutch K.L.M. Two others, Germany’s Lufthansa and Italy’s Alitalia, were still recovering from the effects of the Second World War but were systematically rebuilding. Australia’s QANTAS ranked 22nd, and its domestic airline Trans- Australia Airlines (T.A.A.) was 23rd. From the other continents, only Japan Air Lines (J.A.L.) appeared, ranking 24th, arising phoenix- like from the ashes of a nation severely stricken by the war. In South America, Brazil’s VARIG had dropped off the top- 25 list, and Africa’s airlines were mainly embryonic flagships of still- fragmented emerging colonies not yet able to sustain airlines of international standards.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The British Dan- Air bought every de Havilland Comet it could locate, correctly calculating that the higher direct operating costs could be offset by very low second- hand purchase prices.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Also, as in Europe, the restrictions were government controlled and fully supported by the incumbent airlines, through their lobbying group, the Air Transport Association (A.T.A.).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As Ethiopia entered the 1970s, its politics moved well to the left, and in 1971, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to China. Late in that year, the first Ethiopian national was appointed general manager, and the T.W.A. management contract was terminated, altogether amicably. The airline was now completely on its own. But it faced a dramatic change in the political structure of the country. During the early 1970s, Ethiopia ceased to be a kingdom. A Marxist revolutionary party, under Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, took over the government, and in 1974, the Emperor Haile Selassie was dethroned.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Then the Six Day War with Israel, from 5 to 10 June 1967, affected U.A.A.’ s traffic so much that it took three years to recover from the decline. In 1971, following the renaming of the country back to Egypt and the abandonment of Nasser’s dream of uniting the Arab world, U.A.A.’ s name was also abandoned; it became Egyptair. Abdel Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 11: Emergence of the Middle East</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Unlike most passengers, freight traffic does not make round trips.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Outside the British and French orbit, and until the mid- and late 1920s, most of the Arabian peninsula— as big as most of western Europe, and one- third of the size of the United States— had been almost entirely desert, much of it completely barren. The acquisitive colonial powers passed it by, as being of no apparent commercial, political, or military value. Then came the discovery of oil. Until the Second World War, Middle Eastern oil production had been mainly in Persia and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq and Bahrain. But in the late 1930s, further exploratory drilling revealed considerable resources throughout the Gulf and especially in Saudi Arabia which, by this time, had spread its sovereignty across most of the peninsula. The main beneficary of the new wells, aside from local territorial claims, was the United States. Through the giant Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), it effectively exerted an economic colonialism through its leadership of the Arabian oil industry, which was itself destined to dominate the world’s production.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 12: Development of a Second Line</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Jets Shrink the World</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The net result of these factors was that, during the heady years of the introduction of the Jet Age at the beginning of the 1960s, world air traffic doubled in five years then doubled again— fourfold in 10 years. In the past, even the immortal Douglas DC- 3 did not bring air travel to the masses, but in the 1960s, jet airliners introduced the whole world to a vast new market. English coal miners went to the Canary Islands, bank clerks climbed the pyramids in Egypt, civil servants from Bonn enjoyed California’s Disneyland, and back- packers from Brooklyn climbed the Eiffel Tower. At no time in history had the nations of the world, whether on business, in politics, or on vacation, come closer together. Jet airliners had made the world smaller.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 13: The Commuter Airlines</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>For many years, the United States Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) had listed, right at the end of the various airline categories such as trunk, local service, territorial, freight, and supplemental, a miscellaneous group—“Other”—for which special exemption from the normal certification process was given.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By this time, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) had begun to keep records of them, under Part 135 of the regulations, for navigational and safety needs.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By the early 1960s, the widely spread scheduled air taxi operators had established themselves sufficiently to be recognized as a distinct group, and it was left to the journalists to give them an identifiable name.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During the 1960s, a few F.B.O.s found that their customers chartered flights at regular times every day, except on weekends. The clientele consisted mostly of businessmen, so that these routes became the basis of what at first were termed Scheduled Air Taxi, or “third level” operators.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Scheduled Air Taxi airlines expanded rapidly during the 1970s, both in numbers and in the density of operations. By the 1980s, they comprised the commuter airline industry, and few communities were without a service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 14: Restoring the Balance</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The system was no different than taking a journey by rail, with the same operational simplicity, and Laker called this service, appropriately, Skytrain.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Finally, President Carter, an advocate of airline deregulation, signed the necessary legislation on 15 June 1977, and Skytrain was finally launched on 26 September of that year, using 345- seat DC- 10s, charging a London- New York single fare of £ 59. The public flocked to Victoria Station. Some slept all night at Gatwick, happily exchanging the luxury of a reserved seat for all the money they saved. On 3 June 1978, Laker was knighted, to become Sir Freddie Laker. He made huge profits, extended Skytrain to Los Angeles on 26 September 1978, and placed large orders for more DC- 10s and Airbus A300s. The Duke of Edinburgh was heard to remark that “Freddie Laker is at peace with his Maker, but with the folks at IATA he’s persona non grata.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>There will probably never be another Skytrain. Laker perfected an air traffic system that the once- denigrated non- scheduled charter airlines had campaigned for during many years. More than any other single airline entrepreneur, Sir Freddie Laker and his Skytrain provided the incisive revolutionary spur that transformed the world airline industry from a business- driven to a popular leisure- driven transport activity.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Freddie Laker, who was later knighted for his contributions to British commercial aviation, introduced a no- reservations trans- Atlantic air service in 1977. Reacting to this competition, the incumbent airlines persuaded his bank to foreclose his account and Freddie’s airline closed down. He later sued those airlines under American law. The case was settled out of court for several million dollars. (Davies)</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Three: The Second Jet Age</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 15: Wide-Bodied Jets</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Nowhere did the urge to fly on the big airliner catch on more than within the United States. By the end of the year of Pan American’s inauguration, nine U.S. domestic operators were advertising the Boeing 747 on their main trunk routes, led by T.W.A., which started on the New York- Los Angeles route on 25 February. American Airlines followed on 2 March, but did not retain it as its front- line fleet.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Hawker Siddeley then joined Sud Aviation, which became Aerospatiale, to form the Airbus consortium, which then concentrated on the Airbus A300, with design leadership centered at Toulouse. At first, the British and French were the two equal partners, but this was soon modifed to allow the entry of Germany, now fully recovered from the penalties of wartime destruction of its industry. By 1970, the shares were 40% France (Sud), 40% Great Britain (Hawker Siddeley), and 20% Germany (Deutsche Airbus, based in Munich). Then, in an astonishing decision by the Heath government, the British insisted that the A300 should have Rolls- Royce engines exclusively or it would withdraw. The French disagreed, very sensibly, as other engine manufacturers would be only too happy to oblige, and they did. Only by the alertness of Hawker- Siddeley’s president, Sir Arnold Hall, did Britain retain a stake (17%) in Airbus, by subcontracting to build the wings. The British shareholding is now 20%, and many Airbuses do have Rolls- Royce engines. Other countries have minor stakes in the European answer to American dominance. Spain and Italy have minority shares, to underscore the developing industrial and political trends toward non- nationalistic Europeanization.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The A300 made its maiden flight on 28 October 1972 and went into scheduled airline service with Air France on 23 May 1974. But much time had been lost. The manufacturers in the United States were no slouches when it came to accepting a technical and marketing challenge. Their DC- 10 and the L- 1011 TriStar contenders duly appeared on the scene in 1970, soon after the Boeing 747’ s entry into service and two years before the Airbus A300 made its first flight.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Air France began a 240- seat A300 service in 1974.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The first DC- 10, Series -10, was aimed primarily at the United States domestic market, and while its normal 8- or 9- abreast seating could not quite match the 747’ s possible 10- abreast, this was not significant. In the traveling public’s eye, the aircraft was certainly wide- bodied. In less than a year after its maiden flight, the DC- 10- 10 went into service, when American Airlines introduced it on its Los Angeles- Chicago route on 5 August 1971, to give it a good head- start over its rival tri- jet, the Lockheed L- 1011 TriStar and the European Airbus.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>American Airlines introduced the Douglas DC- 10- 10 wide bodied tri- jet in 1971.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Three engine manufacturers, all with solid records of technical prowess, competed for the wide- bodied airlines market. Boeing’s 747s were powered mainly by four 47,000- lb. thrust Pratt &amp; Whitney JT9Ds, and Douglas’s DC- 10s were powered almost exclusively by 40,000- lb. General Electric CF6- 6Ds.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Competing with Douglas for the wide- bodied tri- jet market, Lockheed suffered a severe setback when its engine supplier, Rolls- Royce, almost went bankrupt.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 16: Supersonic Digression</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During the 1950s, the world’s air transport industry made the biggest technological leap forward during its 30-odd-year history. The infant years were the 1920s; adolescence in the 1930s; coming of age in the 1940s; and maturity achieved with the jets in the 1950s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By November 1956, under Morgan’s chairmanship, the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (S.T.A.C.) was able to report that it had nationwide support to launch the project, although it distorted the development cost estimates optimistically at a mere £150 million (ultimately the figure was to be at least £1 billion for Britain’s share alone).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Much larger than the original designs, the Concorde would weigh 200 tons, of which half would be fuel.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Cost estimates escalated to £835 million, and in 1964, the Labour government’s Harold Wilson tried to cancel the aircraft, but Charles de Gaulle, intent on regaining France’s prestige in the commercial and technological world, refused.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But by the late 1960s serious doubts had emerged concerning basic physics that turned out to be inescapable. Every time any aircraft accelerated to and continued to fly at more than the speed of sound, the resultant shock wave—the so-called Sonic Boom—left a path of potentially destructive vibration on the ground all along the supersonic aircraft’s flight path. In spite of hopes that design modifications could ease the problem, “the Sonic Boom was a physical phenomenon that no sleight of aerodynamic hand could eliminate.” These conclusions were confirmed by extensive testing by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) at Oklahoma City and in Nevada (see below). The effect on the potential customers was devastating. The market was restricted to routes that did not fly over land, and this eliminated about 90% of the world market.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With tremendous aplomb, enormous promotion and publicity, and much flag waving, the world’s first supersonic airliner made its first flight on 2 March 1969, from Toulouse, with the second on 9 April, from Bristol. It went into service on 21 January 1976, with Air France flying from Paris to Rio de Janeiro and British Airways from London to Bahrain.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>the Anglo-French Concorde had made its first flight on 2 March 1969,</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Not a single Concorde was ever sold. As some British observers gloomily commented, Britain and France waved their flags, but Boeing laughed all the way to the bank.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 17: Development of the Breeds</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The project office at Douglas was still not satisfied. It went on to produce a design for the ultimate “stretch” of the fuselage, by no less than 14 feet. This DC-9-80 (the number chosen to coincide with the year of introduction) could carry, in all-economy class, 172 passengers, an astonishing achievement—more than double the capacity of the first DC-9-10. It was renamed the MD-80, to reflect the consolidated merger between McDonnell and Douglas.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The swan-song of this highly successful range of twin-engined jets came during the mid-1990s. Interestingly, the launch customer for the MD-95 (only 100 seats) was AirTran, a low-fare, no-frills newcomer to the eastern United States airline scene, which had taken over ValuJet, a fellow competitor that had been put out of business when one of its DC-9s crashed because of an exploding oxygen container. This DC-9 variant was not only the last of the breed; it was to lose its designation.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 4 August 1997, the biggest merger (or takeover) in the history of the aerospace industry was to take place, surpassing even the Lockheed-Martin amalgamation. The great Boeing Company of Seattle acquired the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation and proceeded to consolidate the various production assembly lines of both companies.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The 737-100 series made its first flight on 9 April 1967 and went into service on 10 February 1968.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The German Lufthansa welcomed the 737 as its City Jet, natural partner to its Boeing 727 Europa Jet. Including those delivered to its non-scheduled/charter associate, Condor Flugdienst, Lufthansa would eventually have more than sixty 727s and top this with ninety 737s of various later models.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The 737 was essentially a reengined short-fuselaged 727, with exactly the same fuselage cross-section. The manufacturer thus enjoyed the commonality of component parts and other aspects of production; it also meant that the 737 offered comfortable six-abreast seating, whereas the DC-9 could only manage five. Boeing built only 30 of the -100 series (of which Lufthansa had 22) but followed Douglas’s example of rapid development of the type.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1981, Boeing announced its “second-generation” 737-300 series, once again lengthening the fuselage by almost nine feet, with 22,100-lb. thrust GE/SNECMA CFM56 engines replacing the 15,500 lb. Pratt &amp; Whitney JT8Ds.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By the year 2010, more than 6,000 Boeing 737s have been ordered. It has been, in terms of financial turnover, the most successful airliner ever produced.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the British industry suffered from illusions of grandeur. Its designers and technicians were the equal of any in the United States, but it completely failed to recognize the levels of production that the likes of Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed could achieve, once a decision was made to go full steam ahead with an aircraft type. Boeing could build and deliver as many 727s in a week as de Havilland/Hawker Siddeley could in three months. The after-sales service, too, was not up to the American standards—even in the 1970s, Douglas would claim to be able to deliver a needed item for any of its in-service aircraft to anywhere in the world within 48 hours.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 18: Redefining the U.S. Second Line</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.), established in 1938, was the guardian of such standards in the commercial arena, while the Civil Aviation Authority (C.A.A.)—later the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.)—watched over navigational and operational requirements—which it still does today, even after deregulation.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>United Air Lines, American Airlines, T.W.A., and Eastern Air Lines came to be called the “Big Four”—they accounted for about 75% of the seat-mile output of all U.S. domestic airlines. The Local Service airlines wanted a term that was not diminutive and decided on “Regionals.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In most cases, the introduction of jet airliners into the U.S. regional airlines’ fleets coincided with important mergers as the bigger fish swallowed the smaller ones. The most important was the merger between Allegheny Airlines and Mohawk Airlines on 12 April 1972, to create a larger Allegheny which, on 30 October 1979 was renamed USAir.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Allegheny could trace its history (as All-American Aviation) back to the experimental aerial pick-up mail service of 1937.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Over a period of several decades following the end of the Second World War, the United States Local Service airlines either merged or were absorbed by trunk airlines. During the 1980s they were called Regionals, and by the end of the 20th century they had disappeared altogether.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>It went straight from the piston-engined Martin 404 (and, of course, the trusty DC-3) to Douglas DC-9s, which it put into service on 15 June 1967. By the time it merged with North Central on 13 July 1978, its network, now linking Chicago and Washington with Miami, was, like its peer airlines, no longer local service and well justified the adoption of the term regional. The merged company was also no longer solely north-central, nor was it southern, and it became Republic Airlines, with its main base remaining at Minneapolis. The first integrated schedules under the new name started on 1 October 1979.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Northwest Orient Airlines, operating cheek-by-jowl from its own hub at the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul) did what all the big fish did in the ocean of competiton: it swallowed the smaller fish. On 23 January 1986, it announced that it had purchased Republic for $884 million. The route networks were combined that year on what had become a traditional date, 1 October.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Once the cold realities of airline deregulation in 1978 had obliterated the comparative security of a regulated fare structure, the aggressively promoted, almost ruthless, momentum toward low fares jeopardized the chances of profitability by small or even medium-sized companies. In the new economic environment, oligopolistic policies alone could florish, and the economics of sheer size now prevailed in the U.S. airline industry and would not change until a new and different threat to a time-honored corporate establishment emerged in the 21st century.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Lorenzo had always believed in the multiplier theory that the extra traffic generated by the low fares more than compensated for the lower yield per seat.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Lorenzo had been increasing his Continental shareholdings and by the fall of 1981, he was in effective control.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 19: Regional Airlines Worldwide</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Brazil has, since the late 1920s, been one of the most air-minded nations in the world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As 90% of Canada’s population was within about two hours drive from the U.S. border, the same percentage of Brazilians lived only two hours from the Atlantic Ocean.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>When the Jet Age arrived, Brazil’s air transport was in good shape, with VARIG as its respected flag carrier and Sâo Paulo’s VASP and Rio’s Cruzeiro do Sul as strong domestic airlines, providing efficient service between all the main cities and to all the provincial towns. Of the smaller domestic airlines at the second level, Omar Fontana’s Transbrasil had survived the process of “survival of the fittest,” and on 22 May 1975, VARIG had acquired Cruzeiro do Sul, which continued to operate it as a separate entity. They had all profited from the incentives to air transport and travel as Kubitschek’s dream of a Federal Capital emerged. With astonishing drive and initiative, the planning and construction of the city of Brasília was accomplished with phenomenal success. Among other domestic immigrants, tens of thousands of civil servants moved in from Rio de Janeiro.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 19 August 1969, at São José dos Campos, about 75 miles east of São Paulo, the Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica (Embraer) was founded as a joint stock company, with the government holding 51%, to produce the airplane in quantity.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Embraer’s designers and engineers quickly recognized that the IPD-6505 needed to be larger. The redesigned EMB 110 Bandeirante was the result. It made its first flight on 9 August 1972, and the first commercial version, the 110C, went into service with Transbrasil on 16 April 1973, soon followed by VASP on 4 November, for service to smaller communities in the southern states of Brazil.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The “Bandits,” as the Bandeirantes became known—as an indication of affection and respect when they went into service in overseas markets—served to consolidate and unify Brazil. It has been a brilliant example of how aeronautical technology can contribute to the basic economy of a whole nation. In the production of commercial aircraft, Brazil was to become an exporter, not an importer, and a positive element in the annual balance-of-trade reports. By the early 2000s, Embraer had built 494 Bandeirantes, together with 350 of the 30-seat EMB 120 Brasilias, and had moved on from turboprops to pure jets with the ERJ 145 family of regional jets.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Its total population was only about one-tenth of that of the United States (or about the same as California’s), and 90% of that was within 100 miles of the U.S. border. Traditionally served by two excellent transcontinental railroads, Canada did not even have a national trunk airline until Trans Canada Air Lines (T.C.A.) was founded in 1937—by Canadian National Railways, the government-supported railroad.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The fragmented individuality was rationalized in 1942 when they were amalgamated to become Canadian Pacific Airlines (C.P.A.), owned by the railroad of that name, which had purchased control of Canadian Airways in 1933.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Four: Airline Deregulation</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 20: The United States Sets the Pace</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>For almost two decades, the annual increase in passenger-miles in the United States had averaged about 15%, which meant that the total volume doubled every five years. When the Jet Age began, the figure was 40 billion. In 1970 it was 170 billion. The numbers for the first-class market hardly changed, but for all other classes of travel, in sheer numbers alone, the airline industry had undergone a metamorphosis. Air travel for the masses had arrived.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The managements of the certificated scheduled airlines were reluctant to recognize this profound change. Through their Air Transport Association (A.T.A.) lobbying group, and with the compliance of the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.), the traditional process of setting fares, dating back to 1938, was perpetuated.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Under the 1977–81 Carter Administration, there was no patching up a wounded leg suspected of approaching gangrene; the leg was cut off. There was no reorganizing of the respected C.A.B., which, for 40 years, with a maximum of only about 800 staff, had ruled over half of the world’s airline productivity. In one piece of legislation, the C.A.B. was to be phased out over five years.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The onslaught came on 15 October 1978, when the U.S. Congress enacted into law the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which was signed by President Carter on 24 October.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In a ruthless survival-of-the-fittest environment, almost all the brash newcomers soon went under. Only one complete newcomer survived into the next century. This was America West, often on the brink of failure, but able to exploit the demographic advantage of its base in Phoenix, the most rapidly growing urban area in the United States. Another star that emerged with conspicuous success was one of the previous intra-state airlines, Southwest Airlines, which, under the driving leadership of the popular Herb Kelleher, steadily grew to become, within two decades, one of the nation’s largest.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The annual 15% per year growth level was a thing of the past. By the early 1980s, almost everyone who wished to fly by air was already doing so.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 21: The Airline World Deregulates</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One major difference between the airlines of the United States and those of the rest of the world is that all the U.S. airlines were completely privately owned. In Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and Latin America, the major airlines were either privately owned, but at the same time regarded by their governments as “chosen instruments” thus given special privileges; alternatively, they were jointly owned by private investors and their governments, or they were completely government-owned.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1980, by Act of Parliament, British Airways ceased to be a national corporation. The stock offering ended on 6 February 1987, with buyers oversubscribing more than 11 times.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Following the end of the Second World War, with few exceptions, most of the world’s airlines had united to form IATA.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In the late 1970s, the United States had plunged into a deregulated airline environment in which the immediate consequences were neither immediately apparent nor achieved. The Japanese airlines and their regulators, however, took a different course. This was partly because Japan is a much smaller country and less amenable to regional airline viability, but also because the authorities recognized airlines as a public utility and not simply as just another form of business. The outcome was almost a textbook example of an economic axiom: that the benefits of competition can be realized with only two or, at the most, three competitors.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The small airlines were handicapped by the acute shortage of pilots, because of the depredations of the war, during which more than 1,500 had turned themselves into human bombs as kamikazes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 22: Russian Metamorphosis</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Transaero’s wide-bodied Ilyushin II-86, with business-class seats, was unprecedented in Russia. The airline then trumped its own ace with Boeing 747s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 23: Decline of the American Giants</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>When Alfred Kahn oversaw the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (see Chapter 20), the way seemed clear for a new era to begin. The consequent liberalization would encourage private enterprise and individual creativity, particularly by permitting all airlines to operate routes wherever they wished and to charge whatever fares they chose.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Making the same mistake that others had made, the new management stressed its “high-class” marketing strategy, to combat the presumed “low-class” of its local competitor, Southwest Airlines.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 4 December 1991, the inevitable end came. United Airlines emerged as the winner of the auction for Pan Am’s assets, paying $135 million for its Latin American routes. The last service was an emotional affair.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 16 January 1991 the Gulf War erupted, and two days later, Eastern Air Lines closed its doors, 19,000 employees lost their jobs, and Shugrue’s only task was to preside over the sale of assets during the long-drawn-out liquidation process.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>After a bizarre offer to buy Pan American Airways, T.W.A.’s proud status on the North Atlantic was devastated. On 21 January 1991, Icahn announced the halving of all services to Europe, and furloughed 2,500 employees. On 14 March, American Airlines bought the routes to London from New York, Los Angeles, and Boston. T.W.A.’s last flight into London’s Heathrow Airport was on 1 July 1991, and the effect of the sale was only a temporary reprieve. On 31 January 1992, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 10 January 2001, after several rumors of various approaches, American Airlines offered to buy T.W.A. for $500 million, provided it file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which it did on the same day.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 11 August 2002, US Airways filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and further economies of staff were made, but a life line appeared from David Bronner, whose Retirement Systems of Alabama offered to take a 37.5% stake in the airline—quite a bargain, as the stock had deteriorated to about $4.00 a share.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The end was in sight. US Airways either had to cease operations or it had to merge or be absorbed by another airline, and in the latter case, it had no cards to play. In the spring of 2005, offers were made by speculative investors, and on 19 May, after discussions that had begun tentatively as early as July 2004, a merger was announced between US Air and Phoenix-based America West.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 24: Birth of the Low-Fare Generation</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One of the cornerstones of Southwest Airlines’s operating policies was becoming evident. Instead of challenging the established airlines head-on at their fortress main-line airports, it nibbled away at secondary or satellite airports.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Sadly, on 19 June 2001, Herb Kelleher was obliged to step down due to ill health as chairman of the airline that he had built into an industry leader.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Baltimore was already a Southwest hub, and the airline was now carrying more individually boarded passengers than any other airline in the United States. The airline that had started with one route in Texas in 1971 had become an industry leader.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>ValuJet was incorporated in Nevada in July 1992 by a triumvirate of Robert Priddy, chairman, Lewis Jordan, president, and Maurice Gallagher, vice chairman.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In February 1999, David Neeleman announced plans for a new airline, provisionally named New Air, certainly an apt choice. Already with airline experience, he had sold Salt Lake City–based Morris Air to Southwest Airlines in 1993 and had been involved with the success of the low-fare Canadian airline WestJet.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Contrasting with Southwest’s policy of a single-type fleet, however, and only two months later, the reason for the apparent reduction was revealed. JetBlue ordered 100 100-seat Embraer 190s, for $3 billion, to diversify the airline’s seat capacity according to the potential demands on individual routes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With Southwest heading the pack, and with AirTran and relative newcomer JetBlue not far behind, by the year 2005 the new bargain-basement airlines had made a severe encroachment upon the preserves of the legacy airlines. The formerly protected preserves were up for grabs; the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act had opened up commercial airline operations to any entrepreneur who wished to risk his or her venture capital. About 150 aspirant challengers to the establishment had applied to the Department of Transportation for scheduled operating authority, but only about 40 managed to begin service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By 2005, the new breed of low-fare airlines was collectively accounting for about one-third of the passenger boardings in the United States.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>on 27 September 2010, Southwest Airlines announced it would acquire AirTran,</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Five: Transformation in Europe</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 25: Low-Fare Revolution</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Finally, in July 1992, the door was opened wide, and beginning in January 1993, almost all restrictions were removed. Not only were the Five Freedoms made completely effective; the rule of cabotage, hitherto a form of national protectionism, was abandoned in April 1997. A German or British airline could henceforth operate, for example, between Milan and Rome, or Air France between London and Glasgow. In practice, however, there was no rush. European countries were too small to permit profitable domestic routes, and the improvements in road and rail transport, notably the introduction of high speed rail networks, emphasized the problem.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Kenny Friedkin of Pacific Southwest Airlines in California and Herb Kelleher of Southwest Airlines in Texas had revolutionized the air transport scene in the United States. Tony Ryan, the Irishman who founded an airline that carried his name, did more than that. Within a single decade, he had put Ryanair in a position of near-supremacy in the whole of Europe—prevented from absolute domination only by an English company, easyJet, started shortly afterward by Stelios Haji-Ioannou.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>There is an economic axiom that claims that all the benefits of competition can be achieved with only two competitors, and that a third participant in an identifiable market is redundant or superfluous, and in any case is doomed to failure or, at best, also-ran status.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Others That Tried One such aspirant was Debonair, founded in January 1994 by Franco Mancassola, who had several years of experience in independent airlines.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>the Virgin Group acquired 90% of the Brussels-based Euro-Belgian Airlines for $60 million and appointed Jonathan Ornstein, ex-president of Continental Express, to head it under the new name, Virgin Express.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In Great Britain, the national airline, British Airways, with unmatched industrial strength—it was the world’s leading international flag carrier at the time—decided to take this unorthodox course by forming a low-fare subsidiary, Go, which would prove to be an unfortunate name choice.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 1 April 2003, the now-dominant Ryanair acquired Buzz, including its 14 BAe 146s and Boeing 737s, for €24 million ($25.6 million).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 26: British Airways Ascendancy</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The first step toward the complete amalgamation of the two British state-owned airlines was the creation, on 1 April 1972, of the British Airways Board, which assumed ownership of B.E.A. and B.O.A.C. and their subsidiaries.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With national frontiers no longer a barrier to the policy of “open skies,” British Airways took advantage of the term to make it their own. This is one of its Boeing 757s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 27: France Consolidates</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Air France ordered the first Airbus A320s in 1981. It was to become an outstanding success world-wide. By 2010 more than 5,000 of this wide-bodied twin-jet had been ordered.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 21 December, facing the inevitable trends in the air transport industry that demanded worldwide international groupings, the U.S. Department of Transportation tentatively approved an alliance of Air France, Delta, Alitalia, and the Czech C.S.A., to be known as Skyteam, and including agreements with AeroMexico and Korean Air.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Air France’s financial problems during the late 1900s did not prevent the maintenance of high operational standards. Its fleet of Boeing 747-400s (left) and Airbus A340s (right) ensured that its intercontinental services were among the world’s best.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 28: Germany Regains a Leading Role</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>To start a national airline again, completely from scratch, was no easy task, and a decade was to pass after the end of the war before the new Lufthansa (German Airlines) got into its stride.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The next announcement from the Cologne headquarters clearly confirmed that, for all its support for the products of Boeing and Douglas, Lufthansa was—in consort with the German manufacturing participation in the French, Toulouse-based Airbus—solidly European. On 20 December 1972 it ordered three twin-engined 240-seat wide-bodied Airbus A300Bs, plus four more on option.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Lufthansa’s solidly established organization enabled it to maintain its airline ascendancy as a world leader. Like Air France, its aircraft, such as the Boeing 747-400s, matched all competition.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 29: European Airline Attritions</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>From the very beginning of the air transport industry, every country in Europe aspired to own a national airline, as a symbol of their industrial and commercial stature.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The final nail in SABENA’s coffin came soon after the terrorist attack in New York on 11 September.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Still confident, K.L.M. established a low-cost subsidiary, Buzz, based at London’s Stansted Airport, in January 2000.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 30: Jet Wings Over the Mediterranean</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Europe took many years to recover from the devastation of the Second World War, and even neutral countries were not exempt from the struggle. Among these was Spain, which although technically neutral, was widely regarded as a Nazi sympathizer, under fellow traveler General Franco, who had only just won a civil war when hostilities broke out in September 1939.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Chapter 31: Farthest North with the Scandinavians</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As events unraveled, the S.A.S. emerged as the world’s only completely successful airline consortium. Geographically, Scandinavia includes only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, but Finland and Iceland are also included in the context of the historical review in this book.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1959 also, severe labor disputes had led to the suspension of most S.A.S. services, which demanded substantial financial help from the three national owners in 1961.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 32: Europe Unites</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The 15-seat Embraer Bandeirante is just the right size to serve the small communities in the north of Finland.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Six: Rise of Asia and the Pacific Rim</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 33: The Growth of China &gt; Location 9583</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 4 August 1985 C.A.A.C. put the first of 28 147-seat “stretched” Shanghai-built MD-82s into service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In April 1985, Shen Tu was succeeded by Hu Yishao, who faced an unprecedented challenge: how to keep up with the growth of Chinese air traffic, at home and overseas, now doubling every two years, reflecting the exploding growth of Chinese industry.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 34: India Awakes</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The first “fly by-wire” Airbus A320 entered service on 1 July 1989,</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The low-fare market that Captain Gopi unleashed then exploded. The example set by Air Deccan spread throughout India like wildfire. In May 2005, Spice Jet, at New Delhi, and GoAir, at Mumbai, entered the LCC (Low-Cost Carrier) arena, followed by IndiGo Airlines, also at New Delhi, founded in August 2006. These companies did not start cautiously with a handful of aircraft. IndiGo stole some headlines at the Paris Air Show in June 2007 by announcing an order for 100 of the Airbus A320/321 series. But the momentum did create its own problems.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Even by the 21st century, only 1% of India’s 1.1 billion population had ever flown by airline.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Traffic is already growing at an unprecedented high rate and shows no sign of abating. Led by innovative and visionary entrepreneurs, India will start to regain, at long last, the respected global status that began to evaporate after the leadership of J.R.D. Tata was cast aside.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 35: The Subcontinent Fragments</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In a mountainous land with no railroads and few roads, an airline is an essential element of the country’s economy.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 36: Eastern Asia Emergent</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Singapore Airlines was the first airline to introduce the double-decked Airbus A380 in 2007.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 37: Budget Fares for Southeast Asia</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Until the late 20th century, air travel for the indigenous peoples was a seldom experienced luxury. Air Asia has sponsored the beginning of a social revolution.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 8 December 2001, 28-year-old Tony Fernandes, who had watched the success of Ryanair and easyJet in Europe, and with three other partners, purchased almost the whole Air Asia stock and its two 737s for 27 cents a share, but assumed $10 million of debt. On 15 January 2002, he launched aggressively a “low fares, no frills” policy, changing the airline livery, and extending the network with more 737s. In April, he introduced ticketless travel, promoted the use of the Internet, and adopted the slogan “Now Everyone Can Fly.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By 2007 the bargain-basement empire was flying to 75 destinations with a fleet of 50 Boeing 737s and Airbuses, and carried 18 million passengers during the year. In January 2008, the A320 order was doubled to 200, a truly astonishing decision for an airline only six years old.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The one-way fare to Chiang Mai was US$15.00. It had to be, with Fernandes setting the pace. But with Thailand’s 65 million people growing in prosperity and with vacation resorts increasingly popular among overseas visitors, the market is a gold mine for all the participants.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In April 2005, Fernandes introduced China to the world of bargain fares with a route to Xiamen.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 9 December 2003, with 49%, Singapore Airlines organized Tiger Airways. The shares were divided equally between Temasek Holdings (the Singapore government had its airline investments well placed everywhere), Indigo Partners, and Tony Ryan’s Irelandia Investments.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>During the following years, orders were firmed up, and on 18 June 2007, at the Paris Air Show, this Indonesian newcomer raised the order to 100, including forty 737-900ERs, of which model it was the launch customer. Lion Air was participating in a minor revolution in air transport across southeastern Asia.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Seven: The Commonwealth Adjusts</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 38: Airlines of Australia</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With the absorption of the Dutch K.L.M. by Air France in 2004, Australia’s national airline, QANTAS, can now claim to be the oldest in the world with a continuous record of independent and uninterrupted scheduled operations. The reason for its early foundation, in 1919, was the result of demography: the distribution of population in a large country—a continent—that had no integrated railroad system.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Australia’s flag carrier, QANTAS (Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services) was founded in 1919 to connect outlying stations with railheads. The “outback” was so sparsely populated that rail extensions would have been uneconomical to build or to operate. An air service, however infrequent, irregular, and expensive to maintain, justified government support. Because of the distances involved, especially in Western Australia, the conditions were ideal for the expansion of airline services. During the early decades of the 20th century, this ex-colony, now a vigorous self-governing dominion, became the most individually traveled nation in the world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 14 January 1958, it had become the first airline in the world to operate a scheduled service completely around the globe, with the Super Constellations (Pan American could not operate across the continental U.S.A.).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Electra’s first route was to Tokyo via Darwin and Manila, on 18 December. Lockheed’s problems with that airliner did not seriously affect Qantas as it operated below the speed limits set by the F.A.A.; but the fleet had to be reengineered and the first flight to Auckland under its own name was on 3 October 1961 (see TEAL, below).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 39: New Zealand and the Pacific</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 40: Canada Reorganizes</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Eight: A Continent Made for Air Transport</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 41: The Sleeping Giant Awakes</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In Colombia, for example, the oldest airline in all the Americas, AVIANCA, is directly descended from SCADTA, founded in 1921. Argentina started, in the same year, an international airline (across the River Plate) that lasted for a few years, whereas the world’s first airline in 1914 in Florida lasted only three months. By the 1940s, in Rio de Janeiro, the downtown airport was within walking distance of the business center, as was the one in Buenos Aires.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Brazil’s Viação Aérea São Paulo (VASP) was operating turboprops before any airline in the U.S.A., and Aerolíneas Argentinas was operating Comet jets to New York in 1959.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>in July 1958, the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo Ponte Aérea set an example as the world’s first no-reservation air shuttle service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>When the Jet Age arrived, Latin America was fully prepared.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Pre-war airlines, such as Syndicato Condor, VASP, Panair do Brasil, and VARIG, were recognized and respected overseas. During the immediate post-war years, with fleets composed largely of war-surplus aircraft, they had reached out to every community in the country. One airline, REAL (Redes Estaduais Aéreas, Ltda), had grown prodigiously by absorbing several small ones. Its fleet included 86 Douglas DC-3s, the largest fleet of its type in the world, and during the late 1950s, it ranked, by passenger boardings, as the tenth largest airline in the world. On 3 May 1957, with a Convair 240, it began the first scheduled service to Brasília.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>VARIG’s first Boeing 707-441 (the Rolls-Royce powered variant) started to fly nonstop from Rio to New York on 28 June, with Brasília included on 2 July.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>on 2 September, VARIG put the first of its 100-seat Lockheed L.188 Electra turboprops into service on the coastal route, and was able to operate them from the downtown Santos Dumont airport, where jets were not allowed. For almost the next 30 years, these reliable airliners also became the standard aircraft for the Ponte Aérea (see above), with the revenues and costs shared between the contributing airlines, but with VARIG supplying the fleet.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Transbrasil had been founded, as Sadia, in 1955 by Omar Fontana: a man who could truly be described as a maverick. He flew fresh meat from his father’s packing plant in the state of Santa Catarina to the high-class butchers in São Paulo, he changed its name in June 1972.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The airline did not necessarily have to be state-owned (though many were) but its important role as a public utility was recognized. Concessions were made, or privileges granted, to guarantee its position as a national standard-bearer. Brazil’s choice, partially the result of political influence in the corridors of power, was VARIG. At the end of the Second World War, it was the smallest of the pioneers, but its home State, Rio Grande do Sul, populated largely by German immigrants, was affluent and efficient. More important, one of its sons, Getulio Vargas, had become President of Brazil, and for several decades, the VARIG management could always count on a favorable nod from the government.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Gomes’s oversight and financial control of his airline did not live up to his ambition, although his staff struggled to sustain it. REAL outgrew its strength and had to reduce its network, first the Chicago route then a half share of its international division to VARIG on 2 May 1961. A few months later, on 16 August, VARIG bought the whole airline,</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With this impressive and creditable record of representing its country in one of the most internationally competitive world industries, the surprising collapse of Panair do Brasil was tinged with a degree of suspicion. On 10 February 1965, all its flights were cancelled, and VARIG took over the operation at three hours’ notice.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In May 1966, Panair’s appeal to the Brazilian Supreme Court was denied. It was a sad end to a flagship airline that had done so much for Brasil’s prestige overseas, and which had built much of the infrastructure all across the country, including the vast reaches of the Amazon.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>VARIG’s next step was to eliminate the major domestic competition. This was from Cruzeiro do Sul, the airline whose name had changed from the German-sponsored Syndicato Condor on 16 January 1943.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On 8 September, VARIG’s affiliated regional airline, Rio-Sul, began service, directed by João Lorenz, who had been Rubem Berta’s economic director, and one of the team from Porto Alegre who had laid a firm foundation for this great airline.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Berta, VARIG’s long-term president, had died on 14 December 1966. His successor, Erik de Carvalho, retired because of illness in February 1979, and Helio Smidt took over on 30 April 1980.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>VARIG seemed to be weathering all the economic storms that were part of the Brazilian way of life.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But the apparent wave of prosperity did not last. Smidt’s successors had to face increased foreign competition, and the late 1980s witnessed a financial decline, even though the government’s latest currency rescue effort, the Real Plan, drastically cut the inflation rate, then 50% per month. In 1994, facing an almost $2 billion debt, this prestigious airline cut its staff by almost 4,000, eliminated most of its international routes, closed offices everywhere, and cancelled orders for eight 747s. Acquiring Uruguay’s national airline, PLUNA, in March 1997, and joining the Star Alliance on 26 October, did little to stem the negative tide. In 1998, a new government policy, effectively deregulation, did not help either. Until then, the major inter-city routes had been operated by only the four main airlines. Now, newcomers were not only allowed to enter these hitherto privileged markets, but also permitted to offer heavily discounted fares. Another currency devaluation on 12 January 1999 led to VARIG repeating the drastic measures of 1994, cutting overseas routes again, and trimming aircraft fleets to only three types, most of them leased. To add to all these disasters, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.A. created a drastic reduction in international ai traffic worldwide. For VARIG it compounded a situation that was already approaching a crisis level. In 2002, the workforce was again reduced, by 30%, and 20 leased aircraft were returned to the lessors. The only segment of VARIG’s entire network still profitable was the Ponte Aérea shuttle service. An attempt in 2003 to merge with TAM, which had been a major discount intruder on the shuttle with Airbus A330s, came to nothing. A rescue plan from Portugal’s T.A.P. early in 2005 also failed, a sad commentary on the fate of an airline that a decade or two earlier could easily have swallowed T.A.P. The Brazilian equivalent of the U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings were started in December 2005. In April 2006, VariLog, VARIG’s former cargo subsidiary that was sold to Volo do Brasil, offered to buy its former parent company for $350 million.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The final blow came in April 2007 when GOL (see below) bought control of the airline for $98 million, plus 6 million shares.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Other than the post-war REAL in 1961, VARIG had absorbed the pre-war Panair do Brasil and Cruzeiro do Sul in 1965 and 1975, respectively.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>VARIG, VASP, Cruzeiro do Sul, and Panair do Brasil had shared in the pre-war establishment of the industry But toward the end of the 20th century, their combined dominance was threatened with collapse. As narrated above, VARIG had been favored as a chosen instrument, taking over Cruzeiro, which, however, continued to operate for a few years under its own name.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Stepping boldly into VARIG’s territory, TAM opened service to Miami on 10 December 1998 and to Paris on 2 April 1999.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Fly and Brasil Rodo Aéreo (BRA) struggled to survive—unsuccessfully; but GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes succeeded beyond its wildest dreams. It was established on 1 August 2000 by the Aurea Group, Brazil’s biggest highway bus operator (11,000 buses), headed by Constantino de Oliviera. His son, Junior, was president of the airline.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Well capitalized, GOL bought new aircraft, starting on 15 January 2001 with an inaugural flight from Brasília to São Paulo. With an initial fleet of six Boeing 737-700s, the no-frills newcomer was soon linking six State capitals with three flights a day to each city.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With its low-fares policy, GOL quickly grew from strength to strength. On 17 May 2004, it ordered 43 Boeing 737-800s, to add to its existing fleet of 20 -700s and -800s. On 24 June, a public stock offering raised $281 million additional capital.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Within a period of only a few years, GOL had usurped the entire airline establishment to claim air transport leadership in Brazil.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 42: Down Mexico Way</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 43: Around the Caribbean</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Close to the steep hillside, severe turbulence is common, and every Winair pilot used to spend a year in the right-hand seat, under instruction from an ex-Free French Spitfire pilot, Captain “La Pipe” Dormoy. To counteract the turbulence, his advice for the DHC-6 Twin Otter pilots who replaced the Dorniers’ was: “Approach the runway from about 50° to the left of the runway heading. Keep this diagonal approach, and pass about 200 feet to the left of the runway, aiming for the parking apron. With airspeed at about 66 knots, with full flaps, you will touch down on the runway immediately. Put the engines into reverse, and careful braking will give you a ground roll of about 250 feet.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 44: Central America</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 45: Airlines of the Andes</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 46: Farthest South</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Nine: Africa</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 47: Across the Mediterranean</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 48: Sub-Saharan Contradictions</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 49: End of the Empire Airlines</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 50:  To the Cape and Beyond</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Part Ten: Transitions</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 51: The Third Jet Age Begins</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The first Jet Age began in 1952 with the introduction into service of the first pioneering (but short-lived) British de Havilland Comet 1 then of Aeroflot’s short-haul Tupolev Tu-104. It was consolidated in 1958, by the larger and far more successful four-engined “big jets” from the United States, followed by the western short-haul jets, beginning with the French Caravelle. At the same time, turboprop airliners were introduced by the Vickers Viscount, and again followed by larger turboprops from the U.S.A., Britain, and the Soviet Union. All the airliners of this generation had four or five-abreast seating. The second Jet Age began in 1970, with the Boeing 747 wider-bodied jets, followed by Douglas and Lockheed tri-jets</u></em><em>. These long-haul twin-aisled types were followed by short-haul wide-bodied aircraft, led by Airbus, as the formerly over-fragmented European aircraft industry combined to create an organization that could match the volume and efficiency of the Americans. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In almost every category, developed variants of initial airliner designs were invariably better than their predecessors, mainly because their bigger—“stretched”—fuselages produced better economics, judged by lower seat-mile costs and more seats sold. Jet engine efficiencies progressed beyond all expectations. By the 21st century, range was no longer a problem. Boeing (which acquired Douglas) and Airbus airliners could fly half-way around the world, and thus connect any pair of major cities with nonstop service.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>During the closing decades of the 20th century, world-wide passenger traffic grew at an astonishing rate</u></em><em>. In the 1960s and 1970s, annual increases averaged as much as 15% per year (doubling the total volume every five years). To cope with the ever-increasing demand, the airlines demanded—and were presented with—ever larger aircraft. By the 1990s Boeing 747-400s were carrying 450 passengers on long-haul routes, and in the more densely traveled routes in Japan, they were carrying up to 530. By the 21st century, to cope with this unremitting requirement for more seats on the world’s major inter-city routes, an even bigger airliner was needed.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 52: A New Competitor:  High Speed Rail</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 53: A New Age Beckons</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The problem facing air transport today is thus not in the air but on the ground</u></em><em>. The airliners cannot fly any faster, nor can the manufacturers or the operators make them any more comfortable, except at the expense of economy and therefore higher fares. The outstanding success of bargain-fare airlines in the United States, Europe, southeast Asia, and Brazil (and the failure of most of the airlines that have emphasized luxury) has demonstrated what the mass market will prefer and accept.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Except for long-distance trans-ocean or transcontinental travel requirements, airlines should no longer concentrate on direct competition with surface transport on the ground, either from high speed roads or high speed trains. Cooperation should be the main criterion for long-term development. Intermodality of transport systems must be increasingly recognized as the ultimate solution to solving the problem of moving the world’s population, estimated to reach eight billion within the Third Jet Age. People will be increasingly more affluent, and anxious to see the world—the whole world—in which we live. The airlines will not be able to do it alone.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A Fourth Jet Age Measurable improvements in air travel in the future can be achieved only by innovative cooperation on the ground</u></em><em>. This author remembers a journey in 1988 from Washington to Cologne, when the Lufthansa connecting rail journey from Frankfurt was a coupon on the air ticket. Airlines should be in partnership with the railroads and be able to code-share with them. When airline passengers everywhere can disembark from an aircraft and walk to a railroad or subway platform (as in London, Zurich, Frankfurt, and Washington’s Reagan National Airport today), and travel onwards using the same ticket, we may witness the beginning of a new era. When airlines and railroads cease to compete, but energetically cooperate, and the policy of intermodality is universally accepted, this could signal the advent of a Fourth Jet Age.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"> </p>								</div>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/04/12/airlines-of-the-jet-age-a-history-2011/">Airlines of the Jet Age: A History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Markets Never Forget (But People Do): How Your Memory Is Costing You Money &#8211; and Why This Time Isn&#8217;t Different</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/03/22/markets-never-forget-but-people-do-how-your-memory-is-costing-you-money-and-why-this-time-isnt-different-2011/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=markets-never-forget-but-people-do-how-your-memory-is-costing-you-money-and-why-this-time-isnt-different-2011</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2023 15:59:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History & Economics]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Ken Fisher, 2011 (240 p.) This is an excellent book that professes the merits of sticking with what works best instead of allowing oneself to get tripped up by...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/03/22/markets-never-forget-but-people-do-how-your-memory-is-costing-you-money-and-why-this-time-isnt-different-2011/">Markets Never Forget (But People Do): How Your Memory Is Costing You Money &#8211; and Why This Time Isn&#8217;t Different</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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									<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">By Ken Fisher, 2011 (240 p.)</span></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">This is an excellent book that professes the merits of sticking with what works best instead of allowing oneself to get tripped up by behavioral biases and trying to time the market in order to avoid pain.  Bear markets have always happened and they always will, but “being bearish and wrong,” explains author Ken Fisher, “can be much more damaging to long-term results than being bullish and wrong.” Fisher uses a dictum often cited by stock market bears (that “<em>this time is different</em> are the four most expensive words in history”) to make the case that people repeatedly forget that the world does not end, and that stocks keep rising over time because “through it all, the profit motive is strong, and human ingenuity never dies.”  He provides hard data from many examples in history when people forgot this simple fact, just when it would have been most beneficial to remember it.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">While Fisher is not universally popular among professional investors, and neither is he known to be humble, his success as an investor and businessman is undeniable. Son of the famous investor and Stanford graduate Phil Fisher, Ken is the founder of <em>Fisher Investments</em>, which manages over $200 billion for institutions and individuals globally. Fisher’s column for Forbes ran from 1984 to 2017, making him the longest continuously running columnist in the magazine’s history. He has also published 11 books on investing and personal finance, four of which were <em>New York Times</em> bestsellers. For many years I dismissed him as a pop-finance marketer, but my respect for him has grown over the years, especially after reading most of his books.  I also <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/06/13/the-making-of-a-market-guru-forbes-presents-25-years-of-ken-fisher/">reviewed</a> <em>The Making of a Market Guru</em> (2010), which compiles his Forbes columns into a single volume, and while I am not a fan of the “market guru” label, it’s hard not to be impressed by how prescient his calls have been over the years.</p><p><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8445" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/image002.jpg" alt="" width="387" height="481" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/image002.jpg 387w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/image002-241x300.jpg 241w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/image002-121x150.jpg 121w" sizes="(max-width: 387px) 100vw, 387px" /></p><p style="font-weight: 400; text-align: center;">Ken Fisher (age 72)</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Fisher is witty in his writing (often too much), and I don’t agree with all of his opinions, but there are so many precious lessons in this book that I classify it as a <u>must read</u>.  For instance, he does a fantastic job in debunking the notion that it matters to the stock market which political party is in control.  He dismisses pundits who announce near every market bottom that the world has entered a “new normal” or that a “new paradigm” is upon us.  He also observes that volatility is a bad gauge or predictor of stock market returns, that volatility itself can be volatile and cyclical, and that “confirmation in general is expensive in capital markets.”</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">There are several other insightful arguments in this book, but my favorite &#8211; and most applicable to the current juncture- is his assertion that the notion of average returns (such as, “the market returns 10%, on average, over the long-term”) can be terribly misleading.  “A major reason investors overall don’t achieve long-term equity averages,” he observes, “is because they [get] in-and-out at the wrong times and don’t stick with a strategy. … Most folks understand when stocks fall 25%, rising 25% doesn’t get them back to breakeven— stocks must then rise 33% for that. To recoup a 40% drop, stocks must rise 67%. So when stocks fall big, as world stocks did from October 2007 to March 2009— down 57.8% — that takes a 137% rise just to get back to previous highs. A common refrain I heard in 2009 and after was, ‘If stocks rise an average of 10% a year, it could take eight years for me just to break even— never mind growing beyond that!’ That would be bleak, indeed. Except that, <u>stocks typically don’t rise an average of 10% in bull markets, they have risen an average 21.2% annually</u>.”</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Another insightful example of something people seem to forget every cycle is how employment data lags, on the way down as well as up.  “Pretend you’re a CEO.” Fisher writes.  “Sales of your widgets are slowing. Maybe a recession is coming or already here—you may not know it yet for sure because, of course, recessions are officially dated at a lag. Sales are plummeting. You don’t want to cut staff—no one does. So you hunker down. You cut costs. No more air travel, everyone has to do conference calls. You find ways to make your widgets cheaper. Sales keep falling. You pull out all the cost-saving stops.”  His main point is that unemployment starts to rise and fall long after the recession starts and ends. This makes perfect sense and happens every cycle, but somehow people, including those who run the Federal Reserve, seem to forget.</p><p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All told, I believe that this is an excellent book that anyone afraid of a bear market should read.  Even though it was written more than a decade ago, the arguments and data th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">at</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Fisher provides are timeless.</span></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em><u>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</u></em></strong></p><p><em><strong>Preface:</strong></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>People forget. So much! So often! So fast! Stuff that happened not long ago—and more often than not. And it causes investing errors—pretty commonly humongous ones. Maybe Hope should have been singing, Pranks for My Memory. Because for a fact, <u>our memories play pranks on us in markets, and always have and we never learn</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>History does not, in fact, repeat—not exactly. Every bear market has a distinct set of drivers, as does every bull market. But human behavior doesn’t change—not enough and not very fast to matter. Investors may not remember how panicked or euphoric they were over past events. <u>They may not remember they had the exact same repeating fears over debt, deficits, stupid politicians, high oil, low oil, consumers spending too much, consumers not spending enough, etc., etc., etc</u>. But markets remember very well that details may change but behavior generally doesn’t.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But if you point out to someone that his opinion-stated-as-fact is actually false, you will run into a brick wall because he simply won’t believe it. They know. They read it in the media or online. Their friends agree. It’s a fact to them. It may also be a false fact and one easily known if we didn’t simply forget so easily. But <u>because we forget as individuals, we do so as a society, too</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>They get head-faked by what later turns out to be normal volatility—because they forget they’ve lived through volatility many times before. They overreact—either too bearish or too bullish—based on some widely dispersed media report that later turns out to be highly overstated or just plain wrong and often backward. Why? <u>They forget the media is often and repeatedly wrong for the exact same reason—it’s made up of humans</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Presumably, if you say with certainty some condition leads to some other condition, that’s because you’ve observed that in the past or can otherwise measure it historically. Either that, or sound economic fundamentals says it must be so. Fair enough? And if a lot of people say Event X must cause Outcome Y, there’s no harm in checking to see if that’s what happened historically most of the time. <u>Because if it hasn’t happened before, it’s unlikely to happen now whether most folks think it will or not</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If you suffer memory loss, that gets very tough to do. But if you remember that you have a lousy memory and can train yourself to use history to understand probabilities, you can better understand what’s likelier (or not at all likely) going forward. And you can begin reducing your error rate.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Further, more investors are prone to be naturally skeptical—bearish—than are prone to be naturally optimistic. Not always and everywhere, and even the most dug-in bears can have times when they’re euphorically bullish (though <u>it’s usually a bad sign when dug-in bears become bullish</u>). But overwhelmingly, since stocks rise much more than fall (over two-thirds of history), folks counterintuitively tend to be bearish more than bullish. That concept—<u>that people overwhelmingly tend to be fearful when they shouldn’t—is at the very core of why so many fail to get the long-term results they want. It’s behind the quote Warren Buffett is famous for (though it’s not his—he just made it broadly popular): You should be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>in history, people have the same exact fears we have now and will have 1, 3, 7, 23 and 189 years into the future.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I’m a firm believer in capitalism and the power of the capital markets pricing mechanism</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 1: The Plain-Old Normal</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Sir John was simply an all-around great guy. He gave heavily to charitable foundations (many he established himself), among other things the world’s largest financial prize, the Templeton Prize in Religion. <u>He was thrifty—preferred driving junky used cars instead of being chauffeured in a limousine. He flew coach</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This isn’t to say history repeats perfectly. It doesn’t—not exactly. That’s not what Sir John meant. But a recession is a recession. Some are worse than others—but we’ve lived through them before. Credit crises aren’t new, nor are bear markets—or bull markets. Geopolitical tension is as old as mankind, as are war and even terror attacks. Natural disasters aren’t new! And this idea that natural disasters are bigger, badder and more frequent now simply isn’t true. <u>Only human arrogance allows us to believe we’re living in some new, unique age</u>. Sure, we are—just like every previous generation did.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Anyone who thinks the 2008 credit crisis was history’s worst knows zero about nineteenth-century history.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>For all the 2000s being frequently referred to as a “lost decade,” somehow the global economy doubled</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>One reason folks fall prey to the notion of long-term stagnancy now, I believe, is the death of journalism. </u>…most of the folks writing news today haven’t been around the block. Maybe 2007 to 2009 really was the biggest thing they’d ever seen. Maybe they were in college during the last recession and bear market or (eek!) high school. Maybe they weren’t even born for the one before that! They have no context. To them, the world really is ending and they can’t fathom how we get past this bad time (whenever it is) because they’ve never seen that happen before—not as an adult.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>To do well at money management—whether for yourself or others—means being right more than wrong over long periods. That means you will still be wrong a lot and frequently in clumpy patches of wrongness. But being right more than wrong is easier if you see the world more correctly.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Just because people think, “This time it’s different,” doesn’t mean they think all is terrible!</u> Sometimes they are overly, dangerously bullish. Sometimes bearish. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Every recovery is jobless</u>—<u>until it isn’t anymore</u>. No one remembers this.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Fears about a “double dip”—which is always talked about but rarely seen</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Starting early 2009, the term new normal (a same-but-different way of saying, “This time it’s different”) started ping-ponging through the media</u>. The new normal was specifically the idea that the bad problems newly emerged or envisioned in the recent recession were insurmountable—resulting in a new era of below-average economic growth, poor market returns, maybe even a double dip. The basis for the new normal was a litany of ills—some real, some vastly overstated: A housing crash that hadn’t recovered, too much US federal debt, too much consumer debt. Many believed greedy bankers had pushed our financial system beyond the brink and it was irrevocably broken. The economy couldn’t recover because banks wouldn’t lend. And tapped-out consumers couldn’t spend!</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Following are just a few historic examples from the media:</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>September 2009</u>—“The applicable word in New Normal is, of course, ‘new.’” This was from the latest round of new-normaling.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>December 13, 2003</u>—“The Industry is starting to settle on a new normal where growth is more muted but sustainable.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>April 30, 2003</u>—A F@stCompany headline said, “Welcome to the New Normal”—calling it a “slightly awkward, slightly odd place” where corporate profitability is more challenging.7Except when this was published, a recession had ended about a year and a half earlier, and a massive bull market run-up from the recent bear had started a month before.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>November 2, 1987</u>—A Time magazine cover said, “After a wild week on Wall Street, the world is different.”8Not the new normal, but a variation of “this time it’s different.” (And no, it wasn’t different. The world recovered from the October 1987 crash and subsequent bear to finish the decade strongly.)</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>January 7, 1978</u>—“The ‘new normal’ is here and now.”9Same new normal, different country—from a Canadian newspaper. June 15, 1959—“We could expect the country to return to the New Normal of the depressed Nineteen Thirties.” You could expect it, but it didn’t happen. Annual GDP growth was 7.2% in 1959, 2.5% in 1960, 2.1% in 1961 and 4.4% in 1963. Normal, fine economic growth. A bit volatile, but normal normal, not new normal. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>October 20, 1939</u>—“Present conditions must be regarded as ‘normal’—a ‘new normal.’”12Sure, if new normal meant GDP annualized 8.1%, 8.8%, 17.1%, 18.5% then 16.4% as it did in 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This isn’t to say every period following widespread use of new normal had fine (sometimes great) GDP growth. It’s just <u>the phrase tends to pop up most around the end of recessions</u> and in the few years of recovery thereafter—when people are bleakest but the actual future is brightest. Regardless, it’s never a very novel concept—or very prescient.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dated the recession’s end as June 2009—but that announcement wasn’t released until September 2010, which is normal. <u>NBER always dates recession start- and end-dates at a big lag</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>More damaging if you’d acted on new normal fears: <u>The stock market bottomed in March 2009, before the economy. Then stocks boomed—world stocks were up 44.1% three months off the bottom, and US stocks 40.2%.16 Twelve months later, world stocks were up 74.3%, US stocks 72.3%—the biggest initial 3- and 12-month bounce since 1932</u>. From the market bottom through year-end 2010, world stocks surged 93.3% and US stocks 93.1%.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This isn’t unusual, either. It’s normal—normal normal—how it almost always happens. <u>Stocks typically fall before a recession officially begins, pricing in glum times ahead. Then when most folks envision only the worst possible outcomes, the market knows (we forget, the market doesn’t) that things aren’t ridiculously rosy, but it isn’t Armageddon</u>. Stocks start moving sharply higher on that disconnect between reality and perception, bottoming before the economy does.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>For those common bear markets that do overlap recessions in the traditional way, stocks almost always rise first—and by a lot. It is the normal normal.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Another normal normal occurrence: As it becomes clear things aren’t so bad, <u>folks who heralded a new normal don’t wave white flags and say, “Oops, we were wrong.” Instead, the definition can just morph!</u> This was on full display in 2009 into 2011.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I don’t know when the next recession will be. I can’t predict that with certainty. But <u>I can near-guarantee that after it hits—when the stock market is maybe already bottoming and bouncing back strongly, and the recession is almost over (or maybe already over but people don’t know it, see it, feel it or believe it yet)—you will hear some variation of the new normal concept again. And that likely goes on for another one to three years, even well past the point at which the recession is officially acknowledged to be over. That’s the way it works—almost always.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In every single recession—as far back as we have good data on both economic cycles and unemployment—improvements in unemployment lagged the recovery.</u> Again, this is normal and healthy, not weird and worrisome. Journalists probably wouldn’t write so many alarming headlines—and investors wouldn’t get so alarmed—if they simply remembered how it all happened the last time (and the time before, and the time before that).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But forget about unemployment for a second and think about employment, which is more important and something NBER does consider in deciding when we have a recession and when we don’t. <u>Pretend you’re a CEO. Sales of your widgets are slowing. Maybe a recession is coming or already here—you may not know it yet for sure because, of course, recessions are officially dated at a lag. Sales are plummeting. You don’t want to cut staff—no one does. So you hunker down. You cut costs. No more air travel, everyone has to do conference calls. You find ways to make your widgets cheaper. Sales keep falling. You pull out all the cost-saving stops</u>. But after a quarter or two, you know: You must cut staff. If you don’t, your entire firm could implode. To preserve your firm, keep your customers and keep some staff, you cut. Things keep getting bad for a while, but you have a bare-bones staff and they keep innovating ways to be more productive. And you barely get by. Then, one day, sales level off. Maybe you’re through the worst, maybe not. Maybe you fear that double dip everyone talks about (but rarely happens—we’ll cover that in a bit).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Confirmation in general is expensive in capital markets</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>NBER defines a double dip as . . . just kidding, they don’t define it, nor identify one. Not at all. A double dip is rather like stagflation—a term without an official definition that a lot of people fear and think is frequently just around the corner but doesn’t show up as often as media headlines imply. Still, you’d think we’d know a double dip in some official way when we see one.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>An average recession (since 1854—as far back as NBER has data) lasts 16 months</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Great Depression was two distinct recessions (and two distinct bear markets, by the way). The first recession was brutal—43 months starting in August 1929—way above average (and skewing the average higher, mind you). Then we got over four years of uninterrupted growth—50 months. The average growth cycle lasts 38 months (which is skewed down by some shorter cycles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), so that mid-1930s growth cycle was markedly above average in duration! Not a double dip. Overall and on average a miserable period—but not one long period of uniform stagnation.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>To summarize: People tend to remember and expect things that never or rarely occurred</u>. <u>They forget things that happen regularly</u>. They look for a concept like the new normal at the same stage of every cycle. They always fear unemployment in every new economic expansion. They regularly fear double-dip recessions that rarely seem to happen. There is much more, but the central problem is: Our memories are faulty. There is a lot more we fail to remember correctly, and all of it leads to the truth of Sir John Templeton’s utterance, “The four most expensive words in the English language are, ‘This time it’s different.’”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 2: Fooled by Averages</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Market averages are useful tools, but individual weeks, months and years are anything but average—in both bull and bear markets. In this chapter, we look at how investors forget: Bull markets are inherently above average. Early bull markets are really above average. Normal returns are extremely extreme. Even within bull markets, annual returns can be wildly variable—including up a little and, yes, down a little. Because annual returns aren’t average, achieving average returns is tactically easy, but mentally very, very difficult.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bull Markets Are Inherently Above Average</u> One common way market-average amnesia manifests: Almost uniformly for the first stage of a new bull market—the first year or even two—headlines claim, “No Bull!” or something similar. Many (maybe most) pundits don’t want to look silly by being too optimistic. It’s not a new bull, they say, but a countertrend in a longer bear. “It’s just a bear market rally!” cries occur most often during the first, initial, massive bounce off a bear market bottom—though such booms are perfectly normal (people just forget). And they can go on long after we get confirmation from the economy (which almost always lags).</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>But fears normal bull market upward volatility (and yes, volatility can go up, too) is really a bear market rally can occur at any point—and have through history</u>. For example: </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>March 26, 2009</u>: In this article, a financial services CEO warned, “This is a bear market rally, not something more.” Oops—it was something more. Globally, the bear market bottomed 17 days earlier, and the bull market runs still as I write.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>May 8, 2003</u>: “Hochberg of Elliot Wave also says this is just another bear market rally.” But it wasn’t. The global bear market double-bottomed just two months earlier, and another bear market didn’t materialize for another four-plus years.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>August 3, 1996</u>: “My feeling is this is simply a bear market rally.” This one’s strange—it was smack in the middle of the decade-long bull market. No bear in sight. Stocks had pulled back a bit in July—not even enough to be a correction—and then rebounded strongly. Normal bull market volatility and not a bear market.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>December 28, 1990</u>: “The market has generally adhered to our bear-market rally forecast since the September-October bottom.” Actually, the 1990s mega-bull market started in October—two months before this quote. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>May 6, 1985</u>: “I still think the recession lurks . . . but continually falling interest rates could ease recession fears enough to cause a healthy bear market rally.” The bull market that started in August 1982 would run through August 1987, pause for that short 1987 bear, then run to July 1990.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>November 1, 1962: “. . . the simple fact that sudden violent advances of this type represent typical bear market rally action.” Or rather, new bull market action. The bull market that started in June 1962 ran through February 1966. And so on . . .</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Interestingly, <u>people frequently think being cautious about a new bull market is prudent</u>. They believe it’s better to be wrong and too bearish rather than wrong and too bullish, even though history shows being wrongly bearish can be more harmful to long-term returns if you’re growth oriented. (Read more in Chapter 7.) Big bull market returns at any stage shouldn’t surprise or frighten you. Why? <u>Bull markets are inherently above average</u>. <u>I hope that seems beyond basic to you—tautology to the nth ridiculous degree</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>when investors experience down years (which happen—fact of life), it’s common for them to feel that one or two bad years ruined it all and they’ll never experience anything like long-term equity returns. And maybe they won’t! But probably not because they were hurt by a down year</u>. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A major reason investors overall don’t achieve long-term equity averages is because they in-and-out at the wrong times and don’t stick with a strategy. Long-term returns have always included down years and will continue to include down years. Down years are a fact of life</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>So if you’re a long- term growth oriented investor and are reasonably diversified, you shouldn’t be overly focused on the occasional down year. Why? Because bull markets are longer and stronger— <u>they are by their very nature above average</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Bear markets average 21 months. Remember: An average is just an average, always! Bear markets can be both longer and shorter. And on average, they fall about 40% cumulatively. Now look at bull markets in Table 2.2—they average 57 months (some more, some less) and on average rise a whopping 164%! That’s price return—returns are higher still if you include dividends. (I don’t here because we don’t have good daily data on total returns back to 1926. But price returns tell the story well enough.)</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Folks get particularly freaked out by big returns when bull markets start.</u> It seems like too much, too fast— and particularly so since they’re still fearful of all the things that freaked them out in the prior bear market. <u>If they can’t remember that stocks don’t return a safe, predictable 10% each year, then new bull markets (no matter how many they’ve been through) really send them into a tailspin of myopic fear</u>. People are basically and naturally afraid of heights, and when the market rises more than they expected right after a scary bear market, they fear it will fall back. And since humans hate losses more than they like gains, that fear of heights is doubly scary.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Most folks understand when stocks fall 25%, rising 25% doesn’t get them back to breakeven— stocks must then rise 33% for that. To recoup a 40% drop, stocks must rise 67%. So when stocks fall big, as world stocks did from October 2007 to March 2009— down 57.8% — that takes a 137% rise just to get back to previous highs. A common refrain I heard in 2009 and after was, “If stocks rise an average of 10% a year, it could take eight years for me just to break even— never mind growing beyond that!” That would be bleak, indeed. Except that, stocks typically don’t rise an average of 10% in bull markets, they have risen an average 21.2% annually.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>History also suggests the harder and faster the bear market, the swifter the initial return off the bottom usually is. For example, world stocks soared 74.3% and US 72.3% in the first 12 months following the March 9, 2009, bear market bottom. Huge—and vastly more than anyone would have guessed during that very trying bear-market-bottoming period.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The first three months of a bull market average 23.1%. Three months! And the first full year averages 46.6%</u>. So basically, the first year of an average bull market about doubles an average bull market year (which is still historically above average overall), and half of that can come in the first three months! Not always, but enough to let you know you don’t want to miss a second of it. Plus, that erases a chunk of bear market losses fast.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Many investors today should remember the hard fast surge off the October 2002 bottom (which retested lows in March 2003 and then exploded up again). Maybe they got fooled by the 1990 surge—just 6.7%. But the full year would have made up for that, not to mention the entirety of the 1990s. More grizzled guys (and gals) should remember the super-swift rebounds from the 1987 bear and the one ending in 1982.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>It’s true through history about two-thirds of bear market losses tend to come in the final third of the bear market duration—the left side of the V. Bear market losses in the final stage are also above average.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>If you’re a long-term investor with growth goals (i.e., most reading this book), you should utterly ignore arbitrary benchmarks like breakeven, high water, round-number index levels, etc.</u>Focus instead on whether your strategy makes sense for your long-term growth goals without thinking about what stocks did last week, last month or last year.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>History shows bull markets start with a bang</u>. So if you miss that, should you sit out the rest, avoid the next bear and get in for the fireworks next time? No way.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>My guess is if you’re sitting out, you may not be so keen to get invested again during the deeply dark, terrifying days of a bear market–bottoming period—which are only evident after the surge is well underway and are actually great times to get all in. <u>Whatever scared you last time likely scares you next time</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>How can remembering big bull market returns are normal and not inherently scary be useful to you? You know to beware the “too far, too fast” concept you hear frequently during bull markets. It particularly pops up in the first year or two, during bull markets’ initial massive surges—<u>but any stage of a bull market can be plagued with “too far, too fast” fears</u>. It doesn’t mean the bull must stop. Why? Because, say it with me, bull markets are longer and stronger than people remember and above average by nature.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>That stock prices have gone up a lot doesn’t mean they always must fall. In fact, more often than not, they just keep rising in irregular fashion, but people forget—always. For example: </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>October 18, 1958</u>: “Among the country’s top industrialists, apprehension over the business outlook has been replaced by high optimism and even some fear that the recovery may go too far, too fast. . . . The stock market already has gone wild.” Nope! This year-old bull market still had over three more years to run.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>April 19, 1959</u>: “Securities and Exchange Commission through its chairman, Edward N. Gadsby, warned that it suspected the stock market was going too far, too fast.” Again, the 1957 to 1961 bull was still alive and well.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>July 13, 1962</u>: “Looking at that and other statistics, some analysts were inclined to feel that the market had moved too far, too fast.” A new bull market had begun just a month earlier and would run into 1966. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>January 29, 1975</u>: “The sale of borrowed shares in expectation of price declines—by traders apparently convinced that the market had gone too far, too fast.” This bull was a little more than three months old and ran for fully 74 months and 126%.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>August 14, 1982</u>: “Analysts said many traders concluded that the recent rallies in both the bond and stock markets had gone too far, too fast.”17Already? This bull market was just two days old! It ran until the famously short, sharp bear in 1987, rising 229%.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>August 13, 1984</u>: “Analysts said many traders appeared to believe that the stock market had come too far, too fast in its rally of the past two weeks.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>January 2, 1986</u>: “Johnson said both the bond and the stock markets have come too far, too fast and some backtracking is overdue.” Nope—this bull still had more than a year and a half to go. Also, US stocks rose 18.6% in 1986, and world stocks a big 41.9%.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>May 20, 1992</u>: “Investors are troubled. . . . They believe the market is overvalued. They’re worried that the stock market has come too far, too fast.” The famous 1990s bull ran for over eight more years, rewarding investors with a total 546% in US stocks, 242% in world.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>March 29, 1995</u>: “It has been clear for a couple days now that investors, particularly institutional investors, were becoming increasingly edgy that the market had gone too far, too fast.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>February 27, 1997</u>: “Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested Wednesday that the tremendous increase in the stock market over the last two years may have gone too far, too fast.” People credit Alan Greenspan for crying, “Irrational exuberance!” about stocks. Trouble was, he spoke those words December 5, 1996. The bull had over three years and another 75.7% to climb in world stocks, 115.6% in US.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>July 1, 2003</u>: “The market has gone too far, too fast, so investors can expect a 7% to 8% correction.”27This was four months into the new bull market, in a year global stocks rose 33.1%. Overall global stocks rose 161.0% from 2002 to the 2007 peak.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>September 19, 2009</u>: “The stock market has been soaring. It may have gone too far, too fast.”29Not so—the bull that started in March kept running and runs still as I write. October 15, 2009: “Despite the celebrations on Wall Street on Wednesday, analysts said the rally may have gone too far, too fast.” (You see how the same phrases pop up over and over again, yet we always seem to think they’re new.) There’s no such thing as “too far, too fast.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>At sentiment extremes, you do get euphoria—and it’s typically a very bad sign. <u>But it’s as bad a sign as extreme, uniform bearishness is typically a good sign of better days soon ahead</u>. Stocks prices can get high and then fall for a time. But they don’t fall just because they are high. Investors have witnessed that repeatedly and simply forget. When someone says, “Too far, too fast,” ignore it. Unless the assessment is rooted in negative fundamentals that are little appreciated and capable of outweighing existing positive fundamentals, someone saying, “Too far! Too fast!” is just showing you how short their memory is.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Normal Returns Are Extreme, Not Average</em></strong><em>:  I’m sure you’ve heard or read that, after a period of volatility (which is normal, more in Chapter 3), investors should wait to invest until markets behave more “normally.” I’ve been in this business for nearly 40 years. I have much less of my career before me than what’s behind me<u>. I’ve written a regular investing column in Forbes for over 27 years and counting. I’ve written academic papers and books and managed tens of billions of dollars for individuals and institutions. I’ve done speaking engagements, seminars, TV. I’ve written, now, eight books on investing and personal finance. I’ve been exposed to capital markets and investors in every which way you can. <strong>And I have never, ever seen the market behave normally</strong></u><strong>.</strong></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>the most common outcome (37.6% of the time) is for stocks to be up over 20%.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Since 1926, US stocks have landed smack dab in the average range (9% to 11%) just three times—in 1968 (stocks up 11%), 1993 (10.1%) and 2004 (10.9%). World stocks have done it just two times since 1970—stocks rose 10.0% in 2005 and 9.6% in 2007.32</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The Great Humiliator, TGH, that perverted trickster, likes to humiliate as many people as possible for as long as possible for as many dollars as possible</u>. Bear markets are TGH at its finest, but TGH finds ways to humiliate investors all the time, in all ways. Corrections are a great way to terrify people into losing money when they otherwise shouldn’t—when markets quickly drop 10% to 20% or a bit more, then quickly reverse, moving to new highs—punishing those who panicked and sold low.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Knowing returns are variable—knowing it in your bones and not forgetting—can keep you from panicking from fear or heat chasing in greed. But there’s a more useful application. If markets return around 10% on average over long periods, and bull markets are above average, it must be easy to get 10%-ish annualized returns in your portfolio, give or take—right? Actually, that’s very tough. Tactically, it’s not—it’s quite easy. But <u>emotionally and psychologically, there are few things tougher. Many investors have a stated goal of beating the market. But the truth is, on average, investors not only don’t beat the market, they don’t even come close to it</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Each year, Dalbar Inc., a research firm based in Boston, releases its study of investor behavior, specifically as it relates to performance. In 2011, its research showed the average equity mutual fund investor got an annualized average return of 3.83% for the 20 years ending in 2010—inclusive of all transaction costs</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Let me put that another way. Had you put $100,000 in the S&amp;P 500 20 years ago and let it ride, you’d have about $571,000. But the average equity investor after 20 years had just $212,000—only 37% as much.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Dalbar estimates the average mutual fund investor holds a mutual fund for just 3.27 years</u>. (If you want more on this, I describe this more fully in my 2010 book Debunkery.) Most long-term growth-oriented investors buy into the general concept of buy and hold. They bicker about what exactly that means and how it’s done. But few would argue holding a mutual fund for 3.27 years on average (sometimes less!) is buy and hold. Many investors I speak with say, “Why do I need to hire a money manager when it’s so easy to buy and hold an S&amp;P 500 ETF? Set it and forget it!” And I agree! But in my experience, precious few can actually do that. And that’s just what <u>Dalbar observed—overwhelmingly, people can’t set it and forget it, especially not when they think they can and that it’s easy.</u> <u>This is an underappreciated value of working with a good professional</u>. Not every money manager can beat or even meet the market. Few have done it long term. But a good professional should be able to guide you to an appropriate long-term strategy and then help you stick with your goals and not in-and-out whenever the going seems tough, or conversely, when you feel like you’re missing out on hot performance elsewhere (i.e., heat chasing). Maybe you don’t average 10% a year—maybe with some professional help you have the discipline to stick with a strategy that nets you an annualized 7% or 8% long term. That’s still much better than what Dalbar observed average investors doing.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Big down years frighten investors into thinking long-term equity averages aren’t attainable. They panic and radically reduce risk (inconsistent with their longer-term goals). Big up years do damage, too—instilling overconfidence and perhaps greed, so they ratchet up risk (also inconsistent with their longer-term goals), usually in time to get hurt worse than they otherwise would have been in the next downturn. Repeat, repeat, repeat</u>. All of which ultimately dings returns.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>They forget chasing heat in the late 1990s hurt bad, then getting excessively risk averse after 2002 also robbed them of returns. And then they chased heat again and reflexively overreacted after 2008, in time to miss a historic bounce off the bottom. They don’t learn from past mistakes because they forget: Market returns aren’t average. Return variability is huge—and normal.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 3: Volatility Is Normal—and Volatile</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Is “now” a more volatile time? Read the news, watch TV—odds are someone is saying it is. And that has been true almost every year forever. (It’s a twist on “this time it’s different” and more evidence investors have faulty memories.)</u> But if you took a time machine back and visited any point 1, 5, 10, 17, 32, 147 years ago, you’d probably still hear folks saying, “Well, now is just more volatile than before!” This belief—that stocks are increasingly more volatile now—doesn’t need a bear market bottom to pop up. Undoubtedly, fears stocks have become more inherently volatile do increase in the intensely volatile bear-bottoming periods. But even in relatively less volatile years (and yes, volatility is itself variable) you get folks feeling like stocks are increasingly careening out of control via volatility. First, stocks are volatile. Can’t escape it. Volatility can be terrifying, but the fact the market wiggles wildly shouldn’t be surprising. It is now volatile, always has been, always will be, forever and ever, world without end, amen. And you want it to be.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Fact is, some years are more volatile than others—always been that way</u>. Some weeks and months are more volatile. But despite ever-present conventional wisdom over the decades that the present is more volatile than the past, there’s no discernible trend the market is getting more volatile overall—just the same normal variability of volatility there’s always been. Plus, whether a year is more or less volatile than average isn’t automatically indicative of trouble—stocks can rise or fall on above- and below-average volatility. There’s no predictive pattern. It’s always been this way, yet people routinely forget. So let’s use some history to correct this memory impairment.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>October 1, 2010</u>: “On top of that, the market is more volatile than usual. An Associated Press–CNBC poll taken in August and September found about three in five investors less confident about buying and selling individual stocks because of the volatility.” Remember, stocks were up huge in 2009 and had another fine year in 2010. Further, polls are about feelings and feelings aren’t good forward-indicators for stock markets. July 31, 2009: “Though it is undeniable that all of these much-ballyhooed innovations have made markets more efficient, there’s good reason to suspect they also make markets more volatile, less stable and less fair.”3I’m not sure what “less fair” means. But there’s no evidence stocks are inherently more volatile. That’s just a variation on “this time it’s different.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Maybe you’d prefer a world without volatility. But a world without volatility is a world where returns on investments likely can’t even beat the eroding power of inflation</u>. To get return, you must take risk—felt frequently as volatility. Maybe your investment goals don’t require much growth—fine! But if you want more return, you must steel yourself to tolerate some volatility. If you want less volatility, that’s fine—you simply must adjust down your return expectations. And if you want no volatility at all, then you must be satisfied with whatever low interest rate your bank is paying on deposits.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The idea <u>there’s some silver bullet</u>—a magical investment—that gets market-like returns with materially less-than-market-like volatility is bewitching. If it existed, everyone would know it, and every money manager in the world would invest in it. Heck, there would be no money managers—everyone would do it on their own! But history doesn’t support the existence of such a thing. Not legitimately, at least.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Volatility is good because it’s required to get you superior returns over time</u>—history teaches us that. But true volatility is also a pretty darned good indication your investment is at least legit—not tied up in a Ponzi fraud.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Fact is, the world has always been a dangerous place</u>—and people have always feared it’s becoming more so “now.” We’ve always had geopolitical tensions, volatile commodity prices, supply disruptions, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>W<u>ars, terror attacks, nuclear emergencies, natural disasters—these aren’t black swans</u>. They are and can be devastating—and we hope they’re rare in the future—but they’ve happened throughout history. They are unpredictable, so you can’t forecast them or build a portfolio strategy around them—but they aren’t wholly improbable. The good news is, though markets are volatile, history shows they are also resilient. Markets know (though people forget) as terrible as these events are, we always rise above. We dig out and rebuild and go on. Through it all, the profit motive is strong, and human ingenuity never dies. So no matter how trying a setback overall, humanity carries on—and so do our economies and capital markets. This isn’t just my optimistic view of human nature. This is, in fact, demonstrated through history. People think “now” is more trying than ever before—but the fact is, there’s never been a dull moment in history.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>People complain inflation is high in 2011</u> (though it’s well below its long-term average). How about 1979 or 1980 when high, double-digit inflation was seen as a fact of life and almost universally expected to rise from there? Stocks were up 11.0% in 1979 and a huge 25.7% in 1980.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Even if you’ve lived through massive volatility a number of times, it’s so easy to forget within just 5 or 10 years. But you forget at your peril. You might end up knee-jerking at what’s otherwise some normal volatility in an overall fine year and robbing yourself of who-knows-how-much future return.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>History teaches us. Memory fails us.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 4: Secular Bear? (Secular) Bull!</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I just can’t find secular bear markets in history.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>even the very longest bear market on record lasted just over 5 years—and that was 75 years ago</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Though secular bear markets are hard to find, secular bears, as individual people, aren’t</u>—you can find them easily on TV and in print.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>it’s just easier to be a dug-in bear. If stocks are up big, you can say, “It’s just a correction in a secular bear.” The higher they go, the more they might fall—and the prospect of falling frightens people more than opportunity makes them feel good</u>. And for some reason, people are more forgiving if you’re wrong and miss upside than if you’re wrong and expose them to the downside—though history shows over time, <u>being bearish and wrong can be much more damaging to long-term results than being bullish and wrong.</u> I think it’s because of what behavioralists have proven—that people hate losses fully twice as much as they enjoy gains emotionally.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>it’s true, from 1965 to 1981, stocks annualized a scant 0.01%—if you measure using the bizarrely constructed, price-weighted Dow Jones Industrial Average (aka, the Dow) and exclude dividends. But why would you? When you do include dividends, the Dow annualized 4.5%—or 111% cumulatively over that supposedly flat period</u>. Below average, but not a bear market and still 111%! Put another way, over those 17 years, your money doubled, plus some!</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Where are the 10-year negative returns in stocks? Historically, there are just a very, very few—and if you wait just a bit after that, they disappeared as stocks bounced back</u>. The only one that really endured for any long period is the one that began in 1929.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Where are the 10-year negative returns in stocks? Historically, there are just a very, very few—and if you wait just a bit after that, they disappeared as stocks bounced back. The only one that really endured for any long period is the one that began in 1929.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The positives and negatives tend to come in clumps, too</u>, so when in the throes of an overall more negative period, it’s easier to forget stocks like to be positive more than negative.<br />you must have a very short memory indeed to not remember calendar years are positive 71.8% of history. Well over two-thirds! Rolling 1-years have been positive 72.9%, rolling 5-years 86.9%, 10-years 94% and every single rolling 20-year period historically has been positive. That is a heck of a lot of upside volatility, and some pretty bad memories most investors have—even professionals. Especially professionals! And don’t forget, even within those few longer periods that were overall negative, they included shorter interludes of hugely positive returns—they weren’t 10-year periods of nonstop consistent downside.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…for many investors, it potentially robs you of superior returns—meaning maybe you must seriously dial back your lifestyle later on. <u>Your time horizon shouldn’t be how long it is until you retire</u>. In my view, a more appropriate way to think about time horizon is how long you need your assets to last—which, for most, is their entire life and that of their spouse. (For gents reading this, remember, odds are your wife lives longer. Plan for that, too, and you’ll increase the odds she remembers you fondly rather than spends her widowhood cursing your name.)<br />In myriad ways, it’s easier—emotionally—to be bearish always than bullish most of the time. If you’re bearish and wrong, you can say “Oh well, at least I didn’t lose money.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 5: Debt and Deficient Thinking</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The fear the world is overindebted is one of the more common, most repeating fears in investing history. It is nothing new. Always through time, debt fears cycle in and out—people just forget today’s fears aren’t so unique: </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>September 15, 1868</u>: “The colony is already greatly overindebted; most of the wealth of the country is absorbed in the payment of interest of public and private debts to English capitalists.” From a New Zealand newspaper. They (and we) seem to have done ok since. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>March 12, 1972</u>: A Time magazine cover asked, “Is the US Going Broke?” Well, we didn’t then. 1983: Another Time magazine cover warned, “The Debt Bomb: The Worldwide Peril of Go-Go Lending.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>February 18, 1988</u>: “The overindebted consumer is likely to be cutting back his spending this year. This sets the stage for a recession.” What happened was another two years of expansion, a shallow recession and a huge market and economic boom for the entirety of the 1990s. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>November 22, 1991</u>: “Yet, corporations generally also are seen as overindebted.” Again, the 1990s were an overall pretty darn good decade—globally—for corporate profitability, economic growth and stocks.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>April 2, 2001</u>: “There are risks in the boom—overindebted homeowners could be taking on too much debt.” Mind you, the 2001 recession ended a few months later, and the bear market about a year after that. The start of the 2007–2008 bear market was more than six years away. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>March 15 2011</u>: “This is the conundrum, the potential economic catastrophe, confronting the overindebted developed world right now.” We shall see. . . .</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This book isn’t about preaching how much debt you or anyone else personally should have. That is up to you, your spouse, your creditors and whatever spiritual adviser you cotton to. But it’s the same concept as corporate debt—used responsibly, the benefits are real. You (probably) used leverage to buy a house, a car, a college education maybe. Debt for a college education can be very economic. Yet we all know there are real-world consequences to having too much debt—but despite widespread assumption, there’s no fact-based evidence society overall is recklessly over-indebted.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>people fear budget deficits, but history shows it’s the surpluses they should fear</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Reflexively, most expect stock returns to do much worse after very big deficits and much better after surpluses. An important lesson: Never reflexively believe anything! History, that useful lab, shows it’s actually the reverse. Twelve months after surplus peaks, stocks returned 1.3% on average. They returned just 0.1% cumulatively after 24 months and just 7.1% cumulatively after 36. And that’s not just a few big negatives dragging the averages down—there’s big return variability after big surpluses. Much more so than after big deficits. Returns 12, 24 and 36 months after deficit troughs are nearly uniformly positive. And the returns are much better—20.1% after 12 months, 29.7% after 24 and 35.1% after 36. If your instinct is to sell when deficits are exploding higher—just because you fear the deficit—you’re likely making the wrong move. <u>The reverse is true: A huge surplus isn’t necessarily a sign all is clear ahead</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Another key lesson: <u>Don’t make market moves based on one factor—capital markets are much too complex</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In my 2006 book, The Only Three Questions That Count, I showed the same relationship between deficits, surpluses and the stock market is true in Germany, Japan, and the UK.)<br />Investing is a game best played in an ideology-free zone.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 6:  Long-Term Love and Other Investing Errors</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>There’s a school of investors who believe, with their very souls, small cap stocks are inherently best for all time. There’s another subset that feels the same about small-cap value. Who’s right? There are those who believe large cap is best; no, large-cap growth is best—steady and safe; no, Tech; no, high-dividend stocks; no, German mid-cap Industrials. Name a category, no matter how big or narrow, there are adherents—rigid in their orthodoxy, absolute in their canonical beliefs. But it’s not blind faith (so they’ll have you believe)! They can show you data proving their category is best! And sometimes they can—if they use shorter time periods. Or oddly define the category. Or use faulty indexes. Or do some other bogus calculation. There are myriad ways data can be altered (or tortured) to get there—false nonetheless.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Anything that becomes widely known loses power—this includes information but also investing tools, methods and valuations</u>. Why promote it? I didn’t think I was so smart that I’d figured out something no one else could, so I expected PSR to lose power. It still remains useful in evaluating stocks against their peers—like the P/E, price to book and any number of valuations. And at certain times, it has more power as a forecasting tool than at others (usually when people think it has none). But on its own, not the PSR nor any other valuation can tell you when a stock is more or less likely to outperform.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Many believe if a bull market runs too long—i.e., longer than average—the bull market must end. No!</u> (See Chapter 2.) Averages have huge variances underneath, and any single category can have fundamentals—even shifting ones—that support outperformance for far longer than average.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Believers in forward ERPs (and other long-term forecasting models) usually suffer from myopia. I’ve never seen any model that stood up well to back-testing consistently. If it did, it got a few periods right, not the majority, and only by happenstance.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If you want an excellent history on bubbles, and why we will always be prone to them periodically, read Charles MacKay’s excellent book, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. <u>My guess is speculative bubbles existed back to the earliest marketplaces in Mesopotamia</u>. As long as humans exist, we’ll have bubble manias from time to time. And we’ll have heat chasers.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The problem with housing, even during the best of times, is it’s a large single transaction with huge transaction costs and ongoing deferred maintenance costs and taxes</u>. Then, too, if a significant portion of your net worth is tied up in a single type of asset—a home—with no geographical diversity, that can be risky. You wouldn’t put all your money in one stock, would you?<br />In 1980, I remember folks having the same feeling they had in the mid-2000s—that real estate was an ironclad investment. I remember a 19-year-old kid who did some maintenance work around my office giving me tips on where to get some cheap land. He quoted Will Rogers to me (19 years old!) saying, “Buy land; they ain’t making any more of it.” Which brought to mind another famous quote from investor Bernard Baruch, “When beggars and shoeshine boys, barbers and beauticians can tell you how to get rich, it is time to remind yourself that there is no more dangerous illusion than the belief that one can get something for nothing.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>the truth is, real estate has always been a pretty lackluster long-term investment</u>. Since we have decent data (1978), a dollar invested in real estate would have grown to $16.65. However, that same dollar in world stocks would have grown to $23.22 and in US stocks to $32.99—almost double!</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Yes, there’s value to owning real estate. For most of us, it may be the value of a roof over our heads. There are other intangibles to real estate, of course. And yes, there are many successful real estate investors—but the best I’ve seen have very diverse portfolios, both in product (commercial versus residential versus mixed use versus industrial) and geography.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>to invest in gold well (as well as most industrial metals and indeed most commodities), you usually must time the boom/busts well</u>. And if you want to give it a try, ask yourself, “What was the last, good, short-term timing call I made?” Then ask yourself—and be honest, “What was the last, good, short-term timing call I got wrong? Have I been wrong more often than right? Or right more than wrong?” For example, did you buy US Tech stocks in the mid-1990s? Did you then short Tech in March 2000? Did you short global stocks in 2001, then buy them back in March 2003 and hold through 2007? Did you buy oil in January 2007, right before its last steep surge, and sell in July 2008? Did you buy Emerging Markets in Fall 2008? Or global stocks in early 2009, when sentiment was black? Did you sell euros and buy dollars in April 2008? Then reverse that in March 2009? Were you overweight Materials, Energy and Consumer Discretionary for the year or so following the bear market bottom, because they fell most in the bear and then bounced the most in the new bull? If you didn’t get those right—some pretty big swings in some fairly broad categories—then what makes you think you can time the next gold boom? Or the next gold bust? If you aren’t a proven, more-right-than-wrong hot hand at market timing, <u>don’t bother with timing gold.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>history teaches, at the end of a bear market, you want to own those narrower categories that fell most in the late stages of a bear.</u> They tend to bounce huge in the early stages of a bull.<br />History (and fundamentals) also says, generally, if you expect the spread between long-term interest rates and short-term rates to narrow (a so-called flattening yield curve) growth stocks tend to do better than value stocks. And if you expect the reverse to occur—so that the spread between long-term interest rates and short-term rates gets wider (a so-called steepening yield curve)—value stocks typically do better than growth stocks.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…<u>an environment when banks are less eager to lend tends to favor growth stocks</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 7:  Poli-Ticking</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Want to see investors’ memories utterly fail? Ask them about their politics. Folks have myriad reasons (misguided or not) for liking one political party over another. And something you commonly hear is Party X is better for stocks and/or the economy while Party Y is disastrous. Simply ain’t so</u>. And investors blinded by partisan preference may miss very real patterns driven not by ideology but by very fundamental factors.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…by stretching your memory a bit longer and studying a bit of market history, you can overcome this problem. Do that and you discover: No one party is materially better or worse than the other for stocks long term. Folks blinded by ideology miss a useful forecasting tool that can help shape better forward-looking expectations. No one party is better, but sometimes party does matter—it just flip-flops. This isn’t a quirk; other nations can be similarly impacted by politics.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I’m occasionally accused of being both a strong Democrat and a strong Republican by people who don’t like something I say. I’m neither—nor do I identify as Independent—and haven’t claimed allegiance to a political party for a long time. I prefer neither party and find plenty to criticize (and, very rarely, applaud) in both</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>As a money manager, my aim is to be ideologically agnostic</u>. Why? A political preference is just another bias. Biases are deadly in investing. They color your analysis, making you blind to certain things while giving others undue weight.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>You may love your political party, and they, in fact, may love you back (in their perverse way)—particularly if you frequently donate. But neither party loves your portfolio.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>History shows neither is materially better for stocks long term. However, that doesn’t stop folks from misremembering this:</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>September 10, 1992</u>: “Some analysts suggest getting out now because a win by Democrat Bill Clinton in November will send the market plunging for six months. (Wall Street prefers Republican administrations, which are perceived to be better for business.)” Except stocks boomed for nearly the totality of Clinton’s administration.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>August 16, 2009</u>: “Measured by simple price appreciation on the Dow Jones industrial average, Democratic presidents have been better for the stock market than Republican ones.” Oops—just the opposite of the previous quote. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, if you must use a faulty index (like the Dow) and ignore dividends, your hypothesis probably doesn’t hold much water.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>December 12, 1971</u>: “If the Dow-Jones industrial average is higher on the Monday before election day than at the start of 1972, President Nixon will undoubtedly be reelected. But if the average is lower than on the first of the year, then the Democratic party will most likely take over the Presidency.” This . . . makes no sense.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>October 31, 1996</u>: “A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll finds Democrats were rated better able to handle most key issues, such as the economy, education and Medicare.”4Fine, but a poll just measures people’s feelings and faulty near-term memories. And feelings change fast. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>September 21, 2010</u>: “Additionally, public opinion about which political party is better for the US economy has swung in favor of the Republicans, according to the Pew poll.”5See? Feelings change—fast. Don’t trust them—not yours or anyone else’s.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>I can’t tell you how many Republicans told me as Barack Obama took office that the market had to do terribly under him because of what he and the Democratic party would do. Note, the market bottomed within a few weeks of his taking office and has done markedly better than average under his tenure.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>ObamaCare (or any other piece of legislation) may make you giddy or may make you want to shake your fist at the sky. But leave all that out of your investing decisions because it doesn’t much matter. I know that is hard for you to believe. Maybe impossible. That’s your problem.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>So stop thinking in terms of, “I like this guy. I think he’s tops for the economy. That other guy is an idiot and possibly hates puppies!” You can say those things at home, at cocktail parties, at political rallies, on Twitter, wherever. <u>But when it comes to making investing decisions, drop the ideology. It’s deadly</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Now look at individual years. The back half of presidential terms—years three and four—are nearly uniformly positive. Year three doesn’t have a single negative since 1939, which was barely negative. Year four has just four down years. And returns are not always but frequently are double-digit positives.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Folks love finding patterns in charts and price graphs. A pattern is nothing more than a quirk and you shouldn’t make market bets based on it—unless there’s a good explanation for it, rooted in sound fundamentals.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Politicians like to sell legislation as a marvelous societal improvement. However, all they’re really doing is taking something from someone who had it or will soon have it and giving it to someone (or someones) else.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>…when legislative risk aversion decreases—as it typically does in years three and four—stock returns historically have been more uniformly positive.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The word politics, as you may know, comes from the Latin poli meaning many, and tics, meaning “small blood-sucking creatures</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Head Tics may not understand how capital markets work at all (never seen one yet who did) but surprisingly, they know political history pretty darn well. They know in the history of modern presidents, the president almost always loses some relative power to the opposition party in mid-term elections. (George W. Bush was the first Republican president in 100 years to buck this trend in the 2002 mid-term, but his party lost badly in 2006—as history would suggest.) Therefore, the president knows that whatever he would pass that is most monumental—the crown jewel of his administration—must be passed in the first two years of his term (I say his because they’ve all been male so far), because he’ll likely face a bigger uphill battle in the back half when he loses relative power.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>This isn’t mere theory—it holds up in history. <u>Most material legislation gets passed in the first two years of any president’s term</u>, whereas the back halves have much quieter legislative calendars. And as the Head Tic loses relative power and can pass less, we move from the highest level of political risk aversion in the front half to the lowest in the back half. Stocks overall like that—which is why <u>market returns historically are nearly uniformly positive year three with the best averages, and very good averages in year four</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A key takeaway if you’re a Republican: Don’t make the mistake I saw so many make in 2009 and assume that because you so disliked this new Democrat president that the market couldn’t go up big time</u>. It can and usually does, because the fear is front-end loaded into the election year. As we said in Chapter 1, markets move in advance of things, not after them.<br />In the history of the S&amp;P 500, 14 incumbents have tried for re-election. Only three failed—Ford, Carter, and G.H.W. Bush.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Many of us are very prone to politics and have watched the arena avidly for a long time. But we miss the messages politics sends us because our memories fail us. We miss the most basic patterns—that first and second years of presidents’ terms are hugely variable—big ups or negative—and that third and fourth years are a very bullish factor. We miss that electing a Republican is good for markets in the election year but more bearish in the inaugural year—and a lesser but similar factor if we re-elect him. We miss that electing a Democrat is bearish in the election year and bullish in the inaugural year but also bullish for both when re-elected.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>To keep civil unrest to a minimum and keep people generally docile, the government uses all the throttles it can to juice economic growth in election years. This little-known fact drives an economic cycle that is useful to the politicians. They cause it and they benefit from it. To play this game, they always pull down growth and inflation in the year prior so they can add very heavy stimulus in election years without spiking inflation. It’s a little like them inducing a big party with a lot of alcohol and taking the vote just before people get too drunk or start to get hung over. Figure 7.1 shows this effect. Over the past 30 years, China’s compound average growth rate (CAGR) is pretty darn fast—averaging about 10%. But election year averages an additional 0.9% over that, whereas the slowest growth year—the year prior—averages 1.1% under that average. They slam on the brakes, then ram the gas. Personally, I think this is a stupid thing to do but they’ve been doing it a long time and their culture motivates them to keep doing it.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I’m beyond proud of my grandfather, Arthur L. Fisher, MD (1875–1958). He was in the fourth graduating class of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine (class of 1900</u>). Johns Hopkins, the man, came from a family of means (they owned plantations and some other businesses) and increased that wealth exponentially through entrepreneurship and wise investing. He left a vast fortune at his death in 1873 and made many bequests—including one to start a hospital. He had a few directives—the hospital should seek out the best possible talent and serve as a platform for ongoing research. And the hospital would serve the poor, all races, free of charge—quite an amazing thing at the time. From that grew what is Johns Hopkins today—a world-class institution doing groundbreaking research—saving and improving lives globally for folks from all walks of life.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter 8:  It’s (Always Been) a Global World, After All</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Chinese learned this lesson during Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” (which was neither great nor a leap nor forward). He mandated collectivism and self-sufficiency. Instead of importing steel from countries doing it better and cheaper, Mao forced citizens to build backyard furnaces and smelt scrap metal. The result? Tens of millions dead from starvation. You don’t want to live in a non-interconnected world. And in America, you can’t.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>B<u>ut Irving Fisher’s book, The Stock Market Crash and After, constitutes about the worst market call in history</u>. Published in 1930, it contained Fisher’s view stock prices would soon rise. Oops! Thereafter, the public was not kind to him and ridiculed him mightily. Even 40-plus years ago when I was a young economics student, people paid him a limited grudging respect for his earlier contributions while shredding his reputation in all other ways. But fact is he was never a great forecaster—academic economists rarely are. He was also a bit creepy. As a result of a battle with tuberculosis, he was a health nut with a little goatee. An active vegetarian (that’s not the creepy part), he wrote a national bestseller on health, diet and exercise: How to Live: Rules for Healthful Living Based on Modern Science. That was all before 1929. But he believed all kinds of wing-nutty things like focal sepsis—the nonsense view that mental illness comes from infectious material in the roots of our teeth, among other places. <u>And he was a eugenicist</u>. Part of the reason he got so heavily ridiculed as the 1930s evolved was for reasons other than the 1929 crash. As Hitler emerged, eugenicists got very unpopular in America and around most of the world. One irony of his focal sepsis fantasy is that when his daughter was diagnosed with schizophrenia, he had a focal sepsis doctor start taking parts of internal organs out of her until she ultimately died. Wing-nut time and thank God for modern medicine. Couldn’t do that today. Oh, and one final point that didn’t help his popularity in the 1930s—he remained an ardent prohibitionist.<br />just because something seems reasonably likely to happen doesn’t mean it must happen that way. Capital markets are incredibly complex. Sometimes, some intensely unexpected thing or things happen. And sometimes your reading of history will be wrong! But since investing is a probabilities game, not a certainties game, you must start somewhere in framing reasonable probabilities.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Build into your daily life the reality that your market memory is likely terrible and you need to study history to know what happened despite having lived through a pretty good swath of it. Money and markets may never forget, but surely people do. And that will not be different this time, next time, or any time in your life</u>.</em></p>								</div>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/03/22/markets-never-forget-but-people-do-how-your-memory-is-costing-you-money-and-why-this-time-isnt-different-2011/">Markets Never Forget (But People Do): How Your Memory Is Costing You Money &#8211; and Why This Time Isn&#8217;t Different</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/01/11/the-great-wave-price-revolutions-and-the-rhythm-of-history/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-great-wave-price-revolutions-and-the-rhythm-of-history</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2023 10:20:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History & Economics]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By David Hackett Fischer, 1996 (536 p.) The thesis of this book is that prices fluctuate in large, durable waves for reasons other than changes in money supply. The author refers to...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/01/11/the-great-wave-price-revolutions-and-the-rhythm-of-history/">The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>By </u><u>David Hackett Fischer</u><u>, 1996</u><u> (536 p.)</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The thesis of this book is that prices fluctuate in large, durable waves for reasons other than changes in money supply. The author refers to these waves as price revolutions that can last for over a century. By his definition, “each price revolution developed through five stages: slow beginnings in a period of high prosperity; a period of surge and decline; a time of discovery and institutionalization; an era of growing imbalances and increasing instability; and finally a general crisis.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">While he does not deny that money printing can cause prices to go up, Fischer challenges Milton Friedman’s credo that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon. “American economists whom I consulted,” writes Fischer, “believed that inflation in the twentieth century began with Lyndon Johnson and the war in Vietnam.” He asserts that historians generally fail to grasp the nature of price movements. Of the historians that Fischer claims to have talked with, “none remembered the medieval price revolution. Even medievalists expressed surprise and even skepticism, until they were invited to examine the data, which was largely unknown to them.”</p>
<p>This book provides abundant evidence of how price waves have been governed by human experience, social mood, and spurious events (i.e. black swans), instead of just money supply growth. Weather, population growth, technological change, pandemics, wars and famines, are just some of the reasons that Fischer cites. Instead of blaming inflation on changes in money supply sparked by greed and incompetence of governments, Fischer helps us appreciate that it’s not so simple. “A monetary explanation cannot tell us why people choose to expand the money supply in the first place,” he argues, “or why they do so in some periods more than others.”</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-8357 size-full" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/image002.jpg" alt="" width="356" height="423" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/image002.jpg 356w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/image002-252x300.jpg 252w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/image002-126x150.jpg 126w" sizes="(max-width: 356px) 100vw, 356px" /></p>
<p>David Hackett Fischer is an American scholar and university professor who devoted most of his life to the study of economic history.  He has written a dozen other history books beside this one, with his latest titled <em>African Founders</em> (2022), on how slavery expanded American ideals.  His best known book was <em>Washington’s Crossing</em> (2004), which won the 2005 Pulitzer Prize for History.  While his specialty and most of his works relate to U.S. history, he claims that the thesis in <em>The Great Wave </em>was inspired by his PhD studies at The Johns Hopkins University under Frederic Chapin Lane, who specialized in Medieval and Renaissance economic history.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">While Fischer makes a convincing case that he backs with fascinating accounts and data, I couldn’t help but question some of his historical inferences. In a sense, this book is similar to Ray Dalio’s <em>Principles for Dealing with The Changing World Order</em> (2021), in that it uses observations of long cycles in history to draw conclusions about what comes next. Unlike Dalio, though, who seems to believe that he possesses the gift of clairvoyance, Fischer admits that the study of history cannot reveal the future. But after reminding us of that caveat, he concludes that “the evidence of this inquiry tells us that we are living in the late stages of a very long price-revolution, perhaps in the critical stage.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Ironically, “today” for Fischer was almost 30 years ago, when technology was about to change the world by more than he could have appreciated. He postulated that the great price revolution of the 20th Century, which started in the late 1900s and included the inflationary surge in the 1970s, still had not peaked. He did not mention the internet, and could not have mentioned the iPhone, which was still ten years away, but he rightly observed that a “cycle” of deflation had taken hold in the 1990s. “It should be understood clearly,” he writes, “that the movements we are studying are waves—not cycles. To repeat: not cycles, but waves.” Good thing he left that door open, since a multi-decade cycle of disinflation was only just getting started as his book went to print.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Fischer does engage in plenty of generalization and oversimplification when he tries to frame the history of price movements over the last 4000 years. It’s interesting and fascinating to study the distant past, but in my opinion it’s a bit too ambitious to try to draw simple patterns from periods spanning centuries. While there are lessons to be gleaned from Fischer’s studies, we should not forget the English historian Herbert Fisher’s assertion that “all of history is one great fact, about which there can be no generalization.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">While not perfect, this was a worthwhile read that I would recommend to anyone interested in the history of inflation. It is well written and organized, and as Barton Biggs put it in his 1997 review of the book, “Fischer is no sensationalist trying to crank out a pseudo-economic best-seller, but a serious economic historian.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Regards,</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Adriano</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>PREFACE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With all of this material in hand, <u>it is possible to follow the movement of prices through nearly four thousand years of recorded history</u>. The interpretive opportunities in these sources are limited only by the reach of our imagination.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Deep change may be understood as a change in the structure of change itself</u></em><em>. In the language of mathematics, <u>deep change is the second derivative. It may be calculated as a rate of change in rates of change</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In other ways the new era of the late 1990s is entirely without precedent. <u>A novel tendency in a period of disinflation is a very powerful inflation of asset values</u>, and especially in the price of common stocks on many exchanges. Here again <u>the cause is to be found outside the conventional frame of economic analysis</u>, in social and cultural tendencies that have caused investment in certain classes of assets to increase more rapidly than the supply of assets themselves. We might have a major problem here, in what an historian would call a shearing effect, created by countervailing price movements.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The world changes faster than our thoughts about it</u></em><em>. For example, <u>in the late 1990s, central bankers in many countries continued to think of themselves as inflation- fighters in a new era when greater dangers rose from disinflation or even deflation</u>. <u>Economists in the 1990s (monetarists especially) predicted that large increases in the money supply would cause inflation to pick up again, as would have happened a generation ago. But other factors have been more powerful</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Greeks called it hubris, and thought that it always ended in the intervention of the goddess Nemesis. <u>That lady makes her appearance when wave- riders begin to believe that they are wave-makers</u>, at the moment when the great wave breaks and begins to gather its energy again. Wayland Massachusetts D.H.F. June 1999</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>INTRODUCTION</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Upswing in the thirteenth century . . . downswing in the later middle ages . . . upswing in the sixteenth century which breaks in the seventeenth century; a third upswing in the eighteenth century . . . what is the meaning of these movements?—Wilhelm Abel, 1935</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If we study the Phelps- Brown-Hopkins index and others like it, we find that <u>most inflation in the past eight centuries has happened in four great waves of rising prices</u>. The first wave continued from the late twelfth century to the early fourteenth century, and has been called <u>the medieval price-revolution</u>. The second was the familiar <u>“price-revolution of the sixteenth century</u>,” which actually began in the fifteenth century and ended in the mid-seventeenth. <u>The third wave started circa 1730, and reached its climax in the age of the French Revolution</u> and the Napoleonic Wars.<u> It might be called the price-revolution of the eighteenth century</u>. <u>The fourth wave commenced in the year 1896, and has continued since</u>, with a <u>short intermission in some nations during the 1920s and early 1930s</u>. It is <u>the price-revolution of the twentieth century</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Economists in the United States also have little memory of these historical events, except for the price- revolution of the sixteenth century, which is distantly remembered as proving the truth of the axiom that inflation is “always and everywhere primarily a monetary phenomenon,” as the American economist Milton Friedman wrote in another context. Otherwise, <u>the author has found that price-revolutions in general are (with some exceptions) entirely unknown to most economists</u>, political leaders, social planners, business executives, and individual investors, even as they struggle to deal with one price- revolution in particular.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Before we begin to study these relationships, a caveat is necessary. <u>It should be understood clearly that the movements we are studying are waves—not cycles. To repeat: not cycles, but waves</u>.</em><em> </em><em><u>One great price-wave lasted less than ninety years; another continued more than 180 years</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A</em><em>ll great waves had important qualities in common. They all shared the same wave-structure. They tended to have the same sequence of development, the same pattern of price-relatives, similar movements of wages, rent, interest-rates; and the same dangerous volatility in later stages. <u>All major price revolutions in modern history began in periods of prosperity. Each ended in shattering world-crises and were followed by periods of recovery and comparative equilibrium</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Today, we are living in the late stages of the price revolution of the twentieth century. Disaster does not necessarily lie ahead for us. This book does not predict the apocalypse. It does not attempt to tell the future. To the contrary, it finds that uncertainty about the future is an inexorable fact of our condition</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Many readers who are literate in economics will remember the special meaning of the Keynesian dictum that in the long run we are all dead</u></em><em>. The events of the twentieth century should have taught us that this idea, in its most common application, is very much mistaken. <u>American economist Herbert Stein, after a term of service in Washington, wrote ruefully in 1979, “we woke up to discover that we were living in the long run, and were suffering for our failure to look after it.”</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>THE FIRST WAVE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Crisis of the Fourteenth Century</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The king was seized and tightly bound. A red- hot iron was driven slowly upward through his anus until it penetrated his brain. It is said that his dying screams could be heard for miles across the Severn Valley. The folk memory of this event is still alive in Gloucestershire. Some swear that the death cry of Edward II can still be heard in the silence of a moonless night.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>These disorders, cruel as they may have been, were not the worst of Europe’s sufferings. Famine, pestilence, war and insurrection returned repeatedly to Europe during the 1320s and 1330s. Some places— Tuscany for example— suffered worse famines in the period 1328– 30 than in 1315– 20. Prices surged and declined in great swings. The rural population shrank, arable lands began to be abandoned, and peasants grew poorer. <u>At the same time, some of the rich continued to grow richer</u>. This was the period when the French popes lived in high luxury at Avignon. Pope John XXII (1316– 34) spent vast sums for jewels and ornaments and gold cloth for his vestments. Papal banquets were served on gold plate beneath gilded frescoes and ceilings. Petrarch protested that even the papal horses were “dressed in gold, fed on gold, and soon to be shod in gold if God does not stop this slavish luxury.” The cardinals accumulated great wealth; one Prince of the Church required 51 houses for his servants. Similar scenes were enacted in royal courts and noble households.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Meanwhile, the peasants suffered and the poor starved. The generation born in this age of crisis was so debilitated by hunger, disease, exploitation, war and disorder that a few years later it succumbed to a still greater catastrophe, the worst in world history.  <u>In 1346 a Tartar army besieged the Genoese town of Caffa (now Feodosia) in the Crimea. The attackers were stricken by plague, and converted their misfortune into a weapon of war— catapulting their dead into the city in a deliberate attempt to spread the infection</u>. This tactic succeeded so well that the Genoese abandoned the city and fled in their galleys through the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean, carrying with them the plague that came to be called the Black Death. <u>By October 1347, the Black Death had established itself in Sicily, and spread swiftly to Africa, Sardinia, Corsica and the mainland of Europe</u>. In January 1348, it reached Venice, Genoa and Marseilles, where 56,000 people died. By June it crossed the Alps and Pyrenees. England was infected by December, and Scotland and Scandinavia by 1349. A few cities miraculously escaped— Milan, Nuremberg, Liège, and several fortunate regions such as Bearn, as well as much of eastern Germany and Poland where the population was sparse.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Equilibrium of the Renaissance</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The new Ottoman Empire was a mixture of light and shadow. It was created by slaughter and maintained by terror. Sultan Mehmed II alone was thought to have been responsible for the murder of more than 800,000 people. But brutal as the Turks may have been, they were humanitarians by contrast with some of the despots whom they destroyed. One of their enemies was the sadistic Vlad Dracul of Wallachia— the original Dracula who ordered mass murders merely for amusement, and once impaled and crucified 20,000 captives in a single orgy of violence. The Turks drove Dracula from power.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Throughout that region, a remarkable transformation occurred in the life of the mind during the quattrocento. “Ever since the humanists’ own days,” writes historian Hans Baron, “the transition from the fourteenth to the fifteenth century has been recognized as a time of big and decisive changes.” During the early decades of the fifteenth century, Florentine humanists such as Leonardo Bruni, Coluccio Salutati and Poggio Bracciolini produced a literature which celebrated republican virtue, the rule of law, and the power of reason.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>THE SECOND WAVE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Equilibrium of the Renaissance</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The starving poor, driven to desperation by rising food prices, gathered before the granary in such numbers that some were crushed and others were suffocated. The surging crowd broke down the doors and attacked the granary, crying “Palle, palle,” the nickname of the Medici who had so often helped them in the past.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1498, the people of Florence began to blame Savonarola himself for their misfortunes, and turned savagely against their spiritual leader. On the eve of Ascension Day they burned him at the stake while the mob jeered, “Prophet, now is the time for a miracle.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>What set this change- regime in motion? There are many answers in the literature: monetarist, Malthusian, Marxist, and more. <u>As the evidence continues to grow, many historians (including this one) have come to believe that prime mover of the price-revolution was a revival of population growth, which placed heavy pressure on material resources</u>.</em><em> … </em><em><u> The growth of population caused the price of food to rise, faster and farther than that of other commodities. Industrial products and wages lagged behind</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In an environment that was rapidly losing its forest cover, the rising price of firewood and charcoal soon outstripped even the cost of food. After 1530 or thereabouts, the price of wood in all its forms (including charcoal) increased more rapidly than that of grain or meat or any other commodity. Wood prices rose sharply in England, France, Germany and Poland. <u>Energy prices were among the most volatile in the long inflation of the sixteenth century</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Some people, more than others, were able to respond to rising prices. As a consequence, social imbalances began to develop</u></em><em>. At the beginning of the price- revolution, wages had risen more or less together with the cost of food and shelter. While they did so, there was a heady sense of high prosperity. In later stages of the price- revolution that pattern changed. Money- wages lagged behind the rising cost of living, and real wages fell sharply. <u>By 1570 real wages were less than half of what they had been before the price- revolution began</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The largest part of this increase was American silver and gold, which flowed abundantly into Europe after 1500. The cause of the price- revolution of the sixteenth century has often been attributed to this single factor: large imports of American metal, which increased the quantity of money in circulation, and reduced its purchasing power by expanding its supply. In light of much historical research, <u>this monetarist explanation must be revised, without being rejected. American treasure could not have been the first cause of a price-revolution</u>. Prices began to go up as early as 1480, many years before American silver and gold arrived in Europe. In England and Germany, prices nearly doubled during the half century before American silver could have had a significant effect on their economies.</em><em> … </em><em><u>The evidence shows that American treasure contributed in a major way to the momentum of the price revolution, but did not set it in motion, or sustain it to the end</u></em><em>. </em><em>… </em><em>The effect of vast new supplies of gold and silver was to support an existing economic trend and to intensify its effect.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Monetary theory explains why an increase in the supply of money drives up prices. It cannot explain why the money- supply increases in the first place, except by introducing the monetarist’s favorite diabolus ex machina in the form of corrupt and incompetent politicians who are believed to be too stupid or weak to understand the monetarist’s favorite remedies</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The same processes worked in other ways. Another monetary factor (small by the measure of American treasure but still important) was the mining of precious metals within Europe, which also expanded during the sixteenth century. The great inflation created a voracious hunger for a larger circulating medium. Old mines were reopened at heavy expense. Once again, <u>most of this activity came after the price- revolution had begun</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As these very dangerous trends continued, the western world experienced a major disaster. In 1591, the weather turned wet and cold. European peasants watched helplessly as their wheat and rye were beaten down in the fields, and their hay crops rotted in the meadows. The same thing happened the next year, and the year after that, and altogether seven years running. In France, the wine harvest was late and small from 1591 to 1597. Grain crops fared even worse. English historian W. G. Hoskins observed, “the 1594 harvest was bad; 1595 was even worse; 1596 was a disaster; 1597 was bad too.” This was more than merely a short spell of bad weather. <u>It was a shift in the climate— one of several sharp downturns in the early modern era that have been called collectively the “little ice age</u>.” The decade of the 1590s was so cold that Alpine glaciers began to send rivers of ice through inhabited valleys. In 1595 the Giétroz glacier buried the villages of Martigny and killed seventy people. Disasters of the same sort happened at Grindelwald and Chamonix and the Val d’Aosta. 4 Similar events had happened before, but in the 1590s they came at a time when the economy was dangerously overstrained. Families had little in reserve. Food riots broke out in many parts of Europe. As the troubles continued, people began to starve. A season of scarcity grew into a massive famine that was called the “great dearth.” There were terrible scenes of suffering in many parts of Europe. A Swede wrote in 1597:</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The combined effect of rising mortality and falling fertility caused a reversal of demographic growth in the seventeenth century</u></em><em>. This was the only period after the Black Death when the population of Europe actually declined. As if these sufferings were not enough, <u>a major economic collapse occurred in the period from 1610 to 1622. This was more than merely a cyclical downturn. It was a major break in the secular trend</u>. Historian Ruggiero Romano observed its effects almost everywhere in Europe. In the Baltic, the number of ships passing through the Danish Sound reached its peak near the year 1600, and then after a period of fluctuation declined steadily for more than fifty years.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>These works were dark visions of a disordered world that seemed to conspire against human hope and happiness. At the same time, Cervantes produced perhaps the greatest masterpiece of Spanish literature, Don Quixote (1605, 1615), which for all its mordant humor was a sad and bitter description of a world that had dissolved into social chaos</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In Poland, Catholic nobles destroyed most of the Protestant churches in that nation. In the Ukraine, the revolt of the Cossacks was in part a religious movement. Throughout central and eastern Europe, the people of Russia, Poland, and Germany expressed their unhappiness in the customary way, by slaughtering the Jews. Chmielnicki’s rebellion in Poland was wildly antisemitic. From 1648 to 1658, more than 700 Jewish settlements were destroyed; perhaps 100,000 Jews were killed. </em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Beyond doubt, a long- term improvement had taken place during the intervening years in productivity, production and per capita income. Markets had become larger and more tightly integrated. Even the worst miseries of this dark era were measures of material progress. During the crisis of the fourteenth century, high medieval civilization had collapsed. <u>In the crisis of the seventeenth century, the civilization of early modern Europe was shaken to its deepest foundations. But it survived</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Equilibrium of the Enlightenment</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>At the same time that wages rose, rents came down. France’s pioneering price historian the Vicomte d’ Avenel calculated that the rent of one hectare of farmland fell from the equivalent of 12.8 francs in 1651– 75 to 7.5 francs by 1701– 25. Subsequent research by academic specialists has confirmed his general findings in France, England, Italy, Germany and most parts of Europe. <u>Interest rates also declined in this period</u>. The maximum lawful rate of interest in England fell from 10 to 6 percent in the seventeenth century. Further, economic historian H. J. Habakkuk discovered that interest actually charged by moneylenders declined even more sharply than the legal maximum. During the general crisis of the seventeenth century, English creditors had tended to charge the highest allowable rate. By the century’s end, actual rates had fallen below the statutory limit. <u>French rentes declined from 10 to 4 percent. In England by the year 1735, the yield on long annuities sank as low of 3 percent. Dutch commercial loans drifted downward to 2 percent or even less in this period</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>What was the “secret of stability” in this age of equilibrium? <u>A simple monetarist model, that seeks an explanation of price movements primarily in terms of the quantity of money in circulation, works no better for this period than for any other</u>. New research by Michel Morineau finds evidence that American treasure flowed abundantly into Europe during the period 1660–1730, in quantities almost (but not quite) equal to the price- revolution that preceded it. But this time there was no long- term inflation. In France, a large increase occurred in the supply of silver and gold in circulation during this period. Voltaire estimated that the quantity of silver money increased from five hundred million livres in 1683 to twelve hundred millions in 1730. Modern economic and social historians generally agree that the quantity of gold and silver doubled or trebled in France during this period. But the cost of living did not go up. Further, the French monetary system in particular also suffered many debasements between 1660 and 1730. One scholar writes that “recoinage after recoinage so altered the value of the real money of France that it caused serious economic difficulties at home and abroad. . . . Only with the great monetary reform and consolidations of 1726 did this era end.” <u>But prices did not rise</u>. Other monetary systems were more stable than that of France. Dutch guilders and rixdollars remained perfectly stable from 1691 to the nineteenth century. British guineas, Venetian ducats and Portuguese crusados also preserved their value. <u>In Europe as a whole, however, price stability in this period was achieved not because of monetary factors but in spite of them</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The great cities, as always the barometers a civilization’s health, prospered throughout Europe in this period</u></em><em>. London was rebuilt to the taste of Christopher Wren and Inigo Jones, and took on the neoclassical character that it preserves to this day. Paris became the metropolis of Europe— its beautiful squares and broad boulevards began to be laid out in this period. Berlin as late as 1654 had been a small river settlement of about 5,000 inhabitants; by 1740 it had become a stately city with nearly 100,000 people. Vienna was transformed from a grim medieval fortress town into an imperial capital of great beauty. The Schönbrunn palace was begun in 1695 and the Belvedere in 1717. The city’s great baroque churches and state buildings date from this period.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The turbulence of the early and mid-seventeenth centuries came to an end in many European states during the period from 1660 to 1740</u></em><em>. <u>English historian J. H. Plumb observes that “political stability, when it comes, often happens to a society . . . as suddenly as water becomes ice</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“In the seventeenth century men killed, tortured and executed each other for political beliefs; they sacked towns and brutalized the countryside. They were subjected to conspiracy, plot and invasion. This uncertain political world lasted until 1715, and then rapidly began to vanish. By comparison, the political structure of eighteenth century England possesses adamantine strength and profound inertia.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Many rulers were called “great” in this era: Louis Le Grand, Frederick the Great Elector, Frederick the Great, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great. These leaders were no more able than many of the failed monarchs who preceded them in the seventeenth century</u></em><em>. The enlightened despots of Europe were consumed by vanity and greed. They quarreled incessantly with other princes, and squandered both the wealth of their nations and lives of their subjects on petty and destructive rivalries. But <u>an age of equilibrium is kind to reigning kings</u>. A reputation for greatness in a monarch often owes more to circumstance than to character.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The man who personified this era better than any other was Francois Marie Arouet (1694– 1778), better known by his pen name, Voltaire.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>THE FOURTH WAVE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Price Revolution of the Twentieth Century</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>“</u></em><em><u>Wages chase prices, prices chase wages, and both chase their past history.</u></em><em><u>”</u></em><em> —Clyde Farnsworth, 1977</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The institutionalization of inflation in the twentieth century was not limited to price and wage regulation itself. Systemic restraints were placed also upon supply</u></em><em>. Many nations imposed limits on production: farm products in the United States, oil in Saudi Arabia, coffee in Colombia, gold in South Africa, and many other commodities throughout the world. International cartels pursued the same policy where they were able to do so. The classic example was the price of diamonds, which the De Beers syndicate inflated to many times their market value by restrictions on supply and other methods.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>The Troubles of Our Time</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>This policy of using high interest rates to control high inflation had many economic and social effects. It increased inequality, discouraged investment, diminished productivity, reduced demand, and drove up unemployment. Ironically, in some ways it also promoted inflation</u></em><em>. The cost of housing, for example, rose sharply in part because home construction was inflated by builders’ capital costs, which increased with the rate of interest. <u>Interest-rate manipulation was a very powerful instrument of economic policy. Its impact was much broader than it was meant to be.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As the pace of population-growth diminished, rates of inflation also fell in the 1990s, with a speed that took experts by surprise. Inflation forecasts were repeatedly revised downward, but not fast enough to keep pace with the new trends. <u>In 1994, economic forecasters around the world swallowed hard and predicted that prices would rise only 3.5 percent the next year. In fact, they rose 2.6 percent</u>. <u>A journalist who studied the accuracy of economic forecasts observed in 1995, “Over the past couple of years, inflation has been consistently lower than expected in Britain and America</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>All that was happening in the Spring of 1996, when this book went to press. The end of the story has not been written. It could end in many different ways. So fragile were the major trends that contingencies of various kinds threatened to disrupt them. A major war in the Middle East or eastern Europe or some other trouble spot could reignite inflation. A collapse of overvalued security markets could cause panic, depression and deep deflation</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CONCLUSION</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>WORKS ON THIS subject often end with a book of Revelations, or at least a chapter of Jeremiah, in which the reader is warned that we are heading for disaster— unless the author’s ideas are speedily enacted. <u>These dark prophecies find a growing market with modern readers, who appear to have an insatiable appetite for predictions of their own impending doom.</u> <u>Even when prophecies fail, they are merely updated and sell briskly once again</u>. <u>They call to mind the career of the Reverend Samuel Miller, a Baptist minister in nineteenth century New England, who predicted that the world would end no later than December 31, 1843. When the fatal day approached, the Prophet discovered an error in his computations. He announced that the last trump had been rescheduled to March 21, 1844</u>. <u>His followers grew to many hundreds. They donned special “resurrection robes” and gathered to await the day of judgment. But Samuel Miller found another mistake in his arithmetic, and postponed the end of the world once again, this time to October 22, 1844. The faithful were undeterred. Their numbers rose so high that on the appointed day, business came to a halt in parts of New England. But Samuel Miller revised his numbers yet again and went on prophesying until his end arrived— without warning— in 1849</u>.</em><em> </em><em><u>Those who believe that the economic future has been revealed to them should remember the story of Samuel Miller</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The first stage was one of silent beginnings and slow advances. Prices rose slowly in a period of prolonged prosperity. Magnitudes of increase remained within the range of previous fluctuations. At first the long wave appeared to be merely another short-run event. Only later did it emerge as a new secular tendency.</em><em> … </em><em>Food and fuel led the upward movement. Manufactured goods and services lagged behind. These patterns indicated that the prime mover was excess aggregate demand, generated by an acceleration of population growth, or by rising living standards, or both.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The first stage of every price-revolution was marked by material progress, cultural confidence, and optimism for the future</u></em><em>. <u>The second stage was very different. It began when prices broke through the boundaries of the previous equilibrium. This tended to happen when other events intervened</u></em><em><u> </u></em><em><u>— commonly wars of ambition that arose from the hubris of the preceding period</u></em><em>. Examples included the rivalry between emperors and popes in the thirteenth century; the state- building conflicts of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; the dynastic and imperial struggles of the mid-eighteenth century; and the world wars of the twentieth century. These events sent prices surging up and down again, in a pattern that was both a symptom and a cause of instability. <u>The consequences included political disorder, social disruption, and a growing mood of cultural anxiety</u>. The third stage began when people discovered the fact of price inflation as a long-term trend, and began to think of it as an inexorable condition. <u>They responded to this discovery by making choices that drove prices still higher</u>. Governments and individuals expanded the supply of money and increased the velocity of its circulation. In each successive wave, price- inflation became more elaborately institutionalized. A fourth stage began as this new institutionalized inflation took hold. Prices went higher, and became highly unstable. They began to surge and decline in movements of increasing volatility. Severe price shocks were felt in commodity movements. The money supply was alternately expanded and contracted. Financial markets became unstable. Government spending grew faster than revenue, and public debt increased at a rapid rate. In every price-revolution, the strongest nation-states suffered severely from fiscal stresses: Spain in the sixteenth century, France in the eighteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth century. Other imbalances were even more dangerous. Wages, which had at first kept up with prices, now lagged behind. Returns to labor declined while returns to land and capital increased. The rich grew richer. People of middling estates lost ground. The poor suffered terribly. Inequalities of wealth and income increased. So also did hunger, homelessness, crime, violence, drink, drugs, and family disruption. These material events had cultural consequences. <u>In literature and the arts, the penultimate stage of every price-revolution was an era of dark visions and restless dreams</u>. This was a time of lost faith in institutions. It was also a period of desperate search for spiritual values. Sects and cults, often very angry and irrational, multiplied rapidly. Intellectuals turned furiously against their environing societies. Young people, uncertain of both the future and the past, gave way to alienation and cultural anomie. <u>Finally, the great wave crested and broke with shattering force, in a cultural crisis that included demographic contraction, economic collapse, political revolution, international war and social violence</u>. These events relieved the pressures that had set the price-revolution in motion.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Sequential Differences</em><em>:</em><em> Even as all price- revolutions shared a common wave-structure, they differed from one another in duration, magnitude, and range. These differences were not random variations. They comprised a coherent process of historical development from one great wave to the next. Since the twelfth century, price- revolutions have succeeded one another in a continuous sequence of historical change. Several sequential patterns of this sort can be identified. The most obvious was a change in rates of change. From one wave to the next, average annual rates of price- inflation tended to increase geometrically: 0.5 percent in the price- revolution of the thirteenth century; a little above I percent in the very long wave of the sixteenth century; nearly 2 percent in the shorter wave of the eighteenth century; and at least 4 percent in the price- revolution of the twentieth century. This acceleration was caused by the expansion of markets, and by the institutionalization of price- increases. Second, as rates of change increased, a larger proportion of total price gains became concentrated in the later stages of each price- revolution. In the medieval price- revolution, absolute magnitudes of gain were comparatively even in their distribution through time. In the price- revolution of the twentieth century, more than half of the total increase in prices from 1896 to 1996 happened after 1970. Nine- tenths of it came after 1945. This pattern was caused by acceleration in rates of price- change from one price- revolution to another. Third, the range of annual fluctuations diminished from one wave to the next. In the medieval price- revolution, these gyrations were very violent and dangerous, mainly as a consequence of changing harvest conditions. Food prices tended also to be less stable when people lived closer to the margin of subsistence. In each subsequent price- revolution, those movements became less extreme, and fluctuations were damped down. The growth of production created surpluses, which functioned as price- cushions. The expansion of markets and the improvement of communications also diminished the disruptive effect of local scarcities and seasonal oscillations. Fourth, from one wave to another, the final stage of cultural crisis became progressively less catastrophic. The medieval price- revolution ended in the massive famines and epidemics of the fourteenth century. The second wave culminated in the general crisis of the seventeenth century. This was the only period after the Black Death when the population of Europe declined, but not as much as in the fourteenth century. The third wave had its climax in an age of world revolutions (1776– 1815), a time of many troubles, but population continued to increase. <u>The price- revolution of the twentieth century has yet to reach its climax.</u> Fifth, as each successive crisis grew less severe in demographic terms, it became more sweeping in its social consequences. Every general crisis caused a social revolution, and the radicalism of these events increased through time. The crisis of the fourteenth century did much to end villeinage in western Europe, and to transform societies based on conquest and subjugation into customary systems of orders and estates. The general crisis of the seventeenth century transformed political systems and expanded the rule of law in Britain, America and Europe. The revolutionary crisis of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (1776– 1815) made public institutions in America and Europe more responsive to the will of the people, and more protective of their individual rights. It also transformed systems of social orders into classes. <u>The great wave of the twentieth century has not yet reached its end, but it has already caused the collapse of totalitarian systems of the left (eastern Europe) and the right (Latin America), as well as sweeping social and economic reforms in many nations.</u> Every general crisis in modern history has improved the condition of ordinary people. It has also enlarged ideas of human dignity, freedom, and the rule of law. This tendency has become more powerful in each successive wave. To summarize, each price- revolution developed through five stages: slow beginnings in a period of high prosperity; a period of surge and decline; a time of discovery and institutionalization; an era of growing imbalances and increasing instability; and finally a general crisis. The climax was followed by a fall of prices, recovery of stability, and a long period of comparative price equilibrium. The social and cultural impact of these movements changed from one great wave to another. Velocity increased and variability declined. Each successive price- revolution became less catastrophic in its demographic consequences, but more sweeping in its social impact.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The most simple and straight- forward explanation of price- revolutions is the monetarist model, which holds that price levels are determined by the quantity and velocity of money in circulation. This explanation has major strengths, and has made an important contribution to knowledge. Much research has established beyond doubt that monetary factors make a major difference in price levels. But <u>when monetarist models are introduced as the first cause of price-revolutions, difficulties appear. The timing is never quite right</u>. The price- revolution of the sixteenth century, for example, began as early as 1475, thirty years before the first American treasure reached Europe, and fifty years before it began to flow in quantity. Further, a monetarist model cannot account for many aspects of a price-revolution. It alone cannot explain the movement of price- relatives, or the disparity between prices and wage movements, or the difference in returns to labor and capital. <u>It does not help us to understand why prices and interest rates tend to rise together in long inflations</u></em><em><u> </u></em><em><u>— the Gibson paradox, which is a major problem for monetarists</u></em><em>. A monetary explanation cannot tell us why people choose to expand the money supply in the first place, or why they do so in some periods more than others. Increases in the supply of money are not suddenly visited upon history as Zeus came to Danae, in a shower of gold. People deliberately decide to change the size of the money supply, for one reason or another. In the history of these events there is always a prior cause. Moreover, <u>the monetarist model works better for some periods than others. It does well for middle and later stages of price revolutions, but badly for early stages, and for periods of price equilibrium. Its explanatory power increases when it is used as an historical variable rather than a theoretical constant. In some periods, monetary forces are strong and overriding. In others they are weak and secondary. Altogether, Wilhelm Abel observes from long and careful study that “Long- term trends in the price of grain . . . cannot be explained adequately by fluctuations in the circulation of money, though that has been attempted since the time of Jean Bodin (1568).</u> Even when improved forms of the simple quantity theory are summoned to the rescue, the discrepancies of time apparent in the course of the price movements remain inexplicable.”  In short, a monetary model is a necessary and important part of any causal explanation of price- revolutions, but it is not a sufficient explanation. Monetarism alone won’t do.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Still the hardest questions remain. <u>Where are we heading? What does the future hold for us?</u> The study of history does not give us the answers to these questions. It cannot reveal the future. But it helps us to understand the present and very recent past. <u>The evidence of this inquiry tells us that we are living in the late stages of a very long price- revolution, perhaps in the critical stage</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In economic history, equilibrium is the exception rather than the rule. A free market restores equilibrium only to break it down again, and to set in motion a new sequence of imbalances and instabilities with all the troubles that follow in their train. In the full span of modern history, most free markets have been in profound disequilibrium most of the time— often dangerous and destructive disequilibrium.</u></em><em> A third fact is also frequently forgotten. In our complex and highly integrated modern economies, there are no truly free markets any more. The free market in the twentieth century is an economic fiction, much like the state of nature in the political theory of the eighteenth century. Markets today are highly regulated and actively manipulated by both public and private instruments. <u>The real question is not whether we should interfere with the market, but what sort of interference we should make, and who will make it, and what its extent will be</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The historical record of the past eight hundred years shows that <u>ordinary people are right to fear inflation, for they have been its victims— more so then elites</u>.</em><em> … </em><em>Price-revolutions and the long-term inflation that they engendered have caused major social problems in the past eight centuries. But there is another difficulty. <u>Recent anti-inflationary policies have also done major damage in other ways, and sometimes even in the same ways</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>If both inflation and anti-inflationary policies have caused trouble, what should we do?</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Many heads of government, leaders of corporations, business managers, economic theorists, and private investors have very little historical understanding of economic processes which they confront. <u>Ideas and solutions are drawn from one set of historical circumstances (often very recent) and applied to others where they do not fit. The corrective is not merely historical knowledge. It is also historical thinking</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Important progress has been made in the use of interest rates as a way of regulating an economic system. This method was first applied on a large scale by the Federal Reserve Board as recently as 1966. In three decades it has become an indispensable instrument of economic policy throughout the world.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>APPENDICES</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The people of ancient Rome experienced repeated price-revolutions, which closely coincided with the rhythm of Roman political history. One great wave reached its climax in a major time of troubles for the early republic, circa 240–210 B.C. Another coincided with the collapse of the republican institutions. In between, there was an intervening period of comparative price stability.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Cycles and Waves Frank Manuel once remarked that every idea of history comes down to either the circle or the line.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A very different institutional model comes from economic historian Peter Lindert, who has framed the counterhypothesis called the “Robin Hood Paradox,” which holds that “across time and jurisdictions, redistribution toward the poor is least given when most needed . . . <u>Robin Hood shows up least when needed most</u>.” (“Toward a Comparative History of Income and Wealth Inequality,” in Brenner, Kaelbe and Thomas, eds., Income Distribution in Historical Perspective,” 226–29</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The reason of a thing is not to be enquired after, till you are sure the thing itself be so. <u>We commonly are at what’s the reason of it? before we are sure of the thing</u>. —John Selden, Table Talk, 1689</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>NOTES</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Daniel J. Boorstin, “Enlarging the Historian’s Vocabulary,” in R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engerman, eds., The Reinterpretation of American Economic History (New York, 1971), xi–xiv.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Homer, History of Interest Rates, 160.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>BIBLIOGRAPHY</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Every early American historian with whom I discussed this work expressed entire ignorance of the fact that prices were rising in the eighteenth century</u></em><em>. <u>All American economists whom I consulted believed that inflation in the twentieth century began with Lyndon Johnson and the war in Vietnam</u>. <u>Most scholars in both disciplines were aware of the price-revolution in the sixteenth century, but nearly all believed that it was a simple reflex of the supply of American treasure in Europe</u>. <u>None remembered the medieval price revolution. Even medievalists expressed surprise and even skepticism, until they were invited to examine the data, which was largely unknown to them</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>This book began nearly forty years ago at The Johns Hopkins University, where I studied economic history with Frederic Chapin Lane</u></em><em>. Fred, as I later came to know him, was a scholar of the old school. <u>His special field was the Venetian economy during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Mine was (and is) American history, but I took a graduate course with him and found myself deeply drawn to the example of his scholarship</u>. One course led to another, and then to a doctoral field under his direction on the economic and social history of Florence and Venice in the fifteenth century.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>While I was teaching at Oxford, I got to know Henry Phelps-Brown whose work revolutionized price history by centering it on the experience of ordinary people, and correcting the elitist bias that had dominated earlier scholarship</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2023/01/11/the-great-wave-price-revolutions-and-the-rhythm-of-history/">The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Honest Weight: The Story of Toledo Scale</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/12/27/honest-weight-the-story-of-toledo-scale-2000/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=honest-weight-the-story-of-toledo-scale-2000</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2022 17:39:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biographies & Companies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>by Bob Terry, 2000 (388p.) Honest Weight is a well written, yet largely unknown book that tells the glamorous story of Toledo Scale, a company founded in 1901 and that today...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/12/27/honest-weight-the-story-of-toledo-scale-2000/">Honest Weight: The Story of Toledo Scale</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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									<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">by Bob Terry, 2000 (388p.)</span></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Honest Weight</em>&nbsp;is a well written, yet largely unknown book that tells the glamorous story of Toledo Scale, a company founded in 1901 and that today is part of Mettler Toledo, one of the world’s most outstanding companies.&nbsp; The book was written by Bob Terry, who was a marketing manager at Toledo Scale from the late 1950s through 1976.&nbsp; Terry mentions himself several times in the book, but always in the third person and without elaborating much on his role in the company’s history. In the&nbsp;<em>Acknowledgements</em>, he explains that his accounts of the company’s early years drew heavily from the unpublished writings of Walter Fink, a company executive who had worked closely with Toledo Scale’s first three CEOs. Bob came into possession of Fink’s manuscript in 1976, the year he vacated his office at Toledo Scale’s headquarters.&nbsp; The headquarters building was in Toledo’s storied&nbsp;<em>Telegraph Road</em>, which was immortalized by Dire Straits in their 1982 album&nbsp;<em>Love Over Gold</em>&nbsp;(<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8bWGGA-5HM">link</a>). &nbsp;The office was being shut down by the company’s new owner, Reliance Electric, as they moved the operation to Columbus, Ohio.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">While he never flatly states it in the book, Terry was devastated by the sale of Toledo Scale to Reliance Electric in the late 1960s.&nbsp; He rightly portrays Reliance Electric, whose disparate parts were subsequently absorbed by other companies, as a poorly managed conglomerate that didn’t understand the scale business and had little appreciation for Toledo Scales’ strong corporate culture and business strategy. Terry worked at Toledo Scale during the years when it’s senior management was gutted and its corporate culture destroyed by Reliance, but it was the replacement of the Toledo Scale brand name by the new Swiss management &#8211; more than two decades after he left the company &#8211; that appears to have scarred him the most.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/image004-1.jpg" alt="" width="228" height="297"></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Bob Terry&nbsp;(1929 – 2013)</strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Terry’s&nbsp;<a href="https://www.newcomertoledo.com/obituary/65955">obituary</a>&nbsp;from 2013 mentions that after leaving Toledo Scale, he went on to start his own marketing firm, named TRIAD, for&nbsp;<em>Terry Robie Industrial Advertising</em>. &nbsp;The book does not mention TRIAD by name, but it cites Terry’s business partner Jan Robie as the graphic designer who created the logo for Masstron, a competing scale manufacturer that was started by ex-Toledo engineers and salespeople during the years when it was owned by Reliance.&nbsp; Ironically, both Reliance and Masstron would be acquired by Exxon in the first half of the 1980s, bringing those teams together under a much bigger, yet still largely unfocused and mismanaged roof.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the mid-1980s, Exxon reversed its diversification strategy and began divesting non-core businesses, which included the sale of Reliance Electric through a highly leveraged buyout.&nbsp; As an independent company, Reliance Electric sold its underperforming Toledo Scale property to the Swiss pharmaceuticals giant Ciba-Geigy in 1988 to reduce its heavy debt load.&nbsp; Ciba-Geigy &nbsp;had owned the Swiss laboratory scale manufacturer, Mettler Instruments AG, since 1981, so the acquisition of Toledo Scale made them the world’s dominant scale manufacturer. &nbsp;According to Terry, the Swiss executive who was instrumental in the acquisition of Toledo Scale from Reliance Electric was Robert&nbsp;Spoerry, who&nbsp;would&nbsp;later&nbsp;become the first CEO of&nbsp;Mettler Toledo&nbsp;when the&nbsp;company&nbsp;was&nbsp;separated from Ciba-Geigy in 1996.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">As Terry tells it,&nbsp;in 1996&nbsp;Ciba-Geigy was cleaning house to prepare for a $27 billion merger with&nbsp;pharma peer&nbsp;Sandoz AG, to form Novartis.&nbsp; They announced&nbsp;plans to float Mettler Toledo in a public share offering, and the news sparked a flood of&nbsp;bids from prospective buyers. The best offer came from AEA Investors, with headquarters in New York City. &nbsp;AEA Investors (<a href="x-webdoc://BC685ECB-67A6-45D4-9D43-DF4190732530/Founded%20by%20the%20Rockefeller,%20Mellon%20and%20Harriman%20family%20interests%20and%20S.G.%20Warburg%20&amp;%20Co.">link</a>) is an American&nbsp;private equity firm&nbsp;started in 1968 by well-known American industrial families, which these days manages approximately $20 billion in assets. Shortly after paying&nbsp;nearly&nbsp;$800&nbsp;million&nbsp;(equal to $1.7 billion in today’s dollars)&nbsp;to acquire the company from Ciba-Geicy, AEA took Mettler Toledo public by selling 6.67 million shares at $14 per share on November 13, 1997.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Understandably, given the turmoil that his cherished company went through during the 20 years before his book was published, Terry laments that shortly after taking office, Mettler Toledo’s new CEO, Robert Spoerry, “gave directions for a complete management shakeup and cultural change in the marketing structure to emulate the structure in place in Europe.”<em>&nbsp;&nbsp;</em>Indeed, the Swiss culture of precision&nbsp;and excellence&nbsp;shines through not only&nbsp;in&nbsp;the&nbsp;high-end&nbsp;instruments&nbsp;that Mettler Toledo&nbsp;produces, but&nbsp;in&nbsp;all aspects of how the company is managed&nbsp;to this day, including how it goes to market.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">While Terry speaks highly of Toledo Scale’s legacy and its impressive leaders, he tells the story of a series of bad decisions over the decades that contributed to the company’s demise, including a drive to diversify into the plastics business in the 1930s and an ill-advised acquisition of a Toledo-based elevator manufacturer in 1957.&nbsp; By the time the company was sold to Reliance in 1967, it was no longer the well oiled machine that had helped established its reputation. Perhaps because of how abruptly it changed hands following the early deaths of its first two CEOs, the Toledo Scale company of the 1960s had lost its focus as the&nbsp;<em>honest weight</em> company.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Started in 1945 by a Swiss engineer named Erhard Mettler, Mettler Instruments AG was a highly innovative&nbsp;and respected&nbsp;company&nbsp;in the laboratory scale business.&nbsp; They are credited&nbsp;with several key inventions in the scale industry, most notably the&nbsp;introduction of the&nbsp;single-pan balance, which gradually replaced conventional two-pan balances as the standard weighing device in laboratories.&nbsp;Terry tells the story of when Toledo technical experts visited Mettler Instruments at their Swiss headquarters in 1967.&nbsp; He writes that “discussions centered around the possibility of Mettler supplying a low capacity electrical output scale to Toledo for use in automatic counting.” One of Toledo’s engineers wrote in a memo quoted by Terry that the association with Mettler “is significant since it’s in line with other evidence of the strong influence—almost domination—exercised by the technical side of European weighing firms.” Interestingly, this same engineer concluded that Mettler was “without question well qualified” to compete in other lines outside of their laboratory weighing expertise, which is precisely what they have done to this day.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Nothing came from the 1967 visit to Zurich, but the tone of admiration for Mettler Instruments that Terry expressed earlier in his book turned more critical and resentful as the narrative unfolded.&nbsp; He writes that “benevolent genocide took place for those painted with the Toledo Scale brush.”&nbsp; While at times Terry praises the high performance culture that the Swiss instilled in the new company, he does not fully conceal the chip on his shoulder regarding the abandonment of the Toledo Scales name, and how successful the Swiss were at turning around the company.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">For example, Terry mentions that&nbsp;Mettler had located their first U.S. office near Princeton, New Jersey, “because they believed that a Princeton address carried extra prestige,” as if to suggest that the Swiss were snobs.&nbsp; He also quotes from an article that ran in the local paper a month after Mettler Toledo came public in 1997: “Mettler Toledo styles itself as a U.S. company that happens to have its headquarters in Griefensee, Switzerland. If that sounds a bit confusing, it’s only because much has happened to the firm in the last 30 years. For many years, Toledo Scale was one of Toledo’s best known exports and trademarks—ranking right up there with Jeeps and Champion Spark Plugs. Of course, all three trademarks ended up in other hands. After all that has happened to Toledo Scale and to Mettler Toledo, it’s a miracle the name ‘Toledo’ survives at all. But then again, it’s such a grand old name.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">All told, this was an excellent book that I would recommend to anyone interested in business history.&nbsp; It provides glaring evidence of the importance of culture and purpose in ensuring the durability of corporations.&nbsp; Bob Terry does an outstanding job at weaving the major historical events of the century into the story of this incredible company.&nbsp; While no book written by an insider can be completely unbiased, his account seems credible and well balanced when it comes to criticisms and flattery.&nbsp; This is not a technical book by any means, yet there is a wealth of technical detail that an analyst of Mettler Toledo could benefit from knowing. I admit to being an enthusiast on the topic, but I don’t think this book is only for enthusiasts.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">For those looking to gain a greater appreciation of why weight measurement is still such a great business, as well as why Mettler Toledo is such a formidable company, I would highly recommend the reading of&nbsp;<em>Honest Weight,</em>&nbsp;by Bob Terry.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Regards,</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Adriano</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong><em>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</em></strong></span></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>PROLOGUE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Front Matter</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>For my wife and family, and for all past Toledo Scale people who, over the century, played parts large and small in this story…&nbsp;<u>with a special bow to the prime entrepreneurs Henry Theobald, Hugh Bennett, Harris Mcintosh and Ben Dillon</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Though this is a work of fact, I have taken certain storytelling liberties.&nbsp;<u>All events and people named in this book are real</u>. The dialogue in the first 15 or 20 years is based on oral history, and represents undocumented conversations the individuals had as told to, and passed on by their peers. Where the sequence or narrative strays from true nonfiction, I have tried to remain faithful to the actual events and real characters.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I’m indebted to many good people, including the late</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Walter Fink who left an unpublished record that detailed events during Toledo Scale’s first 50 years</u></strong><u>. I extracted many facts and conversations from this record. Over his long career, Fink worked closely with company presidents Theobald, Bennett, and McIntosh</u>. I’m also grateful to&nbsp;<u>executive secretary Bessie Deain, who placed Fink’s original manuscript in my care in 1976 when the company moved their headquarters to Columbus, Ohio</u>. Thanks also to&nbsp;<u>Tom Quertinmont who arranged for me to have access to the company archives which included correspondence, photos and copies of Toledo System magazines from the time the company was started</u>. I’m also grateful to&nbsp;<u>Tom’s father Ed Quertinmont, Ted Metcalf, Donivan Hall, Bernard Stanton, and Clarence Weinandy</u>&nbsp;for the personal time and help they gave me as I gathered information for this story…and for the encouragement of countless others. And a very special thanks to Janet Schryver for her excellent help in designing, editing, proofing and correcting the manuscript.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>PROLOGUE</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>So in December 1884 he changed the firm’s name to the National Cash Register Company. He had acquired 13 employees, an old plant in a run-down section of Dayton and several cash register patents. He had serious doubts he would succeed in his new venture. Yet in the 16 years since, Patterson had almost single-handedly created a cash register market with his National Cash Register Company</em><em>&nbsp;(NCR)</em><em>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>The cash register had been vigorously opposed by those who had to use it. Patterson overcame the resistance of thousands of poorly paid clerks who had—over the years—come to consider a little pilferage to be a normal part of their compensation. He faced the resentment of any “new fangled machine”. He created unique ways to demonstrate the payback, efficiency and economy of the cash register in a system he called “creative selling”.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Theobald</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting.”&nbsp;<strong>The Bible: Daniel: 5:25—28</strong></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 1</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“But that’s not the only idea,” he reported saying. “There’s this fellow up in Toledo with a little business that makes computing scales he invented.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>DeVilbiss sold his first computing scale to Felker’s Meat Market</u></em><em>, a nearby butcher shop on Adams Street. Each night after the butcher shop closed, he would walk past it and peek into the window to see if the scale was still on the counter. His confidence grew every day it remained in use.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Within weeks he came to realize&nbsp;<u>the scale increased his profits much more than he would have guessed</u>. He had happy customers. And he was making money. So he told all his butcher friends. They, in turn, began to call on Allen DeVilbiss, Jr. at his family home on Jackson Street to get a demonstration. His computing scale was catching on.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em><u>A rather big man, young DeVilbiss already had a small paunch. He rarely exercised, preferring to spend his time tinkering in the basement of the family home on Jackson Street</u></em><em>. So when he learned that Henry Theobald might want to buy the company, he was eager to sell because of a profit-sharing agreement he had with the actual owners.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Young was curious about Theobald’s estimates. He asked, “Why do you say that the average selling price of your cash registers may be much higher than $100?” Theobald responded, “Because there are a number of higher priced models with popular new features and I expect they will sell the best.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Even though he owned exactly half the company by himself—unlike the other investors— Henry Theobald agreed to become treasurer and general manager. The new firm was named “<u>Toledo Computing Scale and Cash Register Company</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 2</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Theobald was now ready to seriously compete with his former mentor and show him how superior cash registers should be manufactured, sold and serviced.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But Theobald’s delight was short lived. NCR had been watching. John Patterson had great respect for Henry Theobald. He knew him well. And he concluded it was time to stop him. On the 27th of May—in the first month Toledo sold 100 cash registers—a Mr. High from NCR showed up unexpectedly, asking to see Theobald. High had been friendly enough with Theobald at NCR. He counted on being able to see him without an appointment. He was quickly ushered into Theobald’s office, where he was warmly greeted. In a jocular tone, High complimented Theobald’s office furniture, joking about the way Patterson had let him know he had been fired. After a few moments of social talk, he passed Theobald a written message from John Patterson.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Well, it’s clear what these two partners want, Henry,”Rose said. “I’m very much inclined to agree with them. $115,000 cash will go a long way in giving the company a faster start. But I don’t want a corporate crisis…even with my vote, the three of us represent only half the stock. You own the other half, Henry. A tie would be disastrous. What are you going to do?”</em><em>&nbsp;</em><em>Theobald had badly miscalculated.&nbsp;<u>He was devastated that it was his idea that each of them should write down their guess of what the offer would be. His voice choked. “I hate the idea of selling. I’ve lived cash registers for most of my life. It will be hard to change my focus. But you three are my partners. I trust you</u>. I came to you in the first place because I respect you and value your judgment. If all of you want to sell, I’ll go along even if I don’t want to.”Rose strolled to the cupboard. He returned with whiskey and four glasses. The deal went through rapidly. After only eleven months of business, in June 1902, the Toledo Computing Scale and Cash Register Company sold the cash register patents, inventory, parts, machines, jigs, dies, fixtures, patterns, and tools to Patterson’s NCR.&nbsp;<u>Theobald was out of the cash register business for good</u>. And since cash registers were no longer part of the business, the corporate name had to be changed.<u>Theobald suggested Toledo Scale Company. His sales people argued that the word “computing”was too valuable to give up. So in 1902 the name became Toledo Computing Scale Company</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 3</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Theobald quickly came to believe that the scale was far more important to a merchant than the cash register. The merchant could make change out of a drawer or even a shoebox under the counter. Many of them still did, resisting the blandishments of cash register salesmen. But the scale told him how much to charge for his merchandise. Theobald became convinced that the scale was the most important piece of equipment in the store. It converted a commodity directly into money, telling him how much to put in the shoebox. Without a scale, the store could not operate</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>She soon learned that her side of the scale must go “down” if she was to get full weight. The merchant didn’t dare remove a few beans to get an even balance…the customer would think him stingy and take her trade to another store. So&nbsp;<u>“down weight” was the custom</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>The merchant poured the beans into the bag but couldn’t easily predict when the beam was in the exact center of the trig-loop. Again “down weight” was his only solution. Theobald understood this problem. He realized that his automatic indication computing scale largely solved the problem of “down weight.” The merchant could now charge for the overweight almost every time.<u>“Ma’am, it’s slightly over, the price calculation is 28</u>&nbsp;<u><a href="http://cents.is/">cents.is</a></u>&nbsp;<u>that all right?” No problem. As a result, both his sales volume and profits increased</u>.&nbsp;<u>The real problem, Theobald knew, was convincing the merchant that replacing his $8 to $10 balance scale with a Toledo Computing Scale at $35 to $50—four to five times the price— was a good business decision</u>. Time and labor were not important and merchants were always short of cash. An effective selling demonstration was needed to get over this hurdle.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>He then developed a dramatic demonstration using tea. This kind of demonstration lasted for years…changed only by refinement. Tea was sold by weight in small quantities. Since tea was imported from the Far East, it was relatively expensive. He gathered his sales managers in Toledo and conducted a role-playing demonstration personally. He had one of the sales managers act as the merchant. His demonstration used a cloth bag that contained exactly two ounces of tea</u></em><em>. …</em><em>&nbsp;“<u>With this system, you can prove that a new Toledo Scale will pay for itself in a very brief time…sometimes in just a few weeks.</u>”</em><em>&nbsp; …&nbsp;</em><em>At the end of his presentation, Theobald would give each of them enough preweighed bags of tea for each of their salesman. They, in turn, were instructed to show each of the salesmen in their territory how to use it.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Theobald passed on Ditzler’s remarks and a quantity of scale audit forms in a kit was sent to each salesman. It contained a tube of 30 carefully polished one-pound test weights plus an assortment of one- ounce and fractional-ounce weights. Salesmen treasured the kits.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In September 1903, Theobald put a field sales operation in effect. He located men in Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, New York, Omaha, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and Toledo. Young, the company secretary, urged Theobald to open an office in Newark, his hometown. Theobald promised to do so just as soon as he could locate a good man.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Theobald defined dishonest scales as all spring scales no matter who manufactured them.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Since Toledo Scales were more expensive to make, they had to sell at a higher price. At the same time, spring scales were also considerably less accurate than a pendulum scale which measured gravity against gravity.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Fights over scale accuracy were inevitable because there were no established standards anywhere in the nation. Many jurisdictions had weights and measures officials but there were no legal standards they could use requiring that a scale meet any accuracy standard. Spring scales were not illegal, inaccurate as they were. Yet many weights and measures officials tried to establish accuracy standards on their own.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Your Honor, I have a better way to convince you that the Dayton scale is dishonest. On the way to court this morning, I purchased eight food packages over a Dayton scale. I have them with me. I also have a Dayton scale and a Toledo scale here. The best way for you to understand just how dishonest the Dayton scale is, is to weigh the packages yourself. If you would come down here, I’ll show you.”</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>“But, for heavens sake, don’t blame your weights and measures officials either,” Theobald continued. “Their job is to protect the public and they were just doing their job in the best way they knew how. Here in Omaha they were doing it too well to suit the Dayton Scale Company! No, blame them; the Dayton Scale Company for deliberately making a dishonest device, designed, built and sold to rob the innocent consumer!”&nbsp;<u>The judge resumed his bench and threw the case out of court.</u>&nbsp;Later, Dayton dropped the suits in all the other cities.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 4</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>While Theobald was spending time fighting dishonest scales, troubles emerged back at the plant. It became clear that&nbsp;<u>Allen DeVilbiss was the wrong choice to be plant superintendent</u>. His personality clashed with the workers. He could tell he wasn’t getting along with them. As a result, he did little supervising. He thought of himself as an inventor and spent most of his time tinkering.&nbsp;<u>He was soon replaced as plant superintendent and was given the title “Head of the Inventions Department</u>.”</em><em>&nbsp; …&nbsp;</em><em>The sales manager of the DeVilbiss company was J. F. Pixley, who assumed the same job with Toledo.&nbsp;<u>Theobald soon concluded that Pixley was not able to recruit good salesmen…critical to growth</u>. Pixley was fired and Theobald took on the duties of sales manager as well, until he appointed Frank Ditzler to the position. Ditzler was as successful at this as at everything else he had tried. By the end of1905 he had 97 salesmen on his list, scattered all over the nation.&nbsp;<u>Between 1903 and 1905, they had sold more than 30,000 scales</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The new cylinder scale had one-cent graduations with a chart computing capacity up to 30 lb—compared to the Toledo fan scale with a 10 lb computing chart. The fan scale required two 10 lb beams to reach a 30 lb capacity.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Large signs that read “We protect our customers by using Toledo Scales—NO SPRINGS—HONEST WEIGHT GUARANTEED” were shipped with every scale. Merchants were proud to hang the sign in a conspicuous place near the Toledo scale.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Kroger Company bought many hundreds of Toledo cylinder scales finished in gold with a special model number for Kroger, K581. Actually it was the model 581 with a rich gold finish.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“We Protect Our Customers—No Springs—Honest Weight.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Theobald bellowed when he saw it, “Buy pork loins for 9 cents a pound, sell the same pork loins for the same 9 cents a pound, and make a 3% profit besides? By God, they’ve even got the gall to advertise that their scales are crooked!”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 6</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Allen DeVilbiss, Jr., the inventor of the pendulum scale upon which the company was founded, was only 39-years- old at his death</u></em><em>. Though not universally popular, he was universally mourned in the company. Without him, all their lives would have taken a different course.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Think about it,” Theobald replied. “Those others use a beam to read the weight. With this dial, anyone filling a drum or bucket can easily see when he’s approaching the desired weight of the product they’re filling. He slows down and is able to hit the weight he wants right on the money.”“That’s right,” Ditzler added. “I’ve been in a lot of plants and watched how they fill on a Fairbanks or Howe scale. They just keep pouring it in until the beam goes up in the trig-loop. There’s no way they can see that they’re getting near the weight they want, so they overfill. They’ve got to be giving away a lot of their product that way. Just like retail scales until we came along.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>It was time to change the company name again. Industrial scales did not compute. With the rapid growth of the industrial line, the company needed a new name. On February 18, 1913, the word “Computing” was dropped and the company name became simply “Toledo Scale Company.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Toledo mechanical dial scale soon became a familiar sight in virtually every manufacturing plant in the nation and throughout many parts of the world. All over the globe, the city of Toledo became known for scales. They proved to be remarkably reliable, some in regular use decade after decade. The dial remained essentially unchanged throughout the entire mechanical scale era. Even though mechanical scales, with their large dials, were largely replaced by electronic scales, tens of thousands remain in use even in the last decade of the 20th century. Thousands are expected to remain in use throughout industry for simple weighing tasks well into the 21st century.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“<u>The word is that Charles R. Flint put together a holding company that acquired three other companies,” Zolg explained. “One of them was Dayton Scale Company. The other two were the International Time Recording Company, and the Tabulating Machine Company of Washington, D.C.</u>&nbsp;They incorporated the holding company in Endicott, New York as the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company…C.T.R. for short.” “You mean Flint, the old buccaneer? The one who was a famous gunrunner? I heard he stuck his nose in some South American revolutions, even acting as a spy.a double agent.” “That’s the one. But don’t forget, he also was one of the organizers of the U.S. Rubber Company. He’s getting respectable.” “I hope the shake-up means that Dayton will be less troublesome,” Theobald said. “Did you hear who’s going to run the company?” “No. They’re looking for someone, I understand.” C.T.R. drifted for several years.&nbsp;<u>Then in 1914 the board employed Thomas J. Watson to head it. When Watson became president of C.T.R. the company was in poor financial shape. He had to secure a $40,000 loan on his own account to keep it going. It started with less than 4,000 employees who made and sold spring scales, tabulating equipment and time recording devices. Later Watson had the name changed to International Business Machines, soon to be known as IBM.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 7</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>‘About what fractions of its weight would a body lose in going from Cape Nome, Alaska, to San Francisco? ’‘I should say about one in three hundred. ’‘Then gold weighing 600 pounds on the scale used in Nome could not possibly weigh much over 598 pounds on the scale used here, could it?’‘It could not. They were both spring scales, I understand. ’The men applauded vigorously. “But wait,” Geddes warned. “There’s more. The judge was quite interested by now.&nbsp;<u>He questioned Johnson from the bench. ‘Well then, how does the government weigh bullion when they send it from Washington to the New Orleans mint. New Orleans is at sea level…a lower altitude. Don’t they have the same problem? ’‘No, Your Honor, I understand the government uses special scales that show true weights on any different part of the earth. ’‘Special scales…what’s special about them? ’‘The government uses pendulum scales that measure gravity against gravity. They weigh the same everywhere on earth at any altitude…and at any temperature for that matter.’” Geddes paused, then spoke quietly. “Stevens was acquitted,” he concluded. The 100% Club rose and cheered.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 8</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Henry Theobald had released his son’s letter to the newspaper who printed it in its entirety.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Toledo made special scales for the war effort, including force measurement devices and shell loading scales. This started the development of a wide variety of unique scales for special applications; all of which led Toledo to create a wholly owned subsidiary named Toledo Precision Devices, a forerunner of Toledo Systems.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The war was not quite over when Toledo faced serious legal and financial problems. Dayton had filed a suit against Toledo in 1910 in the Federal District Court, Chicago, claiming that Toledo’s 1906 cylinder computing scale had infringed on one of their patents.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 9</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On January 16, 1920, Prohibition took effect in the United States. Beer, wine and liquor were officially banned by the 18th Amendment. Enforced by the National Prohibition or Volstead Act, it was nothing new to the 25 states that had already passed their own Prohibition laws. New York’s Alderman LaGuardia was skeptical about the law, saying that it would take 250,000 police to enforce it in that city alone, and nearly as many more to police the police.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Bob Theobald was to replace Henry Theobald as chairman of the committee even when his father was in Toledo. He was clearly “heir apparent.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>He said, “Selling is one thing. Service is another. The two should always be in close accord but never combined in one man.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On January 3, 1923, not long after settling into their home, a baby girl, Mary Meloy Theobald, was born. The parents and grandparents rejoiced…but their joy was short lived. The new mother had a troubled delivery. Her health steadily failed. Bob hovered over her. She would look up at him and smile wanly. “I’m sorry, I’m sorry,” she would say as tears came to her eyes. Greatly worried about his wife, Bob took little joy in his new daughter. Six weeks after their daughter was born, it was clear a crisis had been reached. Her doctor had been with her for several hours when he came out of her room. “I’m sorry, Bob,” he said, “she’s gone.” Bob and Mary had been married only eleven months when Mary-Meloy Theobald died.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>With his family gathered at his bedside, he steadily grew worse. At 4:30 that afternoon, Henry Theobald died. He was 56 years old</u></em><em>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em><u>Bob Theobald had lost two of the people he loved the most, within 16 months of each other. His marriage of slightly less than a year had given him the greatest joy of his life. The death of his wife Mary-Meloy left a huge void and the death of his father struck another enormous blow</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On Friday evening, December 17, 1925, at about 10:00 p.m. he came to his 717 West Bancroft Street home and went right to his room. At 8:30 on Saturday morning the baby’s nurse knocked on his door to wake him. He usually answered quickly but she couldn’t get a response. She opened the door…and screamed. Sometime during the night,&nbsp;<u>34-year-old Robert R. Theobald had stood before a mirror in his bedroom, put an automatic pistol to his temple and blown his brains out. The Theobald era was over</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 10</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>On January 19, 1926, Hugh Bennett was elected a company director and president of Toledo Scale Company.</u></em><em>&nbsp;Lenox Rose remained chairman of the board. Bennett immediately assumed control. One of his first acts was to bring his younger brother Geoffrey Bennett into the company as his assistant. Only 31 years old when he became president, Hugh Bennett was a vital, handsome and adventurous young man. After graduating from Williams College and before the United States entered the First World War, he joined the French army where he served as an ambulance driver and made some long-term French friends…one of whom was fellow ambulance driver Pierre Pasquier.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bennett set a visible new example. He was in his office no later than 7:30 every morning. He kept his window wide open whatever the weather. Since most employees rode to work on streetcars, they had to pass his window. Workers quickly got the point</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 11</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>So in October 1928 he incorporated Toledo Precision Devices, Inc. as another wholly owned subsidiary. C. O. Marshall, Sr. was transferred and named vice president and general manager.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Porcelain scales weighed up to 165 pounds. They were simply too heavy for most salesmen to haul into stores for demonstrations. When the salesman conducted a “scale audit” which compared the demonstration scale with the actual scale the merchant was using, he usually could prove a savings to the merchant of at least two cents on every weighing. Most merchants claimed they used their scale about 300 times a day.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>While both the new products were well received, the weight printer caused the most excitement. For the first time customers could have a printed record of the weight information shown on the dial. It solved problems in reading, remembering and recording weight readings correctly.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>It was a urea-formaldehyde molding compound with characteristics that were far superior to any known plastic. The new compound produced a beautiful, tough translucent material that could be molded into delicate pastel shades.&nbsp;<u>Bennett was wowed. He had the vision to see far-reaching potential in the new material many decades before Dustin Hoffman had the magic word “plastics” whispered in his ear in The Graduate.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>During the first three years of the Depression, Toledo’s industrial sales volume dropped off 70% and retail scale sales about 50% from their 1929 levels. Service sales increased…scales were being maintained rather than replaced and service remained the only profitable operation</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>As time passed, more and more competitive coin-operated scales were placed on the streets. Income from Toledo’s penny scales continued to drop. The company finally discontinued making the tombstone-style coin-operated penny scales at the end of the decade.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 13</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Two days after his inauguration, Roosevelt declared a national emergency and closed all American banks. It was called a Bank Holiday. At the same time he placed an embargo on gold to prevent hoarding. The Toledo Scale management—along with the management of virtually every American company—was deeply concerned about the affect the bank closings would have on the small amount of business still to be had.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>Little or no effect on Toledo sales was felt from the bank closings…in fact&nbsp;<u>the nation’s morale improved well before business improved</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Saturday morning, Bennett closed the convention with a talk on the glowing possibilities for the future of the Toledo organization with the many new developments research had recently produced. Bennett was an inspiring, highly skilled speaker and the crowd was with him. As one field man put it, “It made the whole convention worthwhile.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Then in 1934, a company that Toledo had been cooperating with became a tough competitor. In June, IBM sold their Dayton Scale Company division to the Hobart Manufacturing Company of Troy, Ohio. Toledo’s relationship with IBM’s Dayton division had been trouble-free since Bennett and Thomas Watson, Sr. had made their “gentlemen’s agreement” eight years previously. Now IBM had sold Dayton</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In August 1935, President Roosevelt signed into law the Social Security Act. It was intended only for those in commercial or industrial jobs and was to be funded by a payroll tax.&nbsp;<u>The depression continued. Bennett was constantly seeking ways to build business. In just the first three years of the Depression, the company lost all but about 10 cents per share of its earned surplus</u>. Its common stock stood at about $20.10 per share. Par value was $20.00 per share at the time.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Well, Lloyd,&nbsp;<u>we know that demonstrating helps sell scales</u>. In fact demonstrations are vital. Let’s see if we can figure out some ways to do more demonstrations like we do at trade shows.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A novel new way to generate more sales resulted from the meeting. Bennett especially wanted to get the market acquainted with the company’s many innovative special purpose scales.&nbsp;<u>Toledo bought two exhibition cars. They were similar to modern mobile homes except the entire interior was devoted to a display of special purpose scales and force measuring devices. An experienced sales engineer was assigned to each one. They called them Aero-Cars</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Toledo’s home town was proud of the company. A local newspaper assigned their top feature writer, Allen Saunders, to do a complete feature on weighing and Toledo Scale. Saunder’s story was given a full page for each of five consecutive days, Monday through Friday. Titled “The Weigh of the World,” the series was incredibly thorough, excellent publicity for the struggling company. Saunders began his first piece on Monday with:</em><em>&nbsp;</em><em>Scales weighed the milk you carry in from the front step; scales packaged the cereal, sugar, coffee and salt on your breakfast table. The clothes you don, the parts of the auto you drive to work, the&nbsp;<u>street surfacing over which you pass, the newspaper you read…and on and on ad infinitum…all that you eat and wear and handle and much that you look at, once caused a quiver of an indicator on the chart of a scale.”</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Egotist</em><em>:&nbsp;<u>“</u></em><em><u>I am as old as the history of civilized Man; early I joined the traffic of the World. Abraham used me as he bargained for his burial ground. Joseph relied upon me during the years of the Great Famine. Belshazzar trembled as I read his doom. I am pictured on the ancient temple walls of Egypt and Babylonia. I antedate the use of money of any sort,—yea, the value of money is determined by me</u></em><em>.</em><em>&nbsp;</em><em>I handle counting problems with startling rapidity and accuracy. I am recognized by the governments of all nations. I can win or lose wars. I measure one of the greatest forces of nature. I tell how much coal is mined and burned. I determine the value of all metals, common and precious; lapidaries would be lost without me. I guard the very water that man drinks. If I were unfaithful to my trust I could bankrupt the commerce of the world. I stand guard in the most unpretentious shops and the mightiest industries rely upon me. I have a part in all the food that is eaten, the clothing that is worn, the soaps, powders and perfumes that are bought. I am important at birth, necessary through life, and useful at death. I spy on most letters that are written, and govern the ingredients of the ink used in writing them. Papers and magazines are subjected to my scrutiny. I work with the ignorant; I assist with accuracy the investigations of the scientist. Pauper or prince, I serve both alike. I hold a front seat at every baseball game. I stand at the starting and finishing line of every horse race. Prizefighters are classified by me. I am known the world over. I am one of the most important necessities of a progressive civilization, yet one of the most neglected,—I AM A SCALE.</em><em>”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 15</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1938, Toledo introduced a logarithmic chart for industrial scales and a weighing system to balance aircraft propellers, which would prove especially useful in just a few years.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 16</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Through the 30’s Plaskon had grown by leaps and bounds. It was a true growth company in a growth industry</u></em><em>. But Toledo was concerned about the potential competition. Many large, well-financed chemical corporations were now working in the plastics field. DuPont, Monsanto, Union Carbide, and more.all very much larger and better financed. There was a chance that one of them would come up with a better product. A&nbsp;<u>war would only serve to accelerate their interest in plastics</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;&nbsp;</em><em><u>Monsanto made a tentative offer of $7,000,000 for 100% of Toledo’s Plaskon stock</u></em><em>…but in Monsanto common stock with restrictions on the number of shares that could be put on the market at any one time, and in total for one year. Toledo needed cash…not stock with selling limitations. Discussions with Monsanto were dropped.&nbsp;<u>Glass was a major Toledo industry</u>.&nbsp;<u>Owens-Illinois, Libbey- Owens-Ford, and the relatively new Owens Corning Fiberglas were all glass companies with headquarters in Toledo</u>. Their management all knew each other well. In fact,&nbsp;<u>Mike Owens, the mechanical genius who invented the bottle blowing machine, among other inventions for glass production, had been involved with all three at one time or another and was the Owens in all three company names</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Out of Toledo’s search for a lightweight material for scale housings came an entirely new industry…developed so a salesman could carry a scale into a store without getting a hernia. Toledo Scale had been paid over $500,000 in cash dividends over the years and realized a final profit of $2,111,156. Toledo research paid off.&nbsp;<u>And Bennett didn’t forget his success with plastics</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 17</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Using the Toledo double pendulum mechanism, Toledo greatly refined force measurement devices. They would be used in dynamometer scales to measure the torque of large aircraft engines and to test diesel engines for landing craft.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Ration stamps were quickly issued for all vital commodities. Gasoline rationing was soon initiated.&nbsp;<u>The company was concerned that there might come a time when it would be impossible for salesmen to get gasoline for their cars</u>. So Toledo Scale asked area manager W. M. Randolph to conduct an experiment down in Dixie to see if sales could still be made using only public transportation. Retail representative Bob Schick was sent from Atlanta to Augusta, Georgia, by train to spend a week there on retail sales. Six pieces of equipment were shipped to him in care of his hotel. On Monday morning, Schick took a bus out to the end of the line. He worked his way back on foot and called on stores along the way. When he located a prospect, he would return to the hotel, call a taxi and take a scale or food machine out to the merchant’s store. He repeated this process all week. At the end of the week total sales were slightly above average. Taxi and miscellaneous expenses for the week were less than ten dollars. Area Manager Randolph wrote, “<u>We now know definitely that should a situation develop where gasoline is impossible to get, we will still be selling retail scales.”</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>At the Harley Davidson plant in Milwaukee, Toledos were added to those already there to quickly and accurately furnish necessary weights for production and weight control</u></em><em>. The name Harley Davidson meant motorcycles the world over, and the plant worked at top speed to put wheels under the Army’s motorized units. This plant was where motorcycles were produced for the Armored Division’s motorized scouts as well as for reconnaissance and message carrying for all services.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Research came up with an answer…Plaskon. Plaskon…another stride forward in the plastics industry. Today, plastic products reach into all our lives…all children of Hyatt’s laboratory mistake…of Bakeland’s experiments…of Bennett’s lightweight scales.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 18</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bennett had not held a majority of Toledo Scale stock for some time. Now a majority was controlled by bankers led by W W Knight, Sr. and others who had been Bennett’s original investors and had also bought out the stock of the original eastern owners</u></em><em>. It was rumored they were pressuring Bennett to pay off the loans he had obtained to expand the plant and convert it to war production.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bennett thought that plastics handling machinery could be developed and manufactured by Defiance Machine Works. In December he reached an agreement with Toledo Scale’s majority stockholders and traded his financial interest in Toledo Scale for 100% interest in Defiance Machine Works</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bennett’s achievements were many</u></em><em>. At the start, he took over an accumulation of problems, which included the huge debt caused when Toledo Scale lost the lawsuit to Dayton because a Phinney scale couldn’t be found.&nbsp;<u>He led the company through a ten-year depression when there was often grave doubt that it would survive. Even as late as 1939, there were still 9,000,000 workers unemployed</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Bennett was a true entrepreneur. Hugh and Geoffrey Bennett enthusiastically took over the Defiance operation and began to implement their plans. They developed a unique press to preform plastic materials. Geoff Bennett took over more of its development as Hugh’s heart disease worsened. Four years later, just as the company was ready to prosper, he suffered a fatal heart attack. Like Henry Theobald before him, Hubert D. Bennett was just 56-years-old at his death. And like Henry Theobald, he was buried in Woodlawn Cemetery, not far from the founder’s grave.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Mcintosh</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Diverse weights are an abomination unto the Lord and a false balance is not good.”&nbsp;<u>Proverbs, chapter XX, verse 23</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 19</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>He spoke to the engineers in a group. “<u>Let me define what we’re going to expect from each of these three groups,” he said. “You research engineers will create the kind of new ideas that will lead to new products. And ideas to improve existing products. That’s your primary job.” He turned to the head of development. “Development engineering will make the new ideas practical. You will adapt them to fit our production facilities. Your engineers have to be familiar with our manufacturing techniques…able to design parts and finished products for efficient production.”</u></em><em>&nbsp;</em><em><u>“You production engineers pick up where development leaves off,” he said to them. “You are the people who establish the procedures we need in the plant to build the new products</u></em><em>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 20</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>After World War II, in the late 1940s, Oklahoma, Kentucky and Louisiana were among the last states in the union to pass weights and measures legislation.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In June, Toledo’s Brazilian distributors,</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Eric Haegler and his son Ricardo Haegler</u></strong>&nbsp;<u>visited the plant. Their firm, S.A. Haegler de Maquinas e Representacoes, had represented Toledo since 1940. The family would prove to play a significant role in the future of the Toledo Scale name</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 21</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Meanwhile McIntosh retained the management consulting firm McKensie &amp; Company to do a study on Toledo’s procedures and people.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Orders included scales to checkweigh waste fibers used in oil filters, to regulate the size of crushed rock nuggets for the Indiana Turnpike, to accurately weigh the clothes used in testing clothes dryers and washing machines, to check the growth of a litter of pigs on an experimental farm, to provide the exact printed weight of chlorine sold directly to customers via a pipeline, to determine the uniformity of loaves of bread, to check lots of golf tees, to check the resiliency standards of sponge rubber products…and many more unusual uses for scales that no one had ever anticipated.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The following year,&nbsp;<u>the developer of IBM, Thomas J. Watson, Sr. died at the age of 82</u>. An IBM Division, the Dayton Scale Company, competed with Toledo Scale in the early years. Watson sold Dayton Scale to Hobart in 1934.&nbsp;<u>Although IBM was not the first to move into computers after World War II, its success in marketing them quickly outdistanced all competitors</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>A breakthrough new product came out of research. A new digital-scanning electronic unit transmitted weights to remotely located data handling devices for the first time. Weights could now go anywhere and be reproduced accurately in almost any form. General sales manager Don Boudinot said, “<u>The achievement has the same significance in the field of weighing as breaking the sound barrier had in aviation</u>. ”<u>The digital-scanning electronic unit was developed in time for display at the Chemical show in December. It was the hit of the show</u>. The basic element was a light source that scanned lines exposed on a special chart. The output was a series of electrical pulses that pass through an electronic counter and translator to a remote recording or indicating device.&nbsp;<u>Called “Electronic Wings”, the unit could be used with any Toledo industrial dial scale. It soon became popular to totalize meat and other items over a monorail scale, to remotely record batch ingredients and supervise remote scales from a central location. It was Toledo Scale’s first digital electronic product</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Harris McIntosh had already expanded the company with several acquisitions and wanted to continue that growth</u></em><em>. “Early this year we decided to further diversify our activities,” McIntosh said. “We cast around for the most likely marriage prospect. It was obvious to us that such an acquisition should not be in a field that required different technologies and skills—such as the chemical field—but one with much the same activities.”&nbsp;<u>In September 1957, McIntosh announced a merger with the Haughton Elevator Company of Toledo. Many thought it was brought about by the “old boy” network in Toledo since Haughton was another local company, even older than Toledo Scale</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>The merger was viewed in financial circles as one of the most significant actions ever taken in the Toledo business community. Still,&nbsp;<u>the merger posed the question of what relationship a scale had to an elevator.</u>&nbsp;In announcing the merger McIntosh said, “<u>Although scales and elevators are vastly different products, they are very closely related in many respects</u>. Haughton’s elevators are electro-mechanical devices and so are many Toledo Scale products. Both companies are in the metal working field. Both make end products. And service is a very important segment of both firms’ business.”</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>“If a scale becomes inaccurate, it is taken out of service by officials until it’s repaired,” he explained. “And when periodic government inspections find an elevator that doesn’t pass inspection and might be unsafe, it’s taken out of service until it’s fixed.” The merger was approved in November. The emerging company became Toledo Scale Corporation. Both Toledo Scale and Haughton Elevator continued as operating divisions of Toledo Scale Corporation.<u>Combined annual sales were estimated to be in excess of $40,000,000 for 1957. Toledo Scale had always been a closed corporation, and never made public its sales or earnings figures. It was said there were only about 100 Toledo Scale shareholders, with most of the stock being concentrated in a few blocks</u>. The merger was effected by an exchange of stock and a new stock was created for Toledo Scale Corporation and offered to the public.&nbsp;<u>After more than half a century, Toledo Scale became a public company for the first time</u>. Reports showed that 50,000 to 70,000 shares of the new stock were offered “over the counter.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 22</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>John Lewis was a scholar. Soon after becoming industrial marketing manager, he spoke to the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.&nbsp;<u>His title, “The History of Weighing.” His script read in part</u>: “As the main purpose of this talk is to take a look at&nbsp;<u>10,000 years of weighing progress</u>, let’s take a look backward: The progress of civilization can be related to the extent that man has used some form of measurement. Probably the oldest form of measurement is by weight.&nbsp;<u>Archaeologists have found primitive weighing balances in Egyptian tombs dating back to 8,000 BC</u>. They consisted simply of a piece of wood, suspended in the middle by a leather thong. Two flat pieces were hung on either end by the same means. A few centuries later, in the land of Sumer near the Persian Gulf, a complete system of balances and standard weights were used for trading in metals and agricultural products. This early system spread to India, China and then into Europe.&nbsp;<u>The weight units of this early system were still in use up to the Renaissance, several centuries before Columbus sailed for America</u>. Ancient Greece, too, had its system of weights and measures. Archimedes, a famous Greek philosopher and mathematician, actually saved himself from being beheaded by using his rapidly acquired knowledge of weighing principals. King Hieron of Greece commissioned Archimedes to prove the goldsmith who fabricated his new crown hadn’t diluted the gold and silver in the crown. The King gave Archimedes 24 hours to come up with a method to test the goldsmith’s honesty…and if he failed he would be beheaded. Naturally, Archimedes was a bit stressed. He went home to relax in a warm bath. As he watched the water rise in the tub as he sat down, inspiration struck. He rushed from the bath into the street nude shouting ‘Eureka!’(I have found it!) Archimedes balanced the finished crown in one pan and the specified content of gold and silver in the other pan, first in the air and secondly with both arms submerged in water. He had discovered the principle named after him, which states that a body surrounded by a fluid is buoyed up by a force equal to the weight of the displaced fluid. Fortunately for the goldsmith, the balance was achieved in water and both their lives were spared.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>The Roman steelyard remained unchanged for almost 19 centuries.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>‘No Springs—Honest Weight’”. Lewis&nbsp;<u>continued bringing the history up to the moment load cells and electronic scales were coming into use. His talk was quite successful and he was asked to repeat it many times before other groups</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 23</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Also in 1963, Toledo System magazine wrote a story which showed how far we’ve come as a nation since Theobald sold the idea of establishing Honest Weight weights and measures laws. It was about the single one-pound platinum weight at the U.S. Bureau of Standards in Washington against which all weights in the country are checked. It read: “The little platinum cylinder is the most tenderly cared for piece of metal in the country. About 1-1/2 inches high, it’s kept in a platinum lined niche in a quartz plate, mounted on a special brass platform. Three glass bells are placed over it.the second and third each a little larger. The whole thing is kept in an air-tight cabinet which itself is stored inside a vault with double steel doors.&nbsp;<u>This one-pound weight is actually rated in kilograms. It’s officially considered to be 46.35% of a kilogram</u>.&nbsp;<u>Many people forget that, as far as weight is concerned, the United States has been legally on the metric system since 1866, when we signed an international agreement to that effect</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>Once every ten years the master weight cylinder gets a check-up of its own. It’s sent to be compared with the International Prototype Kilogram that’s housed in a vault in Sevres, France. To get it there, it’s wrapped in a chamois, then put in a metal box wrapped in felt, then repeated through five layers of felt and five boxes.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Toledo Scale’s Industrial Marketing Manager assigned the author,</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>then an industrial marketing specialist</u></strong><u>, to team with McGiverin on the Swift survey. Terry and McGiverin spent more than two weeks in the plant</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Early in the second week, McGiverin yelled, “Bob, come look at this one!” He had been walking ahead and reached the scale first. When Terry looked at it he saw what had attracted McGiverin’s attention. It was an old Toledo bench scale mounted on a rusted, leaning stand with water standing in the dial head about a third of the way up from the bottom of the dial.&nbsp;<u>The serial number showed the scale was built prior to the first World War. It was over 50-years-old. Terry said, “What the hell, Paul. Let’s check it anyway.”McGiverin put the first test weight in the center of the platform. The indicator was in the water all the way but chattered to a reading in the first quadrant. When it stopped, it showed the scale was reading right on the money</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>“All these old Toledos stay remarkably accurate,” McGiverin said, “even when they’re badly maintained and abused like this one. Now you know why the meat packing industry buys Toledos.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>While McGiverin felt right at home,&nbsp;<u>this had been Terry’s first visit to a meat packing plant</u>. He saw that workers faced cold, wet, smelly and dangerous conditions every day. Terry also saw all the parts that were ground up to make hot dogs. He couldn’t eat a hot dog for almost a year.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Before the advent of chicken factories like Holly Farms, Purdue and Tyson, chicken was quite costly. It was usually reserved for Sunday dinner. “A chicken in every pot,” was the politicians cry.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>At Toledo do Brasil, a line of industrial scales was manufactured in Sao Paulo.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 24</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Marketing produced a 16 mm sales promotion motion picture that told the Verilux story, featuring Fred Carroll’s discovery. It included details on the work he did on his own time in his basement. Continuous loop eight mm copies of the movie were made and used in portable projectors. One projector and two copies of the movie were distributed to each region.</u></em><em>&nbsp;The region manager scheduled it throughout his region so each salesmen could carry it into a prospect’s office.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The company’s stock had been traded over-the-counter since 1958. Now in 1964, management concluded it was ready for the big time. Sales were $65.5 million in 1963.&nbsp;<u>Toledo Scale wanted to broaden its list of investors to include institutional investors and endowment funds, which were limited by law, or policy to listed securities. So on July 24, 1964, Toledo Scale Corporation stock made its debut on the New York Stock Exchange with the ticker symbol TDS. It opened at 29-1/2 and rose to 29-7/8 by mid-afternoon. In a listing ceremony with exchange president Keith Funston, Harris McIntosh bought the first 100 shares</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Quertinmont sent retail marketing specialist Bob Terry to Chicago to work with Dee for a few days</u></em><em>. He was sent to make calls with Dee and determine what kind of new or different scales and food machines were needed.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Terry summed up what they believed</u></em><em>. “You know, Jack never quits selling, always in his own way. He just knows his customers so well, he knows which ones he can bully and which ones call for the velvet glove approach. It’s as simple as that.” They all shook their heads.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 25</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Terry had fallen behind in his work and had a stack of correspondence four inches high in his in-basket on Friday when he left work. The whole stack was missing when he returned to work. He worried about it. Some of it had to be important, he thought, and he didn’t know who had written to him or what he could do about it. Several weeks passed and he heard from no one. Then several months. Nobody complained that he had never responded. Terry said, “It’s pretty obvious…people generate a lot of paper that clearly doesn’t mean much. The correspondence couldn’t been very important after all.”</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>“Checkpoint Charlie” won an international film competition. It was awarded a first-place gold medal at the Ipac-Ima Exhibition in Milan, Italy</u></em><em>. Ipac-Ima was a major international exhibition dedicated to material handling, food processing and packaging equipment. “Checkpoint Charlie” was in competition with 18 films from six countries. The medal was presented to Bernie Stanton by Vice President, International Frank Parmelee in Parmelee’s office. An earlier award ceremony was held at the U.S. Trade Center in Milan. Representatives of Toledo Italiana accepted the award on Stanton’s behalf and forwarded the gold medal to Parmelee. Stanton discovered the medal was real 18 carat gold.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In the spring of 1967, Frank Parmelee convinced McIntosh that a technical expert should visit the European affiliates</u></em><em>. …&nbsp;<u>While in Zurich, arrangements were made for Hall to visit the research laboratories of</u>&nbsp;<strong><u>Mettler Instrument A.G., the first documented contact between Mettler and Toledo Scale at Mettler’s headquarters.</u></strong>&nbsp;<u>Mettler’s assistant sales manager A. Spoerri, and assistant research director E. Grunder spent about half a day with him</u>. Discussions centered around the&nbsp;<u>possibility of Mettler supplying a low capacity electrical output scale to Toledo for use in automatic counting</u>. Hall’s report made many recommendations to solve the problems at the Toledo affiliates. And about his Mettler visit he said, “<u>The Mettler people were most gracious, although extremely constrained</u>.”&nbsp;<u>The discussions were held in a new building housing the research facility along with the sales department</u>. “<u>This association is significant since it’s in line with other evidence of the strong influence—almost domination—exercised by the technical side of European weighing firms</u>,” he wrote. “Prior to my visit I was informed that Mettler was preparing to enter the checkweighing or automatic filling business,” Hall said. “There was no evidence of this in the facility I visited…but this is not of great significance since my tour was carefully directed.&nbsp;<u>Mettler is without question well qualified to enter either of these fields if they choose</u>. It would be consistent with their present product line.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Toledo management thought that their stock was undervalued</u></em><em>. They wanted to do something to raise its trading price.&nbsp;<u>Many other undervalued companies had been successful in boosting the value of their stock through financial public relations activities</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Dick Herron resigned to become advertising manager for Toledo Edison, and</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Bob Terry was named to replace him</u></strong>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>On a Sunday afternoon in the early&nbsp;<u>fall of 1967</u></em></strong><em>, Ted Metcalf got a phone call from Greg Rothe. “Ted,” Rothe said, “I want you to be at the plant at 7 p.m. tonight for an important meeting. Just go on in to the main conference room.&nbsp;&nbsp;<u>Sharply at 7 p.m. McIntosh stood and walked to the head of the room. “I have some important news,” he said, “and I wanted you to hear it directly from me.” He paused<strong>. “I’ve sold the company</strong></u>,” he said quietly. There was a hush. “<u>Toledo Scale will be merged into the Reliance Electric Company of Cleveland through an exchange of stock</u>,” he said. “All company managers and supervisors will be called to the cafeteria at nine tomorrow morning. We’ll tell them all about it then.” “I’ve determined that none of my children are interested in the business,” he said. “There’s really no one in the family who wants to learn this job, and we have to be sure the company’s future is in solid hands for all our sakes. My family. Your families. All our employees and their families. Everyone. So without considering any conglomerates, we went looking for a merger. ”McIntosh paused and wiped his eyes. Metcalf saw that he was wiping away tears. “And we’ve determined that Reliance is a solid, well-managed company. Though it’s not nearly as well-known as we are, it’s about twice our size in terms of annual sales.&nbsp;<u>Reliance had sales of over $172 million in their fiscal year that just ended October 31. We had sales of $88 million last year</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The merger marked the end of Toledo Scale as a locally owned and operated independent company</u></em><em>, one of Toledo’s top ten employers. And many predicted that&nbsp;<u>it marked the beginning of the end of Toledo Scale in Toledo, Ohio</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The merger called for Toledo Scale to maintain its corporate identity with its present management. It would operate as TOLEDO SCALE Division of Reliance Electric Company. Haughton Elevator was to remain an operating division of Toledo Scale</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 26</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The number of pickets was limited by the injunction…but not as limited as Portwood had requested. A large number were permitted. The judge refused to consider the barrier issue. The strikers repaired their barrier and continued to stop every car. Nothing changed. Yet people on both sides seemed to avoid doing anything that would provide an excuse for more violence. The strike continued.&nbsp;<u>The Toledo Scale strike was only a tiny example of a period of violence that hit the nation. The times themselves were violent</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Toledo management people had the feeling that Hugh Luke tended to blame the existing management for the strike</u></em><em>. Whether or not this was true, Dick Moss resigned soon after. He remained in Toledo and became an executive recruiter, having acquired a franchise from one of the large firms that specialized in recruiting top executives for large companies.&nbsp;<u>Luke gave McIntosh one more troubling task while he was still available</u>. McIntosh invited Instone to lunch at the Toledo Club. He insisted they order a drink.&nbsp;<u>When the drinks were served and lunch ordered, Instone asked, “What can I do for you, Harris? McIntosh grimaced. “Frank, I have to ask you for your resignation.” Instone paused a moment. “You got it,”he replied. After returning from lunch, Instone packed up his personal belongings and was out of his office by mid-afternoon</u>. The news swept through the building.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Reliance had taken over completely. McIntosh had vacated his office in the plant for Bob Metzger. He rented an office in the National Bank Building in downtown Toledo for personal business but was rarely seen by anyone. When his many friends within the company approached him about a retirement party or ceremony to mark the end of his more than 20 years of Toledo Scale leadership, he refused to have anything to do with it. He was firm—no retirement party for him—saying that he simply wouldn’t attend.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<u>He appeared to take his lead from the farewell speech General Douglas MacArthur made before the U.S. Congress after he was fired by President Truman. MacArthur closed his speech with his famous remark, “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.”By his own firm choice, Harris McIntosh did indeed choose to simply “fade away”.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 27</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Employee apprehension over the leadership changes at the Toledo Scale Division remained even as business continued to grow and new products were developed.&nbsp;<u>Reliance continued to bring in their own people as top managers</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>1969 marked the real surge of electronic products at Toledo Scale</u></em><em>. The first completely successful electronic digital indicator, the Model 8130, was developed by Roger Williams early in the year. It provided outstanding zero stability and established Toledo’s leadership position in electronic scales and indicators. More electronic scales and instruments quickly followed.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Toledo Scale’s Systems Division developed the Expressweigh, which solved IBP’s problem. It provided random weight package handling, instant in-motion weighing and data recording. Weight data was recorded in a fraction of a second after an item reached the scale. At the Dakota City plant, boxes of vacuum-packed cuts such as tenderloins, sirloins and briskets moved across the Toledo balanced belt conveyors in-motion at a top speed of 20 boxes per minute. Weight and product identification was recorded remotely.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Jenkins, Field Operations Manager John McLellan and Bob Terry personally visited the location to check it out since it would be the first 100% Club meeting held outside the United States</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Reliance management became convinced that the Toledo industrial sales force had to be converted to all engineers, the same as the Reliance sales force.</u></em><em>&nbsp;The Toledo Group created a new post and named Bob Terry as Manager, Management and Development to assure the availability of qualified technical manpower for all three divisions— Toledo Scale, Haughton Elevator and Reliance International.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Since Reliance sales people were salaried, it was announced that the Toledo industrial sales force would also become salaried, as engineers were hired to replace commissioned industrial salesmen</u></em><em>. The technology explosion would require engineers to sell technical products. No change was contemplated for retail salesmen. Retail would remain commissioned. From the beginning of Toledo Scale in 1901, industrial salesmen had been compensated on a commissioned basis. Many made a large amount of money with their commissions. It was believed, however, that engineers would not accept a commission arrangement, another reason for the change. As word got out about the change, many of the top industrial salesmen resigned, seeing that their compensation would be reduced. Most of them quickly found commissioned jobs with competitive scale companies.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The post of Manager, Management and Development was eliminated and&nbsp;<u>Terry was first given a special assignment to develop an entirely new industrial catalog, then again was named advertising manager</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>“You know,” he said, “Even if Toledo Scale hired someone whose only job was to destroy the company, he would fail! The Toledo brand name is so strong, so powerful, by God, he would fail!</u></em><em>”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Reliance sold Toledo’s Kitchen Machines Division to McGraw Edison since it didn’t fit into the vision of</u></em><em>&nbsp;automation.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>They agreed to meet all three of Quertinmont’s conditions. His length of service would be the same as if he never left, and Metzger did indeed rescind his announcement that Toledo would go out of the food machine business. In fact, he said that Toledo would be in the food machine business to stay.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In the early 1970s, a rumor went through the Toledo division headquarters that Reliance Electric was seriously thinking of changing Toledo Scale’s name to Reliance.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<u>At the time, ad manager Terry obtained approval for a major research firm to conduct a study to determine what comes to the public’s mind when the name of a city is mentioned</u>. The cities selected for the study were Akron, Atlanta, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Rochester, Seattle, and Toledo. Many of these had what seemed to be an obvious connection to a given product or company. Twelve cities other than those nine being studied were selected in which two questions were asked. More than 100 adults in each of the twelve locations were chosen at random in a shopping mall to provide the answers. The questions were: “What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word (city name)? Second, what company or product comes to mind that you associate with this city? In only three cities was there much of an association with anything. About Milwaukee, 86% answered “beer”.<u>About Toledo, 82% answered “scales”. About Akron, 57% answered “rubber”. While two of these cities were identified with a product, the only association with a given company was Toledo with scales. For the other cities, more than four out of five answered “nothing”. About Atlanta only 10% answered “Coca-Cola”. About Los Angeles 15% answered “airplanes”(people thought movies were being made in Hollywood…not Los Angeles). And about Cleveland—home of Reliance Electric—only a combined 12% answered “Browns” or “Indians”. Over 80% answered “nothing” about Cleveland</u>. Study results were sent to the advertising manager at Reliance headquarters in Cleveland and the rumors stopped.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>With electronics everything was happening faster. Products were becoming obsolete much more rapidly. Investments in research and development projects had almost doubled in only eight years, from about $400,000 in 1963 to about $750,000 in 1971. Top management of the Toledo Group changed again. While swimming in the ocean on vacation,&nbsp;<u>Bob Metzger came into the range of a large Portuguese man-of-war, a jellyfish with long, poisonous tentacles. He was seriously poisoned over large parts of his body. Recovery was slow. He couldn’t work and the prognosis was for a long recovery. Reliance decided to put him on extended sick leave and replace him</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Ah, but let’s not forget that the folks of Toledo unselfishly gave us the scales, ‘No Springs—Honest Weight’ was the promise they made, so smile and be thankful next time you get weighed…”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 28</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>But&nbsp;<u>features didn’t sell scales: benefits did</u>. What was the real benefit? How would it pay for itself?</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Load cells were becoming vital to the manufacture of scales. The operation in the white room in the Toledo plant couldn’t keep up. A decision was made to build a new plant dedicated to the manufacture of load cells. After examining many options, a decision was made to build the plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Quertinmont turned around, pleased to see him. “I’m fine, Mr. McIntosh, how are you? ”Well, okay, but sometimes I’m not so sure. I just can’t believe.” His lips began to quiver as he paused.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<u>“I never would have believed when I sold Toledo Scale to Reliance—I never would have believed they would</u>&nbsp;<strong><u>move it out of Toledo!</u></strong>&nbsp;<u>I just can’t talk about it.” Obviously moved, McIntosh shook hands and walked away to catch his flight. It was the last time Quertinmont ever saw him</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In the spring, Don Zelazny challenged Terry and his advertising department to recommend something special for the 100% Club sales meeting to mark the event. Of course it had to stay within budget. …&nbsp;<u>Terry said to Cooper, “Let’s think about holding the meeting in Toledo, Spain</u>. After all, it’s the city name that Toledo, Ohio adopted. So it’s the name Toledo Scale adopted too.” Toledo, Ohio and Toledo, Spain had just resumed their “sister city” relationship first established in the 1930s, but put on hold during the Franco regime. … They visited Toledo’s magnificent, gothic cathedral completed in 1492…the year in which Queen Isabella commissioned Columbus to seek a new route to India from this very city, then the seat of the Spanish throne. And the studio home in which El Greco produced the bulk of his famous paintings. …&nbsp;<u>“I’m sorry, Don…Spain is out. Luke and Ames don’t want this division to be the first to have a glamorous overseas meeting. He was afraid the Reliance sales organization would feel slighted. See if you can find a U.S. spot for the meeting</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>By the end of July [1976], the executive offices on the second floor offices in the Toledo plant were virtually empty</u></em><em>.&nbsp;<strong><u>One of the last to leave the offices was Terry, who had resigned to go into the advertising agency business in Toledo</u></strong>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 29</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Toledo continued to market mechanical scales as top of the line. In spite of their success with many electronic products, they were slow to embrace pure electronics for the full line. They had a large investment in tooling and facilities to produce mechanical scales.&nbsp;<u>The market, however, was moving to electronic scales</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A very unusual Toledo Scale order was booked in 1978. Tom Lloyd, a pharmaceutical industry specialist, sold a $400,000 Toledo system in 1971 that did not include a single scale</u></em><em>. He was working with Sterling Drug on a tentative proposal for $20,000 worth of scales for a drug dispensing system. and converted it into a $400,000 order for a security system. … Lloyd commented, “But the interesting part of the project is that we started out trying to get a $20,000 scale order and were having a tough time getting it.&nbsp;<u>So rather than selling just hardware, we sold a solution to our customer’s problem</u>. That solution was worth $400,000 to us. We also sold a maintenance contract with it, and spare parts over the next three years for another $100,000.”&nbsp;<strong>Tom Lloyd sold a solution to a customer’s problem. Much like Theobald had advised over 70 years previously</strong>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Reliance Electric sold their electric motors and related control products through distributors. These were pure distributors in that they bought the products from Reliance and sold them with a mark-up</u></em><em>. Toledo had a selling organization they called distributors…but they were really agents. Scales were sent to them on consignment and the company was not paid until the scales were sold. Part of the Toledo deal was that their distributors—unlike Reliance distributors—would handle only Toledo&nbsp;<a href="http://products.no/">products.no</a>&nbsp;competitors. Toledo’s arrangement had bothered Reliance from the beginning. Now they issued instructions to change it…after all, if Toledo distributors paid for the scales when they ordered them, it would increase cash flow significantly. Traditional Toledo distributors were not happy with the new arrangement. To show their displeasure at being forced to become pure distributors, many signed up to handle competitive scales along with the Toledo line.&nbsp;<u>This decision helped spark a new, competitive scale company</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 30</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>One of his first moves was to call Terry at his agency in Toledo. Dillon needed graphics and print material for everything a new company required: stationery, all business forms, a logo, literature for his first product, ads, and more</u></em><em>.&nbsp;<strong>Terry’s business partner, graphic designer Jan Robie, designed all of these</strong>, including the Masstron logo in a stylized capital M shaped like a scale balance.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Dillon especially admired the shade of orange on his riding lawn mower. He wanted just that shade. Robie determined the color was really PMS Warm Red. She designed the logo and all other elements using this as the second color. The color did the job. It did indeed help identify a Masstron scale from a distance. A bit later it caused some consternation at Toledo Scale.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Dillon knew them all personally and they knew him. He knew which ones did a good job and paid their bills. He signed up the best of those who applied as Masstron distributors. This immediately gave him a highly qualified national sales organization composed of people who liked and respected him.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Soon Masstron had systems capability. The young company acquired a systems-oriented firm founded by Larry Anderson and Bill Pickard, both ex-Toledo employees</u></em><em>. The firm quickly became a force in heavy capacity scales and systems in both the U.S. and Canada. … Toledo grain industry manager Tom Quertinmont, Ed Quertinmont’s son, was another who had left Toledo and joined Masstron.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 31</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>After Ben Dillon had left Toledo to start Masstron, Al Schiff remained the leading executive at the Toledo Scale Division. His solo tenure was brief. Reliance soon transferred Pete Tsivitse to Toledo Scale, naming him vice president of the group</u></em><em>. Later David Patterson joined him from Reliance as general manager of weighing and controls. Once again, Toledo Scale decided to get out of the food machine business. They began to phase them out. Food machines made in Franksville still were unprofitable…and still had quality problems.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Then in early 1979, Reliance abruptly announced that they had sold the Haughton Elevator Division to Schindler Elevator A.G. of Switzerland. Schindler was Reliance’s Swiss partner in a joint company, Schindler-Reliance Electronics A.G. It was the last piece left of the Toledo Scale Corporation that McIntosh had put together.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em><u>In late 1979, a major change took place at Reliance Electric</u></em></strong><em><u>. Some months before<strong>, Reliance had announced the development of a new electric motor that was declared to be extremely energy efficient, requiring much less electricity to operate</strong>. The announcement attracted the attention of Exxon, the giant oil company.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Exxon made an attractive tender offer for Reliance largely based on the development of the energy efficient motor</u></strong><u>. The offer was accepted and Reliance was acquired by Exxon. Now it was Reliance’s turn. Exxon soon discovered that the energy efficient electric motor didn’t perform as announced. Exxon replaced many Reliance executives</u>. They started by naming their own John Morley as president and CEO of Reliance Electric. History repeated itself…just as Reliance replaced Toledo Scale top executives, Exxon replaced Reliance top executives.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In 1981, Reliance CEO Morley negotiated to acquire</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Hi-Speed Checkweigher Company</u></strong><u>, Inc. of Ithaca, New York, for Toledo Scale</u>. Toledo had manufactured checkweighers as early as 1951 but its checkweigher line was incomplete and never very profitable. Meanwhile Hi-Speed had been quite successful.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>An in-motion checkweigher doesn’t provide an actual weight reading, it simply checks package weights within a small, preset weight range. Speeds over a line can be over 1000 packages per minute. They’re used to assure that the package contains at least as much product as is printed on the package to avoid short-weight claims. At the same time it tells packaging line people if they’re giving away too much extra product which quickly adds to extra cost. Hi-Speed kept their own identity. Yet it put Toledo Scale in the checkweigher business with the leading brand.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>“Before the advent of electronic weighing, Toledo Scale had three or four major competitors,” Hall explained. “Now we have two or three dozen that are nibbling away at our traditional business. If we can’t quickly produce new and better products we stand to lose some of our market share. This new Engineering Center is a solid investment that will enhance our competitive edge in the scale market.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Back in Toledo, Ohio, Reliance sold the entire 550,000 square foot Telegraph Road plant and its 70-acre site to Willis-Day Properties for $2.1 million</u></em><em>. Willis-Day planned to use the plant for light manufacturing and warehousing.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>An Open House for employees and their families was held on Sunday,&nbsp;<strong>July 10, 1983</strong>. Overlooked was the fact that this date happened to be the exact 82nd anniversary of Toledo Scale.&nbsp;<u>A small booklet was given to each visitor with a welcome by Joel Wise, the plant manager. In the booklet, Wise wrote, “The renovation of our plant was a direct commitment from our parent company, Reliance Electric, to stay in the Toledo community</u>.” Little did he know.&nbsp;<strong>Less than a year later Reliance announced they would phase out all operations in Toledo</strong>. The work done in Toledo was moved to Windsor, Ontario, and Spartanburg, South Carolina.&nbsp;<u>The last 140 Toledo Scale employees in Toledo lost their jobs</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 32</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Meanwhile, Exxon finally took a closer look at Toledo Scale, which they had acquired as part of Reliance Electric. Toledo’s performance had been slipping.</u></em><em>&nbsp;They were losing share to Masstron and others. The result was to bring Steve Perry in from Kato Engineering as Toledo Scale’s general manager. Morley had placed him at Kato several years previously. It proved to be an excellent move.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Perry soon became aware of the market share—and top employees—Toledo Scale had lost and continued to lose to Masstron. He determined to do something about it. Perry quietly opened negotiations with Dillon to buy Masstron. Concerned that the vast buying power of Exxon could be used against him, Dillon listened</u></em><em>. And he still suffered some trauma from the plane crash that took Susor and Pickard. Perry and Dillon reached an agreement.&nbsp;<strong><u>Toledo Scale acquired Masstron in 1985</u></strong>&nbsp;<u>and made it their heavy-capacity arm</u>. As part of the agreement, Dillon agreed to stay and run the operation for three more years. All ex-Toledo employees who had resigned to join Masstron had their length of service treated as if they had never left Toledo Scale, which could positively affect their future pensions.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In December 1986, Exxon sold Reliance Electric to its management in a highly leveraged buyout. Reliance became independent again. About two years later, Reliance president Morley announced they were investigating the potential sale of Toledo Scale to reduce the company’s large debt</u></em><em>. It went on the block. Reliance had never been very successful in managing their Toledo Scale property. Now identified again as Toledo Scale Corporation, Toledo employees were worried about who might buy the company…and what affect it would have on their lives. Would it be a corporate raider who would milk it for its assets? Would it be a foreign company who would install a vastly different culture?&nbsp;<u>The answer came in December 1988. Reliance Electric president John Morley announced they had reached an agreement to sell Toledo Scale Corporation to Ciba-Geigy, the giant Swiss pharmaceutical and chemical company</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Reliance sold all the assets of Toledo Scale to Ciba-Geigy except for the Brazilian operation, which they sold at the same time to interests in Brazil.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<u>Ciba-Geigy merged Toledo Scale’s industrial and retail capabilities with Mettler Instruments AG, another Swiss company they had purchased in 1981 and operated as a subsidiary</u>.&nbsp;<u>Mettler manufactured laboratory balances and instruments</u>.&nbsp;</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Ciba-Geigy had kept the Mettler name for the subsidiary rather than change it to Ciba-Geigy</u></em><em>. They were concerned that their chemical and pharmaceutical competitors who used the lab equipment that Mettler manufactured wouldn’t buy products that carried a Ciba-Geigy brand name since it was the name of a major competitor.&nbsp;<u>Mettler was a well-known brand name in Europe. Mettler had marketed their balances and instruments in the U.S. to laboratories and the scientific community since shortly after the firm was founded in 1945 at the end of World War II. Yet it was a little-known brand in the U.S. outside of laboratories</u>.&nbsp;</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Though Mettler was slightly larger overall, it was much smaller in the United States when compared to Toledo Scale</u></em><em>. In the U.S. it looked like the minnow had swallowed the whale.&nbsp;<u>Still, most Toledo Scale employees breathed a sigh of relief. Mettler was, after all, involved with weighing</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The only asset Ciba-Geigy did not buy for Mettler was the Brazilian operation</u></em><em>.&nbsp;<u>Reliance sold it to Ricardo Haegler interests in Brazil. The Haegler family had been associated with Toledo Scale since 1940, first as a distributor. Later Toledo built a manufacturing plant in Sao Paulo, which was managed by the Haeglers</u>.&nbsp;<u>The Brazilian plant produced Toledo mechanical scales for years for Latin America. Later they made them for the U.S. market as well, as mechanical scale sales shrunk in the U.S. Ricardo Haegler acquired full rights to the Toledo Scale operation in Brazil including the existing plant and the right to use the Toledo Scale name. Even today, a small market remains for the mechanical scale line, mostly in Latin America. A few Toledo mechanical scales—and parts for all of them—are still being produced by the independent firm, Toledo Do Brasil, in Sao Paulo. The sale was closed on February 15, 1989.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Dillon’s natural impatience caused him to follow the&nbsp;<u>MBWA rule…Management By Walking Around.</u>&nbsp;At one time or another, virtually every manager and supervisor in the company was surprised when Dillon would show up and ask an unexpected question. If he tried to dance around an answer, he would get the stare, followed by, “Bullshit!”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Hermann Vodicka was Dillon’s boss.&nbsp;<u>Vodicka headed the combined companies and ran Mettler’s European operation as well. Since both Mettler and Toledo had well established identities in Europe, Vodicka put the two names together in Europe, calling it METTLER TOLEDO. The U.S. company kept the Toledo Scale identity using the signature, “TOLEDO Scales &amp; Systems”.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The recommendation was rejected by the Swiss owners.&nbsp;<u>Vodicka announced a single brand global strategy. Toledo Scale would become METTLER TOLEDO, as would every other group with a separate identity…with one exception. The only exception was the Ohaus Corporation, fully owned by Mettler Toledo. Ohaus manufactures and markets balances and scales from their headquarters in Florham Park, New Jersey. Since Ohaus balances competed in the marketplace with Mettler balances, Vodicka chose not to change their name. Ohaus balances and scales are still manufactured and sold under the Ohaus brand name with no visible public connection to Mettler Toledo. A few Ohaus brand products are manufactured for them in Mettler Toledo’s Worthington, Ohio plant alongside Mettler Toledo brand products</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Toledo Scale had been an international company since the Theobald era early in the century, with operations in most major parts of the world, including Australia, Canada, much of Europe, Mexico, South and Central America and the People’s Republic of China. With Mettler’s greater strength in Europe, Africa, the Near East and Pacific Rim, the combination became even more global in scope. Mettler Toledo now had manufacturing plants in seven nations around the world, with sales and service companies in eleven more. These sales and service companies were complemented by established trading alliances with general agents in many parts of the world. To serve these wider markets the company was organized in two parts. Mettler-Toledo GmbH with headquarters in Greifensee, Switzerland, served Europe, Africa, the Near East and the Pacific Rim. Mettler-Toledo, Inc. served all the Americas and Australia out of Worthington, Ohio.&nbsp;<u>In 1992 at Vodicka’s order, the Toledo Scale name was officially changed to METTLER TOLEDO all over the world…including the United States. Thus Ben Dillon became the last president of Toledo Scale Corporation…and overnight became the first president of Mettler-Toledo</u>, Inc.&nbsp;<u>For the first time since it was founded in 1901, Toledo Scale lost its separate, highly recognized brand identity…a valuable identity it had carried for more than nine-tenths of the 20th century. After 91 years, the powerful Toledo Scale brand name and identity were officially ordered to be dropped by its new Swiss owners</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 33</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By 1994, awareness/preference studies showed that the name Mettler Toledo was beginning to be recognized, running in 7th or 8th place among all scale companies. The Toledo name by itself was still way ahead at the top position…the most recognized name by far, even though it hadn’t been used for several years. It continued to survive on its own.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em><u>Hermann Vodicka was promoted to a different position within Ciba-Geigy.</u></em><em>&nbsp;<u>Robert F. Spoerry was named to replace him as president of Mettler Toledo. As a Mettler executive, Spoerry had been instrumental in the acquisition of Toledo Scale</u>. He continued Vodicka’s policies. He continued to endorse the name change and the single-brand strategy. And&nbsp;<u>Spoerry was not happy with the progress being made in the U.S. operation on the identity</u>.</em><em>&nbsp;…&nbsp;</em><em>When he was called upon to speak,&nbsp;<u>Spoerry took strong exception to the Toledo Scale mentions</u>. He is a relatively young top executive, appearing to be&nbsp;<u>in his mid-40s</u>, bespectacled and slightly built. Some claim he displays the awkward appearance and manner of a classic, European college professor. Quite fluent in English, he’s usually soft-spoken.&nbsp;<u>He is not the effective public speaker typical of today’s top business executive. But this day he spoke firmly. Prior to launching into his prepared remarks he spontaneously said, “Let me make it clear…you represent Mettler Toledo. Toledo Scale doesn’t exist any more! It hasn’t for over four years. I don’t want to hear any more about Toledo Scale. It’s Mettler Toledo</u>!”</em><em>&nbsp;&nbsp;</em><em>They insisted that everyone use the METTLER TOLEDO signature and elaborate logo.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In spite of their efforts, they were concerned that Spoerry blamed them for the slow pace at which the Mettler Toledo name was being recognized. Internal efforts increased. Yet many distributors continued to resist. They saw only disadvantages to their own business. Their customers knew the old name well…not the new one. In the field they still often presented themselves as representing Toledo Scale…they had no real connection with Mettler lab balances nor did a vast majority of their customers. And in spite of the name, they were not authorized to sell Mettler Toledo balances or instruments.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Meanwhile, Ciba-Geigy was cleaning house to prepare for a $27 billion merger with Sandoz AG. The two later combined under the name Novartis</u></em><em>.&nbsp;<u>In October Ciba-Geigy announced plans to float Mettler Toledo in a public share offering. The news sparked a flood of unsolicited offers from prospective buyers. The best offer came from AEA Investors, with headquarters in New York City.</u>&nbsp;<u>AEA Investors is an American investment fund founded in the 1960s as a private investment vehicle for wealthy Americans such as the Rockefellers, Mellons, DuPonts and Harrimans</u>. AEA Investors specializes in leveraged buyouts of small and medium-sized companies. They discovered that their most useful investors were not the advisors of wealthy families as they had anticipated, but retired large-company chief executives. These men could come up with the capital needed and lend their talents to the boards of the acquired companies. Sitting on the boards, their management skills could help build acquired companies into industry leaders before reselling them or taking them public<strong><u>. In April 1996, Ciba-Geigy agreed to sell Mettler Toledo to AEA Investors for $769.2 million</u></strong>. Ownership changed hands on October 15. Named Mettler-Toledo International, Inc., it was now an American-owned company incorporated in Delaware and reporting results in U.S. dollars. Yet headquarters remained in Greifensee, Switzerland. AEA did indeed choose people from their group of retired chief executives to sit on the board. Phillip Caldwell, former Chairman of Ford Motor Company, was named Chairman of Mettler- Toledo International. Among other prestigious retired chief executives named to sit on the Mettler Toledo board were Reginald Jones, former Chairman of General Electric, and John Macomber, former Chairman of Pfizer. Mettler Toledo president Robert Spoerry was also named to the board.&nbsp;<u>In early 1997, Spoerry ordered a major change in the U.S. operation. He gave directions for a complete management shakeup and cultural change in the marketing structure to emulate the structure in place in Europe.</u>&nbsp;What’s more, the U.S. lab balance and instrument group would close and sell the valuable, largely empty building in Hightstown, New Jersey, and merge their operations into the Worthington, Ohio headquarters. And since the Worthington building was already too crowded, headquarters would be moved to a new building in Polaris, a suburban area north of Columbus. In the new structure, management was split into two groups, a Marketing Organization (MO) and a Producing Organization (PO). Retail and industrial POs were established in the Worthington and Columbus plants under the direction of Mettler- Toledo, Inc. president John Robechek, now also titled “Division Head—Mettler Toledo Industrial/Retail-Americas (MTIRA).”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In April 1997, 15 individual teams called Delta Teams were established. The team members were told that they should begin designing the new MO and the newest PO in the Worthington plant</u></em><em>. Of the 91 people assigned to the separate teams, seven were distributors and only one was not an employee or a distributor. Jan Robie, president of Mettler Toledo’s marketing communications agency, was a member of the Brand Awareness Team. As a contribution to help the company implement their plans, the agency did not bill her time for the countless hours she served on the Delta team. Several lab group employees who accepted a transfer from New Jersey were assigned to Delta teams as well. It soon became clear that of the almost 60 people in the New Jersey operation, only 11 were willing to relocate to Columbus. Apparently most didn’t want to leave their homes in metropolitan New York. Many were coastal types and didn’t want to live in “fly-over” country.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Also in January Robechek announced that sales in 1997 resulted in “an excellent year!” He explained that, “For the full year we were 7% ahead of the previous year but 3% behind our goal. I am really proud of what we accomplished together in 1997, and I hope you feel the same way.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Just over a year after buying Mettler Toledo, AEA Investors took the company public. On November 13, 1997, Mettler-To- ledo International, Inc. completed its initial public equity offering in the United States. It sold 6.67 million primary shares at $14 per share.</em></strong><em>&nbsp;</em><em>These shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol MTD.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>&nbsp;</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>On December 8, 1997, Merrill Lynch published a booklet about Mettler-Toledo International, Inc. titled “The Power of Balance”. In their list of Fundamental Highlights th</em><em>ey wrote:&nbsp;</em><em>Mettler Toledo is the world’s leading supplier of precision weighing instruments. Only supplier to operate in all major geographic regions and in all major served markets.&nbsp;<u>Attractive combination of “ivory tower” intellect in lab business and “street smarts” of industrial and retail settings</u>. One local reader observed, “I always thought that pimps and drug dealers were the kind of people that were usually credited with ‘street smarts’. Now Merrill Lynch seems to have put us in the same category. Their input must have come from the lab people direct from their Swiss ‘ivory tower’. But then, Teutonic people have never been known for their humility.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Blade published a story on December 16 written by senior business writer, Homer Brickey. The headline was, “City name still carries weight on stock exchange”. In part, the story read: “Toledo Scale is back on the Big Board. Oh, it’s not exactly called Toledo Scale anymore—it’s called Mettler-Toledo International, Inc., and its headquarters are in Switzerland. And for the second time in the last three decades, stock of the Toledo-born company is traded on the New York Stock Exchange.&nbsp;<u>Toledo Scale made its debut on NYSE on July 24, 1964, with the ticker symbol TDS. In its new incarnation, the Mettler Toledo scale company went on the Big Board November 14, with the ticker symbol MTD. They had sales last year of $850 million. Mettler Toledo styles itself as a U.S. company that happens to have its headquarters in Griefensee,</u>&nbsp;Switzerland. If that sounds a bit confusing, it’s only because much has happened to the firm in the last 30 years.&nbsp;<u>For many years, Toledo Scale was one of Toledo’s best known exports and trademarks—ranking right up their with Jeeps and Champion Spark Plugs. Of course, all three trademarks ended up in other hands</u>. After all that has happened to Toledo Scale and to Mettler Toledo, it’s a miracle the name ‘Toledo’ survives at all. But then again, it’s such a grand old name.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>By spring, Mettler-Toledo International shares had risen to the low $20s on the New York Stock Exchange. The IPO appeared to be successful.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 34</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>In the spring of 1998 the company offered a buy-out package to employees who qualified by age and experience…a group that happened to be made up largely of former middle-management employees of Toledo Scale. It appeared that they were not perceived as willing to accept the new culture and a “benevolent genocide” took place for those painted with the Toledo Scale brush</u></em><em>. With a few exceptions, only Robechek, Peters and a few other former Toledo Scale people in top management remained…largely those who implemented the MO/PO structure and the new culture. Most who left were replaced with outside hires. At the same time,&nbsp;<u>many long-time vendors were replaced with new ones</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The original fan and cylinder mechanical retail scales bearing Toledo’s name and the slogan “No Springs—Honest Weight” became prized possessions among collectors and antique dealers. They began to sell for as much as $800…three or four times as much as when they were new. “The Toledos have become very popular in the last few years,” said T. S. Carley, vice president of the International Society of Antique Scale Collectors<u>. “Of course, no one is interested in the new ones, but the old ones that were made in Toledo have become very big, particularly on the West coast,” he said</u>.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>CHAPTER 35</em></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Before Ciba-Geigy acquired Toledo Scale, the U.S. lab business for Mettler had their headquarters in Hightstown, New Jersey. Hightstown is near Princeton where Mettler had located their first U.S. office because they believed that a Princeton address carried extra prestige</u></em><em>.</em><em>&nbsp;</em><em>The office arrangement is&nbsp;<u>an “open environment” intended to encourage a team concept</u>. There are no separate offices…or even any Dilbert-like cubicles.<u>Everyone sits facing each other at an angle in individual, alternating pods each containing a computer</u>. There are meeting areas scattered throughout each floor for when people need to talk face to face.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Then in March 1999,</u></em><em>&nbsp;<strong><u>Spoerry</u></strong>&nbsp;<u>announced another change. He consolidated the industrial and retail divisions for the Americas and Europe into one global division, naming Lucas Braunschweiler to head it. Braunschweiler had been head of the European operations but would now move to Columbus to head the global operation. Robechek now reported to him. Three months later, Robechek resigned.</u></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Annual Report stated: “The company does not have a dividend policy. To date, the company has never paid any dividends on common stock. The company has used its cash flow to reduce debt and make acquisitions.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The laboratory market now represented 38% of net sales with the traditional industrial/retail market still providing the majority<u>. By 1998, Mettler-Toledo International was a totally different, truly global company</u>. Europe provided 46% of the business, the Americas 43%, with Asia and other areas providing 11%. 1999 first-quarter results showed continued growth. In his April 30, 1999 memo to employees, Ken Peters reported that his marketing group had exceeded the bookings seasonal budget by over 40%, and the billings budget by more than 15%.</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>One long-time employee offered this possible explanation: “<u>The Toledo Scale brand name remains strongest in American industry. When the Swiss management changed the name, I doubt they considered the long useful life of Toledo mechanical dial scales. Remember, many thousands of Toledo mechanical scales with the familiar large TOLEDO—HONEST WEIGHT dial remain in use in plants and factories all over the world. And person-weigher scales are still before the public in banks, health clubs and supermarkets everywhere. All these Toledo dial scales keep the name alive</u>.”</em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Historical Society is in the process of collecting material for a museum of 20 th century Toledo area industrial developments. Since a home for the collection does not exist yet, a “virtual museum” has been created on the internet by the Society, the Toledo- Lucas County Public Library and the University of Toledo. Called “Toledo’s Attic,” the paintings may now be seen on&nbsp;<a href="http://www.history.utoledo.edu/attic">www.history.utoledo.edu/attic</a></em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>For many years to come, they will display the proud heritage of “TOLEDO—HONEST WEIGHT” throughout the civilized world. Like General Douglas MacArthur—and Harris McIntosh— it seems that the Toledo Scale name will never die, but over time, just…fade away</u></em><em>.</em></p>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/12/27/honest-weight-the-story-of-toledo-scale-2000/">Honest Weight: The Story of Toledo Scale</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beating the Street</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/18/beating-the-street/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=beating-the-street</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2022 09:07:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investing & Strategy]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>by Peter Lynch, 1993 (320p.) In some respects, Peter Lynch’s second book, Beating the Street (1992), was even better than his first, One Up on Wall Street (1989).  Both books...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/18/beating-the-street/">Beating the Street</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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									<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>by Peter Lynch, 1993 (320p.)</em></span></p><p>In some respects, Peter Lynch’s second book<em>, Beating the Street</em> (1992), was even better than his first, <em>One Up on Wall Street</em> (1989).  Both books were classics, and while it was the first one that made me decide to leave engineering to pursue a career in portfolio management, the second one explains better why Lynch was such an amazing portfolio manager: he focused on companies and was not easily distracted by Mr. Market.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">As he writes in the opening sentence of the preface, Lynch retired from the Fidelity Magellan Fund on May 31, 1990, which was exactly 13 years from the day he took the job. “<em>The task of keeping track of so many companies,” </em>he remarks<em>, “had begun to take its toll by mid-decade, as the Dow hit 2000 and I hit 43. In 1989, with the Great Correction of 1987 already behind us and the stock market sailing along smoothly, I was celebrating my 46th birthday with my wife, Carolyn, and my daughters, Mary, Annie, and Beth. In the middle of the party, I had a revelation. I remembered that my father had died when he was 46 years old. You start to feel mortal when you realize you’ve already outlived your parents</em>.”  It’s interesting that he was feeling so old at 46.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-7588 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Peter-Lynch.jpg" alt="" width="116" height="133" /></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Truth be told, Lynch didn’t really retire from money management in 1990.  He just quit the rat race. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6BKMa5ZUF0">In a 2020 interview</a>, at 76 and looking great, he repeats the same message that made him such a legendary dream maker: “<em>In the stock market the most important organ is the stomach, it’s not the brains.  There’s always &#8230; on the way to work, the amount of bad news you can hear is almost infinite. The question is, can you take that?  Do you really have faith that 10 years, 20 years, 30 years from now, common stocks are the place to be? … You ought to look in the mirror every day and say, what am I going to do if the market goes down 10%? What am I gonna do if it goes down 20? Am I going to sell?  Am I going to get out?  If that’s your answer, you should be reducing it today.”</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Later, in <em>Beating the Street</em>, Lynch elaborates on the hectic life he had as a portfolio manager of one of the nation’s most famous funds. His style of investing was unusually eclectic, and it involved quite of bit of trading, mostly because Lynch was the kind of guy who would rarely meet a stock he didn’t like.  He was a true enthusiast who claims to have owned more than 15 thousand stocks during his 13 years of running the Magellan Fund.  At one point in the book, he cites reading 700 annual reports a year, which sounds impressive, but suggests he couldn’t have gone very deep in understanding what it really was that he was buying.  It also implies that his real genius was in just buying and buying in a bull market, but it wouldn’t be fair to call him a <em>bull market genius</em>.  Those come and go, but Lynch is still a giant to this day.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Lynch’s portfolio at Fidelity was always changing into what worked best because he had a good nose for a good story, and he sold the ones that were fading to buy the next big movers.  I can see how that approach would become exhausting after a while and I am sure he takes a different approach these days.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">I still learn a lot from studying Peter Lynch, but it doesn’t change my opinion that it’s not only easier, but much more rewarding, to find the few most outstanding companies and just letting them work for you.  While he claims that he would have put 20% or more into Chrysler stock in the 1980s, the reality is that he couldn’t do that in a mutual fund, since the largest position size allowed is 5%.  And as most people know today, Chrysler was not exactly a long-term serial compounder, and neither was it an outstanding company.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Lynch frequently speaks of 20-or-30-year horizons, but his way of investing in his earlier years would likely have burned him out had he not quit so soon.  He even admits in Chapter 4 that “as I study these reports now, I realize that many stocks that I held for a few months I should have held a lot longer.”  That’s the same conclusion Larry Livingston reaches in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (1923), that Thomas Phelps reached in <em>100 to 1 in the Stock Market</em>(1972), that Phil Fisher reaches in <em>Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits</em> (1958), and the South African money manager Jannie Mouton reaches in <em>And Then they Fired Me</em> (2011). Keynes also famously reached this conclusion while managing the King’s College endowment during the 1930s.  And so did the team at Marathon Asset Management before they decided to pivot away from capital cycles timing calls to focus on quality growth for the long run – as told in their book, <em>Capital Returns </em>(2015).</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">I do not wish to beat up on Lynch, though, as he is one of my heroes!  He made many dreams come true in fund management, but that’s not to say that I would like to repeat his moves as a money manager. According to Fidelity and Lynch’s own claim, the average Magellan investor lost money during Lynch’s tenure, even though it returned and amazing 29% annually from 1977-1990. Lynch’s writings and speeches have likely made many more dreams come true than his famous fund did.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Lynch’s message about the market is so impactful that his videos and books remain prominent and relevant to this day. My favorite part of <em>Beating the Street </em>is when he describes his experience with the Barron’s Roundtable during the time when he was a prominent member.  I could not have told it better, so I reproduced most of the chapter below.  I used to be an avid reader of the Barron’s Roundtable early in my career, and I recall all the characters that Lynch portrays in his story. The underlying message is as applicable today as it was back then.  In fact, I cannot remember a time in the last 25 years of doing what I do, when Lynch’s insight about weekend worrying wasn’t as spot on.  Conclusion:  When in doubt on a weekend, don’t read Barron’s.  Read Peter Lynch!</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">In closing, this was a fantastic book that I would recommend to anyone even vaguely interested in investing.  Lynch is a witty writer who possesses a unique sense of humor and the ability to tell great stories about what matters most.  While he does not lack confidence, he is neither arrogant or pedantic, and the message he conveys can help his readers keep calm and not lose perspective when Mr. Market comes swinging for the gut.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Regards,</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Adriano</p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em> </em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS:</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong><em>Chapter Two of Beating the Street: The Weekend Worrier</em></strong></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>The key to making money in stocks is not to get scared out of them. A successful investor does not let weekend worrying dictate his or her strategy.</u></em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>When we make the mistake of letting the news out of the bag, we are confronted with the latest reasons that mankind is doomed: global warming, global cooling, the evil Soviet empire, the collapse of the evil Soviet empire, recession, inflation, illiteracy, the high cost of health care, fundamentalist Muslims, the budget deficit, the brain drain, tribal warfare, organized crime, disorganized crime, sex scandals, money scandals, sex and money scandals. Even the sports pages can make you sick.  While catching up on the news is merely depressing to the citizen who has no stocks, it is a dangerous habit for the investor. Who wants to own shares in the Gap if the AIDS virus is going to kill half the consumers, and the hole in the ozone the other half, either before or after the rain forest disappears and turns the Western Hemisphere into the new Gobi Desert, an event that will likely be preceded, if not followed, by the collapse of the remaining savings and loans, the cities, and the suburbs?</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>You may never admit to yourself, “I decided to sell my Gap shares because I read an article in the Sunday magazine about the effects of global warming,” but that’s the kind of weekend logic that’s in force when the sell orders come pouring in on Mondays. It’s no accident that Mondays historically are the biggest down days in stocks and that Decembers are often losing months, when the annual tax-loss selling is combined with an extended holiday during which millions of people have extra time to consider the fate of the world. Weekend worrying is what our panel of experts, in the first half of the Barron’s session, practices year after year. In 1986, we worried about M-1 versus M-3, the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction package, what the Group of Seven would do, and whether the “J Curve effect” would begin to reduce the trade deficit. In 1987, we worried that the dollar was collapsing, foreign companies were dumping their products in our markets, the Iran-Iraq War would cause a global oil shortage, foreigners would stop buying our stocks and bonds, the consumer was deeply in shock and unable to buy merchandise, and President Reagan was not allowed to run for a third term.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Mr. Zulauf [a prominent Roundtable participant] set the tone in 1988 with his opening statement that “the honeymoon, from 1982 to 1987, is over.” This was the most optimistic thing said all day. The rest of the time, we debated whether we were going to have a standard bear market, which would take the Dow average down to 1500 or lower, or a killer bear market that would “wipe out most people in the financial community and most investors around the world” (Jimmy Rogers’s fret) and bring about a “worldwide depression like we saw in the early thirties” (Paul Tudor Jones’s). In between worrying about the killer bear market and the worldwide depression, we worried about the trade deficit, unemployment, and the budget deficit. I rarely sleep well the night before I’m scheduled to meet with the Barron’s panel, but after this one I had bad dreams for three months. The 1989 panel was somewhat cheerier than 1988, although Mr. Zulauf brought up the fact that this was the Year of the Snake, a bad sign in Chinese cosmology. <u>When we convened in 1990, the oft-predicted Depression was nowhere in evidence and the Dow had climbed back to 2500 points. Still, we found new reasons to stay out of stocks</u>. There was the collapse in real estate, another calamity to add to the list. We were unsettled by the fact that after seven straight years of up markets (1987 ended with a slight gain over 1986, in spite of the Great Correction), a down market was inevitable. Here was a worry that things had been going too well! Friends of mine, sophisticated people and not easily frightened, were talking about taking the money out of banks and hiding it at home, because they thought the money-center banks might fail and collapse the banking system.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In 1990, they weren’t simply avoiding the subject, they were eager to tell you how they were betting against the market. I actually heard cabdrivers recommending bonds, and barbers bragging about how they’d bought “puts,” which increase in value as stocks decline. Barbers are a segment of the population that I assumed had never heard of put options, but here they were making these complicated wagers with their own paychecks. <u>If Bernard Baruch was right about selling all stocks when the shoeshine boys are buying, then surely the right time to be buying is when the barbers discover puts</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>To top it all off, there was a war in the desert to fight. <u>Cameras were rolling in the Pentagon briefing rooms, where millions of viewers learned for the first time where Iraq and Kuwait were located</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>In October 1990, The Wall Street Journal noticed that I’d increased my personal stake in W. R. Grace and Morrison-Knudsen, two companies on whose boards I serve. I told the reporter, Georgette Jasen, that these were just “two of about ten stocks I added to… if they go lower, I’ll buy more.” I also went on record as having purchased another 2,000 shares in Magellan to add to my holdings, just as I had after I retired. This was the perfect scenario for the disciplined stock picker to search his or her buy lists for likely prospects. The headlines were negative, the Dow Jones average had lost 600 points over the summer and the early fall, cabdrivers were recommending bonds, mutual-fund managers had 12 percent of their fund assets in cash, and at least five of my fellow panelists were predicting a severe recession. Of course, we now know that the war wasn’t as terrible as some had expected (unless you were an Iraqi) <u>and what we got from the stock market instead of a 33 percent drop was a 30 percent gain in the S&amp;P 500 average, a 25 percent gain in the Dow, and a 60 percent gain in smaller stocks, which added up to making 1991 the best year in two decades</u>. You would have missed it had you paid the slightest attention to our celebrated prognostications. Moreover, if you had paid close attention to the negative tone of most of our “whither the economy” sessions over the past six years, you would have been scared out of your stocks during the strongest leg of the greatest market advance in modern history, when investors who maintained their blissful ignorance of the world coming to an end were merrily tripling or quadrupling their money. Remember this the next time you find you’re being talked out of a good investment by somebody who convinces you that Japan is going bankrupt or that a rogue meteor is hurtling toward the New York Stock Exchange. “<u>Suspense and dread cast a heavy pall over the markets,” said Barron’s the week of our gathering for the 1991 Roundtable and just prior to the great upward spurt in the market that would carry the Dow to a record high</u>.</em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>Keeping the faith and stockpicking are normally not discussed in the same paragraph, but success in the latter depends on the former</u></em><em>. You can be the world’s greatest expert on balance sheets or p/e ratios, but without faith, you’ll tend to believe the negative headlines. You can put your assets in a good mutual fund, but without faith you’ll sell when you fear the worst, which undoubtedly will be when the prices are their lowest. What sort of faith am I talking about? Faith that America will survive, that people will continue to get up in the morning and put their pants on one leg at a time, and that the corporations that make the pants will turn a profit for the shareholders. <u>Faith that as old enterprises lose momentum and disappear, exciting new ones such as Wal-Mart, Federal Express, and Apple Computer will emerge to take their place</u>. Faith that America is a nation of hardworking and inventive people, and that even yuppies have gotten a bad rap for being lazy. Whenever I am confronted with doubts and despair about the current Big Picture, I try to concentrate on the Even Bigger Picture. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>The Even Bigger Picture is the one that’s worth knowing about, if you expect to be able to keep the faith in stocks. <u>The Even Bigger Picture tells us that over the last 70 years, stocks have provided their owners with gains of 11 percent a year</u>, on average, whereas Treasury bills, bonds, and CDs have returned less than half that amount. In spite of all the great and minor calamities that have occurred in this century—all the thousands of reasons that the world might be coming to an end—owning stocks has continued to be twice as rewarding as owning bonds. Acting on this bit of information will be far more lucrative in the long run than acting on the opinion of 200 commentators and advisory services that are predicting the coming depression. Moreover, <u>in this same 70 years in which stocks have outperformed the other popular alternatives, there have been 40 scary declines of 10 percent or more in the market</u>. Of these 40 scary declines, 13 have been for 33 percent, which puts them into the category of terrifying declines, including the Mother of All Terrifying Declines, the 1929–33 sell-off. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>I’m convinced that it’s the cultural memory of the 1929 Crash more than any other single factor that continues to keep millions of investors away from stocks and attracts them to bonds and to money-market accounts</u></em><em>. Sixty years later, the Crash is still scaring people out of stocks, including people in my generation who weren’t even born in 1929. If this is a post-Crash trauma syndrome we suffer from, it’s been very costly. <u>All the people who’ve kept their money in bonds, money-market accounts, savings accounts or CDs to avoid being involved in another Crash have missed out on 60 years of stock-market gains and have suffered the ravages of inflation, which over time has done more damage to their wealth than another crash would have done, had they experienced one.</u> Because the famous Crash was followed by the Depression, we’ve learned to associate stock-market collapses with economic collapses, and we continue to believe that the former will lead to the latter. This misguided conviction persists in the public mind, even though we had an underpublicized crash in 1972 that was almost as severe as the one in 1929 (stocks in wonderful companies such as Taco Bell declined from $15 to $1) and it didn’t lead to an economic collapse, nor did the Great Correction of 1987. <u>Perhaps there will be another Big One, but since I’m not equipped to predict such matters—nor, obviously, are my learned colleagues on the Barron’s panel—what’s the sense of trying to protect myself in advance?</u>In 39 out of the 40 stock-market corrections in modern history, I would have sold all my stocks and been sorry. Even from the Big One, stocks eventually came back. </em></p><p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>A decline in stocks is not a surprising event, it’s a recurring event—as normal as frigid air in Minnesota. If you live in a cold climate, you expect freezing temperatures, so when your outdoor thermometer drops below zero, you don’t think of this as the beginning of the next Ice Age</u></em><em>. You put on your parka, throw salt on the walk, and remind yourself that by summertime it will be warm outside. A successful stock picker has the same relationship with a drop in the market as a Minnesotan has with freezing weather. You know it’s coming, and you’re ready to ride it out, and when your favorite stocks go down with the rest, you jump at the chance to buy more. After the Great Correction, when 508 points were shaved from the Dow Jones average in a single day, a symphony of experts predicted the worst, but as it turned out, the 1000-point decline in the Dow (33 percent from the August high) did not bring on the apocalypse that so many were expecting. It was a normal, albeit severe, correction, the latest in a string of 13 such 33 percent drops in this century. The next 10 percent decline, which may already have occurred since I’ve written this, will be the 41st in recent history, or, if it happens to be a 33 percent decline, the 14th. In Magellan’s annual reports, I often reminded the shareholders that such setbacks were inevitable. <u>The story of the 40 declines continues to comfort me during gloomy periods when you and I have another chance in a long string of chances to buy great companies at bargain prices</u>.</em></p>								</div>
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		<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/18/beating-the-street/">Beating the Street</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>My Life in Dire Straits: The Inside Story of One of the Biggest Bands in Rock History</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/07/my-life-in-dire-straits-the-inside-story-of-one-of-the-biggest-bands-in-rock-history-2021/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=my-life-in-dire-straits-the-inside-story-of-one-of-the-biggest-bands-in-rock-history-2021</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Oct 2022 14:02:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biographies & Companies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bands]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dire Straits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Music]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By John Illsley, 2021 (320 p.) John Illsley was the bass guitarist and one of the founding members of Dire Straits, my favorite band. I like this band so much...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/07/my-life-in-dire-straits-the-inside-story-of-one-of-the-biggest-bands-in-rock-history-2021/">My Life in Dire Straits: The Inside Story of One of the Biggest Bands in Rock History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em><u>By John Illsley, 2021 (320 p.)</u></em></p>
<p>John Illsley was the bass guitarist and one of the founding members of Dire Straits, my favorite band. I like this band so much that even my teenage boys, who aren’t diehard fans, can sing along to their many classic songs that I have played to them since they were babies.</p>
<p>Illsely was one of the founding members of Dire Straits in 1977, with the Knopfler brothers and drummer Pick Withers.  While Illsley was not fond of standing out with his base sound (no chord slapping), he played a major role in developing the band’s musical style, as well as in keeping the members together over the years.  In 1980 they added keyboardist Alan Clark, who modernized the band’s music and played a big role in the hit albums <em>Making Movies</em> (1980), <em>Love Over Gold</em> (1982), and <em>Brothers in Arms</em> (1985).</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-7421 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/22-10-07-John-Illsley-226x300.jpg" alt="" width="226" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/22-10-07-John-Illsley-226x300.jpg 226w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/22-10-07-John-Illsley-113x150.jpg 113w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/22-10-07-John-Illsley.jpg 234w" sizes="(max-width: 226px) 100vw, 226px" /></p>
<p>Mark’s brother, David, who played rhythm guitar, left the group after fighting with Mark while they were recording <em>Making Movies</em>, and wasn’t even credited in the album.  The band members “took a break” in 1988, but reunited a couple of years later to release <em>On Every Street</em> (1991), which was one of my favorites. Both Knopfler and Illsley went on to release solo albums after the break, with Knopfler venturing into country music and even making an appearance on Saturday Night Live in 1990.</p>
<p>Illsley and Knopfler have remained friends and by some accounts, Illsley has repeatedly asked Knopfler over the years to re-form Dire Straits, but to no avail.  Towards the end of the book Illsley discloses that with the help of a therapist, he has found inner peace in Hampshire, England, where he lives with his second wife. He also has four children and four grandchildren.  Having turned 73 in June, he spends much of his time painting, but also owns a couple of local hotels and a nearby pub called the <em>East End Arms</em>, situated in the New Forest National Park.</p>
<p>As with most books I venture to read, I was able to draw several great lessons on investing from Illsley’s biography, ranging from the importance of the band’s focus and perseverance in its early years, to the critical role that team dynamics played in their success. For example, Illsley recognized early on that his role as a base player was not to stand out, but to serve as a foundation, or the anchor, if you will, for the band.  He played this role not only with his instrument, but through how he interacted with the other members.</p>
<p>The Knopfler brothers had their issues, and this took its toll on the band during its early years. Illsley claims that Dave never accepted that it was his brother who ended up with all the attention when it was he who introduced Mark to the group. While I like their early material, there is no denying that the band blossomed after Dave left.  That said, Illsley claims that some of Mark’s best material was produced when he was confronting his darkest times.  But like other great bands and companies that thrive, Dire Straits was able to evolve and adapt to a changing world.  This ability is one of the most important attributes of outstanding organizations and is something we look for in our investments.  The magic doesn’t last forever, but when we conclude that it’s gone, we sell. Likewise, when Mark Knopfler decided it was time to end the gig for good, he did so with conviction and has never looked back.</p>
<p>According to Illsley, everyone understood that Mark was a genius and the star of the band.  They all looked up to Mark and drew inspiration from his brilliance and creativity.  “Without Mark, there was no Dire Straits,” Illsley writes, “but each of us brought something to the collective effort.” Interestingly, or better yet, impressively, Illsley claims that “Mark isn’t crazy about being the center of attention. He’s shy and modest.” Having a super star that is shy and modest wasn’t the only thing that set Dire Straits apart from the bands of the time.  They drank the occasional pint and smoked the occasional joint, but by Illsley’s account, “no one had anything like a serious problem with drink or drugs; it was just a case of how we unwound, dulled the post-gig buzz, and the lack of sleep that entailed.”  It was an unspoken rule, but one that was never really broken, that there would be no drinking before shows.</p>
<p>So, all told, this was an excellent book that I would recommend, even to those who are not Dire Straits fans.  Illsley comes across as a humble and likeable guy who you’d want as a friend and a mentor.  The book is well written and has some hilarious stories and passages that were probably unknown to the general public.  It was also a quick and easy read, which always helps.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Adriano</p>
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<p>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 2:  Night Flight to Luxembourg</em></strong></p>
<p><em>Our parents probably thought the guitar was the instrument of the devil, but they feigned indifference, happy, I guess, that at least we were learning to play an instrument and not smoking cigarettes down by the railway tracks (although we did that as well!). We had a basic chord book and some sheet music and, once I had mastered where to put my fingers, Will showed me some simple chords on his acoustic, starting with the three basic blues ones, E, A, and B. I found it very hard, but I persevered for hour after hour, barely emerging from my room all day in the holidays and at weekends, at first going from E to A, and from A to E, then expanding the repertoire until my fingers hurt and my brain was fried. <u>You have to really want to learn to play the guitar, or any instrument. It’s why there are so many barely used guitars lying around in the world’s bedrooms, attics, and basements</u>. It takes endless practice to break through and get to the stage when it becomes automatic and you’re not thinking about it, just feeling it.</em></p>
<p><em>The Rosetti Lucky Seven was a very crude instrument, but it was probably a good thing that I had to learn the craft the hard way. (<u>Both Keith Richards and George Harrison also learned to play on a Rosetti </u>and, for that reason alone, it deserves an honorable mention in the Rock ’n’ Roll Hall of Fame.)</em></p>
<p><em>When I upgraded to a half- decent Hofner, I was delighted to discover that <u>not all guitars are born or built equal</u>. It was like getting behind the wheel of a Mercedes after passing my test in a Robin Reliant.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 3:  Banjos, Beatings, and Bass</em></strong></p>
<p><em>I was sixteen then, in my third year, and from that day on the art room became my sanctuary, a refuge from the harsher world beyond. It was the day I realized there was always a way out of whatever hell you might find yourself in. There was always sanctuary somewhere, be it in art, music, or the company of a good man. Or woman. “I’ll be here all the time,” Don said. “Come in whenever you like, even if you just want to hang out and chat.” The older I have become, the more I have come to respect John Hedley, but at the time it was very hard to imagine him making the same offer, and I needed no second invitation from Don to indulge in his company and enjoy his outlook on life and art.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 6:  Mr. Knopfler, I Presume?</em></strong></p>
<p><em>There was a man lying on the cement floor fast asleep— the promised carpet had never materialized— and his head, propped against the only chair, was at right angles to his body. The guy had an electric guitar across his chest. To one side of him, the giant square ashtray spilled over with a thousand butts; on the other sat a couple of empty bottles of Newcastle Brown Ale. His face, sheet- white, revealed a hint of David. This must have been the brother he had mentioned. He stirred and groaned, and an eyelid unstuck itself. “Cup of tea?” I asked. When I came back, he had cleared up the cigarettes and the beer bottles and I heard him splashing his face in the bathroom. I picked up his guitar, a Gibson Les Paul Junior. Nice. He came back in and I handed the tea to him. He held out his hand and, in a mellow Geordie accent, he said, “Mark, by the way. Mark Knopfler, David’s brother.” “I guessed as much. Heard a lot about you. John— John Illsley. Nice one.” He sat down on the only chair and I perched on the old sofa bed I had found in a builder’s skip a few weeks earlier. We fell into an easy chat about this and that<u>. I took to him at once. There was a natural air and softness about him, and you could see him thinking hard before he answered a question</u>. The conversation drifted toward music and he picked up his Gibson and started playing. He plucked a few strings and twisted the tuning pegs. Then he really started playing, messing around with riffs and snatches of tunes. He had a curious finger- picking style. <u>I had never seen anyone play a guitar like that</u>, but even just fooling around, it was a great sound— <u>a bit country, a bit rock— but fresh and original</u>. <u>Dave was right— his brother could play</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 7:  Punks on the Lawn</em></strong></p>
<p><em>I played with the Café Racers now and then, and over a pint after one gig, Mark said, “Why don’t we put a band together?” <u>Not long after, he played me a song he had been working on. He had called it “Sultans of Swing,” the name of an amateur jazz band he and Dave had seen playing in a half- empty Greenwich pub, just a bunch of ageing guys playing music for the sheer love of it</u>. He played it on his newly acquired red Fender Stratocaster through a 1960s Vibrolux amp that I had recently given him. This was the moment when I realized something special was going on. It was just him and his Strat but, not long into it, I became aware I was listening to lyrics and a melody of true craftsmanship and originality. He still has the Strat and the Vibrolux today. Bought for a hundred pounds or so, the guitar is probably worth about £ 30,000 on the open market— and a great deal more on account of its owner.</em></p>
<p><em>A week later, we were in the apartment and I was messing around with some reggae sounds on my bass. <u>Mark said, “Hey, that might just work on this song I’ve been toying with since that art exhibition. I’ve called it ‘In the Gallery.</u>’”</em></p>
<p><em>There have been a number of stories about how the name Dire Straits came about, but we are in broad agreement that it probably came from a keyboard- playing pal of Pick’s north London roommate Simon Cowe, who was in the band Lindisfarne. We’d agreed to keep rehearsing together and to start hunting down some gigs, so we needed a name. <u>Simon apparently said to Pick, “You’ve never made any money, mate, and you’re always in dire straits. How about that? Dire Straits!</u>”</em></p>
<p><em>Punk was in full cry at the time, and I have to confess, apart from a few acts like the Clash and the Sex Pistols, I was no fan.</em></p>
<p><em>It made perfect sense. It was angry music, almost anti- music. That was the point of it, wasn’t it? To distort, to pervert, to mock, to do away with harmony and craft, and the anarchy of its outlook was reflected in the tuneless chaos of the “songs.” But they weren’t stupid, these guys, at least not the leading proponents of the movement. Some were putting on an act, and the best of them were consummate performers. Maybe that was because quite a few of them were middle- class lads who had been to art or drama school.</em></p>
<p><em>Looking back now, you can see it all more clearly. At the time, we never really thought about our identity. <u>I don’t think we gave much thought to the fashions of the day</u>, so there was no “look.” We didn’t belong to a movement or aspire to be part of one. As a band, we were developing our own style and identity— an attitude that we maintained from then on. Disco and punk were the dominant, happening sounds of the day, and the drift was toward what would become known as “new wave,” with bands like Talking Heads, Elvis Costello and the Attractions, the Police, Squeeze, the Boomtown Rats, and Blondie. We were just doing our own thing in a musical world of our own, and if people liked what we did and there was an appetite for it, then great, so much the better. That was a bonus.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Mark was in a highly creative period</u></em><em> and soon we dropped the cover versions and we could fill the show with our own songs.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 8:  Five Hundred Pounds</em></strong></p>
<p><em>By the time we made our way up the steps to 2a Grosvenor Avenue, we were in pretty good shape, musically. We didn’t have the time, money, or need to put all our songs down. We just needed the best possible versions of the ones we’d chosen: “Sultans of Swing,” “Wild West End,” “Water of Love,” “Down to the Waterline,” and one by Dave called “Sacred Loving.”</em></p>
<p><em>It was a strange experience to hear ourselves coming out of the speakers— it was as if it wasn’t us, but another band. The sound quality was great and the version of “Sultans,” in particular, was excellent. It sounded very pure. There are many people who believe that this is the best recorded version of the song we ever made, and I’m inclined to agree. Who knows? I love it. It’s a strange phenomenon, a song. You can play it a thousand times, but every single version is very slightly different. <u>Again, it all goes back to feel, to the band clicking and syncing in a particular way, plugged into the same mood and vibe</u></em>. [AA comment:  flow]</p>
<p><em>A bit of a cheer went up as we entered and, as we approached the bar, we got a slap on the back and some broad grins. “Well done, well done. Amazing! Brilliant news.” “What is? What are you on about?” “The radio! Charlie Gillett played ‘Sultans of Swing’ on the radio this morning.” “You’re bloody kidding!” “No, and it gets better. <u>He said ‘Sultans’ was one of the best new songs he’s heard in years and that he was going to play it every Sunday until someone signed you guys up</u>.” After that, as you can imagine, we drank a lot of pints.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 9:  Panic in the Shower</em></strong></p>
<p><em>About a week later, the whole band were invited for an evening at a Greek restaurant up in Paddington, not far from Virgin’s offices. It was hilarious— like something out of a film. <u>On arrival, we were ushered into a private room where there were quite a few extremely attractive women, all of whom worked for Virgin and none of whom were overly or formally dressed</u>. A waiter came in with a tray of ready- rolled joints. At dinner, each of us sat next to one of the women and <u>there was a quite a lot of wandering- hand business under the table, and those hands were not ours</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 10:  Off with the Heads</em></strong></p>
<p><em>On the subject of hygiene, we were amused and surprised to discover that <u>the </u></em><u>[Talking] <em>Heads never cleaned their guitars and only changed their strings when one broke. Even then, they would replace only the broken one, not the whole lot, as was standard practice. Mark and Dave changed theirs every other day</em></u><em>.</em></p>
<p><em>We had our own instruments, of course, and Mark brought a couple of pedals, but otherwise we shared the equipment with the Heads, walking on and just plugging in. The Heads were very gracious and generous about us using their kit and also in their appreciation of us as their support act, always clapping and slapping our backs as we came off. Remarkably for a support act, we were getting encores from the first gig. Ordinarily, the audience can’t wait to get you off and get into the main act, so it was flattering to be called back on. That could have been awkward with other, less charitable bands than the Heads, but they were genuinely delighted for us. On a couple of occasions, <u>they even asked Mark and me to come on and play “Psycho Killer” with them</u>.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Without Mark, there was no Dire Straits, but each of us brought something to the collective effort</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p><em>There are way too many to name, but dozens of great bands and artists have recorded some of the biggest singles and albums of all time at Basing Street: the Stones, Bob Marley, Led Zep, Queen, the Who, Madonna, George Michael . . . the list really does go on and on.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 11:  Wolverhampton Woe to Marquee Magic</em></strong></p>
<p><em>So out it came, we held our breath, drum roll and . . . pretty much nothing happened. First time out, “Sultans” barely troubled the charts, peaking at number thirty- seven. The length of it, the version of it— who knows why it failed to make a splash. Of course we were disappointed, but there was the album to come and the tours to promote it, so we got on with preparing for our first UK tour with us as the headline act. Rejection and public indifference are part of the experience for an aspiring band, just as they are in the book world. Both industries have produced countless tales of famous bands and authors who were turned down or ignored for years before breaking through. We were mature enough to understand and weather these harsh facts of life.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Mark had been writing fresh material out on the road for the second album, and we had played a few of the songs at our gigs. It was amazing that he had the time, energy, and inspiration when there was so much going on. I just wanted to go to bed</u></em><em>. He was getting close to having a full complement of songs for the second album, which was to be recorded at the end of the year, including “Single- Handed Sailor,” “Lady Writer,” “Where Do You Think You’re Going?,” and “News,” a particular favorite of mine.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 12:  Sessions in the Sun</em></strong></p>
<p><em>There are many reasons why it’s hard to sell an album to a record company, and especially in the States, but the main difficulty is that <u>you are not courting and wooing an entire market or audience but just one or two people in an office. If they don’t like it, that’s pretty well the end of the talks</u>, possibly the end of a promising career and the extinction of a great talent.</em></p>
<p><em>For example, one time I was in the control room with Barry, who was doing most of the production hard work, and Pick was working on some percussion for the song <u>“Single- Handed Sailor,” about the yachtsman Sir Francis Chichester sailing around the world</u>.</em></p>
<p><em>The mixing of an album, very different from recording, is an interesting stage of the process when each element of the music is examined in detail. <u>Mixing is a fine art, but we all had the opportunity to contribute to the end product</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 14:  The Night at the Roxy</em></strong></p>
<p><em><u>In spite of being the heart of the band, and quite literally center stage, Mark isn’t crazy about being the center of attention. He’s shy and modest.</u></em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 15:  Into the Arena</em></strong></p>
<p><em>Refueling with the usual after- gig refreshments may have given us short- term, nightly relief but, over a long tour, you pay the cumulative price, the compound interest of late-night snacking and pints and any other self- medication of choice. <u>It was around then that I gave up smoking and, although there had always been an unspoken agreement not to drink before a gig, from there on we got a bit smarter about how we unwound afterwards too</u>. <u>No one had anything like a serious problem with drink or drugs; it was just a case of how we unwound, dulled the post- gig buzz, and the lack of sleep that entailed</u>. The main problem was exhaustion and tensions inside the band and with girlfriends, who were always having to compromise. Ed remembers this period as the lowest in the band’s experience.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Mark had been struggling in his private life, and I was astonished that he was able to produce something so beautiful while being so distracted</u></em><em>. But, thinking about it afterwards, I realized <u>it was precisely because he had been troubled and anxious that he was able to be so creative</u>. I doubt whether much, if any, great music, art, or literature has ever emerged from the souls of the complacent. <u>A soul in a state of agitation has a better chance of producing great art than one at ease with itself</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 18:  Electric Power</em></strong></p>
<p><em>One song that didn’t make it on to the album in the end was “Private Dancer,” mainly because, Mark rightly decided, it should be sung by a woman. The lines “I’m your private dancer, a dancer for money, I’ll do what you want me to do” just didn’t sound right coming from Mark’s mouth! <u>He ended up giving it to Tina Turner— with spectacular results, but more of that later</u>.</em></p>
<p><em>I have been privileged to know two great artists well in my lifetime, both great friends: Mark and Brett. Some people you meet have a special way of seeing the world and reinterpret it for the rest of us. Brett was one of those. He did the world great favors with the art he left behind— check it out, it’s mind- blowing— but he did himself no favors in the execution of it. <u>He was tormented by demons. To achieve what he wanted in art, he’d explain, he needed to “nudge it along a bit” or “trick them up” with drink and narcotics. When he was off heroin, he used to throw back three massive whisky and orange juices then hurl himself into his work. He was a very gifted draftsman but felt he needed the boldness he thought stimulants gave him</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 19:  Brothers and Souls</em></strong></p>
<p><em><u>“Brothers in Arms,” inspired by the recent Falklands War</u></em><em>, was a slow, powerful, mournful song about the futility of war, embraced ever since by the Armed Forces as an anthem at charity fund- raising events.</em></p>
<p><em>I remember one afternoon when we were recording “Money for Nothing.” The “I want my MTV” line at the end was inspired by Mark seeing the Police talking on an ad for MTV and simply saying, “I want my MTV.” He’d mated that with a few notes from Sting’s composition “Don’t Stand So Close to Me.” In the studio, Mark happened to remark, <u>“I wish Sting was here to sing this part.” And someone said, “Well, he is. He’s here on holiday</u>!” <u>So the next morning, warming up, Sting started singing, “I want my MTV,” over and over. And that was it. His work was done</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 20:  Jerusalem Syndrome</em></strong></p>
<p><em>All El Al pilots doubled as fighter pilots with the Israeli Defense Force and it was sobering to hear them explain that if they got the call, they’d be scrambling into their cockpits in half an hour on the wrong end of God knows how many beers and cocktails. We hung out with them until about four o’clock in the morning and, as we said goodbye, all of us pretty smashed, we asked them when they were next on duty. Tomorrow, they said, crewing the 11 a.m. flight to Athens. That was our flight! We were a little nervous, hungover ourselves, as we boarded the 747 just seven hours later, but the pilots were as fresh as daisies when they greeted us. They even invited us into the cockpit for the landing . . . which went very smoothly, in spite of the pilots almost certainly being over the limit.</em></p>
<p><em>From Greece, we moved on in our massive caravan of tour buses and trucks to the Montreux Festival in Switzerland, where we were reunited with Sting and his new band, which included Omar Hakim on drums. I am not sure he and Terry chatted for too long, but it was great to see him and thank him for his excellent work. A few gigs earlier, Sting told us, just before going on stage, the band had approached him and the management, saying they weren’t going to play unless they were given more money. <u>Sting said, “Fine, no matter, I’ll play by myself.” And he did, just him and his guitar in front of ten thousand people. The band were back on stage the next night</u>.</em></p>
<p><em>A little name- dropping, if you’ll excuse me, purely in the interests of historical record, of course, but after the show we were visited backstage by Prince Albert of Monaco and Princesses Stephanie and Caroline. Royalty had found their way into our sweaty dressing room to pay their compliments and I am happy to report that <u>they were charming— though not so charming that Mark would hand over his shirt, which was an unexpected request</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 21:  Live Aid Union</em></strong></p>
<p><em>The tour resumed in Tempe, an inner suburb of Phoenix, Arizona, a city that receives only three centimeters of rain a year and where the temperature averages 100 degrees Fahrenheit in September. <u>It was there that I made the mistake of smoking some local grass that was so strong I couldn’t leave my room for six hours.</u></em></p>
<p><em>Crazier still was our experience in New York, as our crew was forced to work under the tyranny of the Teamsters, the incredibly powerful labor union. <u>They took complete control of setting up the three shows in Radio City Music Hall at the start of October, and our brilliant crew were left as mere bystanders and lackeys. It was so absurd that our lot were forbidden from even touching any of the equipment, let alone plugging anything in— heaven forbid— unless or until they were told to do so. They were all experts in their roles, but they had to follow the Teamsters guys around and wait for orders. It was a corrupt racket and they charged so much money that what should have been three lucrative sold- out gigs ended with our hardly breaking even</u>. There was nothing Ed could do about it because they would just refuse to let us play, but it was still a true joy to play Radio City Music Hall, a historic venue inside the Rockefeller Center and home to the Rockettes precision dance company, famous for their kick- lines. It was the same story when we played Madison Square Garden on the penultimate night of the leg, the Teamsters taking most of the cash and bossing everyone around. But we just had to deal with it and, besides, we were playing “The Garden,” one of the greatest venues in the world, “the holy temple of rock ’n’ roll,” as Billy Joel puts it.</em></p>
<p><em>We kept the show on the road for so long, going from strength to strength, rather than into a slow decline and collapse, principally because <u>we looked after ourselves. We never went face- down in a heap of coke, never smashed up a bar, never threw a TV from the window, drove a car into a swimming pool, or wheelbarrowed a harem of hookers around our hotel rooms. That may not be very rock ‘n’ roll, but at least it meant we could keep playing it</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 22:  New Worlds</em></strong></p>
<p><em>We stayed in George Martin’s beautiful plantation house, waited upon by the lovely house staff.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Bob Dylan, for me the Picasso of music</u></em><em>, has always been prepared to take risks. Never bothered by what others might think, he does what he likes.</em></p>
<p><em><u>In spite of being a smoker then, Mark never suffered a chest cold or a sore throat</u></em><em>. There are no understudies in a band, so you have to play.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 23:  What Now?</em></strong></p>
<p><em><u>It would take an entire page to list all Mark’s projects in the years that followed. He wrote scores for films such as The Princess Bride and Last Exit to Brooklyn, produced albums for other artists, including Randy Newman’s Land of Dreams, played on others, appeared live . . . He may have had enough of tour buses, but he couldn’t keep away from the music</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p><em>I was thirty- seven when the tour finished and I still wanted to be active, to get involved, to engage with the world in a new way. It was just a question of how and what.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 24:  Here We Go Again</em></strong></p>
<p><em>As with Brothers in Arms, it was the four of us who came together for the pre- recording session— Mark, Guy, Alan, and myself— and, as last time, there was the same anticipation to hear the new material for the first time.</em></p>
<p><em>I have often wondered how Dire Straits’ music might have turned out had Mark played with a completely different set of musicians. It may well have sounded exactly the same, or very close to what’s out there today, but I doubt it.</em></p>
<p><em><u>Mark was only interested in producing the best result. If something wasn’t working, he was the first to say it</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Chapter 25:  When the Music Stops</em></strong></p>
<p><em>I was only forty- three, fit as a springer spaniel and, unlike many of my peers in the music industry, I had no substance problems or health issues. That much was good. <u>My body was fine. It was just my head that needed some maintenance work, my soul some nourishment</u>.</em></p>
<p><em>It was a relief, and therapy of sorts, to discover that <u>the only people more self-centered and demanding than rock musicians are young kids</u>.</em></p>
<p><em>It is not to dishonor the good times I had with Pauline and Louise to say that my marriage to Steph has been the best thing to happen to me, not least in its production of two more delightful children, Harry in 1996 and DeeDee in 1998, both of whom, funnily enough, are very musical. James and Jess are both very happily married, to Beth and Moses respectively, and have two children each. <u>So, a lovely wife, four children, and four grandchildren</u>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Acknowledgments</em></strong></p>
<p><em><u>The Dire Straits phenomenon began after a chance meeting with Mark Knopfler in a council flat in south London. A remarkably gifted songwriter and musician, and one of my oldest friends, he continues to be a constant inspiration and an exciting person to know</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>About the Author</em></strong></p>
<p><em>About the Author John Illsley rose to fame as the bass guitarist of the critically acclaimed band Dire Straits. With Dire Straits, John has been the recipient of multiple Grammy Awards and a Heritage Award. As one of the founding members (with Mark Knopfler, his brother David and drummer Pick Withers) John played a major role in the development of the Dire Straits sound. When Dire Straits finished touring in 1993, John became involved in the art world. Having carved a reputation for himself as a painter, John had solo exhibitions in London, New York, Sydney, and across Europe. He also cofounded the children’s charity Life Education in 1987, which was recently integrated into Coram, one of the oldest UK charities. John also owns a pub, the East End Arms in the New Forest.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/10/07/my-life-in-dire-straits-the-inside-story-of-one-of-the-biggest-bands-in-rock-history-2021/">My Life in Dire Straits: The Inside Story of One of the Biggest Bands in Rock History</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Tulipomania: The Story of the World&#8217;s Most Coveted Flower &#038; the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/18/tulipomania-the-story-of-the-worlds-most-coveted-flower-the-extraordinary-passions-it-aroused/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=tulipomania-the-story-of-the-worlds-most-coveted-flower-the-extraordinary-passions-it-aroused</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Aug 2022 18:54:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History & Economics]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.vii-llc.com/?p=5951</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Mike Dash, 2010 (288p.) While I had read about Tulipmania in other books, such as Charles Mackay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841) and...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/18/tulipomania-the-story-of-the-worlds-most-coveted-flower-the-extraordinary-passions-it-aroused/">Tulipomania: The Story of the World&#8217;s Most Coveted Flower &#038; the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h5 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>By Mike Dash, 2010 (288p.)</em></span></h5>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While I had read about <em>Tulipmania</em> in other books, such as Charles Mackay’s <em>Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds</em> (1841) and Edward Chancellor’s <em>Devil Take the Hindmost</em> (1999), this was my first book dedicated to the topic.  I read it with the purpose of drawing parallels with Cryptomania, and I was not disappointed with what it had to offer on this front.  It tells the story of how a mysterious man called Carolus Clusius became known as “<em>the greatest botanist of the sixteenth century, indeed one of the greatest of all time</em>, the <em>father of the tulip</em>.” Like the myth of <em>Satoshi Nakamoto</em>, known as the “father of Bitcoin” for publishing a 9-page whitepaper in 2008 containing flowcharts and complex scientific equations (<a href="https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>), the myth of <em>Clusius the Botanist</em> added respectability to the practice of collecting tulips in the early 1600s.  Notably, Clusius was not the botanist&#8217;s real name.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The flower lovers of Clusius’s day had only a handful of tulip species to pursue, while the noblemen who collected them relied on specialists like Clusius to help them understand what they owned. The book mentions several tulip species that gained prominence and traded at absurd prices at the peak of the bubble, but Dash focuses on <em>Semper augustus</em>.  Anyone who had seen one professed that it was a living wonder, yet, according to Dash, “<em>very few people ever had this privilege</em>”.  Dash makes the point that the <em>Semper augustus</em> was practically never actually traded, and was so rare that there were simply no bulbs to be had.  But Clusius, who was only known by a few prominent connoisseurs, was said to hold a huge collection of <em>Semper augusti</em> that he would never sell.  Sound familiar?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mike Dash is a British writer and his book was not only extremely informative, but a joy to read.  I second the <em>NY Times</em> comment that he “<em>writes with unabashedly cinematic flair, backed by meticulous research</em>.”  I don’t think Dash considers himself a scholar, but his historic research and bibliographic citations are impressive, as is his background.  He attended King’s College, which is where John Maynard Keynes got his higher Mathematics degree.  But Dash went to King’s to complete an obscure PhD thesis focused on British submarine policy between the Crimean and the First World Wars. He has published four other history books, including <em>Batavia’s Graveyard</em> (2002), which tells the story of a mutiny on one of the Dutch East India Company’s ships in 1628, and <em>The First Family</em> (2009), which recounts the birth of the American Mafia.  What I appreciated the most from Dash’s narrative is that it is unbiased and well-balanced.  Towards the end of the book, for instance, Dash makes the case that “even after sounding the necessary notes of caution about the reliability of the popular accounts, historians and particularly economists remain guilty of exaggerating the real importance and extent of the tulip mania.”  This comment inspired me to re-read Mackay’s chapter on the mania, and indeed, it seems a tad exaggerated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-5952 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Tulipomania-1-of-1.jpg" alt="" width="216" height="293" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Tulipomania-1-of-1.jpg 216w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Tulipomania-1-of-1-111x150.jpg 111w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Mike Dash</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">By the time Tulipmania climaxed in 1636, there were close to six thousand different tulips cataloged, and hundreds of Tulip brokers, who were called <em>Florists</em>. As with cryptos, there were many different options for speculating.  But that’s not where the parallels end.  The Black Plague had created a shortage of labor, which in turn resulted in a rise in wages as employers competed for manpower. But instead of rising to the challenge by getting a real job, many younger Dutch laborers wanted more. “<em>The notion of creating a little tulip nursery came naturally to many people who began to call themselves florists. It was lot easier than working an eighty-hour week hammering horseshoes or working a loom</em>,” Dash explains, “<em>and because demand for the flowers was steadily increasing, prices, at least for the finer varieties, consistently rose. No wonder Dutchmen thought they had chanced upon the dream of every gambler: a safe bet. … It was with this backdrop that people of all walks of life suspended disbelief. Ignoring the customs of the connoisseurs, increasing numbers of florists progressed from trading only tulips that they had in their possession to buying and selling flowers that were still in the ground. Bulbs then ceased to be the unit of exchange; now the only thing that changed hands was a promissory note— a scrap of paper giving details of the flower being sold and noting the date on which the bulb would be lifted and available for collection</em>.” I am not saying (although the parallel is hard to ignore) that cryptos are like tulips.  But I am suggesting that the stories of bubbles often rhyme, and that the bitcoin story sounds a lot like the tulip story.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I had never quite understood why tulips became an article of wild speculation, but this book helped me see it.  Again, as with Bitcoin, there is a story of limited supply.  As Dash explains:  “<em>Most tulip bulbs will produce only two or three offsets a year and can do so for only a couple of years before the mother bulb becomes exhausted and dies. For this reason new varieties of tulips multiply only very slowly at first. Once a grower has identified, in a single flower of some new variety, great beauty or strength that he may be able to sell, he will have— even if all goes well— quite possibly only two bulbs the next year, four the year after that, eight in the next year, and sixteen in the fourth year of cultivation. If he parts with some of these bulbs, moreover, he limits his own ability to produce large quantities of the new variety. Plainly, then, it can take a decade for a new tulip to become available in any sort of numbers— and in Golden Age Holland, where propagation was a poorly understood mystery at best, the number of bulbs that were actually produced would have fallen well short of the theoretical maximum. Any rare and coveted variety would thus inevitably remain in short supply for a number of years, and there was nothing that even the most brilliant bulb growers could do to increase production to meet demand.”  </em>Buy!</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While it’s possible to find parallels among most (if not all) speculative manias in history, it’s the differences that interest me the most.  Most people conflate the bursting of speculative bubbles with economic ruin, but as I learned from this book, Tulipmania stands out as an exception on this front.  There are, of course, the tales about people who lost everything in the frenzy, but what most people perhaps don’t realize is that Tulipmania was a contained event that took no more than two months to play out, and it did very little damage except to those who were directly involved.  Dash writes that “<em>by 1636, there were at least 360 different commodities traded on the Amsterdam exchange. Tulips, however, were not among them</em>.”  Mackay wrote in his 1841 book that “<em>regular marts for their [tulips] sale were established on the Stock Exchange of Amsterdam, in Rotterdam, Harlaem, Leyden, Alkmar, Hoorn, and other towns</em>,” but I prefer to go with Dash, who claims that “<em>speculation in tulip bulbs always existed at the margins of Dutch economic life, but it was conducted by amateurs, not professional traders, and was never subject either to the customs (however peculiar) or to the regulation of the stock exchange.</em>”  As so often happens, many of the folk who got burned by tulips were largely “<em>country people and poor city dwellers who had, when they started dealing in bulbs, almost certainly never owned a single share in their whole lives</em>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In closing, this was an excellent history book that I would recommend to anyone interested in manias and the human proclivity to engage in dangerous speculations based on popular delusions wrapped in a seductive veil of complexity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cheers,<br />
Adriano</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em><u>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</u></em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>A Note on Prices</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>1,600 guilders: Rembrandt’s fee for his greatest masterpiece, The Night Watch, 1642</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>5,200 guilders: highest reliably attested price paid for a tulip bulb, 1637</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>…a Disease that ruined several rich Families. (LONDON, 1743)</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 1 &#8211; A Mania for Tulips</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The date was <u>February 5, 1637,</u> the day flower fever reached such a pitch of frenzy in the United Provinces that once- worthless bulbs truly theatened to supplant precious metals as objects of desire. That day the tulip completed a journey that had begun hundreds of years before and thousands of miles away.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 2 &#8211; The Valleys of Tien Shan</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Hundreds of years after this story was first written down, wild red tulips remained a favorite Persian token of undying love. “When a young man presents one to his mistress,” the seventeenth- century traveler John Chardin recounted, “he gives her to understand, by the general colour of the flower, that he is on fire with her beauty; and by the black base of it, that his heart is burnt to a coal.”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 3 &#8211; Within the Abode of Bliss</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Bayezid is the first man in history who can be personally identified with the tulip</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Admittedly Constantinople was something of a shadow city by 1400, its decline reflecting the fading fortunes of its Byzantine rulers</u></em><em>. In fact it was more than half empty, the seven long miles of its walls enclosing a town of no more than fifty thousand people, scattered now among what were effectively large villages separated by ruins, working farms, and orchards. But in size and situation and repute, it was still the greatest city in the world. It was fit to be the capital of the Ottoman Empire— and the new home of the tulip too.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>In 1453</u></em><em>, after a desperate siege lasting less than two months, Mehmed’s troops forced a breach in the walls, and the Turks poured into Constantinople. The last Byzantine emperor threw away his imperial insignia and sought an anonymous death in the press of the fighting. Then amid terrible scenes of massacre, the <u>Ottomans took Constantinople and made it Istanbul</u>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Europeans who traveled to Istanbul during the high days of the Ottoman Empire that Mehmed and his successors now built were generally surprised not merely by the city’s size and opulence but by its masters’ manners and good taste</u></em><em>. This was a city of culture and coffeehouses that tolerated the religious diversity of its inhabitants in a manner inconceivable in Europe.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 4 &#8211; Stranger from the East</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Fortunately such a man existed. He was indisputably the greatest botanist of the sixteenth century, indeed one of the greatest of all time. He was to become, in important respects, <strong>the father of the tulip. His name was <u>Carolus Clusius</u></strong>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 5 &#8211; Clusius</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Clusius was <strong>not his real name</strong></u></em><em>.  <u>By now the botanist was at the height of his powers</u>. A contemporary portrait shows a long-faced gentleman of obvious intelligence with a steady, piercing gaze.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 6 &#8211; Leiden</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Most tulip bulbs will produce only two or three offsets a year and can do so for only a couple of years before the mother bulb becomes exhausted and dies. For this reason new varieties of tulips multiply only very slowly at first. Once a grower has identified, in a single flower of some new variety, great beauty or strength that he may be able to sell, he will have— even if all goes well— quite possibly only two bulbs the next year, four the year after that, eight in the next year, and sixteen in the fourth year of cultivation. If he parts with some of these bulbs, moreover, he limits his own ability to produce large quantities of the new variety. Plainly, then, it can take a decade for a new tulip to become available in any sort of numbers— and in Golden Age Holland, where propagation was a poorly understood mystery at best, the number of bulbs that were actually produced would have fallen well short of the theoretical maximum. Any rare and coveted variety would thus inevitably remain in short supply for a number of years, and there was nothing that even the most brilliant bulb growers could do to increase production to meet demand.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 7 &#8211; An Adornment to the Cleavage</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>It was a time of tremendous cultural progress. The arts flourished as never before, fueled not only by the establishment of Leiden and other universities and schools but also by the arrival of many painters and writers from the south.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 8 &#8211; The Tulip in the Mirror</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Those fortunate enough to actually see a specimen of Semper Augustus in flower thought it a living wonder, as seductive as Aphrodite</u></em><em>. In truth, though, very few people ever had this privilege. Although the tulip was endlessly hymned by the connoisseurs, illustrated in more tulip books than any other variety, and mentioned so frequently in connection with the bulb craze that it has become virtually synonymous with it, Semper Augustus was practically never actually traded. It was so rare that there were simply no bulbs to be had. The earliest mentions of the flower date only to the 1620s. By 1624— according to the Dutch chronicler Nicolaes van Wassenaer, who is virtually the only reliable source on the subject— no more than a dozen examples were then in existence, and all twelve were in the hands of a single man who was generally rumored to live in Amsterdam. The identity of this unknown connoisseur is one of the great mysteries of the tulip craze. Van Wassenaer is careful not to name him, and in the absence of any other evidence, it seems unlikely that the puzzle will ever be solved. This, perhaps, is what the reclusive connoisseur would have wished, because the chronicler makes it clear that he was determined not to part with his flowers at any price.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>…who had none of the skills needed to breed varieties of their own and few of the connections necessary to obtain bulbs in the traditional way, had begun to enter the market. Some possessed extensive gardens and wished to cultivate tulips of many different varieties. These newcomers were forced to look elsewhere for their supplies.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Clusius and his circle of aristocratic friends possessed a low opinion of these first professionals, criticizing them for their often alarming ignorance of botany and despising their willingness to bestow crudely populist names on the new varieties that occasionally appeared— more, perhaps, by luck than judgment— in their gardens.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 9 &#8211; Florists</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>The notion of creating a little tulip nursery would have come quite naturally to many of the florists</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Here two of the most striking characteristics of Dutch society came into play: the urge to save and the urge to gamble. These impulses may seem quite contradictory, but in fact they worked together to fuel the tulip mania.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Compared to such insane wagers, tulips looked like a good investment. <u>Growing bulbs was a lot easier than working an eighty- hour week hammering horseshoes or working a loom, and because demand for the flowers was steadily increasing, prices, at least for the finer varieties, consistently rose. No wonder Dutchmen thought they had chanced upon the dream of every gambler: a safe bet</u>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 10 &#8211; Boom</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>The tulip mania climaxed in just two mad months: December 1636 and January 1637</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The appalling impact of the plague had two significant consequences. <u>One was that it created a shortage of labor and thus resulted in a rise in wages as employers competed for manpower</u>;</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>From the autumn of 1635, then, the bulb trade changed fundamentally and forever. <u>Ignoring the customs of the connoisseurs, increasing numbers of florists progressed from trading only tulips that they had in their possession to buying and selling flowers that were still in the ground. Bulbs then ceased to be the unit of exchange; now the only thing that changed hands was a promissory note— a scrap of paper giving details of the flower being sold and noting the date on which the bulb would be lifted and available for collection.</u></em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 11 &#8211; At the Sign of The Golden Grape</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Vega </em><em>(<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_de_la_Vega" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wikipedia</a>) does not mention what his small-time broker was hoping to buy or sell for his handful of guilders, but he had a considerable choice: By 1636 at least 360 different commodities were traded on the Amsterdam exchange. Tulips, however, were not among them. This fact may come as a surprise to those who assume that a financial calamity with the reputation that the tulip mania enjoys must necessarily have been serious and widespread and have had a significant impact on the stock market, on trade, and on the Dutch economy in general. Nothing could be further from the truth. The speculation in tulip bulbs always existed at the margins of Dutch economic life. It was conducted by amateurs, not professional traders, and was never subject either to the customs (however peculiar) or to the regulation of the stock exchange. The mania took, in fact, the form of a rough but intended parody of the trade in commodities and shares that flourished on the beurs. It was the province not of financiers experienced in the ways of business, but of country people and poor city dwellers who had, when they started dealing in bulbs, almost certainly never owned a single share in their whole lives.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 12 &#8211; The Orphans of Wouter Winkel</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>…was the first week of February, 1637. <u>The boom time was over</u>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 13 &#8211; Bust</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>On this day, however, there were no bidders for the bulbs at 1,250 guilders. The auctioneer offered them again, this time cutting the price to 1,100 guilders. Still there was no interest. Desperately now, he offered his bulbs for a third time, dropping his price to a risible thousand guilders the pound. Once again there were no bids.</em><em> … <u>It took only a few days for the panic to spread through the rest of the United Provinces</u>. In college after college and in town after town, desperate florists discovered that flowers that had been worth thousands of guilders only a day or two before now could not be sold for any price. A few dealers kept their heads and tried to stimulate renewed interest by organizing mock auctions or offering bulbs at huge discounts, but they were ignored. In most places the tavern trade crashed so completely that it was not even a question of prices falling to a quarter or a tenth of what they had been when the mania was at its peak. <u>The market for tulips simply ceased to exist</u>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>…where tulips could be sold at all, they fetched, at best, <u>just over 5 percent of their old values, and often 1 percent or less</u>. There can be no doubt, then, that this was a truly spectacular crash. Even if it was not more or less instantaneous in each of the towns affected by the mania— and it probably was— the collapse of the tulip trade certainly cannot have taken more than three or four months.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Amid all the confusion <u>few florists seem to have understood exactly why the bulb trade had collapsed in such spectacular fashion.</u> Yet in retrospect it is not difficult to see that the crash was all but inevitable.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 14 &#8211; Goddess of Whores</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Few of the florists possessed enough money to be worth suing</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 15 &#8211; At the Court of the Tulip King</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The new sultan was besotted by the flower, so much so that the tulip became the most prominent feature of his long reign, and the Turkish historian Ahmed Refik was moved to bestow the title lale devri, the tulip era, on the period. From the time of his accession in 1703, tulip mania bust forth again, in Istanbul this time. <u>It was to rage on in the Turkish capital for almost three decades</u>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Chapter 16 &#8211; Late Flowering</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>The bulb industry views the destruction of the mosaic virus as one of its proudest achievements</u></em><em>, and with good reason. It is the florists’ equivalent of the elimination of smallpox. Yet it can hardly be denied that something has been lost in the winning of this war. The infinite variety that each broken tulip could display is gone, and with it much of the flower’s capacity to fascinate and astound.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>The flower lover of Clusius’s day had only a handful of species to enjoy, but now close to six thousand different tulips have been bred, described, and cataloged</u></em><em>.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The most recent manifestation of the old virus occurred as recently as 1985, when a mania broke out in China that followed the template of the tulip craze almost exactly. In this case speculation centered on yet another bulbous flower, the jun zi lan plant, or Lycoris radiata— the red spider lily.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>It would be wrong to see the Dutch tulip mania as unique</em></strong><em>. Similar booms— by which economists mean exceptionally rapid rises in prices— and bubbles (booms in which a commodity’s price quite outstrips what it is actually worth to anyone other than a speculator) have occurred all over the world throughout the last four hundred years. The objects of speculation vary from the obvious— stocks and shares, land and oil— to the unusual. <u>In the United Provinces themselves there was a boom in investment in the passenger canal system begun in 1630</u>— a genuinely useful development in the transport system that made many men rich— and during the 1670s a bubble involving the erection of elaborate public clocks.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>An edition of the Miami Daily News published in the summer of 1925 ran to 504 pages, almost all of it real estate advertising</u></em><em>— a world record at the time. It was said there were two thousand estate agents in Miami alone, employing 25,000 salespeople. The crash came in the autumn, as crashes often do.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Notes</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>…good <u>early summaries such as Sir Daniel Hall’s</u> The Book of the Tulip (London: Martin Hopkinson, 1929),</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>The most comprehensive general account, however, is undoubtedly Anna Pavord’s The Tulip (London: Bloomsbury, 1998</u></em><em>).</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477– 1806</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em><u>Many of the short accounts of the subject are based on badly flawed popular studies, most notably Charles Mackay’s entertaining but misleading Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds </u></em><em>(Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1995), which remains in print today despite having originally appeared in 1841.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Ponzi Schemes, Invaders from Mars and More Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds [<u>New York: Harmony, 1992</u>],</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/18/tulipomania-the-story-of-the-worlds-most-coveted-flower-the-extraordinary-passions-it-aroused/">Tulipomania: The Story of the World&#8217;s Most Coveted Flower &#038; the Extraordinary Passions It Aroused</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Beatles: The Biography</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/17/the-beatles-the-biography/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-beatles-the-biography</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Aug 2022 21:51:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biographies & Companies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.vii-llc.com/?p=5921</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Bob Spitz, 2005 (992p.) I admit to being a Beatles fan, but the main reason I decided to read Bob Spitz’s 990-page book was that I figured there would...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/17/the-beatles-the-biography/">The Beatles: The Biography</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h5 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>By Bob Spitz, 2005 (992p.)</em></span></h5>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I admit to being a Beatles fan, but the main reason I decided to read Bob Spitz’s 990-page book was that I figured there would be something to learn about <em>team dynamics</em>, and how it relates to investing.  The book is a <em>must-read</em> on that angle alone!  What I didn’t expect though, was how the Beatles story would captivate me and get better by the page.  Spitz does a fantastic job with facts and story-telling.  He succeeds in demonstrating how complicated it was to be a Beatle, and how much those four lads loved their music. Towards the end of their 10-year run as the most famous band ever, they hated each other – and yet, to the last day, they would get together for only one reason – to record great music.  It was on April 10, 1970 (<a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/paul-mccartney-announces-the-breakup-of-the-beatles#:~:text=The%20legendary%20rock%20band%20the,who%20did%20what%20and%20why." target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>) that Paul McCartney officially announced that the Beatles were done for good, although John claims he quit first.  When asked why, Paul answered: “Personal differences, business differences, musical differences, but most of all because I have a better time with my family.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Bob Spitz is an outstanding biographer.  On his website (<a href="https://bobspitz.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://bobspitz.com/</a>) he lists four of his more recent books beside this one.  They include <em>Barefoot in Babylon </em>(2014), which tells the story of the Woodstock Music Festival, a Biography of <em>Ronald Reagan</em> (2018), and one of <em>Led Zeppelin</em> (2021). Early in his career, Spitz worked as a manager for Bruce Springsteen and Elton John, so he’s clearly been around the block.  Indeed, Spitz has been a writer for a long time.  He published a biography of Bob Dylan in 1988, and a book on the New York Knicks 1970 NBA title (1995).  <em>The Beatles: The Biography</em>, was my first Spitz book, and it won’t be the last.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5922 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-1-of-2-255x300.jpg" alt="" width="255" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-1-of-2-255x300.jpg 255w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-1-of-2-128x150.jpg 128w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-1-of-2.jpg 303w" sizes="(max-width: 255px) 100vw, 255px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As Spitz pointed out in the <em>End Note</em>, “when the band split, McCartney was all of twenty-nine years old; John and Ringo, thirty; and George, twenty-seven.”  That they were young goes a long way in explaining their many mistakes, as do their rocky upbringings, and the <em>zeitgeist</em> of the period.  They all took drugs, but it was only John who really lost it because of the drugs, and that only really happened after Yoko introduced John to heroin. Spitz paints John as a selfish and cruel individual, but also a bit of a mad genius, while Paul comes across as a control freak.  The book leaves no question that it was Paul who deserves the credit for keeping it together, but then again, Paul and John did more working together than each would ever have done on their own. “Through it all,” Spitz writes, “John and Paul continued to write, with blocks of time devoted to working in their comfort zone: eyeball-to-eyeball.”  This was true even when they were already fighting, and it didn’t apply to just John and Paul.  When Ringo walked out in 1969 (<a href="https://www.thevintagenews.com/2021/09/30/remember-when-ringo-walked-out-on-the-beatles-and-paul-had-to-play-the-drums/?chrome=1&amp;A1c=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>), “it didn’t take long for the Beatles to appreciate his absence. A week later a telegram arrived at Ringo’s Mediterranean beach retreat, begging him to return to the studio. Needing no further invitation, he reached Abbey Road on September 9, in time to participate in an uproarious remake of <em>Helter Skelter</em>.” Spitz paints Ringo as a nice guy, but some of my Google searches revealed plenty of dirt. For example, according to this article (<a href="https://www.grunge.com/284616/the-tragic-death-of-ringo-starrs-first-wife/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>), Ringo’s first wife accused him of being &#8220;a drunk, a wife-beater, and an absent father.&#8221;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Every Beatles fan has his favorite, and for a long time I thought mine was Paul.  He is the brainy Beatle, who according to Spitz, loves to read about all sorts of things, including art and artificial intelligence.  But after reading this book, I changed my mind to George – the young one.  A mug shot of Harrison taken in Hamburg in Aug 1960, shows just how young he looked when they got started.  John and Paul were just 17, but George was 14! When the Beatles landed at JFK airport in early Feb 1964, George was still only 20.  Most of the places where they had played to that day would not have let George in, were he not playing with the band.  For the next six years since that landing, George would blossom, both spiritually and as an artist.  “It was this sense of alienation as much as his interest in music that made George so susceptible to guiding spirits,” explains Spitz. “In the Bahamas during the filming of Help!, he heard the siren song of the sitar and came under the influence of Swami Vishnu- devananda, who introduced him to hatha yoga and Eastern religions. Later in life he would become a vegetarian, consult an astrologer, and devote himself to <em>Transcendental Meditation</em> before embracing traditional Christianity. Like many others who flirted with mysticism, it gave him a sense of authority and confidence.”  Unfortunately, Harrison died of cancer in 2001, when he was only 58.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-5923 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2-300x96.jpg" alt="" width="547" height="175" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2-300x96.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2-1024x327.jpg 1024w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2-150x48.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2-768x245.jpg 768w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-2-of-2.jpg 1097w" sizes="(max-width: 547px) 100vw, 547px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The biggest insight I took away from this book was the importance that <strong><em>purpose</em></strong> played in making the Beatles a huge success. Their purpose was to make music that people liked, and the more people liked what they made, the more focused they became. Shortly after Beatlemania started, the four lads began to dislike their jobs. They were turned off by all the screaming, and took insult (especially John) by the notion that nobody was really listening at the concerts.  John started feeling like his whole life was a lie, but he was not alone in being frustrated.  Their meteoric rise to fame destroyed their private lives – even though it was precisely what they thought they wanted, and what they had worked so hard for. They craved attention, but they soon began to hate it when they got too much.  As Spitz quotes John complaining angrily, “I’ve sold myself to the devil.” They were not the only ones to struggle with fame, but Beatlemania was unlike anything the world had ever seen.  People had lost their rockers and young women everywhere were fainting at the site of a Beatle.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In a paper titled  <em>Form Follows Function: Organizational Structure and Investment Results</em> (2016), Mauboussin concludes that “the organization is more important than the individuals within it,” before observing that when it comes to performance, “a team with an odd number of members is at the top of the list. Having three team members allows sufficient diversity to entertain and vet multiple points of views and has a built-in mechanism to break ties.”  Some people have called Brian Epstein the <em>Fifth Beatle,</em> while others have bestowed George Martin with that title, but the reality was that there was no odd Beatle.  Had Martin gotten his way and they named the band Paul McCartney and the Beatles, there would likely be nothing amazing to write about.  To me the number of people matters less than everyone having a unifying purpose.  John was crazy enough to say it, but he spoke for their misdirected purpose when he bragged that “the Beatles had become more popular than Jesus.”  It wasn’t the money nor the music itself, but the popularity that guided their way, and caused their demise.  Viewed from afar and with 50 years of hindsight, it’s amazing they managed to pull it off for as long as they did.  Interestingly, some of their best work came out of their most turbulent times.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Regards,<br />
Adriano</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">PS:  I put some extra effort into the Highlighted Excerpts section below.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em><u>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</u></em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Note:  The earlier chapters focus on the family background and childhood of each Beatle.  It’s interesting, but it got better after they started the band.    </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 8. The College Band </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One pint, however, led to two, then three. “Aside from George,” recalls Hanton, “Paul, John, and I got pretty well drunk.” Slowly but steadily, they got plastered on black velvets— a bottle of Guinness mixed with a half- pint of cider. “By the time we had to go on again, we were totally out of it,” George recalled. Any effort to contain the damage backfired.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 11. Hit the Road: Jac</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Paul remembers being told of the name the next day, along with George, and immediately liking it. “John and Stuart came out of their flat and said, ‘We’ve just thought of a name!’ ” he recalls, smiling. <u>The Beatals</u>. It had the right sound, its reference a dazzling throwback. The name was bluff and cheeky, sturdy; it possessed an easy, buoyant, ornamental quality. <u>The Beatals</u>. Yes, he thought, it would do, it would do nicely.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Not quite everyone. It never even dawned on Williams to include the Beatals on the program. Without a drummer, they wouldn’t stand a chance alongside other major bands. To spare the lads the embarrassment, he made sure they had good seats. In the audience. Punters. Fans. Like everyone else.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>It is not entirely clear who Moore was</u>. Like many musicians who hung around the scene, he was familiar to others by his face, but few had ever heard Tommy actually play. Part of the reason was his age. <u>Already thirty- six, he was well outside the core rock ’n roll demographic— twice Paul’s age</u>— and part of another world as far as performance bands went. He also had a day job, operating a forklift at the Garston bottle works, which made him unfamiliar to the Jac’s daytime crowd. Still, he had all the qualifications: he was small but stocky, with powerful, responsive wrists and impeccable timing. “<u>Tommy Moore was a pro,” says one of the Cassanovas</u>, “what we call a session drummer today. He had played in dance bands, at social clubs. He could put the beat in the right place, and <u>he could play anything</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-5930 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-3-of-17-300x196.png" alt="" width="517" height="338" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-3-of-17-300x196.png 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-3-of-17-150x98.png 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-3-of-17-768x501.png 768w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-3-of-17.png 795w" sizes="(max-width: 517px) 100vw, 517px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Crowning a burst of energy and artifice, arrangements were hastily made. George and Tommy took time off from their jobs, Paul sweet- talked his father into a holiday before the upcoming exams, while John and Stuart simply cut classes. The problem of equipment was similarly solved when they decided to “borrow” the art school P.A. All the pieces fell neatly into place. Suddenly everything seemed possible. <u>They were actually going on the road— a road from which they would never look back. It began with a baby step.</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 13. A Revelation to Behold</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">But they were records in name only— and not even in their name. <u>As a concession to German slang, in which the word peedles skewed as “tiny dicks</u>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 15. A Gigantic Leap of Faith</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">That was the intricate nature of the band. <u>It put Paul and John at cross- purposes, terrific cross- purposes, that would grow in intensity over the years</u>. Passing was the perfect harmony that marked their songwriting relationship. In its place was a distinction so contrary, a conflict so profound, that the friction it produced built up an armor. <u>Both men schemed aggressively to impose their vision on the Beatles</u>. Always there was Paul’s need to smooth the rough edges and John’s need to rough them up. Somehow, it drove them to fertile middle ground. But <u>the constant compromise was ultimately a debilitating position, and the balance on both sides could not be sustained forever</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 16. The Road to London</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Ron Appleby, who promoted the show, recalled an incident that would soon have far-reaching repercussions. “<u>Brian Epstein decided that everyone who came into the dance before eight [o’clock] would be given a photograph of the Beatles</u>.” It was a nice incentive, although an unusual practice for a Liverpool dance, and it went over in a big way before taking an unforeseen turn. “<u>The girls were ripping up the photograph and sticking the picture of Pete Best onto their jumpers</u>.” No one, especially Pete, had counted on that happening. He was “embarrassed” by the attention, but it wasn’t an isolated incident. “<u>Almost since he joined the band, Pete was the most popular Beatle</u>,” says Bill Harry, expressing a view shared by many early fans. “<u>He was certainly the best-looking among them, and the girls used to go bananas over him</u>.” This phenomenon was nothing new. Best had immense stage presence. Unlike the other Beatles, who mugged shamelessly for the girls, <u>Pete, unsmiling, ignored the crowd, attacking the drums with his long muscular arms, which only heightened his mystique</u>. One can only imagine how much resentment and envy that stirred, <strong>especially in Paul, who was sensitive to being upstaged</strong>. He’d already gotten bent out of shape by the way Stuart Sutcliffe used to steal the limelight. <u>Now suddenly Pete was crawling up his back. “If one of the others got more applause, Paul would notice and be on him like lightning,” recalls Bob Wooler</u>, whose own behavior did nothing to tone down the jealousy. Wooler had worked out a little rap he delivered at the end of a band’s set to introduce individual musicians. A <u>poster for The Outlaw he’d seen described Jane Russell as being “mean, moody, and magnificent,” which Wooler borrowed and applied to Pete Best</u>. “<strong>He was the only Beatle I mentioned by name every time, and it sparked enmity between them—especially with McCartney</strong>.”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 17. Do the Right Thing</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Abbey Road wasn’t meant to look like a recording complex, much less a facility like EMI’s other studios at Hayes, which adjoined its record factories. <u>It had originated in 1831 as a nine- bedroom residence, with five reception rooms, servants’ quarters, and a wine cellar, before being converted in 1928 into the world’s first “purpose- [or custom-] built” studio</u>. For all the building’s unpretentiousness, much of the modern technology found in the more imposing high- tech studios was first designed by EMI engineers in one of its boxy, low- ceilinged rooms. The fundamentals of stereo were developed here, as were moving- coil microphones, large- valve tape recorders, and an amusing battery of sound effects that gained industrywide use throughout the war years and beyond. None of that, however, would have impressed the apprehensive Beatles, who were growing increasingly anxious to make their own mark.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The Beatles managed to climb into the coach, but the girls were mobbing Pete and he couldn’t get on</u>.” <u>Everyone on the bus had to wait— and watch. John, Paul, and George watched expressionlessly in the dark</u>. Few friends who observed them realized what this grave demeanor concealed— how, in fact, it was a mask worn to conceal a bitter dissatisfaction. So hard were the lines of their lips and the set of their jaws that they might have been statues for a garden display. Outwardly, their composure never cracked, but inwardly they smoldered as Neil Aspinall extricated his friend from the crowd’s adoring grip. <u>The Beatles never said a word— it was Jim McCartney, of all people, who angrily accosted Pete and accused him of trying to upstage the others— but <strong>they had already made up their minds to make sure that it never happened again</strong></u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 18. Starr Time</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Of all the drummers in Liverpool, where the pecking order was so clearly established, <u>bands ranked Ringo among the best</u>. And by the summer of 1962, he figured in many of their plans. One band in particular.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>It was only ever music, only the band, only the Beatles. There were no other options. This was their life’s work.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Paul’s own deep passion for drumming had never been concealed. He’d long had a trap set at home, which he mastered <strong>as he did all the other instruments in the band</strong></u>. And during jam sessions at the Blue Angel, with Gerry Marsden and Wally Shepherd, he “always made for the drums.” Earl Preston’s drummer, Ritchie Galvin, recalled encountering Paul and Pete huddled at the Mandolin Club one afternoon in 1962 after a lunchtime session at the Cavern. “<u>Paul was showing Pete the drum pattern that he wanted on a particular song,” Galvin remembered. “Pete tried to do it, but he didn’t get it</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The saga of Ringo’s personal history— more like a Dickensian chronicle of misfortune— is one of the erratic tragic chapters in the glittering Beatles legacy</u>. In contrast to the others, who were middle- (John) or working- class (Paul and George), <u>Ringo was “ordinary, poor,” a hardship case. “He was not a barefoot, ragged child,” recalls Marie Maguire Crawford, a neighbor who doubled as his surrogate sister, “but like all of the families who lived in the Dingle, he was part of an ongoing struggle to survive</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 19. A Touch of the Barnum &amp; Bailey</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Martin, however, was already thinking ahead</u>. The Beatles had put a bug into his ear about image, and he was concerned that the first record should lay it all on the line. “He knew how important it was to establish their identity,” Richards says, “<u>so we kept walking and talked about what to call them— <strong>Paul McCartney and the Beatles</strong>, or <strong>John Lennon and the Beatles</strong></u>.” <u>Martin felt they needed a leader out front, like Cliff and the Shadows</u>. Paul could handle that; he was “the pretty boy” and more outgoing, whereas “John was the down- to- earth type” and the sharp wit. That could also work to the band’s advantage, they decided. It was a tough choice. Paul… John? John… Paul? “It went on like that, back and forth, as we continued along Oxford Street,” Richards says. Nothing emerged from their various proposed scenarios to sway things one way or the other. <strong>Each boy had enough star power to carry the group</strong>. <u>And yet, a move like that might serve to fracture the beautiful balance they seemed to have found</u>. The band’s personality was pretty much intact— and a very important part of their appeal. <u>There were no apparent power struggles. Besides, Martin mused, <strong>maybe the Beatles were right. Maybe this was something new and different </strong>that didn’t fall into the same tired mold. “And when we got to the end, we knew it was perfect the way it was</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Forty years later, Paul McCartney, in nearly every reminiscence, goes out of his way to curse the Northern Songs pact as “a slave deal”— and worse. He believes they were bamboozled out of the rights to their songs and, ultimately, untold millions of dollars, saying: “Dick James’s entire empire was built on our backs.” <u>But at the time, it must have sounded like a sweetheart of an offer</u>. <strong><em>When they were asked if they wanted to read the agreement, John and Paul declined</em></strong>. <u>It called for Northern Songs to acquire Lenmac Enterprises, a holding company set up in April by Brian that owned fifty- nine Lennon- McCartney songs</u>. Under the terms of the agreement, John and Paul were obligated to write only six songs per year for the next four years. During that time, however, they would add an extraordinary hundred new copyrights to the catalogue, each one a classic that would never again be under their control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 20. Dead Chuffed</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I think the Beatles shook those crowds up, even scared them a little,” says Kenny Lynch, who watched every set from the cinema wings. “They were so different, so tight, so confident, really playing their hearts out. It was like no experience those kids ever had before. Every girl thought they were singing straight to her, every boy saw himself standing in their place. “It all changed from that night. We took a break a day or two later, before the next leg of the tour, but when we went back out on the road <u>you could tell the whole balance had shifted</u>, because <strong>all anyone wanted to hear was the Beatles</strong>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>John was wasted, near collapse</u>, but the others already knew what he was about to find out from a playback: that <u>for all its hairiness, “Twist and Shout” is a masterpiece</u>— imperfect but no less masterful, with all the rough edges exposed to underscore its power. It is raw, explosive. The sound of ravaged lassitude, of everything coming apart, only complements the spirit of a tumultuous live performance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Mania</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 21. The Jungle Drums</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As dreary as the theaters were, their accommodations were often worse— <u>the guesthouses they stayed in run- down, staffed with local help who regarded them as nothing more than riffraff</u>. All- night service stations were the restaurant of choice for most package- tour units, with a heaping portion of starchy beans on toast and chips a safe enough bet to see them through until the next opportunity arose to eat something.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“It was always the same routine: <u>one would play, and the other would be writing down lyrics and chord changes</u>.” They were in their own private world back there, <u>absorbed by the instant gratification of the work and adept at blocking out distractions</u>. [AA comment: Flow].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<u>John told me that there had never been a day in his life when he didn’t feel he needed some kind of drug</u>,” Dot recalls.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the first hours of <u>April 8</u>, Cynthia, who had been staying at Aunt Mimi’s house with her friend Phyllis McKenzie, was rushed by ambulance to Sefton General Hospital, where just after 6 A.M. <u>she gave birth to a six- pound, eight- ounce boy. Had it been a girl, she was to be called Julia, after John’s mother. For the birth certificate, however, Cynthia confidently recorded his name as John Charles Julian Lennon</u>.  [AA comment:  Julian suffered.  There is a YouTube interview with him where he says his dad never gave him anything, not even money.]</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sexuality. <u>John was almost as unsparing about gays as he was about cripples and the retarded</u>. “My God, how he ranted about ‘fucking queers’ and ‘fucking fags!’ ” says Bob Wooler, who was privy to many of John’s backstage outbursts. “<u>He was very outspoken, indifferent to anyone’s feelings. He didn’t give a shite about anyone, really— but he was especially intolerant of gays</u>.” But there is every reason to believe that as they became more relaxed, <u>John was drawn further and further into Brian’s guarded confidence</u>. … No doubt John encouraged the direction of the conversation, but Brian did most of the talking, regaling John with details about the life, sometimes with rapturous descriptions of encounters and taboos. In the provocative Spanish sun, <u>Brian became bold enough to behave with John as he might naturally around other gay men, pointing out “all the boys” he found attractive, even daring to act on his desires. “I watched Brian picking up boys</u>,” John recalled, “and I liked playing it a bit faggy— it’s enjoyable.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Albert Goldman is most emphatic: “[<u>John] and Brian had sex</u>,” he declares in The Lives of John Lennon. Pete Shotton, in his footloose memoir, claims that John told him: “I let [Brian] toss me off.” And in The Love You Make, Peter Brown and his coauthor, Steven Gaines, go so far as to construct an intimate bedroom scene, complete with cartoonish, overheated dialogue, in which “John lay there, tentative and still, and Brian fulfilled the fantasies he was so sure would bring him contentment….” As far as it is known, the issue of homosexuality never surfaced again in John’s life.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Still, it set a dangerous precedent. Brian came away from the vacation brimming with exhilaration, overjoyed that John had opened up to him and poised for something more. He told friends that their time together had been “something to build on” in the months ahead. <u>The other Beatles were aware that something consensual had gone on between John and Brian</u>. In retrospect, <u>Paul referred to it as “the homosexual thing” and suggested that it was John’s way of exercising power over their manager</u>. But if power was part of John’s strategy, he was also exercising it over Paul. More influence with Brian also meant more control of Paul— and ultimately of the Beatles. <u>It was a currency he would collect for the rest of his life</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Rolling Stones. <u>It was only a month earlier that the Beatles had first laid eyes on them</u>. Following the taping of Thank Your Lucky Stars, an experimental filmmaker and part- time jazz promoter named Giorgio Gomelsky had approached the Beatles in Twickenham, with the intention of making a documentary film about them. Brian, who was already fantasizing about Hollywood, gave him a polite brush- off. Nevertheless, Gomelsky invited the boys to hear a great “full- bodied R&amp; B” band playing at the Crawdaddy Club, which he ran in a room behind the Station Hotel in Richmond, later that night.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 22. Kings of the Jungle</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<u>There was no longer any question of the Beatles appearing in a club or, indeed, anywhere in direct contact with their public</u>,” writes George Melly in Revolt Into Style. “They had become a four- headed Orpheus. <u>They would have been torn to pieces by the teenage Furies</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“She Loves You” was finished the next evening, during a rare day off in Liverpool. The boys worked intently in the tiny dining nook at Forthlin Road while Paul’s father sat not five feet away, chain- smoking and watching TV.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Sometimes, you know, I feel as if there’s nothing I’d like better than to get back to the kind of thing we were doing a year ago,” Paul mused in the midst of the hot summer tour. “Just playing the Cavern and some of the other places around Liverpool. I suppose the rest of the lads feel that way at times, too. You feel as if you’d like to turn back the clock.” If that was even remotely feasible before, all bets were off the moment “She Loves You” hit the airwaves.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 23. So This Is Beatlemania</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Britain’s papers had discovered sex earlier that spring, when they began tracking a <u>colorful rumor that John Profumo, the secretary of state of war, had engaged in a sexual liaison with a young call girl named Christine Keeler</u>. Word had it that he’d met her in 1961 during a weekend social at Cliveden, Lord Astor’s estate, where she was staying with her friend Dr. Stephen Ward. To make matters worse, there were also reports of Keeler’s involvement with a man named Eugene Ivanov, a Russian naval attaché and reported KGB agent, possibly compromising state secrets. At first no paper dared run any part of the story, fearing the harsh slap of England’s libel laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">NME’s album chart was even more rewarding, listing With the Beatles and Please Please Me as vying for the very top, with three EPs— Twist and Shout, The Beatles Hits, and Beatles No. 1— padding close behind. <u>The dominance was unprecedented. In a single outburst, the Beatles had hijacked the charts</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 24. Once Upon a Time in America</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The New York Times’ TV critic, Jack Gould, dismissed the Beatles as nothing more than “a fad” while giving them credit for a “bemused awareness” that acknowledged their complicity in the clever affair.</u> “Televised Beatlemania,” Gould wrote, “appeared to be a fine mass placebo,” and he summed up the performance itself as a “sedate anticlimax” to all the hype New York had withstood since the Beatles hit town.  Visually they are a nightmare: tight, dandified Edwardian beatnik suits and great pudding- bowls of hair. Musically they are a near disaster, guitars and drums slamming out a merciless beat that does away with secondary rhythms, harmony and melody. Their lyrics (punctuated by nutty shouts of yeah, yeah, yeah!) are a catastrophe, a preposterous farrago of Valentine- card romantic sentiments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>When a skeptical reporter speculated in a column as to whether the Beatles’ longevity would last through the month</u>, a colleague pointed out that their ratings for the second Ed Sullivan Show had doubled, and at that rate, there weren’t enough people left in the United States to cover the third appearance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 25. Tomorrow Never Knows</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As it turned out, it was impossible to put a real dollar value on their worth to Great Britain. No one knew about the $253,000 check from Capitol Records in Brian’s pocket— the Beatles’ share of royalties so far— but it was hot news that the Barclays Bank Review had declared them an “invisible export,” estimating their overseas record sales at something over $ 7 million. <u>But there was no clear picture of what the Beatles actually brought in</u>. Aside from records and performances, merchandising remained a vast gray area. The Seltaeb compact was practically minting money— published reports put it somewhere around $50 million— but who knew how much of that would ever find its way back to the source. Income from the enormous number of bootleg products was impossible to peg.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>For the first time in the history of the English charts, British records occupied the top fourteen places</u>. The days of second billing and second- class citizenship for British rock ’n roll seemed over. “With this transition,” wrote pop music historian Greg Shaw, “British rock became real.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The next morning, Tuesday, February 25— George’s twenty- first birthday— the boys checked into the Abbey Road studio to work on songs for a new album</strong>. <u>They could hardly wait to get started</u>. <u>Since the beginning of the year, <strong>they had barely played a note that wasn’t drowned out by screams</strong></u> and, as musicians, they had become clearly frustrated by the emptiness of it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5931 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-4-of-17-196x300.jpg" alt="" width="196" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-4-of-17-196x300.jpg 196w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-4-of-17-98x150.jpg 98w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-4-of-17.jpg 442w" sizes="(max-width: 196px) 100vw, 196px" /></u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The work itself was more demanding than they’d expected</u>. For one thing, they had to report for costume and makeup at six o’clock in the morning, which meant getting up at five— an ungodly hour for most people but especially for a Beatle. Moreover, they were seriously out of their element. Learning lines was an uphill battle on top of everything else that was going on in their lives. Victor Spinetti, another of their costars, observed how “the lads never touched the script.” In fact, they “frantically” gave it a once- over in the car each morning on their way to the studio, then simply winged it. “You never knew what they were going to say or do.” “We’d make things up because of our being so comfortable with each other,” recalled Ringo. Some real gems came out of their mouths, the same kind of spontaneous witty stuff that dazzled at their press conferences, but for a seasoned film crew it was a hair- raising way to work. <u>To counteract the Beatles’ lack of preparation, Dick Lester kept five cameras running, even after a scene technically ended.</u> “Dick just went on shooting,” Spinetti recalled, “shooting everything…. [H]e just pointed the cameras at them and let them go…. And I just used to keep going…. [W]hen he caught them actually talking amongst themselves, it was just magical.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Though the review made no strides in the advancement of rock criticism, it gave the record a commendable launch. It also helped distract from the pack of would- be marauders who were pecking at the kingdom walls. <strong>Competitors were flooding the market with anything that might capitalize on the Beatles’</strong> success. All along, there had been scores of singles that made no pretensions as to their agenda: “My Boyfriend Got a Beatle Haircut,” “Yes, You Can Hold My Hand,” “Beatle Fever,” “The Beatle Dance,” “The Boy with the Beatle Hair,” “Beatle Mania in the U.S.A.” (by the Liverpools, no less), “We Love You Beatles”— there were too many to keep track of. A start-up label, Top Six, announced that its debut album would provide a full menu of Beatles covers, coincidentally entitled Beatlemania. Another new label, Dial, was banking on a group called the Grasshoppers. Even Decca, at the behest of onetime Beatles producer Mike Smith, recognized the value of ancestry <u>by signing a band called the All- Stars to be led by Pete Best</u>. To their credit, the Beatles wasted not so much as a glance on any of these coattail surfers, their evil eyes trained on more unbenign targets that threatened to cut into their royalties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It helped defuse the situation temporarily. <strong>Still, John wasn’t particularly sympathetic toward the broken-down man and the timing of his visit. “He turned up after I was famous,” complained John, who remained “furious” at Freddie for abandoning him as a child. “He knew where I was all my life— I’d lived in the same house in the same place for most of my childhood, and he knew where.”</strong> It may have crushed John to grow up without a father, but it took no effort for him to cut short Freddie’s visit and ultimately order him from Brian’s office. Whatever reasons had rendered his father no longer incommunicado, <u>it was more convenient for John that Freddie remain at large</u>. (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Lennon#:~:text=Alfred%20Lennon%20(14%20December%201912,Edith%2C%20after%20his%20father%20died.&amp;text=Lennon%20married%20Julia%20Stanley%20in%201938." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wikipedia</a> for Freddie Lennon).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5932 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-5-of-17-184x300.jpg" alt="" width="184" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-5-of-17-184x300.jpg 184w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-5-of-17-92x150.jpg 92w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-5-of-17.jpg 233w" sizes="(max-width: 184px) 100vw, 184px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The women were, in fact, only one small cloudburst in the mammoth typhoon of press that surged through the spring of 1964. <u>Everyone followed the Beatles like a favorite soap opera</u>. Not a day went by that didn’t offer ample stories about their exploits, even if they were only vague speculation. Papers reported on where they were last seen and with whom, how they were dressed, what they had for dinner, when they went home (and with whom). The gloves had come off; all angles were now fair game.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are several “official” versions of how the title was finally arrived at. What they all agree on is that it occurred during a lunch break at Twickenham Studios, where either Paul remarked to Bud Ornstein— or John to Walter Shenson—“ <u>There was something Ringo said the other day…,” at which point, the two Beatles recounted their drummer’s penchant for “abusing the English language</u>.” “Ringo would always say grammatically incorrect phrases and we’d all laugh,” George recalled. One that sprang easily to mind had popped out at the Heathrow press conference, when Ringo described having his hair cut at the British embassy soiree. “I was just talking, having an interview… and then ‘snip’… Well, what can you say? Tomorrow never knows.” Tomorrow never knows! The Beatles cut wicked glances at one another when that gem fell out. And John promptly wrote it down, to use in one of his stories and, later, songs. There was another malapropism— <u>or “Ringosim,” as John called them</u>— that had already appeared in John’s book, In His Own Write: “<u>He’d had a hard day’s night that day</u>.” One of the boys entertained the lunch gathering with details of its origin, following a grueling late- night gig, but they were already one step ahead of him. “We’ve just got our title!” one of the producers exclaimed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The next morning on the set, the assistant producer paged Shenson and told him: “John Lennon wants to see you in his dressing room.” The producer went through every imaginable scenario, wondering how he’d respond to the young man’s irritation. “He and Paul were standing there, with their guitars slung over their shoulders,” Shenson recalls. “<u>John fiddled with a matchbook cover on which were scrawled the lyrics to a song—‘ A Hard Day’s Night’— which they played and sang to perfection</u>. <strong>This was ten hours after I’d asked for a song</strong>.” When they’d finished, John glanced at the producer and said, “Okay, that’s it, right?” It was all Shenson could do to feebly mutter, “Right.” “Good,” John said, “now don’t bother us about songs anymore.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>How George came up with it remains a mystery to this day; he never discussed it, even though the chord has become as identifiable as the song that follows</u>. As it uncoils, there is nothing left to chance. The energy it delivers is explosive, full of fireworks—“ It’s been a haaaard daaaays night…”— and musically as daring, with a vocal track that gathers so much steam that the middle eight (sung by Paul, John explained, “because I couldn’t reach the notes”) comes as almost a relief.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the Beatles wrapped up work on A Hard Day’s Night, as the movie was now readily being called, <u>Brian left for the Devon coast, where he planned to begin work on an autobiography that had been commissioned by a small London publisher</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 26. In the Eye of a Hurricane</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over Derek Taylor’s objections, they refused to get off the plane anywhere other than Bangkok, fueling their dark mood with a steady diet of stimulants. “<u>We’d been sitting on the floor, drinking and taking Preludins for about thirty hours [sic],” George recalled</u>. Then, arriving in Kowloon, exhausted and grimy, they were expected to judge the finals of the Miss Hong Kong beauty pageant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Peter Brown and Brian had spent part of May together</u>, following the feria in Seville among a crowd of aficións that included Ken Tynan and Orson Welles. There, <u>Brown noticed Brian’s growing dependence on pills, amphetamines, that he buffered with excessive quantities of alcohol</u> in an attempt to offset the highs with lows. “<u>It had a disastrous effect on him. It accelerated the mood swings</u>. He was really the sweetest, most sensitive man, but he became belligerent in the blink of an eye. And the worst part was that nobody understood where it came from.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Art Schreiber, who happened to be passing through the suite, was startled when Paul motioned with his chin and whispered, “I like that one. Can you get her for me?” Answered Schreiber: “Listen, pal, I’m no fucking pimp. I’m a reporter</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">…<strong>it was Dylan with whom they would reshape their generation</strong>. Paul had discovered him first, buying the Freewheelin’ album before they’d left for Paris at the beginning of the year. That record hit the turntable the moment the Beatles settled into their suite at the George V. “And for the rest of our three weeks in Paris we didn’t stop playing it,” John recalled. In fact, George considered the experience “one of the most memorable things of the trip,” alleviating the irritation of being cooped up in their rooms. <u>One can only imagine the impact that Dylan’s music had on the boys</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>It didn’t take long before someone retrieved the communal pillbox from John’s leather bag and Drinamyls and Preludins were offered like after- dinner mints to the edgy guests</u>. The Beatles downed a handful on most nights of the tour as a way of staying up— and up— when their bodies ached for sleep. <u>But Dylan took one look at the assortment of gaily colored pills and shook his head. “How about something a little more organic?”</u> he suggested. “<u>Something green… marijuana.”</u> <strong>The Beatles recoiled. They were scotch and Coke men, chain- smokers</strong>. Granted, there were the pills, but they served a purpose other than getting stoned. “<u>We’ve never really smoked marijuana before,” Brian interjected, sensing the boys’ immediate discomfort. This, unbeknownst to him, wasn’t entirely true. “We first got marijuana from an older drummer with another group in Liverpool,” George recalled. </u>Besides, an acquaintance had shared a joint with the Beatles at the Star- Club in Hamburg, but it was what Neil called “just the sticks,” which probably meant a deposit of stems mixed with dried oregano or some such filler.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">No matter. <u>Rolling “a skinny American joint,” Dylan handed it to John, who gave it a dubious look and passed it on to Ringo, dubbing him “my official taster</u>.” <u>Ringo was no blushing maiden</u>. Without a word, he retreated to a back room sealed with rolled towels— there was a battalion of New York City policemen on a security detail in the hall— and smoked it down to his fingertips. A few minutes later he emerged with a twisted grin plastered on his face. <u>As Paul recounted the experience, “We said, ‘How is it?’ He said, ‘The ceiling’s coming down on me.’ And we went, Wow! Leaped up, ‘God, got to do this!’ So we ran into the back room— first John, then me and George, then Brian.”</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The pot had loosened up Brian to a degree that was truly emancipating. He became entranced by his reflection in the mirror. After a moment or two he stood back, then pointed to himself, and blurted out: “Jew!” to everyone’s hilarity. <u>Paul noted how that was the first time Brian had ever referred to himself as a Jew</u>. “It may not seem the least bit significant to anyone else,” he admitted, “but in our circle, it was very liberating.” And a sign to those not red-eyed of Brian’s deep self-loathing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 27. Lennon and McCartney to the Rescue</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">John and Paul had been writing steadily— together and apart— throughout their travels, with about eight songs in good enough shape to record right away. But it had not been a breeze, unlike the previous records. <u>They’d struggled through what John described as “a lousy period,” a time when everything they came up with sounded trite, even flat</u>. There were even hints that the album might have to be put off until the material was up to snuff; but before anyone panicked, they’d finally pounded out a few gems that had the earmarks of their very best work.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Through it all, John and Paul continued to write, with blocks of time devoted to working in their comfort zone: eyeball- to- eyeball</strong>. There was always a room available at Abbey Road studios where they could steal a few minutes to bash around ideas. There was also the tiny music salon below the Ashers’ flat, when it wasn’t booked for lessons. Otherwise, <u>Paul ran his new forest green Aston Martin DB out to Kenwood, where John was spending most of his spare time since returning from the States, and they’d spread out in a little mess of an attic room overlooking the garden to “kick things around” for two or three hours.</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5933 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-6-of-17-300x216.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="216" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-6-of-17-300x216.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-6-of-17-150x108.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-6-of-17.jpg 479w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One day, just as the limo was turning into the driveway, <u>Paul put down his paper and, more out of politeness than real interest, asked the chauffeur how he’d been. The driver gazed in his rearview mirror and shook his head. “Oh, working hard,” he replied with an emphatic huff, “<strong><em>working eight days a week</em></strong>.” A bell went off in Paul’s head. Eight days a week! “It was like a little blessing from the gods,” Paul recalled</u>. No sooner had John answered his door than Paul dropped this little nugget into his hands. “Well, I’ve got the title,” he insisted, and blurted it out. John, normally as competitive as an insurance salesman, knew when to hop on the bus. They practically dashed upstairs and began spitting out lyrics, just “filling it in from the title,” as Paul remembered it. Bam, bam, bam. <u>Much later John dismissed “Eight Days a Week,” saying it “was never a good song,”</u> but at the time they wrote it there was no hesitation as to whether it would fit into their recording plans. An obvious crowd- pleaser, “Eight Days a Week” contains all the drive and spunk of their previous hits, its exuberant spirit punctuated by explosive guitar fanfare, joyous handclaps, and an unforgettable hook—“a typical happy John- and- Paul song,” as Derek Johnson, writing in NME, described it. And each pop hit they offered carved out space for more radical exploration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There was other carelessness. NEMS’ finances in America were particularly a mess. The proceeds from the last tour had been frozen by the Internal Revenue Service until it was satisfied that proper taxes were paid. That left the Beatles completely out- of- pocket for their five weeks of work. Moreover<u>, during most of the tour Brian had effectively isolated himself from the outside world— there were strings of days when he simply disappeared— to the point that scores of producers and entrepreneurs bearing lucrative proposals, proposals the Beatles should have accepted, were unable to contact him.</u> <strong>The number of important deals he let slip through his fingers is scandalous</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5934 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-7-of-17-170x300.jpg" alt="" width="170" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-7-of-17-170x300.jpg 170w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-7-of-17-85x150.jpg 85w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-7-of-17.jpg 234w" sizes="(max-width: 170px) 100vw, 170px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It took nearly three years to settle the suit, untangling thirty- nine separate claims against NEMS and a $ 22 million claim for damages, which eventually broke Nicky Byrne and rent the merchandising deal asunder. “<u>The reality is that the Beatles never saw a penny out of the merchandising</u>,” says Nat Weiss, the avuncular divorce lawyer Brian befriended in New York who subsequently took over their American affairs. “<u>Tens of millions of dollars went down the drain because of the way the whole thing was mishandled</u>. Even after the judgment was vacated, you could smell the smoke from the ashes, that’s how badly they had been burned.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>They wanted to make records, not statements</strong>. There was too much at stake, too much fever and magic, to antagonize their largely mainstream audience, leaving the extreme rule- breaking to newcomers like the Stones and the Who, both of whom were willing to be outrageous and risk everything for maximum impact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Most nights, he got stoned in the spacious Gothic toilet. Since returning from the States, John had become more and more devoted to the giddy pleasures of pot, smoking it intermittently throughout the day, from the time he got up until he collapsed from exhaustion</u>. Then he curled up on a couch, brooding and sending out the kind of barbed- wire vibes that discouraged idle chitchat, let alone anything close to intimacy. Guests avoided him, knowing how lethal the combination of sycophants and drugs (and/ or alcohol) could be for John. Of course, the more distant he became, the more the guests ignored him and the harder he had to strike out to draw enough attention. No one was immune. “Everyone who came in was a potential target,” says a frequent guest. <u>When Brian’s favorite, Judy Garland, arrived on Sid Luft’s arm one night, John berated her indiscriminately, implying that she was a hack and introducing her as “Judy Garbage.” On another occasion, feeling “particularly wicked,” he lashed out at an actor’s German girlfriend, blaming her parents for killing 6 million Jews, until the poor girl fled in terror</u>. Other times he was content to pick on Brian, embarrassing him about his sexuality—“ If he pretended to be straight, for instance,” says Bart, “John wouldn’t let him get away with it”— in front of as many people as he could attract. <u>John’s behavior was nothing new. It was the usual outlet for a lifetime of anger, anger at being given up by his mother and her subsequent death, anger at his father for abandoning him without a fair chance, anger at all the parochial teachers who demanded he conform, <strong>anger at Brian for tidying up the Beatles’ </strong></u>jagged image (“<strong>I’ve sold myself to the devil</strong>,” he complained to Tony Sheridan), and anger at trusted friends like Stu Sutcliffe, who died without warning, and now even Paul, who continuously upstaged him.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<u>Cynthia wanted to settle John down</u>, pipe and slippers” according to Paul— a decision that, to his mind, spelled imminent disaster. “The minute she said that to me I thought, <u>Kiss of Death, I know my mate and that is not what he wants</u>.” For another, they’d been cooped up rather annoyingly in the attic apartment of their new posh home while a team of local contractors gave the living quarters a thorough makeover<strong>. It had been hard enough living with Cynthia and Julian</strong> in the Emperor’s Gate flat, but in the attic— and miles from nowhere— the situation groaned under the strain. To make matters worse, Cynthia’s mother, Lillian Powell, recently returned from Canada, had moved in while John was on tour and now all of them squeezed into the accommodations like rabbits in a hutch. There <u>wasn’t an ounce of love lost between John and Mrs. Powell, a spiteful, insufferable woman who had never forgiven him for impregnating her daughter and fulminated against her son- in- law every chance she got</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Incredibly, neither Cynthia nor John knew how to drive</u>. They had bought a new Rolls- Royce that sat in the garage until a chauffeur was eventually hired, but even then, with few friends and a young son to take care of, any attempt to steal time away from home was futile. “<u>I would frequently spend weeks of being virtually housebound by duties to child and staff,” Cynthia complained in a memoir</u>. <strong>Even when John was around, he usually slept until one or two, then took off for London, rarely coming home until the early hours of the morning, often stoned and drunk</strong>. Cynthia had learned to endure his new love of pot, which she viewed as being “relatively harmless” compared with alcohol, but despite the hip and social aspect of getting stoned, it was never something they would share. Alas, <u>marijuana only made Cynthia “sick and sleepy,” further distancing them in their eroding relationship</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Paul, on the other hand, lived between the cracks</strong>. Beatlemania was rampant in London, yet for some inexplicable reason he was free to move about with little regard for the usual encroachments. Thr<u>oughout the end of 1964 and well into the New Year, Paul became a habitué of London nightlife, aggressively cultivating an image as <strong>a young man of substance</strong></u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Not that they could recall much from the shoot. They had packed ample reserves of pot to get them through the process. The Beatles were so stoned, so distracted, they couldn’t remember lines. Brian’s effort to contain the damage went for naught. <u>Even though, as John revealed, they were “smoking marijuana for breakfast,” mornings seemed to be the only time scenes got completed</u>. By noon they were out of their gourds. “Dick Lester knew that very little would get done after lunch,” Ringo recalled. “In the afternoon, we very seldom got past the first line of the script.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Ringo received the most applause, screams, and gasps from the audience.” “I Love Ringo” badges outsold all their other merchandise. The same proved true wherever the Beatles went. “<u>In the States, I know I went over well,” Ringo admitted in a moment of pardonable pride</u>. “It knocked me out to see and hear the kids waving for me. I’d made it as a personality.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>In spite of everything, Ringo was excited to tie the knot.</strong> “He’s the marrying kind,” John explained after the news hit the papers, “a sort of family man,” which was true enough. <u>Only a few months earlier, Ringo had told a reporter: “No matter what the consequences, I don’t want to remain single all my life. I want to get married some day and I don’t plan to wait too long about it.</u> <u>I’m 23 now and that can seem pretty old when you look out every night and see an audience full of 13- and 14- year- old girls.</u>”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.grunge.com/284616/the-tragic-death-of-ringo-starrs-first-wife/"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5935 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-8-of-17-300x255.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="255" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-8-of-17-300x255.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-8-of-17-150x127.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-8-of-17.jpg 495w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a><a href="https://www.grunge.com/284616/the-tragic-death-of-ringo-starrs-first-wife/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.grunge.com/284616/the-tragic-death-of-ringo-starrs-first-wife/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“Ticket to Ride” is hardly gobbledegook, and not at all the self- penned effort for which John eventually took credit. In a hasty reflection, he reduced Paul’s contribution to “the way Ringo played the drums.” However, Paul later argued: “We sat down and wrote it together…. [W] e sat down and worked on that song for a full three- hour songwriting session, and at the end of it all we had all the words, we had the harmonies, and we had all the little bits.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>He [John] was getting tired of hearing Paul described as “the handsome Beatle</u>” or “the cute Beatle,” <u>tired of seeing Paul charm the media, posing as the band’s spokesperson, voicing opinions he didn’t share</u>. Never had John seen anyone turn on the gas like that; throw the spotlight on him and he popped off like a parrot on speed. “<u>He’s a good P.R. man, Paul,” John said, only half seriously</u>. “He’s about the best in the world, probably, he really does a job.” Even as a rock ’n roller, Paul continued to court the kind of establishment approval that offended John. Paul was slick, as slick as they came—“ He could charm the Queen’s profile off a shiny shilling,” says Bob Wooler and not at all kindly— and it stuck in John’s craw. Paul still deferred to John, but skillfully. He knew how to play the angles, which is what it took to humor a cranky hothead like John. <u>Paul could dance archly around his partner’s subtle moods, but on tiptoe, always ready to concede center stage rather than risk confrontation</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To make Paul more comfortable, Martin had the studio lights dimmed to a shade resembling candlelight and moved the other Beatles out of his sight line before retreating with the engineers into the overhead control booth. There was a short last- minute lull while Smith spun dials to get a proper balance. When he finally flashed the thumbs- up, Paul stabbed out his cigarette in an ashtray, cleared his throat, and delivered a “remarkably controlled” take of a ballad that would become the most recorded song of all time. “<u>Yesterday” had been rattling around Paul’s head for nearly two years, since he “woke up one morning with the tune,” tumbled out of bed, and before even washing his face ran through it at the upright piano propped against the wall by the window in his room</u>. What was the source of his inspiration? <u>The question gnawed at him for weeks afterward. Had it come in a dream, as he initially suspected?</u> Was it something he’d heard that his subconscious refused to let go of? Paul hadn’t the foggiest. The chords just kept coming, one after another, falling neatly into place. The melody sounded familiar, to say nothing of cozy, like one of the old standards that his father used to pound out after dinner at Forthlin Road, and while the overall impression it left was “very nice” indeed, Paul convinced himself the tune was “a nick,” something he’d lifted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>“Yesterday” warranted a solo release</strong>. <u>Brian, to his credit, wouldn’t hear of it. He was adamant</u>: “<u>No, whatever we do we are not splitting up the Beatles.”</u> But in a way, <u>the bubble was already beginning to burst</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 28. Into the Cosmic Consciousness</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“We’ve had LSD,” John finally revealed to George in a bone-dry voice. The acid had been slipped into their coffee on sugar cubes and might have been an after- dinner cordial, for all George knew. … John was livid. He had not come to dinner to be dosed by a virtual stranger. Mumbling good-byes, they grabbed the girls and bolted, speeding toward the Pickwick, a London nightclub, with the dentist in hot pursuit. For a few minutes everything was fine. They got seated and ordered drinks, squinting in the low light to identify the faces of other musicians who waved to get their attention. “Suddenly I felt the most incredible feeling come over me,” George remembered. “It was something like a very concentrated version of the best feeling I’d ever had in my whole life.” <u>He was overcome with love— hot, feathery, dizzying love</u>. … And <u>none of the Beatles was more receptive to LSD’s spiritual potential than George Harrison</u>. From that very first trip, he felt “a light bulb” go on in his head that blazed the way to enlightenment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Paul, cautious as ever, wanted nothing to do with it.</strong> But Ringo was game, as was Neil, who had Paul’s share, with enough left over for Roger McGuinn, David Crosby, and Peter Fonda. “<u>We were all ripped on LSD,” recalls Fonda</u>, who joined the guests around the pool, while <u>Paul worked in his usual capacity “to keep everything calm and level</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It was this sense of alienation as much as his interest in music that made George so susceptible to guiding spirits. <strong><u>In the Bahamas</u></strong><u> during the filming of Help!, he heard the siren song of the sitar and came under the influence of Swami Vishnu- devananda, who introduced him to hatha yoga and Eastern religions. Later in life he would become vegetarian, consult an astrologer, and devote himself to Transcendental Meditation before embracing traditional Christianity</u>. Like many others who flirted with mysticism, it gave him a sense of authority and confidence. But with LSD, George stepped out— and into the cosmic consciousness.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5936 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-9-of-17-193x300.jpg" alt="" width="193" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-9-of-17-193x300.jpg 193w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-9-of-17-97x150.jpg 97w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-9-of-17.jpg 518w" sizes="(max-width: 193px) 100vw, 193px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mick Jagger, who, along with Keith Richards, was watching from a seat behind the first- base dugout, was visibly shaken by the crowd’s behavior. “It’s frightening,” he told a companion.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><u><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5937 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-10-of-17-300x183.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="183" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-10-of-17-300x183.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-10-of-17-150x91.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-10-of-17.jpg 659w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></u></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><u>George Martin</u></strong><u> had been with EMI for fourteen years, ten of them as head of Parlophone, and after a feeble contract negotiation in 1963, he was still earning less than £ 70 a week</u>. All his requests for a commission against sales were rejected out of hand— an outcome made all the more incredible considering his monumental effort in breaking seven or eight NEMS acts, to say nothing of the Beatles. “I was in the studio twenty- four hours a day,” Martin argued. “You know, you don’t [spend] thirty- seven weeks out of fifty- two at number one without working quite hard.” Even so, a commission was unheard- of. Producers and A&amp; R men were company drones, ciphers, lacking any residual perks— not even a car or a negligible Christmas bonus. Martin, who not only brought in tens of millions of pounds, reversing EMI’s flat earnings, but was largely responsible for thrusting the label into the rock ’n roll era, surely deserved at least the same kind of compensation as company sales reps, a reward for his extraordinary success— or so he thought. <u>EMI balked until the summer of 1964, when Martin notified the label that he would not be renewing his contract at the end of its current term</u>. Len Wood attempted to broker a new deal, but each proposal he made was more preposterous, more arrogant— and ultimately more insulting— than the last. When, at their final meeting, Wood, sitting ramrod- stiff and imperious behind a polished yacht- size desk, proposed a deal by which Martin would be forced to reimburse EMI for departmental costs out of his profit, the producer yanked the plug. “Thank you, very much,” George informed him. “I’m leaving.” Martin decided to start an independent production company— a revolutionary concept, “a shock to the recording industry,” NME conceded— that would lease its staff’s services to the labels for a respectable fee against royalties. Not only that, but he was taking a couple of EMI’s young frontline producers, Ron Richards and John Burgess, as well as Decca’s Peter Sullivan, along with him. That gave them— or A.I.R. (Associated Independent Recording), as it was to be called— an artist base that included Adam Faith, Manfred Mann, Cilla Black, Tom Jones, Peter and Gordon, the Hollies, Gerry and the Pacemakers, Matt Monro, Freddy and the Dreamers, Billy J. Kramer, P. J. Proby, Lulu, the Fourmost, and, of course, the Beatles.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5938 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-11-of-17-300x221.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="221" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-11-of-17-300x221.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-11-of-17-150x111.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-11-of-17.jpg 309w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Harrison had already become fascinated, if not yet proficient, with the sitar, an Indian lute popularized by Wendy Hanson’s friend Ravi Shankar, and he worked out a subtle arrangement that helped dramatize “<strong>Norwegian Wood</strong>.” [AA comment:  One of my favorites.]</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Such experiments were hastened by Martin. “He’d come up with amazing technical things, slowing down the piano and things like that,” John recalled. “They were incredibly inquisitive about the recording process,” Martin recalled. “<u>They wanted to know what they could do that people hadn’t [already] done</u>.” A guideline was immediately established: no idea, however vague or outlandish, was too risky or off- limits. Martin knew better than to dismiss their penchant for experimentation. For every trial concept that crashed and burned, there were four that not only took off but soared.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>When it came to musical terminology, however, they couldn’t speak the language. Not only didn’t any of the Beatles have formal training, none could read a note</u>. To stem the lack of communication, they developed a rapport with the eloquent Martin that facilitated discussions about music free of theory- loaded jargon. “Give it some color here,” they might suggest. “Make it punchier.” On one number, “In My Life,” which required an instrumental bridge between the verses, John’s instruction got whittled down to “play it like Bach.” Exchanges like that galvanized Martin, who took up each of their abstract ideas as a challenge. Play it like Bach. That one especially intrigued him. They needed to fill about twelve bars with a piano solo that would lend the song a classical feel. Martin felt he could swing it. Not a pianist by training, he could still manage a fairly decent passage that would approximate “something baroque- sounding,” as John expressed it. “I quickly wrote out a Bach two- part invention [for piano],” he recalled, “ but it was too fast for me to play. So I lowered the speed of the tape to half speed… and then speeded it up [on playback],” an engineering trick that allowed him to simulate an Elizabethan- style harpsichord. Another time, he wove a few sheets of newspaper through the strings of the piano “to make it sound different.” He wrote the middle figure of “Michelle” as well, taking the song’s basic chord structure and inverting it as an instrumental that he played in a duet with John against George’s guitar solo. Martin called these departures “just manipulations of the resources we had at the time,” but that would be akin to playing Hamlet just by putting on the clothes. Resources take resourceful people to manipulate them, and <u>the Beatles, with George Martin’s able assistance, injected originality and daring into the mix that hinted at the great artistic recordings to come</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Mastery</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 29. Just Sort of a Freak Show</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Stoned— which they were most of the time in the studio— the experiments became part prank, part innovation. In that kind of dreamy, altered— impractical— state, the possibilities were limitless. <u>Recording became no longer just another way of putting out songs, but a new way of creating them</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>“Got to Get You into My Life,”</em> which had begun, according to studio notes, as “a very acoustic number.” Paul had not composed it in a romantic gist, as the lyric might indicate, but ironically, as an ode to drugs. “<u>It was a song about pot actually,” he admitted</u>— not about acid, as John later suspected (Paul hadn’t taken acid yet)— written to a great extent after Bob Dylan turned on the Beatles in New York.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<u>We were really hard workers… we worked like dogs to get it right.”</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Foot pedals for guitars were still a few years off, there were no remote sound- mixing boards, no faders, no monitors. Their new songs, like “Eleanor Rigby” and “Tomorrow Never Knows,” contained crucial sounds that could be made only in the studio. It’d take a pretty substantial horn section to pull off “Got to Get You into My Life.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A Melody Maker poll reflected the residual impact this had on the Beatles’ popularity by a tabulation showing that <u>80 percent of respondents were greatly disappointed by the band’s dearth of personal appearances, with only slightly less declaring that Beatlemania had passed its peak. But the Beatles couldn’t have cared less. “Musically, we’re only just starting,” George told a reporter</u>. “We’ve realized for ourselves that as far as recording is concerned most of the things that recording men have said were impossible for 39 years are in fact very possible.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Beatles let their hair down for one of the album’s final tracks. On “Yellow Submarine” they gave a blunt comic edge to a children’s song Paul had brought in by layering it with gentle wisecracks and sound effects from their boyhood iconography. Studio Two was in complete disarray as the four Beatles, along with Neil, Mal, and a full battalion of Abbey Road irregulars, ransacked the trap room, a small equipment closet just inside the door, where a trove of noisemaking effects was conveniently stashed. The vast wooden floor was suddenly littered with “chains, ship’s bells, hand bells from wartime, tap dancing mats, whistles, hooters, wind machines, thunderstorm machines”— every oddity they could lay their hands on. A cash register (<u>the one eventually used to ring up Pink Floyd’s “Money”</u>) was dragged out, along with several buckets, a set of bar glasses, even an old metal bath that was promptly filled with water.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Four years: in that brief span they’d collected nineteen number one hits and six gold albums; they’d made two box- office smashes, become virtuosos, and <u>played in front of more people than any other act in the history of show business</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<em><u>Christianity will go. It will vanish and shrink. I needn’t argue about that. I’m right and will be proved right. We’re more popular than Jesus now. I don’t know which will go first— rock ’n roll or Christianity. Jesus was all right, but his disciples were thick and ordinary. It’s them twisting it that ruins it for me</u>.</em>” – John Lennon</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The concerts were just as remarkable, with none of the hysteria or even screaming that was the hallmark of Beatlemania. “The audience was very subdued,” Ringo recalled. The unsuspecting Beatles found they could actually hear themselves play! “There were one or two screamers,” according to an account, “but for the most part the teenaged boys and girls sat politely in their seats and applauded enthusiastically after each number.” The politeness was due in no small part to the cultural ethos of Japan, as well as the three thousand cops stationed conspicuously in the arena— one for every three kids who’d bought a ticket to the show.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 30. A Storm in a Teacup</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Of all the Beatles, <strong>only Paul was inclined to play along</strong>. Paul loved the showbiz aspect of Beatlemania, to say nothing of the acclaim. The times he spent on the road— engaging the fans, jawing with reporters, mugging for photographers, and winding up the crowds— were among the highlights of his life</u>. Lionel Bart, who saw him often during this time, called him a born crowd- pleaser and presumed that he’d eventually find his place on mainstream stages like those at the Palladium. “It was clear from the start that show business ran deep in Paul’s veins and he was committed to a lifetime on the stage.” But <strong>the other three were disgusted</strong>. <u>George especially had had his fill</u>. Ren Grevatt, Melody Maker’s American stringer, had been watching throughout the tour how the whole grind weighed on the Beatles’ personalities. “I’ve noticed that George Harrison is getting deeper and deeper every day and will probably end up being a bald recluse monk,” he observed in an unusually frank column. “He’s trying to figure out life, but don’t let this sound mocking— he is very serious.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">George was fed up with the grim, chaotic life of the Beatles. In discussions with friends, he talked of feeling “wasted” and virtually “imprisoned” by the constraints of Beatlemania. The touring and its effluvia had beat him up, physically and emotionally. “It had been four years of legging around in a screaming mania,” he grumbled. Endless performances—“ about 1,400 live shows,” by George’s count— had left him bored and dispirited. It was all he could do to get up for the thirty-minute appearance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“We didn’t make a formal announcement that we were going to stop touring,” Ringo recalled. Nevertheless, the matter was settled between them. The August 29 concert in San Francisco would be their last. There would be no more Beatles shows, no more participation in the tumult of Beatlemania. <u>From now on, they would exist solely in the studio as a band that made records</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“We would be Sgt. Pepper’s band, and for the whole of the album we’d pretend to be someone else,” Paul explained. Pretend! Pretend was one of those words that always raised a red flag; the whole thing sounded like a gimmick. Besides, everyone’s head was in a different place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The skinny, pale boy with big ears and no ambition, the dropout burdened with intellectual insecurity, who used to follow half a block behind John Lennon, had developed into a grimly optimistic, pensive young man clamoring for “the meaning of it all.” LSD had jolted George awake.</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">… when Brown got back to Chapel Street the next day, he found a note on Brian’s night table, next to an empty vial of Nembutal. Written in Brian’s familiar script, it said: <strong>“I can’t deal with this anymore. It’s beyond me, and I just can’t go on.”</strong> There was a codicil attached, in which he left his estate to Queenie and his brother, Clive, with other belongings to be distributed among Brown, Geoffrey Ellis, and Nat Weiss. Brian’s desperate act shocked his closest friends. Throughout the tour, his erratic behavior and manic depression had stirred up sympathy and concern. But in the many years they’d known him, even grown accustomed to the emotional jags of his “torturous life,” there was never any indication that he intended to kill himself. Certainly there had been irrational talk, even some low- grade drama. “But <strong>none of us, however shortsighted, suspected he was suicidal</strong>,” says Nat Weiss.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Certainly, John and Cyn had little more than familiarity left to give each other. <strong>There was Julian, of course, but John was hardly an attentive father</strong>. He left the parenting to his wife, along with most other household responsibilities. <u>Days went by in which they barely exchanged five words between them, even when living— or rather, coexisting— under the same roof</u>. John was aloof, uncooperative, disappearing into the music room for hours on end or staring hypnotically at the television until he passed out from fatigue. Paul, who seldom saw John during this time, remembered encountering him once in London and asking what he’d been up to. “Well, watching telly, smoking pot,” John replied.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 31. A Very Freaky Experience</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Groups like the Doors and those psychedelic boogie bands that were emerging out of San Francisco put listeners on notice that rock music was growing up. Within the next few years, they would be joined by virtually the entire sixties rock pantheon: Pink Floyd, Janis Joplin, Traffic, Jethro Tull, Sly and the Family Stone, the Band, the Chambers Brothers, Ten Years After, the Jefferson Airplane, Elton John, Credence Clearwater Revival, the Allman Brothers, Joni Mitchell, <strong><em><u>Led Zeppelin</u></em></strong><u>,</u> as well as the entire Motown and Stax/ Volt rosters— all of them swept in in the aftermath of the British invasion and subsequent demise of the Brill Building factory sound. “To those of us making music for a living,” said Pete Townshend, “it seemed like, finally, rock ’n roll had found a perfect groove.” Pop playlists began mixing more progressive “album cuts” with singles, so that songs such as “Windy,” “Happy Together,” and “Somethin’ Stupid” were programmed with “For What It’s Worth” and “A Whiter Shade of Pale.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5939 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-12-of-17-220x300.jpg" alt="" width="220" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-12-of-17-220x300.jpg 220w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-12-of-17-110x150.jpg 110w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-12-of-17.jpg 465w" sizes="(max-width: 220px) 100vw, 220px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The lyric came, he maintained, during a stretch at the piano, with the January 17 edition of the Daily Mail propped open on the music stand in front of him. “I noticed two stories,” he explained. “One was about the Guinness heir”— <strong><u>Tara Browne</u></strong><u>, a friend of Paul’s—“ who killed himself in a car</u>.  That was the main headline story…. <u>On the next page was a story about four thousand potholes in the streets of Blackburn</u>, Lancashire, that needed to be filled.” Paul’s contribution, he said, was “the beautiful little lick ‘I’d love to turn you on’ ” that had been “floating around” unused.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It had become such an issue that late in 1966, against his better judgment, <u>Paul succumbed to the pressure and dropped some acid in the company of <strong>Tara Browne</strong></u>. If he was unwilling to take the drug before, his reaction to it leaned more to ambivalence. Overall, he found it quite “spacy,” a “very, very deeply emotional experience,” ranging in sensations from godliness to depression. <u>Most likely, Paul was too uptight to give it a fair ride</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tara_Browne" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5940 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-13-of-17-171x300.jpg" alt="" width="171" height="300" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-13-of-17-171x300.jpg 171w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-13-of-17-85x150.jpg 85w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-13-of-17.jpg 312w" sizes="(max-width: 171px) 100vw, 171px" /></a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tara_Browne" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tara_Browne</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the meantime, they set to work on the title song, “<u>Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band,” which Paul wrote, he claimed, “with little or no input from John</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>In the studio, the Beatles’ regimen of drugs was fairly limited, although Paul has reported— quite surprisingly— that “the one hard drug used during the making of Sgt. Pepper was cocaine.</u>” This amounted to a few lines before the sessions: “For Sgt. Pepper I used to have a bit of coke and then smoke some grass to balance it out.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Somewhere between Abbey Road and Cavendish Avenue, Paul reached a pivotal decision. “I thought, Maybe this is the moment where I should take a trip with [John],” he recalled. <strong>Paul had avoided tripping with the other Beatles</strong>. He described himself as “a guy who wasn’t keen on getting that weird” because of “a disturbing element to it.” As a matter of fact, the prospect terrified him. He later attributed his abstinence to common sense; <strong>Paul had great reserves of self-control and an eye on posterity. Even with pot, which was consumed with relish, he felt the reins of responsibility</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to Cynthia, she decided to go against her better judgment and drop acid along with everyone else. In her memoir, she de- scribes it as a “paralyzing” experience, during which she sank into a hollow- eyed depression, withdrew to a bedroom on the second floor of the house, and contemplated jumping out the window onto the stone driveway below. Instead of being drawn into her husband’s grateful embrace, John was furious with her for ruining his drug reverie.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Deep down, <strong>Paul loved John in the way someone loved an elder brother</strong>. He knew all of John’s faults— many of which frustrated Paul’s ambition— <u>but he still looked up to his partner, even courted his attention. John was a loose cannon, but <strong>he was the genuine article</strong></u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 32. The Summer of Love</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I still felt every now and then that Brian would come in and say, ‘It’s time to record,’ or ‘Time to do this,’ ” John recalled. “And [now] Paul started doing that: ‘Now we’re going to make a movie. Now we’re going to make a record.’ ” A feeling crept over John that Paul was somehow trying to dominate the Beatles, which, after all, had been his group. <u>Paul had all but taken over the Sgt. Pepper’s sessions. He contributed so many suggestions for the arrangements, and so fast, so fluently, it was all John could do to keep up with him. It angered him that Paul had come up with the mystery tour concept; he grew peevish, jealous.</u> Why hadn’t he thought of it first? And yet, admittedly, John “enjoyed the fish and chip quality of [it],” the idea that they’d go out “with a load of freaks” and make a low- budget, tongue- in- cheek film. And <u>even if he hated the idea, he may have been distracted— or too fucked- up— to resist</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to a music journalist, “McCartney arrived at the studio with only three chords and the opening line of the lyric:” “Roll up! Roll up!— for the Magical Mystery Tour.” John and Paul had hit on what was, for them, the perfect bit of wordplay: a phrase that fired up listeners with the keen, romantic cry of circus troupes and carnival barkers rolling their riggings into town— and, a <u>phrase that, to any fan with the slightest streak of hipness, served as a veiled invitation to roll up a joint. It was chock- full of feeble “references to drugs and to trips,” Paul recalled</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Obviously, this frustrated Paul, who thrived on the energy crackling in the atmosphere. <strong>Even when the Beatles had no commitments, he seldom rested</strong>. At the slightest spark, he would flame into action. “<u>We can do this. Then we can do that. And maybe if this falls into place, we can take it there and do</u>…” If the rest of them wanted to get stoned and sleep in front of the telly, that was their problem. <strong>Fuck the dopeheads! Paul was bursting at the seams with creative energy, and nothing, absolutely nothing, was going to stand in his path.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the afternoon photo shoot, <strong>Paul deposited himself majestically in an armchair by the fireplace, sipping champagne and dispensing opinions on everything <u>from art to</u> </strong><strong><u>artificial intelligence</u></strong><strong>, a subject he’d just read about in <u>one of the underground journals he devoured</u></strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 33. From Bad to Worse</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After a brief Hindu prayer was intoned, the Maharishi whispered a handpicked mantra in the disciple’s ear, along with advice that he or she was never to share it with anyone. “It has been specially chosen to harmonize with your personal vibration,” he said. Weeks later, after the novelty had worn off, Mal Evans divulged that his mantra was I-ing, at which point <strong>everyone discovered they’d been given the same word</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Peter Brown: The last thing Paul wanted that day was to speak with anyone from NEMS, but if there was Beatles business that needed immediate attention, then he was the only one suited to take care of it. As it turned out, however, this was business of the kind that even Paul was incapable of processing. Brian had so looked forward to the weekend “divertissement” that he skipped the Beatles’ send- off to Wales and headed straight for Sussex in his <u>precious Bentley convertible</u>. There were too many last- minute details that required his attention— <u>an alluring dinner menu, drugs, recreation, discreet sleeping arrangements</u>. … “<strong>It was some time before we called the police</strong>,” Joanne remembered, “because we wanted to make sure that things were okay in the house— that there were no substances for them to find.” They combed through Brian’s study, tidying up this and that, and waited for David Jacobs, Brian’s lawyer, who was already on his way, via fast train, from Brighton. … <strong>Brian Epstein was all of thirty- two years old. On a lovely summer night, he finally got the one thing that had always eluded him: eternal peace.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However, when the Beatles entered Studio Two on Tuesday evening, ready to roll, it was evident that John had come up with a killer. “<u>I Am the Walrus” is pure Lennon fantasy, written, he claimed, over the course of two acid trips</u>. The lyric is based on Lewis Carroll’s “The Walrus and the Carpenter” from Through the Looking- Glass, which John considered “a beautiful poem,” although he pleaded ignorance when it came to the political undertones in the narrative.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The Fool on the Hill,” by contrast, evolved in a stunningly straightforward way. <u>Written back in March, days before finishing “With a Little Help from My Friends,” Paul drew unknowingly on personal feelings about social hermits like the Maharishi, whom he had not met at the time</u>. “It was this idea of a fool on the hill, a guru in a cave, I was attracted to,” he recalled. Years earlier he’d heard the tale about a recluse in an Italian hill town who had missed World War II, and that may have sparked the title. But one night in Liverpool Paul conjured up the lonely image and wrote what is arguably one of his finest and most beautiful compositions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Only John made a specific casting request: he insisted on hiring Nat Jackley, an old- style music hall comedian whom he had always admired, as well as a couple of midgets. (“<u>John would always want a midget or two around</u>,” Ringo noted.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Stigwood needed control, the Beatles craved complete freedom— neither was willing to give an inch. Of course, Brian’s unsecured 70 percent stake in NEMS raised the possibility of a hostile takeover. Such action was never threatened per se, although elements in the heated exchange gave the impression that it might be considered, prompting the Beatles to issue a public statement. “<u>They would be willing to put money into NEMS if there was any question of a takeover from an outsider</u>,” a spokesman told NME. “The Beatles will not withdraw their shares from NEMS. Things will go on just as before.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Throughout the fall of 1967, while Britain waged an all- out assault on conformity, the Beatles hastened to consolidate their interests. <u>The longtime holding company, Beatles Ltd., was officially renamed Apple Music Ltd., after which seven subsidiaries were formed: Apricot Investments Ltd., Blackberry Investments Ltd., Cornflower Investments Ltd., Daffodil Investments Ltd., Edelweiss Investments Ltd., Foxglove Investments Ltd., and Greengage Investments Ltd., each capitalized with a substantial financial endowment. Money was no problem</u>. “There was an enormous sum of money— well over a million pounds— that had been accumulated by EMI while the new contract was being negotiated,” recalls Peter Brown. “The Beatles received twenty- five percent of that— and that was the money that set up Apple.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Paul fancied himself a pretty good businessman</strong>. … It mirrored their bickering over the music: each of the two Beatles wanted to put his own stamp on the boutique, each suspicious and jealous of the other’s contribution. Unable to take sides in the matter, Shotton struggled, ineffectually, to please both John and Paul. “They needed someone strong, someone like Brian, to say no, and I wasn’t the one who could do it…. I only ever wanted to be friends with them.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 34. An Additional Act</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The same rules pertained to the music. John and Paul might preview a nascent song they’d just written for Cynthia or Jane, but other than a rare special occasion— like the “All You Need Is Love” broadcast— <u>women were barred. No woman had ever been invited into the studio and, as far as can be determined, none had asked. In Paul’s view, the studio was sacrosanct, the Beatles’ relationship to it like “four miners who go down the pit.</u>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Of all the plum roles that had come her way, <strong>the Subservient Beatles Woman was the only one Jane Asher refused to play</strong>. And <u>Jane hated the drug scene</u>. “Jane confided in me enough to say that Paul wanted her to become the little woman at home with the kiddies,” Cynthia wrote. Another reliable observer says Jane had “clearly decided that she was setting her own terms on how she conducted her career.” There were to be no cop-outs, no compromises, no backseats taken to pop stars.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Although no one else knew it— not even Paul, George, or Ringo— John Lennon found himself wrestling with similar emotional issues</u>. Cynthia noticed that a look of “pure shock” crossed her husband’s face— then said, “This is Yoko. Do you mind if she comes back with us?”  …  The trouble was, he was married. <u>And so, it turned out, was she.  In fact, Yoko had been married for almost half of her young life</u>. <strong>She was born on February 18, 1933, into a spectacularly prosperous Japanese family descended from samurai that was as wealthy and influential as, say, the Rockefellers in the United States</strong>. Her father, Eisuke, a Christian financier proficient in English and French who headed an institution that would eventually merge with the Bank of Japan, moved his family to America on two separate occasions— once in 1936 and again in 1940, not all that long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Yoko had unchecked access to a prescription for sleeping pills and the requisite overdose nearly delivered the coup de </u>grâce. Yoko woke up in a sanitorium, where she was confined for several weeks. It was during this time that Yoko met Tony Cox, a small-time hustler with an art background, who rescued her from her depression and set out to make her a star. In the course of their tempestuous romance, there was one remaining hitch: she still had not resolved the situation with Toshi. <strong>Further complications arose when Yoko discovered she was pregnant</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>In Peter Brown’s estimation, “Paul and Jane were much too sophisticated for [the Maharishi’s] mystical gibberish.” Paul was obviously never as committed to TM in the way that John and George were, never one to expect “some huge spiritual lift- off.”</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<strong>John took meditation very seriously</strong>,” Cynthia recalled. <u>His approach to it brought with it a remarkable transformation; he seemed happier, certainly healthier, now that drugs and hard liquor were out of the picture</u>. But Cynthia was beginning to suspect the Maharishi’s sweeping power over John: <u>suspicion that there was some sort of mind control involved to wrest her husband away from his career. “He seemed very isolated and would spend days on end with the Maharishi, emerging bleary- eyed and not wanting to communicate with me or anyone…. He went so deeply within himself through meditation that he separated himself from everything</u>.” It didn’t occur to Cynthia at the time that John was struggling to separate himself from her. <strong>He’d moved into a separate bedroom, hardly exchanging a word with her, even in private moments</strong>. Knowing that John despised confrontations with her, Cynthia chose to ignore the bad vibes. “Something had gone very wrong between John and me,” Cynthia concluded. “It was as if a brick wall had gone up between us.”  <strong><u>Yoko Ono, not the Maharishi, had taken control of John’s mind</u>.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the institutional setting, complete with a cordon of bodyguards in three- piece suits and a gallery of doting blue- haired dowagers, <strong><u>the Beatles were clearly entranced by the</u></strong><u> <strong>Maharishi</strong></u><strong>.</strong> He was an extraordinary sight to behold: an elfin, bronze- skinned holy man draped in an immaculate white dhoti, positioned in front of acres of soothing lemony yellow curtains. A picture of contentment, he sat cross- legged on a deerskin mat strewn with flowers and, between arpeggios of an irrepressible giggle, offered to clarify anyone’s experiences. … Despite the embarrassing criticism from more traditional Hindu teachers and a predilection for publicity and fund- raising— followers were required to donate the equivalent of a week’s salary to the ministry, which ran contrary to the basic Hindu principles of free instruction— the Spiritual Regeneration Movement grew into a worldwide organization, <u>with a luxurious, air- conditioned ashram situated on a fifteen- acre estate in Rishikesh</u>, in the foothills of the Himalaya. There were already meditation centers in more than fifty countries, with the London office attracting more new followers than it was able to process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The actress <em>Mia Farrow</em>, who had matriculated some weeks earlier, at the beginning of the term, recalled experiencing an initial regret at the boys’ noisy presence, feeling that it disrupted the commune’s focus. “Nevertheless,” she later wrote in her 1997 memoir, “with their cheerful chatter and guitars and singing, the new arrivals brought an element of ‘normalcy’ to the ashram— a sort of contemporary reality, which at first seemed jarringly out of place.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ringo, still tormented by childhood gastrointestinal problems, <u>couldn’t handle the spicy curries used to season the food</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5941 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-14-of-17-300x180.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="180" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-14-of-17-300x180.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-14-of-17-150x90.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-14-of-17-768x461.jpg 768w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-14-of-17.jpg 924w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In her memoir <u>Mia Farrow intimates that the Maharishi might have come on to her, but then acknowledges she may have been disoriented and misinterpreted the “advance</u>”: it may have been nothing more than the <u>traditional embrace given by a holy man after meditation</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">George and John went back and forth all night, arguing heatedly: was it true, or not? Throughout their soul- searching, Alex continued to pour it on, tossing in excoriating details to inflame their doubt. There was really no way the beleaguered guru could defend himself in this situation. The more Alex talked, the more guilty— and despicable— the Maharishi seemed. Eventually George’s faith buckled ever so slightly. “When George started thinking it might be true,” John said, “I thought, ‘<u>Well, it must be true, because if George is doubting him, there must be something in it.</u>’ ”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">(Though Peter Brown insists that some months later “<u>John told me he knew for a fact that Maharishi had fucked that young girl.”)</u> Why? the Maharishi repeatedly implored. A wave of belligerence swept over John, who responded: “If you’re so cosmically conscious, as you claim, then you should know why we’re leaving.” With those words, the two remaining Beatles walked out of the ashram at Rishikesh— and out of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi’s life forever.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>No opportunity to inflict pain, no matter how insignificant, went unseized [by John]</u>. Liverpool, Hamburg, London, America, Australia, Japan, France— he claimed to have screwed his way around the globe. Hundreds, thousands, of girls; he’d lost count a long time ago. <strong>It was a cruel, horrible way to put his wife on notice, but John, in his rage, saw no other way of doing it</strong>. Later Cynthia wrote: “I never dreamed that he had been unfaithful to me during our married life,” but that denial is so much blather. Whatever the case, she undoubtedly understood the indiscreet confession: her marriage, as everyone else knew, was teetering on the edge of collapse. Still, she swallowed her outrage and continued to play the dutiful wife. As <u>if to underscore his disaffection, two weeks after they returned home, John sent Cynthia on a fateful vacation to Greece</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<strong>Paul, for the longest time, was Apple,” says Peter Brown</strong>. “It was his baby. He was coming in every day, and decisions were made by either Neil or me going to him and saying, ‘Do you approve?’ ‘Yes.’ Okay, it was done. Paul oversaw everything, from building the offices to designing the layouts.” Technically, George and John were also directors of the company and, therefore, necessary to any major decisions, but Brown, as much as possible, avoided getting either one of them involved. “John wouldn’t give me an answer,” he says, “and George would give me a runaround.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Which only made things worse for John. By all accounts, John had hit an all- time low</u>. “John was in a rage because God had forsaken him,” George recalled. “Then he went and completely reversed himself. He turned from being positive to being totally negative.” According to Pete Shotton, who was spending time with John at Weybridge, there was an overriding feeling of humiliation— from the Maharishi, from the Apple Boutique shambles, from his deteriorating marriage, from what he felt was his shrinking position in the Beatles. “He was more fucked up than I’d even seen him,” Shotton remembers. “It seemed like everything was going to the dogs. He’d been desperately grasping [at] straws, as far as I was concerned, and there wasn’t even a straw there<u>.” The nonstop drug- taking had left John hollowed- out. Stoned and cranky during his brief outings to the Apple office, he growled at the inexperienced young staff, firing off obscenities at the most insignificant provocation</u>. Otherwise, he just checked out. At a London party on April 18 for the launch of Bell Records, an independent pop label, John arrived already higher than a kite and drank so much champagne that he passed out at the table and had to be carried to his car.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Anyone who thought the Beatles would relinquish creative control to an outsider was, however, seriously mistaken. </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In fact, no sooner had <u>Peter Asher come on board at the end of May than he officially signed Apple’s first outside artist, a lanky, twenty- year-old folkie named James Taylor</u>. “He is an American song writer and singer who is extremely good,” Asher explained with typical understatement, in a June 1 memo to Ron Kass. “We intend to start recording him 20th June…. He is ready to discuss contracts and things as soon as you are.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The Beatles were getting real tense with each other,” <u>said John, who pegged Paul and George as being “resentful” with regard to his songs</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 35. Good-bye to the Boys in the Band!</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It also meant that the writing process would forgo the critical feedback— the suggestion of a phrase, a few bars, or a middle eight— that helped shape a Lennon- McCartney song in the past. <u>One of the key ingredients unique to John and Paul’s partnership was their reliance on and trust in each other to fine- tune, or, as John described it, “just finish off the tail ends” of each composition. Even with songs that were written almost entirely by one person, some last- minute advice would polish it to perfection</u>. That give- and- take had been instrumental to their success from the very beginning. But now, as Paul pointed out, “it meant that I’d hear some of the songs for the first time when [John] came to the studio, whereas in the past we checked them with each other.” Even though he no longer depended on it, Paul regretted the loss of John’s influence, blaming the intensifying emotional crisis in his partner’s life for the breach. Over a few weeks in May John’s affair with Yoko Ono had all but thrown his life into complete upheaval. After that first encounter John stumbled through the early days of summer in what he described as “my love cloud,” admitting, when it came to Yoko, he’d “never known love like this before.” It must have been as unnerving as it was exhilarating. He managed to fill those scattered weeks with mundane Apple business but became too distracted, too rocked by the constant clash of emotions. <u>John later claimed that every time he was in Yoko’s company “my head would go off like I was on an acid trip.” One “sniff” of her potent mojo and he “was hooked,” he said, mixing drugs and metaphors in equal measure. “She was the ultimate trip.”</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The latter condition, as it happened, was most essential to their needs: wearied by itinerancy and the accumulation of tension around them, <strong>John and Yoko had begun a chilling dependence on heroin</strong>. Paul assumed that his hospitality would have a therapeutic effect on John and Yoko, that they would enjoy a carefree, homey stay and start off life together on the right romantic foot. Instead, they spent almost all their time at Cavendish camped out on his couch, watching television and staring vacantly into each other’s eyes— activities, that, according to Barry Miles, made “Paul [feel] uncomfortable.” Miles put much of the blame on “their drug use [which] made communication difficult,” but attributed it to smoking weed and “eating hash cookies that Yoko baked.” Paul, however, knew different. “[John] was getting into harder drugs than we’d been into,” he recalled, crediting it to a sinister liaison with the junkie art dealer <strong>Robert Fraser (<a href="https://www.cnn.com/style/article/strong-sweet-smell-incense-portrait-robert-fraser/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>)</strong>, who’d only recently gained his release from prison on a drug charge. <u>It was Fraser, according to Paul, who introduced John to heroin before the Beatles left for India, and he’d begun sniffing it with Yoko soon after their return</u>. The residual effects both troubled and “disappointed” Paul, as well as the other Beatles. Outwardly, the drug manifested itself, he said, in John’s “adversity and… craziness,” <u>but the underlying influence had also crept insidiously into the songs. It was evident right off the bat, when on May 30, 1968, the Beatles began work on the new album. The first song they tackled was John’s indecisive but audacious, bluesy “Revolution,” which kicked things off in tantalizingly chaotic fashion</u>. Eventually, three versions of the song would find its way into release, but the foundation of this track set the tone for the contradictory rhetoric that followed.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class=" wp-image-5946 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17-300x147.png" alt="" width="459" height="225" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17-300x147.png 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17-1024x503.png 1024w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17-150x74.png 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17-768x378.png 768w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-16-of-17.png 1064w" sizes="(max-width: 459px) 100vw, 459px" />Robert Fraser (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fraser_(art_dealer)" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wikipedia</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Now, suddenly, Yoko had landed in the thick of things. She “just moved in,” according to George, who was not at all pleased. “<strong>John brought her into the control room</strong>… at the start of the ‘White Album’ sessions,” said Geoff Emerick. “He quickly introduced her to everyone and that was it. She was always by his side after that.” … As <u>John waded deeper into the junk, his bond with Yoko strengthened</u>. There wasn’t anywhere he went that she didn’t follow. If John entered the control room to speak with George Martin, Yoko accompanied him. <u>If he huddled with Paul regarding a song or arrangement, Yoko joined the discussion</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In his enthusiasm, he rushed to play “<strong><em>Hey Jude</em></strong>” for John and Yoko, who had arrived upstairs in his music room as it all came together. <u>The couple, stoned and sullen, were not so easily impressed, but John later acknowledged the song as “one of [Paul’s] masterpieces.”</u> His account, however, differs as to what the lyric really means. “<u>He said it was written about Julian, my child,” John told Playboy in the days preceding his death, “but I always heard it as a song to me</u>. If you think about it, Yoko’s just come into the picture [and]… the words ‘go out and get her’— subconsciously he was saying, <u>Go ahead, leave me</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">John was better equipped to deal with Paul’s business because of the impregnability of his own success, but for George it stung— and doubly so— from years of mistreatment and insecurity. He’d been spending mornings down the hall, producing “Sour Milk Sea,” a single he’d written for Jackie Lomax, and even had the structure for a new song, “Something,” pretty much down. And while it was no “Hey Jude,” the Beatles only days earlier had finished laying down a demo of “While My Guitar Gently Weeps,” which is as close to brilliance as George ever got. No, <u>George had come a long way since that evening he played “Raunchy” on the upper level of a Liverpool bus, and he’d had about all the bullshit he was going to take from Paul McCartney— and he told him that, in not so many words</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Finally, on August 22, sensing that “the whole thing was going down,” Ringo threw his hands up and walked out, effectively quitting the group</u>. The in- fighting had finally gotten to him. Everywhere he turned, he encountered the same crude, belligerent exchanges. The ongoing party that had been the Beatles’ recording sessions had turned cruel and forbidding. <strong>“I couldn’t take it anymore,” Ringo said upon reflection.</strong> “<strong>There was no magic, and the relationships were terrible</strong>.”  <u>Convinced that he wouldn’t be missed, Ringo took his family to Sardinia for a vacation on <strong>Peter Sellers’s yacht</strong></u>. The band tried carrying on without him, recording a blistering version of “Back in the U.S.S.R.,” but it took all three of them to patch together a composite drum track that suffered from being too mannered. <strong>They sorely missed Ringo’s “feel and soul,” his intuitive fills, which established the beat and kept the rhythm in check</strong>. He never got much credit, but his drumming had become a kind of center of gravity for the songs, just as <u>Ringo’s droll deadpan helped anchor the band</u>. From the beginning, he’d been the missing piece of the puzzle, and <strong>it didn’t take long for the Beatles to appreciate his absence</strong>. A week later a telegram arrived at Ringo’s Mediterranean beach retreat, <strong>begging him to return to the studio</strong>. <strong>Needing no further invitation, he reached Abbey Road on September 9, in time to participate in an uproarious remake of “Helter Skelter,”</strong> Paul’s attempt at making “the most raucous… loudest,” dirtiest- sounding track possible, which had originally run on for an epic twenty- seven minutes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5947 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-17-of-17-300x211.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="211" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-17-of-17-300x211.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-17-of-17-150x105.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-The-Beatles-17-of-17.jpg 671w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The release of The Beatles— known forever afterward as the White Album— on November 22, 1968</u> was regarded in most quarters as an international event, certainly “the most important musical event of the year,” as the Times (London) expressed it in a column that morning. Except for the news that Yoko had miscarried the night before, nothing upstaged its long- awaited appearance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>“I [John] decided to leave the group when I decided that I could no longer get anything out of the Beatles. And here was someone who could turn me on to a million things</u>.” Yoko represented his ultimate rejection of the Beatles— a rejection that John had been entertaining for some time. With Yoko there to stimulate him, John said, “the boys became of no interest whatsoever, other than they were like old friends.” <strong>From that moment on, he told Ray Coleman,</strong> “<strong>It was ‘Goodbye to the boys in the band!</strong>’ ”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 36. Disturbing the Peace</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“When Paul got bored,” says Peter Brown, “his dick got twitchy.” … <u>Together, he and Linda explored every neighborhood, from Chinatown to Harlem, where Paul lingered in local record shops disguised in army- navy surplus and “a big beard, like Ratso out of Midnight Cowboy</u>.” In a way, it was the culmination of a dream.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yoko’s interference continued to make a bad situation worse. <u>More than ever, according to George, she was putting out “negative vibes.” Between the Beatles’ takes, John withdrew further from the group fold, whispering in studio corners with Yoko, missing cues, often not showing up on time for a session and refusing to apologize for it</u>. His mood vacillated wildly between the wittiness of previous occasions and the dark self- doubts fed and fueled by Yoko.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although many had claimed the title— Brian Epstein, George Martin, and Murray the K, to name a few— <u>there was no room in the band for a “fifth Beatle</u>.” <u>Paul felt the same way when John had suggested replacing George with Eric Clapton</u>; he never would have agreed to it— never. The Beatles had a legacy to protect. <u>As far as he cared, they were— and always would be— John, Paul, George, and Ringo</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A day or two later, when Paul confronted John about selecting Allen Klein as his manager, John sheepishly admitted it was more her decision than his, saying, “Well, he’s the only one Yoko liked.” That sounded more like a convenient dodge, except for one thing: <strong>Yoko was clearly pulling John’s strings</strong>. Since they became an item, at her insistence John never strayed more than a few inches from her side. <u>Everything he did, everything he said, filtered through her for approval</u>. … <u>John was her insurance policy, her safeguard. He gave her instant credibility as a media star</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 37. And in the End… </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Their behavior, too much of a liability, put his investment at risk, providing even more justification for the sale.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Months later <u>he actually was approached by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice to play the title role in Jesus Christ Superstar, but they lost their interest when he said: “If I do it, I would want Yoko Ono to play Mary</u>.” Loyal fans, to say nothing of his closest friends, found him bizarre. “<u>I don’t know what people think of John at the moment,” Ringo said, puzzled</u>. “Maureen was in Liverpool and I know a lot of people there are saying that he has gone a bit crazy…. [T]hey think he has gone off his head.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Throughout May and into July they blazed through most of the album’s basic tracks. Beginning with George’s masterpiece, “Something,” the Beatles laid the groundwork for an intensely stirring romantic ballad that would challenge “Yesterday” and “Michelle” as one of the most recognizable songs they ever produced. In John’s opinion, George’s songwriting “wasn’t in the same league [as his and Paul’s] for a long time,” but that opinion changed after “Something.” <strong>Even George Martin admitted being “surprised that George had it in him</strong>.” There was a sense of structure they could no longer overlook, an instinct for atmosphere and emotion that was absent in his earlier songs. Time, in its review, called “Something” simply “the best song on the album.” Paul, delivering a somewhat backhanded compliment, felt it “came out of left field,” but he was struck by its “very beautiful melody” and suggested releasing it as a single. … “<u>Here Comes the Sun,” which George wrote while meandering around the garden of Eric Clapton’s house one gorgeous afternoon in June</u>, increased his currency. No lightweight throwaway, on the order of “Blue Jay Way” or “You Like Me Too Much,” it held its own against the Lennon and McCartney songs already on the album, standing out from the pack for its wispy, rolling simplicity and irregular guitar lick that seems to stutter behind the vocal: “Sun, sun, sun— here it comes.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, with all the distractions and everyone’s patience growing thin, they lined up for a final take, as Macmillan climbed a ladder in the middle of the street. <u>At the last minute, Paul kicked off his sandals and rejoined the procession. “Barefoot, nice warm day, I didn’t feel like wearing shoes,” he remembered. Accordingly, he lit a cigarette and carried it at his side</u>. The ordeal was over after six quick shots, but the scene that morning would linger for posterity. Aside from being perhaps the most famous cover shot ever taken, it inspired a bizarre episode— another bizarre episode— in the extraordinary Beatles saga. <u>When Abbey Road was released on September 26, 1969, it touched off a feeding frenzy unusual even for Beatles albums</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>In late August 1969, John, Paul, George, and Ringo sold their remaining shares in NEMS Enterprises, officially ending all ties to the company they had joined in January 1962</u>. Then, on September 25 they finally lost the yearlong battle with ATV for control of their Northern Songs catalogue; Paul and John held on to about 30 percent of their songs, but the takeover signaled that the identity they had fought so dearly to preserve was slipping from their hands. <u>Impatient to divest themselves of the equity, they sold their remaining shares in Northern Songs to a reluctant ATV board based on Lew Grade’s recommendation that “the songs in Northern will live on forever.</u>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not Paul felt encouraged by John’s compromise, he was deeply disturbed by subsequent events. In the days that followed, everyone went his own way, which only heightened the feeling that the Beatles had indeed disbanded. He lapsed into a depression—“ a withdrawal,” he called it in retrospect— that swung between two emotional extremes. Some days he really missed the band, the guys and their horseplay, but there were also times he despised them. “Anger, deep, deep anger sets in,” he recalled, “… with yourself, number one, and with everything in the world, number two.” He felt cheated, abused. “And justifiably so because I was being screwed by my mates.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Still, it didn’t end there. With the release date now only weeks away, <strong>the others decided they had to confront Paul directly in an effort to change his mind</strong>. One of them was recruited to go ring his doorbell and reach a compromise. “Unfortunately, it was Ringo,” Paul recalled. <strong>The gentlest of the Beatles, the only one who never uttered a bad word about his bandmates, who genuinely loved the others and wanted only their love in return, Ringo appeared at Cavendish Avenue with a letter from the group. “We want you to put your release date back, it’s for the good of the group,” he told Paul, who went blind with rage.</strong> Paul finally snapped and in an interview a week later said, “I called him everything under the sun.” He gave poor Ringo a royal tongue-lashing, backing him helplessly against a wall and shaking a finger in his face as all the bitterness and frustration came hurling out. Paul has said in subsequent interviews that it almost came to blows—“ it was near enough,” he admitted— <u>but just before things reached that point</u>, he came to his senses and simply threw Ringo out.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>From Google Research:  April 1970 Interview</u>: (<a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/paul-mccartney-announces-the-breakup-of-the-beatles#:~:text=The%20legendary%20rock%20band%20the,who%20did%20what%20and%20why." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Link</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Q: “<em>Is your break with the Beatles temporary or permanent, due to personal differences or musical ones?”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">PAUL: <em>“Personal differences, business differences, musical differences, but most of all because I have a better time with my family. Temporary or permanent? I don’t really know.”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Q: “<em>Do you foresee a time when Lennon-McCartney becomes an active songwriting partnership again</em>?”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">PAUL:<em> “No.”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Endnote</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Endnote There would be the release of Let It Be, in all its suffocated Phil Spector production, and then one after another Beatles re- release— red albums, blue albums, rock albums, movie albums, number ones and studio tapes, all massive sellers, all exposing not just old fans but new ones to the magic and the myth. There would be solo careers with hits and misses, crass duets (Paul) and graying all- star supergroups (Ringo and George). There would be huge stadiums of fans cheering Wings, Paul’s post- Beatles group, and strollers in Manhattan’s Central Park who would smile as John and Yoko passed them by, as if the most normal thing in the world was one of the Beatles at ease. <u>There would be a December night in 1980 when a man walked up to John and shot him in the chest, ending his life. There would be the night, nineteen years later, when an intruder broke into George’s home and stabbed him, then the Tuesday in November 2001, when George succumbed to cancer, the cigarettes catching up to him before the jelly babies. Ringo’s ex, Maureen, died of cancer in 1996; Paul’s “Lovely Linda” would die of cancer, too, in 1998</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">And the story changed as the players aged. Paul was no longer Paul— he was Sir Paul, knighted by the Queen in 1997. John was no longer John— he was Saint John, an archetype to angry young rock ’n rollers everywhere. George was no longer a third wheel— he was George Harrison, an artist in his own right and a humanitarian who organized benefit concerts to feed the poor and change the world, something and then some. And Ringo— well, he was still Ringo. Always would be. Sure, he had married a former Bond girl, and his son had become the drummer he feared he would, but otherwise, life remained full of simple pleasures. The sickly boy who had almost died so many times had outlived two of his bandmates and so many others in this story. Lives begun together ended apart, as happens everywhere, even in pop songs. But the Beatles were no longer just boys who had played rock ’n roll. They had been mere babes when it all happened; <strong>when the band split, McCartney was all of twenty- nine years old; John and Ringo, thirty; and George, twenty- seven.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Acknowledgments</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>No one suspected that the two years set aside to research and write this book would ultimately stretch into seven</u>. Throughout the often rugged, always solitary process, I was the beneficiary of the kindness of many people whose assistance and encouragement are responsible for the outcome, and they deserve to share the credit— though none of the criticism— for its content. The book grew out of a profile commissioned by the New York Times Magazine (and eventually published in the newspaper’s Arts and Leisure section), which has always been the preeminent showcase for a journalist’s work, or as the Beatles might put it: the toppermost of the poppermost. In addition, the paper’s morgue and files served as an essential resource, as well as the blueprint for an accurate chronology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>About the Author</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Bob Spitz has represented the careers of Bruce Springsteen and Elton John</u>. He is also the author of the books The Making of Superstars, Barefoot in Babylon, Dylan: A Biography, and Shoot Out the Lights, as well as of the screenplay Silent Victim. <u>His articles appear regularly in the New York Times Magazine, GQ, Condé Nast Traveler, Men’s Journal, In Style, Esquire, Sky, and the Washington Post</u>. He <strong>lives in Connecticut</strong> and can be reached at thebeatles@bobspitz.com.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/17/the-beatles-the-biography/">The Beatles: The Biography</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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		<title>Where the Money Is:  Value Investing in the Digital Age</title>
		<link>https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/05/where-the-money-is-value-investing-in-the-digital-age/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=where-the-money-is-value-investing-in-the-digital-age</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adriano Almeida]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Aug 2022 18:30:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investing & Strategy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.vii-llc.com/?p=5898</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Adam Seessel, 2022 (272p.) This was a fantastic book that I read in one sitting. Seessel is a fund manager who does frequent appearances in the media, yet I...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/05/where-the-money-is-value-investing-in-the-digital-age/">Where the Money Is:  Value Investing in the Digital Age</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h5 style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>By Adam Seessel, 2022 (272p.)</em></span></h5>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This was a fantastic book that I read in one sitting. Seessel is a fund manager who does frequent appearances in the media, yet I had never heard of him until a friend asked me yesterday if I had read his book. Seessel tells us of his pilgrimage from hard core value investor (disciple of Graham &amp; Dodd, Buffett &amp; Munger), to a state of enlightenment and harmony in a world where only high-multiple, durable growth stocks make any sense for the long term. To me its clear that Seessel still struggles with valuation, or he wouldn’t bother with writing this book, nor the mental accounting contortions he describes in Part II, my least favorite part of the book.  I agree with Bill Ackman, who commented that this was one of the best investment books he has read in a while, but the reason I liked it so much is that Seessel does a fine job of pitching three of our favorite holdings: <em>Alphabet</em>, <em>Intuit</em>, and <em>Heico</em>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Here is a 4 minute <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHGCXhH4QaY" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interview on CNBC</a> where Adam Seessel is introduced as “the founder of Gravity Capital Management, advisers on roughly $8 billion.” I was unable to pull up Gravity Capital’s portfolio on the Bloomberg, which suggests they aren’t really that big by SEC standards.  I searched through SEC.gov and saw that in fact, they filed as an “exempt reporting advisor” in March 2022, with <em>regulatory</em> assets of $25-100m – but its common in this business for people to count assets that the SEC doesn’t, so nothing against Seessel.  With a quick Google search, I discovered that “Gravity Capital Management manages money in both a partnership and a separate-account format.  It has a long-term record of beating the market after fees, with special focus on capital preservation. In 2008, for example, the Gravity Long-Biased Fund lost only 5.5% of capital and returned 27% in 2009.” (<a href="https://www.salt.org/speakers/adam-seessel" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>).  I also learned that Seessel and his wife, an artist, live in Manhattan, and that they have a grown son who is a software engineer. Adam graduated summa cum laude from Dartmouth College in 1985, with a BA in Religion.  Google also revealed that he runs <em>Clear Mind at Work Program</em> for the Kadampa Meditation Center of New York (<a href="https://meditationinnewyork.org/workplace-meditation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>), which is a charitable entity with ties to the International Kadampa Buddhist Union – a global religious movement founded by <em>Kelsang Gyatso</em> in England in 1991 (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Kadampa_Tradition#:~:text=Nowadays%20the%20New%20Kadampa%20Tradition,to%20people%20throughout%20the%20world." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wikipedia</a>). He mentions meditation once in his book (next to parenting), but doesn’t elaborate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-5900 aligncenter" src="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Where-The-Money-Is-1-of-1-300x260.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="260" srcset="https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Where-The-Money-Is-1-of-1-300x260.jpg 300w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Where-The-Money-Is-1-of-1-150x130.jpg 150w, https://www.vii-llc.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Idea-Hub-Book-Reviews-Where-The-Money-Is-1-of-1.jpg 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I loved the book and would recommend it as a top 10 on investing, but that doesn’t mean I wasn’t disappointed by a detail or two. Seessel never even mentions Phil Fisher, for example, yet he devotes a lot of attention to Ben Graham. Buffett even gives Fisher credit for helping him see the light on growth, but Seessel doesn’t acknowledge it.  But then, as if trying to win sympathy with the “value” school, Seessel goes and throws Jesse Livermore, the boy plunger, under the bus. “In 1940, rather than face another personal financial crisis, Livermore took a Colt pistol and shot himself in the head,” he reminds us before he utters: “Don’t be this guy.” I didn’t like that line. Jesse Livermore was a genius who was said to suffer from clinical depression, so the fact that he shot himself at 63 doesn’t mean he was a bad investor with the wrong ideas. In fact, he was known to put much weight on the quality of the people and the durability of the narratives that he invested in.  While he was famous for his trading, he recognized, like Seessel, that the big money was not made by trading, but by sitting.  Edwin Lefevre told Livermore’s story in <em>Reminiscences of a Stock Operator</em> (1923), and Livermore published his own book, <em>How to Trade in Stocks </em>(1940), seventeen years later. It remains to be seen is Seessel’s book will age as well as those two classics.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Adam Seessel and I have some friends in common so I need to take my jabs carefully.  But it would be impossible for me to read a book like his without finding some flaws.  When describing Intuit, for instance, Seessel portrays Turbotax as being “largely mature” – which is a dated view, in my opinion.  After Intuit acquired Credit Karma in Dec 2020, which Seessel doesn’t mention, they pivoted the Consumer Group (which houses TurboTax), towards a much larger total addressable market (TAM) than just tax filers. Seessell also fails to mention the acquisition of MailChimp in 2021, which significantly expanded Quickbooks’ growth opportunities. While about a third of QBO subscribers are global, international subscribers account for less than 10% of QBO revenues.  Seessel doesn’t mention this, probably because he wanted to keep it simple.  But then he suggests that Intuit overstates their TAM, which I don’t agree with.  Seessel also claims in Chapter 9 that Intuit “invented and brought to market TurboTax,” which I know isn’t true.  Turbotax was developed by Michael Chipman, founder of Chipsoft, not by Intuit.  Intuit agreed to acquire Chipsoft in September 1993, the same year it had come public. As the 1993 press release announcing the deal explained (<a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-02-fi-30906-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>), Chipsoft shareholders ended up holding 39% of the merged company. I also believed TurboTax was “largely mature” when we started buying Intuit in our accounts in Q2-2017, but today we disagree with that view.  The opportunity to go up-market is enormous, and indeed, management expects half of the Consumer Group growth will come from upselling their premium offerings, including TurboTax Live and TurboTax Full Service (<a href="https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/live/full-service/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Below I share some of my highlights from the book, but only up to Chapter 4, which is as much as the publisher allowed me to export from the Kindle. That Adam Seessel and I don’t agree on everything, is what makes a market.  I do think, though, that his book is a masterpiece.  And hats off to Professor Chris Begg of Columbia Business School, for giving Seessel the idea of framing the evolution of value investing as a series of software releases. That’s an interesting way to think about it, but beware the Value 3.0 release, since in the era of cloud computing, such launches can become obsolete quickly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Best,<br />
Adriano</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em><u>HIGHLIGHTED EXCERPTS</u></em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction: So Big, So Fast</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Apple’s wonderful ascent, however, obscures the fact that four times over the last fifteen years, Apple’s stock lost 30% of its market value</u>. Once every three to four years, Alex saw his life savings decline by almost a third. As anyone who has ever invested in the stock market can tell you, that does not feel good. But Alex didn’t lose his head, or his lunch, or his conviction in the logic for owning Apple, and he has become wealthy simply by identifying a single, superior business and sticking with it. <u>A $10,000 investment in Apple when the iPhone came out is today worth nearly $500,000, about fifteen times what he would have made if he’d invested in the S&amp;P 500 index</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Contrary to what many people believe, <u>the market is neither a hall of mirrors nor the Emerald City, where the Wizard of Oz hides behind the curtain pulling the strings. The stock market is nothing more than a collection of American companies whose profits grow over time. As their profits grow, so does their market value. If you believe that the United States will continue to grow and prosper, you should own a piece of that action</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Because 5% annual appreciation is decent, <u>putting $10,000 to work in the American real estate market over fifty years will net you slightly more than $100,000. But investing that same amount at the average stock market return will generate more than $700,000</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Even if you’re, say, forty years old, I believe you shouldn’t have much at all in bonds</u>, which barely pay more than a three-year CD. Some so-called 2045 target date funds have as much as 15% bond exposure in them, which is 15% too much for me. With more than twenty years ahead of you to smooth out returns, you should be letting the growth of American business work for you.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Like Alex with his Apple, I <u>want to find businesses that are going to do better than the market’s average of roughly 9% annual growth</u>. In this book, I am going to suggest that you do the same, and I’m going to give you techniques to do so.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>The magic of compounding will see to that: $10,000 invested at the market average of 9% will give you more than $700,000 after fifty years, but that same amount invested at a 12% rate will give you almost $3 million</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Lynch’s words remain as true as ever, but the problem is that over the last generation technological change has altered the economy so much that the nature and character of what constitutes a superior business has also dramatically changed. The internet, the cell phone, and social media didn’t exist when Lynch wrote. <u>Many of the everyday examples that he used to illustrate superior businesses—Toys “R” Us, Subaru, and Hanes, the maker of L’eggs pantyhose—are now laughably out of date</u>. That’s no knock on Peter Lynch—the world changes—but we must acknowledge that the same common sense that led him to those stocks now tells us to go nowhere near them. The internal-combustion automobile today faces threats from both driverless and electric cars; most women stopped wearing pantyhose a long time ago; and as for Toys “R” Us, squeezed between the giant pincers of Walmart and e-commerce, it filed for bankruptcy protection in 2017.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tech dominates our daily lives so thoroughly that it’s natural to think the digital revolution is largely complete, but that’s not true. In many ways, it’s just beginning. Even after a generation of growth, Amazon’s annual retail sales volume only now matches Walmart’s. Cloud computing, which today accounts for roughly 10% to 15% of all spending on information technology, will one day likely account for more than two-thirds. <strong>Intuit, the world’s leading provider of small-business accounting software, reaches only 1% to 2% of its ultimate addressable market.</strong> The list goes on, and as computing power compounds, the list gets longer every year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tech’s dramatic rise has been accompanied by an astonishing fall in the old economy’s market value. Over the last decade, the fossil fuel sector has shrunk from 13% of the U.S. stock market’s value to less than 3%. During the same period, the financial services industry has shrunk from 15% of the market to 10%. As recently as 2015, Exxon Mobil and Wells Fargo, two reliable blue-chip investments for generations, were each two to three times more valuable than Amazon. Today, as the chart below shows, Amazon is four times more valuable than Exxon Mobil and Wells Fargo combined.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Big tech gets most of the headlines, but hundreds of smaller, lesser-known tech companies have also continued to appreciate. Adobe in document productivity and digital marketing; Ansys in design-simulation software; and Autodesk in digital construction tools are only a few examples, and I’ve not yet exhausted the list of companies beginning with the letter A. Most people know Adobe because of its PDF functionality; fewer know that in 2020 Adobe earned roughly $3.5 billion, about the same as Kraft Heinz, whose brands like Oscar Mayer hot dogs and Philadelphia cream cheese have been around since the 1800s.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Pessimists are wrong, however, to suggest that we’re in for another bust. Today’s tech companies have put down powerful and profitable roots in ways that the first wave of dot-com companies never did. Two decades ago, businesses such as Pets.com IPO’d at multi-hundred-million-dollar valuations on the dubious proposition that they were somehow valuable because they attracted lots of “eyeballs.” At its peak, however, Pets.com never turned a profit and never generated more than $50 million a year in sales despite spending more than twice that in marketing. Today’s online companies don’t look anything like Pets.com. Adobe’s annual revenues are nearly $16 billion, from which it makes $5 billion in profit. Facebook has 3.5 billion users, and its annual earnings approach $40 billion, which is roughly four times what Disney makes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some also believe that, given all the concern over big tech’s sudden influence over our lives, government intervention will soon check tech’s power and, with it, its ability to generate wealth for shareholders. Governments may well move to curb the influence of the digital giants. They may even succeed in breaking them up altogether—but it’s impossible for regulation or legislation to undo a generation of daily, habit-forming usage of the world’s largest tech applications. How is any government going to regulate away the fact that, every day, people around the world search on Google 5.5 billion times? Are politicians going to outlaw Facebook from serving its billions of regular monthly users? These companies’ applications are woven into the fabric of daily life around the world, and every year the weave gets tighter and stronger. As such, companies like Google and Facebook can rightly be regarded as the Coca-Cola and the General Motors of our generation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When technologists introduced the field-effect transistor, a basic semiconductor that’s become the most manufactured artifact in human history, it could hold only a single chip and it cost more than $1. Today, each field-effect transistor contains millions of chips and costs $0.000000001, or one billionth of a dollar. This price/performance explosion became known as Moore’s law, and it’s been in force now for more than sixty years. Engineers have been predicting the death of Moore’s law for at least a decade, but so far it hasn’t happened.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the turn of the millennium, only 1% of the world’s population had a broadband internet connection, as the venture capitalist Marc Andreessen pointed out in a seminal essay a decade ago. Cell phones were so expensive then that only 15% of the world’s population owned one. Such facts help explain why the dot-com boom busted: the technological backbone wasn’t strong enough yet to support it.I</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Today, more than half the world’s population has both broadband access and a powerful smartphone. As a result, much of the world searches, shops, chats, banks, and performs many other everyday activities online.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Before Google Search, you had to go to the library or invest in a set of encyclopedias, which were bulky, went quickly out of date, and were hardly interactive. Before digital maps, you needed paper maps, which often ripped, never folded properly, and didn’t give you alternate routes or reports on traffic accidents along the way.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A recent MIT study led by Erik Brynjolfsson quantified how much consumers value their everyday tech applications. He and his team asked consumers how much money it would take to get them to forsake their accounts at Facebook, Google, and others. On average, the study found, it would take $550 in annual payments to make a Facebook user quit Facebook. The number was much higher, nearly ten times so, for WhatsApp. Almost unbelievably, the study found that to go without Google, the average user would require a $17,500 annual payment. That’s almost one-third the average American citizen’s income.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Intuit, the small-business software provider, has profit margins twice that of Campbell’s, the soup maker</strong>, even though <strong>Intuit spends roughly four times as much in marketing, sales, and research and development</strong>. How can that be? Campbell’s raw materials are tomatoes and chicken and noodles, which cost a lot; Intuit’s raw materials are nonphysical and therefore cost almost nothing. Moreover, software-based enterprises like Intuit have no major capital or manufacturing needs. When Campbell’s wants to make more soup, it must build a new production line or a new plant. Even Coca-Cola, which sells sugar water, must have its subsidiaries build a bottling plant and invest in trucks and vending machines to expand. Software companies don’t require factories or production lines; they require laptops manned by intelligent engineers. When a software company wants to enter a new geographic market, its engineers write new code, hit “deploy,” and their software is available around the globe, instantaneously and with almost no incremental costs. Even a software company’s major capital requirement, giant servers that process and store data, can now be rented rather than bought. That’s the essence of cloud computing. Higher profitability + lower asset intensity = the highest return on capital businesses ever seen. When Ford wants to grow its business, it must invest $10 in assets to generate $1 in profit. Coke requires roughly $6. Facebook, only $2.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Stock market speculators have always been with us, but they now can place their bets wherever they have cell reception. Recently, they banded together on social media and used new trading platforms to cripple professional short sellers. Given such turbulence and confusion, an inexperienced investor might reasonably ask: Why should we invest in the stock market at all? The answer is not complicated. We invest our money because, while it would be nice to spend all of it today, we know that we’ll require some down the road. We will need money to put our kids through college, to help our parents get long-term care, and to make sure we ourselves can live comfortably during retirement. We forgo the pleasure of spending $1 in the present to transform that $1 into $5 and then $10 to use at some time in the future. And as I laid out earlier, for the last one hundred years the U.S. stock market has been the best place to do that.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Peter Lynch told us to “invest in what you know,” and this is generally good advice. Like hunters, investors do best when they understand the terrain. Many older investors, however, today find themselves in an unfamiliar landscape. What do companies with nonsensical names such as Chegg, Splunk, and Pinduoduo do, anyway?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Younger and less experienced investors have the opposite problem. They grew up in the digital ecosystem, and they know the territory in that intuitive, born-with-it way that positions them to hunt and track today’s investment opportunities. On the other hand, many younger investors mistrust the markets and “the system” in general. They have legitimate reasons. Young investors have already endured three major market meltdowns—the dot-com bust in 2000–2001, the financial crisis in 2008–2009, and the coronavirus pandemic in 2020—and they have entered adulthood with lower incomes and more debt than their parents. No wonder that, rather than turning to reliable investments to build wealth as their elders did, the younger generation has turned to newer, more experimental asset classes like cryptocurrency, socially responsible stocks, and speculations promoted on Reddit message boards. Don’t get me wrong: I dislike crypto as an investment not because it’s young and I’m not. I dislike cryptocurrency for the same reason I dislike gold. Neither crypto nor gold are living, dynamic businesses that can expand over time. Bitcoin may be a new storehouse of value, but in the end it’s just a currency. It has no customers, no revenues, and no profits to grow.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We must remind ourselves that the stock market is nothing more than a collection of businesses and that investing in them has historically been the best way to build wealth. We should acknowledge that the world’s economy is increasingly digital, so we must learn how digital companies create wealth. We should invest in the best such companies, then let compounding do its job.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">No subset of investors has had a harder time adapting to the changes brought on by the Digital Age than value investors, an investment discipline of which I’m proud to be part. Although the term is often used, “value investing” is rather hard to define. Just as there are many sects of Christianity, so are there many branches of value investing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Value investing does, however, revolve around a few central principles. Chief among these is an insistence upon discipline, rigor, and study.</u> Value investors approach the stock market not as a betting parlor or a bodega where we can buy a lottery ticket but as a place where we can systematically attempt to build wealth. We are not traders or speculators. We are bookish and analytical, and we love metrics, yardsticks, and ratios—anything that can help us make sense of the public markets. Above all, we seek to codify our approach to investing through a set of rules. We use a framework that we impose on the stock market so that when we beat it, it’s not a matter of luck, but rather of a system. Value investors are also notorious cheapskates who hate to pay a high price for an investment. That’s why we’re called “value” investors and that’s why we look down on other methods that give price less weight in the decision-making process. We disdain so-called growth investors, who are interested mainly in companies with steep sales and earnings trajectories. We are even more disgusted by momentum investors, who do in fact treat the market like a casino, seeking to ride their luck by following short-term trends. Because of value investing’s disciplined approach, study after academic study has shown that a value-based discipline has led to long-term, market-beating results.II Faced with technology’s radically new and alien business models, however, value investing’s frameworks have begun to break down. Reliable value-based metrics like price to book value, which measures how expensive a company is relative to its assets, and price to current earnings, which measures expensiveness in relation to how much profit a company is generating, have failed to capture tech’s enormous value creation. As a result, these same academic studies are now beginning to show that value investing hasn’t been working the way that it once did. <u>Even Warren Buffett, the high priest of value investing and widely considered the most successful investor of all time, has struggled to navigate the new economic landscape. While Buffett’s long-term returns remain awesome in the original sense of the word, they have been diminishing. As the following chart shows, his market-beating performance peaked in the 1980s, lessened in the 1990s, and since 2017 has turned into underperformance</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a Wall Street investment analyst since 1995, I’ve watched as tech stocks have grown from gawky adolescents into some of the most powerful economic specimens the world has ever seen. For the last several years, I’ve been wrestling with these issues as both a full-time money manager and as a contributor to Barron’s and Fortune. In this book, I do my best to resolve them.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Honestly, I’d rather not have had to investigate “tech” at all.</u> Only a half dozen years ago, I was a stodgy value investor who was comfortable with the old orthodoxies. I’d have been happy to spend the next twenty-five years of my investing career in the same way I’d spent the first twenty-five. I have no innate interest in technology, I dislike gadgets, and I barely understand how electricity works. If it weren’t so financially dangerous to do so, I’d stay set in my ways—but old industries are dying and new ones are being born at a rate not seen in more than a century. To continue as I had would have been to ignore economic reality and to consign myself and my clients to a future of dismal performance. I arrived at this conclusion only after several years of struggle, research, and contemplation. I came to it unwillingly, with the same reluctance that a true believer gives up his faith. But as a student of business, and as someone devoted to what might be grandiosely called Truth, I had to admit that something important had happened. So I recalibrated my instruments and focused my attention on the digital economy. I did this not because tech is sexy, or interesting, or beneficial to society. I did it for the same reason Willie Sutton robbed banks: it’s where the money is.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A<u>nyone interested in this subject would enjoy reading Andreessen’s “Why Software Is Eating the World,” first published in the Wall Street Journal in 2011.</u> Likewise, you should read Gordon Moore’s less elegantly titled “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” a 1965 essay that laid out the price/performance dynamics of computing power. The former is five pages long and the latter is four pages. Why are all the most important papers so short?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">See for example Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Value Versus Growth: The International Evidence,” Journal of Finance 53, no. 6 (1998): 1975–99, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/117458" target="_blank" rel="noopener">http://www.jstor.org/stable/117458</a>. “Long term” here means a decade or more.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">See for example Baruch Lev and Anup Srivastava, “Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing,” New York University, Stern School of Business, October 2019, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442539" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442539</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Part I: Preparing to Invest</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">My first job was at Sanford C. Bernstein, a firm known for the thoroughness of its investment research, and its halls were as quiet as a monastery’s.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Good investors do not live by testosterone or adrenaline; they ignore them. Peter Lynch said that his most valuable course in college had nothing to do with finance—it was a course on logic. To relax, Warren Buffett reads the philosopher Bertrand Russell and plays bridge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This slow, incremental approach especially characterizes long-term investors, who don’t see the stock exchange as a gambling hall in which we “play the market.” Instead, we see it as a place where, over time, value is found out.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As Peter Lynch has said, superior businesses win in the stock market over time. Inferior ones either languish or die.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">All value investors do their research. All value investors are disciplined about the price they pay. Above all, all value investors scorn randomness; instead, like Graham, we impose a framework onto the markets. We invest using a set of rules that we rarely alter, trusting that our discipline will help us outperform the market averages over time.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The reversion to the mean framework measures stocks as Buffett does, comparing a business’s current quoted price to its profits, and the essence of the discipline can be summed up by value investor Sir John Templeton’s dictum, <u>“The four most dangerous words in the English language are ‘this time it’s different.’” At Bernstein, this phrase was our Apostle’s Creed</u>. Don’t try to predict wholesale change, we were taught, because it’s not going to happen. Simply buy the companies that are historically cheap and sell the ones that are historically expensive. Eventually, life will return to normal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I was the junior oil and gas analyst apprenticed to the senior one, and it was our job, along with all the other analysts, to feed data about the companies we covered into what we called “the black box.” This wasn’t a box at all, but rather a sophisticated computer model Bernstein used to determine statistical cheapness using mean reversion calculations. In would go data on projected sales, estimated earnings, debt ratios, and so forth, and out would come the stocks and the sectors that the black box deemed expensive and the ones it deemed cheap.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Because in the late twentieth century everything did eventually return to normal, the black box generated large gains for the firm and its clients. <u>At its peak, Bernstein managed $800 billion, making us one of the largest money management firms in the world.</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The man who presided over the black box when I was there was Lew Sanders, Bernstein’s chief investment officer. Lew was slim and quiet, and he moved through Bernstein’s corridors with the quiet grace of an abbot in his priory. Lew embodied the kind of cerebral, tide-mapping investor I wanted to be.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When I felt my apprenticeship at Bernstein was done, I left to become a more senior analyst at first one and then another firm, Baron Capital and Davis Selected Advisors. In 2000, I began co-managing a mutual fund for Davis, and by 2003 I felt experienced enough as a value investor to start my own firm.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Then, in the middle of the last decade, my system rather suddenly stopped working.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sitting at my desk that dark December evening, however, I had the uncomfortable feeling that the market had finished weighing my stocks and found them wanting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">What if the businesses I owned were not cheap because they were on sale—what if they were cheap because their futures were bleak?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Software companies have few tangible assets and cannot therefore be valued using Graham’s original asset-based analysis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When tech stocks collapsed in the dot-com bust, it confirmed to value investors that the four most dangerous words in the English language were indeed “this time it’s different.” If there was any reversion to the mean in the tech sector, it was to the mean of chaos, and no serious value investor was interested in that. Fifteen years later, however, something unusual happened. <u>In 2016, Buffett, the guiding light of value investors and the keeper of the flame passed down to him by Ben Graham, bought $7 billion worth of shares in Apple</u>. To say that this move mystified the investment community is like saying Catholics would be confused by a pope who opened the priesthood to women. Apple was a hardware technology company so historically brutalized by competition that in the late 1990s it was ninety days away from declaring bankruptcy. What, the value investing community asked itself, was the Oracle of Omaha doing? Fortunately, I had a plane ticket to hear Buffett explain himself. Every spring, 40,000 of value investing’s faithful gather in Omaha, Buffett’s hometown, to hear him and Charlie Munger expound on the state of their holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, and the world at large. Anyone interested in investing should make the pilgrimage to Omaha at least once: Buffett and Munger sit on a dais in a basketball arena and answer a full day of questions, laying out what they invested in over the past year and why. Even though Buffett is ninety-one years old and Munger’s well past that, they remain committed to transmitting the lineage of value investing the old-fashioned way: orally and in person.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>By the time I went to Omaha, I’d sold Avon, Tribune, and the other stocks whose best days were behind them</u>. I’d concluded that these companies were, in Wall Street parlance, value traps: cheap, but not valuable. My largest position was now Alphabet, my performance had improved, and my conversion to a new way of looking at the world was deepening. But it was still new, and I wanted to hear from Buffett why he’d bought Apple. Misery loves company, but so does conviction, especially when it’s recently discovered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“I didn’t go into Apple because it was a tech stock in the least,” he would later say. “I went into Apple because I came to certain conclusions about the value of its ecosystem, and how permanent that ecosystem could be.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Munger, who is almost always more direct than Buffett, chided both himself and his partner for not buying Alphabet, the parent company of Google</strong>. “<strong>If you ask me in retrospect what was our worst mistake in the tech field, I think we were smart enough to figure out Google,” Munger told the crowd. “So I would say we failed you there. We were smart enough to do it and didn’t do it.”</strong> <strong>Buffett agreed</strong>, recalling how Google had first appeared on his radar screen a decade earlier when GEICO, Berkshire’s auto insurance subsidiary, began to buy Google Search ads on a per-click basis. “We were paying them $10 or $11 a click or something like that,” Buffett said. “Any time you’re paying $10 or $11 every time someone just punches a little thing where you’ve got no incremental cost at all, that’s a good business.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Aha, I thought. Buffett and I are on to the same idea, and the word is getting out. As the meeting ended, I found myself looking forward to talking about it with my peers at the dinners and cocktail parties that followed the gathering. At these events, however, I found that nobody wanted to talk about Apple</u>. <u>Nobody, in fact, wanted to talk about tech in general or the new world that Buffett had just described</u>. Instead, everyone continued to chatter away about the same old old-economy businesses they’d been chattering away about for years. They talked about Buffett’s recent airline investments, even though these investments represented a smaller dollar commitment than the one he’d made to Apple. People also spent lots of time unpacking tiny, incremental changes Buffett had made to Berkshire’s various insurance subsidiaries. This struck me as insane. Both airline and insurance companies were the very kind of mature, capital-intensive businesses that Buffett had just said were fading away. Had nobody heard our guru telling us it was time to look forward rather than back?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">By late 2009, the market had recovered from the crisis and the S&amp;P was on its way to its best year in decades; Bernstein’s flagship fund, however, remained down more than 50%. On another dark day in late December, Lew Sanders left his office at Bernstein for the last time. I lost track of Lew after that, but he resurfaced for me as I began to wrestle with the ascent of the Digital Age. He had started his own firm, Sanders Capital, and I was shocked when I read that his top holdings included several tech companies, including Alphabet and Microsoft. Neither of these stocks was even close to attractive when viewed through traditional value lenses. This made me very curious indeed. What had made the archbishop of reversion to the mean renounce it? “Lew,” I began, “over the last few years I’ve come to suspect that many of our old investing methods no longer work. Businesses like Alibaba, Facebook, and dozens of other, smaller companies are prospering. None look attractive when you look at them using conventional metrics—but maybe the conventional metrics are wrong. Maybe ‘this time it’s different’ aren’t the most dangerous words in the English language anymore; maybe it’s ‘life is going back to normal.’” Lew was silent, and his ice-blue eyes were downcast. So I continued. “I’ve begun to invest in such businesses,” I said, “and I notice you’re doing the same.” Still nothing. “<u>So, Lew, I have to ask you,” I finally said. “What the hell is going on?” Lew smiled, raised his glacial eyes to mine, and uttered four words that will remain with me for some time. “The world,” he said, “has changed.”</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 2: Value 1.0: Ben Graham and the Age of Asset Values</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although Graham became known as the father of modern security analysis, he was at heart an intellectual. He knew seven languages and routinely quoted Corneille in French, Kafka in German, and Homer in ancient Greek. Graham is likely the only financial analyst in history who, during a poor stretch of investment performance during the Great Depression, composed a poem about it. (“Where shall he sleep whose soul knows no rest,” the poem concludes. “Poor hunted stag in wild woods of care?”) Like many thinkers, Graham was known in equal measure for his brilliance and his absentmindedness. He invented a new version of the slide rule, but he would also often show up at work wearing two different-colored shoes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 1923, Graham quit Newburger, Henderson &amp; Loeb to start his own investment operation. He was only twenty-nine but he had an edge, and he knew it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“To old Wall Street hands it seemed silly to pore over dry statistics when the determiners of price change were thought to be an entirely different set of factors—all of them very human,” Graham later wrote in his memoirs. But “[a]s a newcomer—uninfluenced by the distorting traditions of the old regime—I could respond readily to the new forces that were beginning to enter the financial scene. I learned to distinguish between what was important and unimportant, dependable and undependable, even what was honest and dishonest, with a clearer eye and better judgment than many of my seniors, whose intelligence had been corrupted by their experience” (emphasis added).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Graham’s reputation, his bank account, and his self-confidence all grew. His asset-based approach was working well—so well that he used the securities he owned as collateral to borrow money and buy even more stocks with it. He leveraged up, as we say on Wall Street, or “went on margin,” and he did this right into the Crash of 1929. All stocks sank, and Graham’s borrowings amplified his losses. By 1932, his investment partnership was down 70% from its peak. It would not be until five years after the crash that Graham’s fund recovered to pre-1929 levels.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Graham moved his family to a smaller apartment, and his wife found work as a dance instructor. He abandoned the car and chauffeur he’d kept for his mother, but he did not abandon his investment discipline. While other investors despaired, Graham continued to invest using his asset-based system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While Graham’s full performance records do not survive, it appears that by using this system he outperformed the larger market by a comfortable margin from the 1930s until he retired in 1956. Graham estimated his returns to be 20% per year, roughly double the market averages over that period.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are deeper problems with Graham’s system, however. Value 1.0 is largely a short-term strategy, one that requires a constant portfolio recycling as inexpensive stocks appreciate to fair value. Graham’s approach came to be known as “cigar butt investing,” because the stocks in a Graham portfolio are like cheap stogies picked up off the sidewalk. Good for only one or two puffs, they must be quickly discarded, then new ones found. It’s time-intensive to find such stocks, track them, and decide on entry and exit points for each one. Because the recycling is rapid, gains in cigar butt investing are also often taxed at ordinary-income rates, which are higher than long-term capital gains rates. In the upper tax brackets, a 20% short-term investment gain becomes a 10% gain after paying 50% taxes on it. Finally, and most importantly, Value 1.0 is rigid, rote, and monomaniacal in its focus on asset prices. As a result, the biggest fish routinely slip through its net. Value 1.0 was well-suited to its times; its strict adherence to numerical formulas kept investors away from speculating. It’s a simple system with easy, binary answers: either a stock meets Graham’s liquidation criteria, or it does not. Finding a company you can invest in with a margin of safety, Graham wrote in The Intelligent Investor, “rests upon simple and definite arithmetical reasoning from statistical data.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Obsessed with formulas, Graham ignored any sort of qualitative analysis; one of his assistants recalled that he would get bored and look out the window if anyone started talking about what a company actually did.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Walter Schloss, who worked for Graham and later became a legendary value investor in his own right, once pitched Graham on a company that wasn’t selling for a fire sale price but owned a promising new technology: Haloid, which would later commercialize the Xerox machine. “Walter, I’m not interested,” Graham told Schloss. “It’s not cheap enough.”</u></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Graham retired early for a portfolio manager, at sixty-two. A wealthy man, he could afford to return to his earlier, more intellectual interests. He translated a novel from Spanish, published a volume of poetry, and began to split his time among the United States, Portugal, and Aix-en-Provence. Shortly before he died, however, <u>Graham made a bizarre, indirect confession about the limitations of the discipline he had created. The confession came in a two-page postscript from the final edition of The Intelligent Investor, published in 1973. Graham apparently felt so sheepish about the matter that he wrote of himself in the third person. He describes what transpired as if it had happened to someone else, whereas in fact it happened to him and his longtime business partner, Jerome Newman</u>. “We know very well two partners who spent a good part of their lives handling their own and other people’s funds in Wall Street,” Graham begins in the postscript. “Some hard experience taught them it was better to be safe and careful rather than to try to make all the money in the world…. In this way they did quite well through many years of ups and downs in the general market…” Graham goes on to say that in 1948 he put 20% of his partnership’s assets into a single stock. The stock was cheap relative to both assets and earnings, and, Graham writes, he and his partner were “impressed by the company’s possibilities.” Almost soon after Graham bought it, the stock took off and continued to appreciate—so much so that over time, it made Graham and his partners two hundred times their initial investment. This appreciation quickly made it look expensive on Graham’s asset-based metrics, but he decided to keep it because, as he says in his memoirs, he regarded the company as “sort of a family business.” “<strong><u>Ironically enough,” Graham concludes in The Intelligent Investor, “the aggregate of profits accruing from this single investment decision far exceed the sum of all the others realized through 20 years of wide-ranging operations in the partners’ specialized fields, involving much investigation, endless pondering, and countless individual decisions</u></strong>” (emphasis added). In other words, a single investment in one great business made Graham more money than a generation’s worth of cigar butts combined. The company was GEICO, the automobile insurer. Yet in Graham’s memoirs, he mentions GEICO only twice, once in relation to an insurance claim he filed with them. Northern Pipe Line, on the other hand, receives a whole chapter. “Are there morals to this story of value to the intelligent investor?” Graham asks in the conclusion to his postscript. “An obvious one is that there are several different ways to make and keep money on Wall Street. Another, not so obvious, is that one lucky break, or one supremely shrewd decision—can we tell them apart?—may count for more than a lifetime of journeyman efforts.” Here, Graham was dissembling. By the time he wrote this postscript, he knew that identifying great businesses like GEICO did not involve a lucky break. He knew that the identification of great businesses could be systemized, just as he had systematized asset-based investing. One of his former Columbia students—his star pupil, in fact, the only one he ever awarded an A+—was proving it through his own investment track record.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>End of Chapter Footnote</strong>:  <u>I am indebted to my friend and colleague Chris Begg, cofounder and chief investment officer of East Coast Asset Management, who gave me the terms Value 1.0, Value 2.0, and Value 3.0, which I use throughout the book</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 3: Value 2.0: Warren Buffett and the Brand-TV Ecosystem</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Buffett was heavily influenced in his thinking by John Burr Williams, an economist who had written a book called The Theory of Investment Value. Like Graham’s Security Analysis, Williams’s book had been written in the depths of the Depression, but it was as optimistic and as forward-looking as Graham’s was cautious.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“The key to investing,” Buffett said in a 1999 speech that was later published in Fortune, “is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and<u>, above all, the durability of that advantage</u>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In both its general worldview and its specific tools, Value 2.0 is beginning to fail us. As the economy changes, the moats that protect many of Buffett’s classic postwar franchises are weakening. At the same time, Buffett’s valuation framework, with its focus on mature companies generating lots of current earnings, hasn’t captured the enormous value being created in the Digital Age. While Value 2.0 was exquisite in capturing where the money was, it’s not capturing where the money is.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">the pair have been slower to recognize the secondary effects that media’s decline has had on mass brands: Coca-Cola and Kraft Heinz remain large Berkshire positions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>A third of Buffett’s top fifteen publicly traded stocks are financial-services companies, including American Express, Bank of America, and, until recently, Wells Fargo. This is a real problem, because digital companies are looking at legacy banks the way a lion sizes up an aging zebra. Like GEICO, a bank’s competitive advantages arises from its low-cost position. Unlike GEICO, however, which offers its customers better deals, banks have offered customers worse deals, betting—correctly, so far—that customers would put up with them. However, those days may soon be over</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While it’s true that it’s hard to change banks when you have so many accounts with them, banks have abused their customers’ trust for so long that they are all but inviting customers to leave. Not only do banks offer below-market rates, but they also routinely ding their customers with fees. Account-opening fees, account maintenance fees, fees for using another bank’s ATM, fees for failing to maintain a minimum balance, overdraft fees—as anyone who has seen them on their monthly statement knows, the list is long. The average American pays roughly $20 in banking fees every month, more than they pay for a Netflix subscription. But at least, with Netflix, people get something.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Why is that? What is it about value investing as currently constructed that lets most tech companies slip through its net? The answer is complex, but I think it begins with Buffett’s worldview. <u>Buffett’s career coincided with a time when the American economy was unusually stable and homogenous</u>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Unlike many other tech companies, Apple is relatively unambitious in terms of trying to attack new markets; as a percentage of sales, Apple spends only about one-third of what Alphabet, Microsoft, and Facebook spend on R &amp; D. Over the last decade, the company has acted like an old-fashioned capital allocator, using much of its cash flow to repurchase its own shares in the open market.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Experience has taught them to look for steady, persistent economic farmers, safe behind their moats and castle walls. The blitzkrieg success of companies like Alphabet, Facebook, and Netflix is alien to them, and little wonder. They’d never seen anything like it until they were more than seventy years old.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Alternatively, read Berkshire Hathaway’s 1992 annual report, in which Buffett gives a condensed version of Williams’s ideas.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 4: Value 3.0 and the BMP Checklist</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This company makes generic spare parts for airplanes. Like GEICO in 1951, it has a small share of a huge addressable market. Like GEICO, its competitive advantage stems from being the low-cost provider of an essential product. Even its name resembles GEICO’s: It’s HEICO, a company I came across during my wretched period of underperformance in the mid-2010s.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the time, I was working with a talented analyst named Clint Leman. I asked Clint to write a simple computer program that used different metrics from the “look for cheap stocks” criteria I’d been using. No longer would I put price ahead of business quality as I had with Avon, Tribune Media, and the rest. Instead, I would search for businesses with superior economic characteristics, then see about price later. I also asked Clint to screen for management quality using a single simple yardstick: whether executives owned a lot of stock in the company they were running. Clint’s screen turned up a dozen names, the most interesting of which was HEICO. <u>The company was founded in 1957 as Heinicke Instruments Company, but the story really begins in the late 1980s, when one of Larry Mendelson’s kids stumbled upon it. Larry</u> Mendelson was a New Yorker who, while attending Columbia Business School a decade after Buffett, took the same security analysis course Buffett had. After graduation, Mendelson moved to Florida and made a lot of money in real estate, but he put his value-investing skills to work in the stock market as well. In the 1980s, his sons Eric and Victor attended Columbia as undergraduates; while they were there, Larry asked them to look for undervalued securities in their spare time. Interest rates were falling, stocks were modestly priced, and Larry was looking for a business he and his sons could take over and run. In keeping with Ben Graham’s tradition, the Mendelsons didn’t particularly care what the business did. It just needed to be cheap, poorly managed, and located in Florida, where the family wanted to stay. One day, while doing research in the Columbia law school library, Victor found HEICO, which appeared to meet the family’s criteria. The company specialized in making medical-laboratory equipment, but it had made a series of acquisitions, including one in the aerospace business. By the time Victor found HEICO, it had been public for nearly thirty years but barely made any money. Like Graham with Northern Pipe Line and Buffett with Sanborn Map, <u>the Mendelsons saw HEICO as a company whose shares they could buy in the open market and then agitate for change</u>. Unlike Northern Pipe Line and Sanborn Map, however, HEICO’s appeal lay not in the liquidation value of its assets, but in the latent earnings potential of its aerospace subsidiary.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As they learned more about airline spare parts, the Mendelsons discovered that HEICO could produce and sell a generic option at a 30% to 40% discount and still make healthy profits and returns on capital. The Mendelsons also found that there were few patents or intellectual-property rights attached to aerospace replacement parts. Moreover, the market for spares was huge—it’s roughly $50 billion a year today—and the aerospace industry was growing. Like American Express, investing in airline travel is a classic call on rising worldwide prosperity, which leads to a rising demand for travel.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><u>In 1989, the Mendelsons and their allies bought 15% of HEICO’s stock in the open market.</u> After a proxy fight almost as ludicrous as Graham’s Northern Pipe Line contest, they secured four seats on the board and named Larry Mendelson the new CEO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">He immediately sold HEICO’s lab business and focused on the market for airplane spares.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When Clint’s screen led me to HEICO in 2015, it had shipped 68 million parts without a single adverse incident, and nineteen of the world’s top twenty airlines bought parts from the company.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Part II: Tools for Picking Winners</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 5: Competitive Advantage Then and Now</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><u>Go to Intuit’s site and you will see that Intuit now has 5 million online subscribers to QuickBooks</u></strong><u>, <strong>its small-business accounting product. Intuit says that the worldwide addressable market for QuickBooks is 800 million customers. Five million divided by 800 million equals less than a 1% share—I’m interested</strong></u><strong>.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 6: Management: Some Things Never Change</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 7: Price and Value 3.0 Toolbox</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 8: Earnings Power</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 9: BMP Case Studies: Alphabet and Intuit</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 10: Investing in Non-Tech Companies</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Part III:  Putting it All Together</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 11: Buy What You Know – With a Twist</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 12: Thoughts on Process and Priorities</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Chapter 13: Regulation, Innovation, and Second Half of the Chessboard</strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com/2022/08/05/where-the-money-is-value-investing-in-the-digital-age/">Where the Money Is:  Value Investing in the Digital Age</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.vii-llc.com">VII Capital Management</a>.</p>
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